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Abstract 
 
This doctoral dissertation, Narratology, Rhetoric, and Transitional Justice: the Function of 
Narrative in Redressing the Legacy of Mass Atrocities, examines the extent to which the success 
and feasibility of human rights tribunals and truth commissions are dependent upon the 
ways in which the past is “narrativized”1 in State-sponsored legal reports and subsequently 
promulgated through the stories we tell. Juxtaposing three historical cases that have 
constituted transitional justice according to divergent ideological paths, Narratology, Rhetoric, 
and Transitional Justice compares and cross-references the final reports on three high-profile 
transitional justice cases: the Nuremberg tribunals (1945-49), the Argentine “Trial of the 
Juntas” (1985), and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2008-15), to study 
the ways in which these reports have shaped the collective or national memories of various 
historical traumas. The dissertation examines how the final reports on truth commissions 
and war crimes tribunals deploy a highly sophisticated set of rhetorical and narratological 
techniques in order to fix a single, specific version of historical events in the cultural 
memories with disparate aims in bringing together a fractured nation. By highlighting the 
significant degree of artistry that go into preparing these reports, it examines how and why 
transitional governments are often motivated to frame historical violence in order to elicit 
collective feelings of outrage, shame, guilt, or forgiveness. Narratology, Rhetoric, and Transitional 
Justice thereby illustrates how transitional justice practices mobilize blueprints for 
reconciliation, restoration, or retribution through the recovery and narrativization of 
traumatic memories, and how these respective sentiments have facilitated the 
implementation of subsequent political and economic policies by the transitional 
governments. A key aspect of this analysis centeres on the unique ability of “final reports” to 
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contextualize national traumas by designating precisely which crimes were committed, by and 
against whom, by regulating whose testimony is to be included and/or excluded from the 
“master narrative,” and by articulating the appropriate measure of justice that ought to be 
faced by the perpetrators. As the apotheosis of the transitional justice process, my research 
demonstrates that truth commission reports not only present their mercurial and highly 
contentious histories as binding, legally-validated, and irrefutably “fixed” versions of a series 
of often dubious events, but they also effectively situate each citizen within the 
“victim/perpetrator” and “innocent/guilty” binary ethical paradigms upon which the judicial 
system is grounded. Negotiating the final reports on truth commissions and human rights 
tribunals as historical non-fiction texts, these case studies weigh their reports alongside other 
vehicles of cultural storytelling (including historical novels, films, ballets, etc.).
                                                
1  The focus of this slightly awkward but useful word “narrativized” is on the how of 
the narrative telling. Differentiated from its etymological kin “narrate,” the term 
“narrativize” is meant to emphasize the performance of (or carrying out of) the narrative-writing 
endeavor by the author or speaker. “Narrativize,” therefore, foregrounds both the action 
(narration) and the specific person or persons who perform that action. 
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Introduction: 
 
Since the mid nineteen-forties, following a century marked by countless genocides, 
apartheids, and varying atrocities carried out by a host of autocratic and democratic states 
alike, nations across the world have increasingly turned to transitional justice practices as a 
means of addressing their tumultuous and violent histories. Signaling a mutual relationship 
between legal justice and a nation’s political and cultural transition from a period of despotism 
into a new paradigm of restoration (and in some cases reconciliation), the term transitional 
justice has since become synonymous with the emergence of human rights discourse. 
Although the emergence of the transitional justice movement can be traced back to the 
Nuremberg Trials, conceived to aid Germany’s transition to democracy following World 
War II and from which our modern concept of “human rights” was founded, the field 
gained full momentum in the nineteen-eighties following the trials of former military junta 
members in Greece and Argentina (Arthur 322) and following José Zalaquett’s seminal 
article, “Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments,” 
written for the 1988 Aspen Institute conference. 
As the foremost representative of this global human rights movement, the United 
Nations Security Council considers the various instruments of transitional justice to include 
“the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation” (UN, “Rule of Law” 4). Whether confronting past civil disputes, 
histories of systematic racial, ideological, or gendered discrimination, or the transition from a 
period of authoritarian rule to a new democratic chapter in countries’ histories, a host of 
transitional justice mechanisms have been embraced to an increasing extent by both 
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established and emerging democracies in the ensuing decades. International tribunals, truth 
commissions, punitive actions, official state apologies, and symbolic or financial reparations 
are just some of the instruments that these nations have turned to in an ongoing attempt to 
address and/or redress traumatic chapters in their history.2 
As a relatively contemporary socio-political and ethical movement that has rapidly 
developed and diversified since its emergence just six decades ago, the field has enjoyed 
immense success as a topic du jour in academic, legal, and humanitarian circles. Yet, despite 
the increased scholarly attention paid to the many socio-political, judicial, and ethical 
intricacies of implementing this range of processes on a national and transnational scale, very 
little consideration has centered on an oft-overlooked, yet crucial underlying component in 
the successful unfolding of the transitional process: the extent to which transitional justice 
practices directly shape a nation’s collective understanding and shared memories of its own 
past. Narratology, Rhetoric, and Transitional Justice: the Function of Narrative in Redressing the Legacy of 
Mass Atrocities therefore maps the unique “history-writing” potential of truth commissions, 
human rights tribunals, and war crimes trials by examining the rhetorical, historiographic, 
and partisan strategies that transitional governments have implemented in order to guide the 
public’s perception and understanding of its own history.3 
Specifically, both within the courtroom and in the “Final Reports” of the tribunals 
and truth commissions, storytelling devices comprising sophisticated sets of rhetorical and 
narratological techniques emerge as central.  Storytelling connotes fiction, which might seem 
ironic in the context of a trial or a truth commission, and the irony is part of the issue being 
examined in this dissertation.  Truth can be told and communicated in writing to a public.  
In the three exemplary cases under study, namely the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals 
(1946-1949), the Argentine “Trial of the Juntas” (1984), and the Canadian Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission (2015), various rhetorical and narratological techniques are 
employed to generate the elements of story as such, which artistically convey truth in order to 
captivate the imagination and the affective engagement of a reading public.  That public is 
arguably first a national public and the story is principally the State’s official version of events 
in the cultural memories of a nation. Operating at the intersection of literary studies, 
memory studies, and transitional justice practices, this dissertation serves as a sustained 
critical investigation into the history-writing aspect of transitional justice reports and into the 
complex ways in which TRCs and human rights tribunals shape the political, cultural, and 
ideological contexts according to which national traumas are absorbed into the cultural 
storytelling process.  Simply put, what is brought into focus is the relationship between the 
crafting of national histories and the emergence of cultural memories in the wake of 
collective traumas.  When analyzed comparatively alongside other vehicles of cultural 
storytelling, for instance, historical novels, films, plays, and visual art, transitional justice 
reports emerge as a unique genre of historical non-fiction.  
I approach truth commission reports from a “literary perspective” by attending to 
the significant degree of artistry that goes into their composition and underscoring their 
unique rhetorical and narratological nuances. Since, in many cases, these critical historical 
and legal texts are carefully crafted by (or with the help of) prominent literary authors – 
including Argentine novelist Ernesto Sábato, Moroccan poet Salah El Ouadie, and Chilean 
journalist Gonzalo Vial Correa – I suggest that truth commission reports lend themselves to 
a rigorous “literary interpretation.” In contrast to other scholars who have merely interpreted 
these reports as the formal records of judicial processes that objectively reflect a nation’s 
values and moral codes, this project instead suggests that the political and ethical vicissitudes 
of “truth” and “reconciliation” are better understood as being shaped by the rhetorical 
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devices employed from within these texts, themselves (including the visual rhetoric of 
photographs). 
By juxtaposing three historical cases that have constituted transitional justice 
according to divergent ideological paths and with disparate aims in bringing together a 
fractured nation, my research examines how and why transitional governments are often 
motivated to frame historical violence in order to elicit collective feelings of outrage, shame, 
guilt, or forgiveness. My research illustrates how transitional justice practices are capable of 
mobilizing blueprints for reconciliation, restoration, or retribution through the recovery and 
narrativization of traumatic memories, and by either empowering or silencing individuals by 
categorizing those who have been impacted by historical violence as victims, heroes, 
bystanders, or perpetrators. 
In the following chapters, I demonstrate that the narrative “framing” of victim-
testimony and the rhetorical and narratological nuances of various transitional justice 
practices directly participate in shaping public and cultural perceptions of whether the 
appropriate form of “justice” for their respective national traumas is to be grounded in a 
desire for revenge and retribution, or on the other hand, in a notion of forgiveness and 
reconciliation. As such, this dissertation demonstrates that the promise and feasibility of 
punitive, restorative, or reconciliatory justice are each intimately linked to the ways in which 
the past is “narrativized” in these reports and accordingly remembered as a community 
through the stories we tell. 
Whether and how the perceived “truths” of the past can be forged into a common 
history that might serve to reconcile a divided nation and reconstruct a new transitional 
society is a question that is only beginning to be addressed. But, as a thoroughgoing 
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examination of the history-making capacity of truth commission reports, Rhetoric, Narratology, 
and Transitional Justice fleshes out a critical and urgent framework for this endeavor. 
 
 
Transitional Justice Reports as a Unique Genre of Historical Non-Fiction: 
 
Capping off the transitional justice process, truth commission reports serve as both 
the symbolic and administrative culmination of the traumatic period, summarizing and 
encapsulating the legal undertakings (in the form of investigations, tribunals, or state 
commissions), while also providing a concise history of the crimes that were committed by 
all parties involved. The final reports on truth commissions therefore function as ceremonial 
historical-legal narratives that weave together testimonies, confessions, and other historical 
documents into a concise (and seemingly exhaustive) narrative account of the previous 
tumultuous period, while also offering recommendations for disciplinary or reparative justice 
in the present. Incorporating elements of narrative histories, legal transcripts, and political 
constitutions, these reports clarify and contextualize a series of unresolved and mercurial 
events into a comprehensible “story” by presenting their histories as chapters that are now 
effectively closed, all the while presenting a carefully crafted vision for the future that 
encapsulates the political, ideological, and ethical aims of the transitional government. 
As the discursive embodiment of transitional justice practices, truth commission 
reports narrate the investigation and prosecution of large-scale crimes on a national or 
transnational stage, bringing together a fractured society under the judicial and symbolic 
auspices of either “healing” or “retribution” (or a combination of both). Through their 
unique capacity to synthesize the political, legal, and socio-cultural components of the 
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transitional process, truth commission reports are decisive history-making instruments, 
insofar as they establish the symbolic parameters that mark the ostensible “beginning” and 
“end” of national traumas and the corresponding starting point for the transition toward 
“reconciliation” or “justice.” 
My analysis of truth commission reports differs from previous academic approaches 
by proposing that the most vital consideration of the transitional justice process is the degree 
to which the fractured community coheres around a shared historical account of the 
previous traumatic period, while also acknowledging that a nation’s successful transition into 
a new cultural paradigm of healing and restoration is dependent on a diverse array of socio-
political, cultural, economic, and ideological factors. If a nation is willing to embrace a 
specific historical narrative – for instance, that a military regime were aggressors who 
inflicted a precise series of injustices upon a clearly-demarcated group of victims – then, in 
bringing the two groups together and enacting a suitable course of disciplinary action, the 
nation believes that it can genuinely begin the process of “healing.” As such, the promise 
and feasibility of truth commissions and war crimes tribunals is intimately linked to the ways 
in which the past is “narrativized”4 and accordingly remembered as a community through the 
stories told. 
As the “official” historical records of the years of trauma, truth commission reports 
directly participate in shaping the public and cultural perception of whether the appropriate 
form of “justice” for their respective traumas ought to be grounded in a desire for revenge 
and retribution or, on the other hand, in a notion of forgiveness and reconciliation. These 
final reports, which increasingly serve as the crowning achievement of transitional justice 
processes, therefore directly shape the ways in which national traumas are absorbed into the 
cultural storytelling process and are subsequently engrained in the nation’s collective 
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memories, all the while explicitly precipitating the collective shame, fear, sadness, or guilt 
that emerge from the shadows of the cultural traumas toward which they attend. 
As the apotheosis of the transitional justice process, final truth commission reports 
contextualize national traumas by designating precisely which crimes were committed, by and 
against whom, by regulating whose testimony is to be included and/or excluded from the 
“master narrative,” in which context these testimonies are to be presented, and by 
articulating the appropriate measure of justice that ought to be faced by the perpetrators; and 
all of this designation is accomplished through the employment of highly sophisticated 
rhetorical and narratological devices. Functioning as ostensible “master” historical narratives, 
truth commission reports not only present their mercurial and highly contentious histories as 
binding, legally-validated, and irrefutably “fixed” versions of a series of often dubious events, 
but they also effectively situate each individual who has been impacted by the traumatic 
events within the “victim/perpetrator” and “innocent/guilty” binary ethical paradigms upon 
which judicial systems are grounded. While the categorization of a nation’s population 
according to these capricious groupings may appear to be a seemingly incidental outcome of 
any judicial exercise, they are also pivotal influences on the formation of cultural memories, 
often having a “flattening” or “simplifying” effect on the narration of complex historical 
events. 
As the ostensible “master” historical narratives of a nation’s traumatic past, the 
circumspect composition of these reports is deeply suffused with the politics of cultural 
remembrance. These reports – which serve as the primary documents in the education and 
re-education of future generations – memorialize the past in a permanent form, indicating to 
future generations that this is the “official” version of the past to be remembered and retold.  
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Transitional Justice and the “Frameworks” of Cultural Remembrance: 
  
In negotiating the complex ways in which these State-approved and legally endorsed 
historical reports influence, shape, and otherwise interact with the emergence of “collective” 
memories in a “cultural” setting, we must therefore distinguish at the outset exactly what we 
mean by these two correlative terms. As Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney note, “[w]here earlier 
discussions of collective memory had a thematic focus and were concerned above all with 
identifying the ‘sites of memory’ that act as placeholders for the memories of particular 
groups, attention has been shifting in recent years to the cultural processes by which 
memories become shared in the first place” (113, italics mine). Following Erll and Rigney, I 
consider “cultural memory” to be a type of “umbrella term to describe the complex ways in 
which societies remember their past using a variety of media” (Erll and Rigney, 111). In the 
forthcoming chapters, “cultural memory” therefore refers to the various cumulate methods 
by which a society narrativizes, visualizes, or otherwise documents the past within a social or 
cultural context, including the registering of the past within literary, visual, or oral practices. 
However, as elucidated by Maurice Halbwachs in his quintessential work On Collective 
Memory (1925), all collaborative or communal memories, including his original formulation of 
“collective memories” as the shared psychic impressions of the past by a society, are nearly 
always constituted according to what he calls “social memory frameworks”: a set of 
prevailing ethical and cultural values that define a given historical epoch and accordingly 
shape and define the shared memories in question. On that account, “cultural memories” 
emerge in accordance with these antecedent and a priori socio-ethical frameworks that 
implicitly condition and inform a society’s collective memories from the outset. Put simply, 
Halbwachs maintains that if we hope to engage reasonably with and interpret a society’s 
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cultural memories (as represented through the myriad narratives and visualizations of its 
shared past), we must first acquaint ourselves with the foundational ethical codes and cultural 
values that govern that society. Only then can we truly begin the process of examining the 
form and content of the collective “memoryscapes” themselves.5 Following this reasoning, I 
contend that large-scale judicial inquiries, such as truth commissions and human rights 
tribunals, both shape and reflect a society’s politics and ethics with as much clarity and vitality 
as other socio-cultural institutions, such as laws and government policies. In light of this 
conceptual interpretation of the social frameworks of collective or cultural memories, this 
dissertation serves as a critical and thoroughgoing interrogation of the politics and ethics of 
collective remembrance. Given the increasing prominence of transitional justice practices in 
shaping and regulating the construction of national memories, it is critical that we engage in 
a thoroughgoing analysis of the ways in which shared memories are subsequently absorbed 
into the cultural storytelling process, and how these cultural memoryscapes reflect and 
reinforce a specific set of ethical values within a volatile political and legal context. 
Following Erll and Rigney, I propose that various objects of cultural production – 
novels, photographs, memoirs, monuments, museums, etc. – participate in the mutual 
formation of what we might call a “topography” of shared memory-images, according to 
which our shared cultural impressions of the past are informed. As Erll and Rigney suggest, 
readers today “all have some ‘recollection’ of the First World War, but since most readers 
were not alive in 1914, these ‘recollections’ are vicarious ones, the product of accumulated 
exposure to a common reservoir of products, including photographs and documentaries, 
museums, personal accounts, histories and novels” (111). Following the idea that literature 
“makes remembrance observable… [and] helps produce collective memory” (Erll and 
Rigney 113), my research centers on the hypothesis that the stockpile of cultural artifacts 
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produced from within, or in the wake of, national traumas creates and sustains our collective 
remembrances of these events. 
 This approach to the history-writing and memory-making capacity of literature 
approximates John Hersey’s oft-quoted assertion that our shared knowledge of historical 
events is, more often than not, shaped by historical novels as opposed to conventional 
histories and journalistic reporting. In his acclaimed essay, The Novel of Contemporary History 
(1949), Hersey writes: 
Most of us know what little we do of the Napoleonic wars, not from 
histories, but from Tolstoy’s War and Peace. Of the American Civil War,  
not from the voluminous military commentaries …but from Crane’s  
The Red Badge of Courage and the stories of Ambrose Bierce and Margaret 
Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind; of the Spanish Civil War, not from news  
dispatches from the time, but from Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls  
and Malraux’s Man’s Hope…. (1-2) 
 
 That these novels continue to serve as the foundation for inter-generational 
memories of a nation’s shared past emphasizes the notion that historical knowledge is nearly 
always preserved by posterity. Extending Hersey’s assertion beyond the exclusive realm of 
literature to include visual art, film, and public memorials, I contend that this type of 
complex interplay between the various media of cultural remembrance – which continually 
challenge, inform, and build upon one another – produces what we might call a “field of 
mutual public remembrance” (or what Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes refer to as 
the “memoryscape”) of a nation’s shared past. As such, my methodological approach hinges 
on the aforementioned assumption that all public acts of remembrance are the collaborative 
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product of a multi-media tapestry of various mnemonic works, in the sense that historical 
novels are informed by photographs, films by oral testimonies, monuments by written 
stories, and vice versa in a reciprocal nexus of what Michael Rothberg calls the “ongoing 
negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing” (3) of cultural artifacts. Ultimately, as Erll 
and Rigney, Phillips and Reyes, and Rothberg each suggest, this multi-media pastiche of 
memory products contributes to a general visual/narrative account of the historical events in 
question that is always already pregnant with a host of ethical and cultural suppositions, and 
which – when taken as a whole – can be regarded as the “cultural remembrance” of our 
shared past. 
In particular, it is critical to weigh the complex ways in which such cultural artifacts 
interact with, challenge, and inform the seemingly “official” State-sanctioned truth 
commission reports, which hold a disproportionately esteemed position within this nexus of 
memoryworks based on their ostensible status as legally-binding accounts of the historical 
events in question. Unlike the relatively mercurial “histories,” “voluminous military 
commentaries,” and “news dispatches” against which Hersey weighs the finest works by 
such literary greats as Tolstoy, Mitchell, and Hemingway, these increasingly prominent truth 
commission reports have steadily furnished our collective psyche with enduring and 
seemingly unshakable historical narratives of many of the most heinous and tragic historical 
events of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; and they have done so by successfully 
employing the unique set of rhetorical and narratological practices available to the historical 
novel as a distinct form of “truth-telling.” Within these cases studies, I am therefore 
operating at the intersection of literature, art criticism, memory studies, and transitional 
justice, by examining precisely how the literature, films, and public memorials in transitional 
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societies inform and are informed by the calculated writing of history associated with human 
rights tribunals and truth commissions.6 
As a unique synthesis of traditional historical narratives, historical fiction, and 
government/legal documents, truth commission reports serve as a rich site for an 
exploration of the way(s) in which the politics of cultural remembrance explicitly inform and 
are informed by our transitory understanding of individual rights, moral responsibilities, 
national and individual identities, and, in a broader sense, our understanding of good and 
evil, through the stories we tell about our past. This project, therefore, concerns itself with 
how these constantly shifting mnemonic narratives are instrumental in shaping and re-
shaping the social, cultural, political, and in some cases even the geographic landscapes of 
post-conflict nations (and those constituted by similar post-traumatic “truth regimes”7) 
according to the manner in which the past is collectively evoked and re-interpreted. In so 
doing, I make critical interventions into two distinct fields, “memory studies” and 
“transitional justice,” with a specific focus on the links between them. 
In weighing truth commission reports alongside a constellation of cultural texts that 
share in the production of post-transition collective memories (including historical novels, 
testimonies and confessions, films, photography, and visual art), it is possible to map out 
how each narrative interacts with, challenges, or informs one another in the evolution of a 
nation’s collective psyche after a shared trauma. 
I, therefore, ultimately adhere to a theoretical paradigm similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
literary sociology, which views the text as both a product of external social and political forces, 
while also having the capacity to exert significant influence on the collective consciousness of a 
society. In applying Bourdieu’s methodology to transitional justice reports (as artistic 
constructs deserving of a rigorous literary analysis), as well as to the nexus of visual, literary, 
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and cinematic works with which they interact, I approach and engage with each of these 
texts in terms of their ability to reveal information about the social world that they portray, 
as well as their ability to exert influence on the public understanding of the historical events 
in question. In this sense, my research is predicated on the supposition of an inherent 
homology between the social and literary worlds – the idea that the imaginary world of the 
text pertains to the collective consciousness of a community, whose members both take in 
and reproduce the structures of power and social categories embodied by the narrative 
structures of the text. 
However, as narrative histories of extreme trauma, transitional justice reports also 
perform an additional set of abreactive or cathartic functions for their audience and, 
therefore, produce a distinctive type of “post-traumatic” knowledge upon which cultural 
memories are forged. Insofar as transitional justice reports aim to summarize and clarify a 
series of devastating and injurious events, the specific history-writing and memory-shaping 
aspects of transitional justice reports are also fraught with a host of psychological and 
emotional considerations that must also be attended to. 
As Cathy Caruth notes, traumatic events, whether experienced by an individual, or a 
community of individuals, represent a radical psychical shattering that necessitates a desperate 
effort by the traumatized to repair the irreparable or to understand the incomprehensible. 
This experience of devastation, Caruth insists, “suggests a certain paradox: that the most 
direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it” (“Traumatic 
Awakenings” 208). For the German people faced with the realities of the Holocaust 
following the end of the war, the millions of Argentinians who witnessed the brazen and 
horrifying atrocities carried out by their government in full public view, or the generations of 
Indigenous peoples across Canada who have carried the torment of the residential schools 
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from one generation to the next, the mere ability to know or verify many of the facts about the 
events does not necessarily entail a comprehension of them.  
Radical trauma is therefore, as Giorgio Agamben puts it, only ever experienced as an 
“aporia of historical knowledge: a non-coincidence between facts and truth, between 
verification and comprehension” (12). Since the experience of a traumatic episode precludes 
one’s immediate ability to comprehend it in its fullness, the trauma can only be returned to 
through flashbacks, nightmares, or other delayed attempts at understanding. Trauma, then, 
becomes a form of interpretive madness that can only be resolved – if at all – through a 
retroactive re-narrativization or re-imagining, in which the wounded party regains control 
over the events retroactively. 
This “belatedness of trauma,” as Caruth refers to it, is the fundamental paradox of 
traumatic experiences; “since the traumatic event is not experienced as it occurs, it is fully 
evident only in connection with another place, and in a another time” (7). For Caruth, and 
Sigmund Freud before her, trauma becomes an impossible quest of returning to the scenes 
of distress, an attempt to re-enact the traumatic moment in order to retrieve the irretrievable 
and, ultimately, to achieve mastery over it. 
This, according to Caruth, is a fundamental benefit of post-traumatic narratives. 
Stories about violent events offer a coping mechanism for victims by presenting something 
close to an intelligible account of their experiences. By attempting to make sense of the past, 
historical accounts of violent events fill a lacuna between history and understanding, and 
provide the public with a story that they can coalesce around as a community. 
The potential for narrative abreaction explains the unlikely literary success of many 
government reports, including the highly successful 9/11 Commission Report (2004), which 
provided an accessible and straightforward account of what was a deeply traumatic 
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experience for many Americans. Like the Canadian and Argentine reports examined in the 
forthcoming chapters, the 9/11 Report was written in a “riveting” literary style, yet was 
validated by the authority of the nation’s highest court. Heralded as an “improbable literary 
triumph” by New York Times critic Richard Posner (“9/11 Report: A Dissent”), the report 
signaled to the public that the attacks had been thoroughly investigated by the administration 
and, and upon its publication, signified a symbolic resolution to the trauma. 
Besides topping several bestseller lists and being named a finalist for the 2004 
National Book Award, the 9/11 Commission Report became an intrinsic and vital part of the 
cultural storytelling fabric of the nation. In the years following its publication, the report 
spawned several adaptations, including a graphic novel by Sid Jacobson and Ernie Colón, a 
television miniseries starring Harvey Keitel and Mark Wahlberg (“The Path to 9/11”), and a 
documentary film narrated by Kevin Costner and Hilary Swank (On Native Soil). As the 
commission’s narrative became increasingly entrenched in the nation’s cultural 
consciousness with each adaptation, the report provided the American public, still struggling 
to make sense of the devastation, with a sense of collective mastery over the attacks. 
This, I contend, is a paramount function of transitional justice reports. When a 
nation is able to rally together around a shared narrative of their traumatic past – when they 
are able to declare, as a community, that this is what happened, and these are the people 
responsible, and here is how we will deal with it – they are in a position to conjointly take 
ownership of the trauma and, ultimately, achieve mastery over it. 
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Transitional Justice in Historical Context – The Conflicting Cases of Germany, 
Argentina, and Canada: 
 
It is crucial to begin, therefore, by situating the origins of transitional justice practices 
with the emergence of international judicial proceedings in the mid-twentieth century – 
particularly the Nuremberg trials – which have then continued with the implementation of 
dozens of truth commissions and criminal tribunals as well as the formation of the 
International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and the legitimization of 
Universal Jurisdiction under the auspices of the latter two organizations. As these continually 
developing organizations and institutions interact with, inform, and challenge one another, 
with each new truth commission building upon the last, the transnational “social-
frameworks” of post-traumatic cultural memories continue to evolve with, against, and 
amongst one another. As the cultural, political, and judicial machinery of these organizations 
evolve and grow over time, so too do the corresponding history-writing mechanisms that 
attend to them. Each new instantiation of the transitional justice process brings with it new 
and novel means of consciously crafting a nation’s history through the incorporation of 
testimonies and confessions from exiles, transnational witnesses, and as the wider diaspora in 
general are integrated into the transitional justice history-writing endeavor. Whether and how 
the “truths” of the past can be forged into a common history that might serve to reconcile a 
divided county and reconstruct a new transitional society are questions that are only 
beginning to be addressed. 
While final truth commission reports have taken many forms, styles, and structures 
over the last six decades, ranging from placid legal documents to riveting literary-style 
narratives, the unifying characteristic of each report has remained the unique type of history-
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writing to which it adheres. As histories that are written not by historians but by state or legal 
agents, truth commission reports are narratives about the past, with clear political, legal, and 
ideological aims. In other words, these are histories with a specific and unequivocal purpose 
– meant to shape public opinion and guide their readers toward a clearly defined set of 
political and cultural outcomes. While they might, at first glance, appear as traditional, 
seemingly objective historical studies, truth commission reports are nevertheless a form of 
history-writing as a means to a political end, meant to persuade their audience to embrace a set 
of legal and political aims based on the particular brand of “justice” upon which the truth 
commissions are predicated. 
Framing their judicial proceedings according to either the “punitive,” “restorative,” 
or “reconciliatory” justice models, truth commissions and human rights tribunals are often 
implicitly predicated on a series of deducible economic and political outcomes desired by the 
incoming transitional government. Contingent upon the specifics of these desired outcomes, 
truth commissions and war crimes tribunals are thereby framed according to the ideological 
conviction that the most appropriate path to national healing is through the judicial 
emphasis of either: a) the open, and often publicly lauded, punishment of the perpetrators 
via retributive justice; b) the nullification or minimization of legal and moral “blame” 
followed by a commensurate call for a return to the pre-traumatic state of political, 
economic, and cultural “status quo”; or c) reconciliation and rehabilitation by bringing 
together both victims and perpetrators, with the aim of fostering a new cultural and political 
relationship based on a dialogue of healing and forgiveness. Each of these judicial 
frameworks represents a competing conception of “justice” and therefore espouses its own 
distinct set of ethical and cultural principles for the ways in which histories are narrated. 
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In the case of postwar Allied-occupied Germany, the punitive approach of the 
Nuremberg Trials produced an historical narrative of the Nazi years that was intended to 
punish the former Nazi leaders while simultaneously inducing a general sphere of guilt 
amongst the wider German population in order to aid in the denazification and 
Westernization of the nation’s political and economic establishment. The Allied 
commissioners of the Nuremberg tribunals had hoped that an internalized sense of guilt and 
remorsefulness would encourage and hasten the German peoples’ capitulation to American 
values by transferring the moral guilt (and subsequent shame) of the Nazi leaders onto the 
general populace, with some propaganda posters explicitly declaring: “This is your fault!” 
(See Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2). The historical narrative that the Nuremberg Report puts forth, 
therefore, is one that at times both insinuates and explicitly accuses average German citizens 
of complicity in the Nazi crimes in order to induce them into surrendering any remaining 
fidelity to Nazi ideology in favor of American neoliberal economic and political reform in 
the occupied territory. 
Contrary to Nuremberg’s “punitive” strategy, the Argentine Nunca Más report, 
instead took up a restorative approach to the historical violence of the 1970s. Following the 
return of democracy, the National Commission on the Disappeared Persons attempted to 
quell public outrage directed at members of the former dictatorial regimes by diminishing 
the value of disciplinary action. Instead, the commission insisted that horrible acts were 
committed by “both the extreme right and the far left” (Nunca Más 1), and proposed that 
both groups, the authoritarian regimes and the anti-fascist resistance groups, were equally 
responsible for terrorizing the nation. In contrast to the accusatory tone of the Nuremberg 
Report, which shamed the general public for allowing such a degenerate regime to come into 
power, Nunca Más instead attempted to persuade its readers that they were, in fact, the true 
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innocent victims, while those who were murdered and tortured by the juntas were likely 
associated with violent terrorist groups. By framing the historical violence according to a 
narrative that attempted to flatten out all moral guilt, Nunca Más would present the general 
public with the view that the most prudent path forward would be one that would simply 
close the book on Argentina’s traumatic past in favor of political and economic restoration. 
The history-writing objectives of the Nunca Más report, funded by the newly-elected Raúl 
Alfonsín government, aimed, then, to conclude that chapter of history in order to put an end 
to the thousands of costly court cases and investigations into those accused of violence 
during the dictatorships and to refocus government resources on restoring the national 
economy. Indeed, once the Alfonsín government had succeeded in bringing the costly 
tribunals to an end following the implementation of the “Full Stop Law” (which established 
a sixty day deadline for the filing of lawsuits in 1986, a year and a half after the report had 
been published), Nunca Más was considered by the governing party to have accomplished its 
goal and was subsequently taken out of print (Crenzel, “Genesis” 30).8 As opposed to the 
“punitive” framework of the Nuremberg Report, which told a story of the past that would be 
used to discipline West German citizens, the “restorative” approach of the Nunca Más report 
instead attempted to persuade Argentines to symbolically move on from the trauma of the 
1970s in order to restore the political and economic infrastructure of the nation. In each 
case, the respective truth commission reports narrated a version of history that was intended 
to persuade their audience to take up a specific set of ideological beliefs that would facilitate 
the political and economic intentions of the newly instituted transitional government. 
On the other hand, several recent truth commissions have opted to eschew both the 
“punitive” and “restorative” framework in favor of a reconciliatory approach. Like the South 
African commission before it, the Final Report on the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission narrativized a version of Canada’s history of the residential school system that 
aimed to persuade its audience to embrace a vision for what it defined as a new political and 
cultural relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. The truth and 
reconciliation model of history-writing is predicated on an ostensible acknowledgment of a 
history of racial discrimination (in the form of a seemingly “truthful” confession) with the 
aim of fostering a new relationship of forgiveness and repentance in order to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, ensure accountability, and achieve reconciliation by 
emphasizing both “reconciliation” and “truth.” The Final Report on the Canadian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission accordingly gives rise to a unique version of Canadian history that 
attempts to alleviate the cultural, economic, and political alienation of the country’s First 
Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities to whom the government confesses, by 
acknowledging the historical abuse of Indigenous populations by the Canadian government 
and validating a collective sense of shame and remorse. 
The “truth and reconciliation” judicial model therefore institutes a form of history as 
confession – an attempt to narrate the nation’s historical transgressions in a way that makes 
sense of, and gives meaning to, the State’s colonial practices. On account of this ersatz 
“confessional” form of history-writing, the historical narratives produced within TRC 
reports are always constructed with an eye toward public opinion, with the aim of facilitating 
forgiveness and fostering a new relationship of unity and accord, and of playing an 
important role in the discursive construction of a new, post-reconciliation vision for the 
nation. 
Backed by the perceived authority of the nation’s legal system and often grounded in 
an endorsement from the new “post-transition” government, each of these historiographic 
texts have enjoyed immense success (often becoming international best-sellers) and 
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prominence as the “official” and conclusive record of a nation’s shared trauma. Their status 
as ostensible “master narratives” of the traumatic years about which they pertain make these 
historiographic texts a rare breed of government documents, in that they are actually meant to 
be read by the public. Based on their prominence as the “official” and conclusive record of 
the nation’s shared trauma, transitional justice reports often become the single most decisive 
instrument in shaping public and cultural perceptions, as well as in guiding the production of 
the collective memories of a nation’s traumatic past.  
 
Transitional Justice and the Art of Rhetoric: 
 
Bearing in mind that truth commission reports are historical narratives explicitly 
written with the aim of persuading their readers to embrace a current or future set of 
political actions, a critical interrogation of the distinctive types of historico-legal knowledge 
that these unique texts produce is vital. Operating at the intersection of historiography and 
rhetoric, truth commission reports employ the techniques of classical rhetoricians – such as 
highly stylized and affecting prose, an appeal to the emotional and psychological makeup of 
the audience, and the writer’s appeal to the unique authority of the legal system – in order to 
craft historical narratives that, often unknowingly, compel entire populations toward the 
ideological and political principles put forth by the “post-transition” regime. They, therefore, 
represent a type of history for persuasion, or, to borrow American literary critic Van Wyck 
Brooks’ term, they constitute a version of “the past as usable,” (“On Creating a Usable Past” 
337-341); at the service of politicians and lawmakers. In each of these cases, a nation’s 
violent past is contextualized and narrated in such a way as to provoke a particular set of 
sentiments amongst the general population – be it shame, outrage, pride, complacency, or 
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forgiveness – that are meant to help facilitate a set of unspoken political aims.  
The rhetorical dimensions of history-writing within the pages of truth commission 
reports – including discussions of consequences and implications of actions in the past to 
deliver moral and political lessons, the use and contextual placement of victim testimony to 
evoke specific empathetic responses from its audience, the strategic use of pronouns and 
other devices to form bonds of community amongst readers, and the invocation of temporal 
markers that situate the present alongside or as completely detached from the near past – are 
compelling techniques drawn on to provoke specific types of bias and partisanship, yet 
which often go unnoticed by the reader. This artful form of politically-oriented 
manipulation, I contend, is the primary distinction between truth commission reports and 
other, less insidious forms of historical writing, such as novels and journalism, which do not 
tend to manipulate their audience for the same reasons or ends. 
The “art” of rhetoric, as Aristotle famously referred to it, refers to the deliberate 
tactics and techniques employed by writers and orators to persuade their audience toward 
the acceptance of specific arguments or beliefs. As both artistic and a form of artifice (and 
therefore pertaining to elements of both style and trickery), the art of rhetoric is predicated 
on the orator’s or writer’s ability to appeal to her or his audience by means of a certain sense 
of style, flair, or sophistication. While the techniques and devices employed by rhetoricians 
have evolved throughout the ages, the essence of rhetoric remains rooted in the ancient 
fundamentals expounded by Aristotle and his contemporaries. The central focus of 
rhetorical persuasion has invariably centered on the three main elements first introduced in 
the Classical ages.  According to Aristotle, “the Audience,” which is the emotional and 
psychological makeup of those who will receive the argument (139); “the style,” To Prepon, 
with which the orator or writer clothes her or his argument (215); and Kairos, which refers to 
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the specific contextual moment and place in which the argument is being made. Kairos, in 
the Sophistic context, is based on the thought that speech must happen at a certain time in 
order for it to be most effective. If rhetoric is to be meaningful and successful, it must 
therefore be presented at the most opportune moment, or else it will not have the same 
impact on the audience.9 Likewise, the modes of rhetorical appeal remain rooted in: Ethos, 
the writer or speaker’s appeal to his or her unique authority; Pathos, the writer or speaker’s 
appeal to the emotions of the audience; Logos, the writer or speaker’s appeal to logic (see 
Aristotle 74-75); and once again, Kairos, the writer or speaker’s ability to take full advantage 
of the current moment, including the political and cultural context within which the 
argument is being made. 
These rhetorical techniques – designed to have a persuasive or affective impression 
on one’s audience, but often regarded as lacking in sincerity – are precisely the types of tools 
that the authors of transitional justice reports employ as a means of persuading their 
audience toward their respective “punitive,” “restorative,” or “reconciliatory” objectives. 
Emotional appeals to the audience via the contextual placement of victim testimony, the 
swathing of ideological beliefs in eloquent literary flare, an appeal to the unique and 
seemingly incontrovertible authority of the State or legal system, and the felicitous 
capitalization on feelings of freedom or relief from long periods of oppression are all drawn-
upon in subtle, yet impactful, ways by the authors of these reports in order to cajole their 
audiences toward embracing a particular set of political beliefs and measures. 
Employing such artful rhetorical techniques within the context of historical 
narratives, truth commission reports produce carefully crafted versions of history that appeal 
to their audience’s emotional and ideological impulses. As such, truth commission reports 
have furtively become sites in which rhetorical “modes of persuasion” intersect with the 
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form, style, and structure of representations of past events in the written form, as well as with 
the various political, epistemological, and legal ramifications that are commensurate with the 
“writing” of history.  
 
The Cultural Vicissitudes of History-Writing: 
 
In addition to aiding the reader in discerning how and in what ways these reports 
make use of specific rhetorical devices, my analysis also strives to acknowledge and respond 
to how each report attends to the particular vicissitudes of history-writing within its 
respective cultural contexts. There are certain epistemological, ontological, and 
historiographic assumptions that determine how historical narratives are interpreted 
according to these cultural contexts, respectively German and American, Latin American, 
settler-Canadian and Indigenous.  Historically and culturally specific in-context analysis 
enables also, therefore, a comparative and cross-cultural analysis of history-writing, to which 
this dissertation also makes some inroads. 
Navigating precisely how rhetorical modes of persuasion operate within historical 
narratives requires a preliminary “fleshing out” of the core distinction between a) history as a 
series of past events, and b) History as the narrative written about a series of past events. As Hegel 
notes in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1837): 
In our language, the word “history” [Geschichte, derived from the verb 
geschehen, to happen] combines both objective and subjective meanings, for it 
denotes the historia rerum gestarum [the “narration” of things that happened] as 
well as the res gestae [the things that happened themselves], the historical 
narrative and the actual happenings, deeds and events – which, in the  
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stricter sense, are quite distinct from one another. But this conjunction of the 
two meanings should be recognized as belonging to a higher order than that 
of mere external contingency: we must in fact suppose that the writing of 
history and the actual deeds and events of history make their appearance 
simultaneously, and that they emerge together from a common source. (135) 
 
This last point – the idea that the actual unfolding of historical events and the 
subsequent narration of them emerge together, “from a common source” – is predicated on 
an enduring belief in the Western conception of history as the universal forward-march of 
time in an unceasing linear and teleological direction; from an arche (or “beginning point”) to 
a telos (an “end,” “purpose,” or “goal”). The ubiquity of this Western conception of “linear 
history” – that time is always only experienced as an unending series of moments that pass, 
from one to the next, in an eternal chronological sequence – is crystalized in Hegel’s 
conviction that the writing of history and the actual unfolding of past events do not simply 
coincide as mere external contingency, but rather they equate to one another in a direct and 
faithful manner according to what he calls a universal “higher order.” Within this 
framework, Western historical consciousness has always been constituted in such a way that 
we are believed to not only be capable of possessing incontrovertible knowledge about past 
events, but that we also have the ability to articulate this knowledge in an equally immutable 
and eternal narrative form. The writing of history is therefore expected, in our contemporary 
Western context, to adhere to the same ontological properties that we have ascribed to time, 
itself. The narrative structure of Western history-writing, in other words, is assumed to 
comply with a correspondingly linear, chronological, and teleological order – with a marked 
“beginning,” “middle,” and “end” – since that is how we have, au fond, conceptualized the 
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experience of history. It is subsequently expected that the historical events being narrated in 
historical texts are retrospectively imbued with an outwardly rational sense of meaning and 
order, such that one event leads to or brings about the next, and so on. History is to be read, in 
this Western context, as a story in which a series of events unfold commensurate with the 
ostensible progress of history.10 
Distinctions between how the nature of history is comprehended in the Western, 
pre-Canadian Indigenous, and Latin American contexts, for instance – as well as our ability 
and/or inclination to know and subsequently narrate the past – is pivotal when embarking 
upon a critical assessment of the narrative form of historical documents (especially those 
with such weighty political and ideological consequences as truth commission reports). 
Understanding the fundamental differences between the European teleological form of 
history-writing versus the fragmentary, aphoristic structure that is characteristic of many 
Latin American histories allows us to more clearly discern where and how historians employ 
rhetorical techniques within the contexts of their respective historical narratives. Whereas 
our modern Western conception of the historical narrative is one that is well defined and 
distinct from other forms of writing (such as poetry and even journalism), the Latin 
American historical narrative, for instance, has a long tradition of blurring genre and formal 
boundaries.11 
In Latin American history-writing, the intertwining of myth and historical reality 
often unfolds at the intersection of several narrative styles, including Romanticism, Realism, 
Indigenista, Magical Realism, naturalism, symbolism, and so on. For historian and literary critic 
Victoria Carpenter, the commixing of myth and historical reality “all but eliminates [the 
supposition of] a single historical ‘truth’ from the Latin American historical narrative” (3). 
Given that historical narratives “both reflect and affect the collective memory of events” 
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(Carpenter 3), the intertwining of myth and historical reality inevitably coincides with the 
emergence of an entirely non-Western historical consciousness. 
The non-linear nature of time developed in many Latin American historical 
narratives “and the resulting multiplicity of ‘histories’” – which often result in transnational 
and cross-cultural histories – therefore participates in what Carpenter calls “the creation, 
destruction, and re-creation of collective memory, and consequently, national identities” (3). 
Within this non-linear matrix of history and memory, “the uncertainty of time becomes the 
uncertainty of historical narrative as it recreates not an actual event, but one of its many 
representations in official, collective, and individual memories” (Carpenter 3-4). “Thus,” she 
adds, “the removal of a singular entity of ‘history’ and its replacement with ‘histories’… 
presents us with the importance of considering all historical narratives as equally valid 
representations of past events” (Carpenter 4). Whereas linear Western historical 
consciousness gives rise to a resultant hierarchy of historical truths – in which the veracity of 
historical narratives are open to debate and one history is regarded as being potentially more 
genuine or authentic than another – all forms and genres of Latino history-writing are upheld as 
proportionate representations of the past. 
Among Western readers, the most well regarded contemporary practitioner of this 
unique form of Latino history-writing is Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano. Best known 
for Days and Nights of Love and War, Children of the Days: A Calendar of Human History (1978), as 
well as his Memory of Fire trilogy (1982-1986), Galeano’s major historical works are each 
constituted by a distinctive blending of history, journalism, mythology, poetry, and prose, as 
well as a characteristic non-linear aphoristic style. Galeano, known mostly for his sweeping 
historical epics, opens his Memory of Fire trilogy with the admission that he “was a wretched 
history student” (13), later explicitly adding, “I am not a historian” (13). As a prototypically 
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non-traditional chronicler of Latino histories, Galeano embodies the particular non-Western 
historical consciousness that is unique to the Southern Americas. As one of the continent’s 
foremost writers of history, Galeano’s prefatory note is not intended for his Latino audience, 
but rather for those Western readers who would otherwise expect his monumental history of 
the Americas to abide by the Hegelian teleological form, in which a seemingly 
comprehensive account of all past events unfold chronologically in a cause-and-effect 
relation. Instead, in Galeano’s works the reader discovers a sweeping mosaic of the history 
of the Americas, from their birth to the present day, in which both pre and post-colonial 
history is seamlessly interwoven with Latino folklore and Inca, Aztec, Mayan, Muisca, and 
Mapuche mythology. Rather than presenting his “history” in a single comprehensive and 
monolithic structure, Galeano’s trilogy is comprised of over eleven hundred short vignettes 
of prose, poetry, journalistic sketches of indigenous tribes, and archival documents reprinted 
verbatim, in a style that we might describe as “magical journalism” or, better still, “magical 
history.” Literary critic Ronald Christ notes, in a review for the New York Times: “The 
assemblage of [thousands of] imaginatively re-created parts flashes a staccato montage – the 
violently jolting tradition of the New World, from indigenous myths in the book’s first 
section, through the gold-sucking European conquest (disguised as religious conversion) in 
the second part” (“Dramas that Scorch”). In response to the genre-bending style of his form 
of history writing, Galeano contends: “I don’t know if [Memory of Fire] is a novel or essay or 
epic poem or testament or chronicle… [but] deciding robs me of no sleep. I do not believe 
in the frontiers that, according to literature’s [Western] customs officers, separate the forms” 
(Memory 13). 
Despite the unparalleled uniqueness of his work, the historical consciousness that 
Galeano’s work embodies is not unique to him alone. Other celebrated works of historical 
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writing within the Latin American pantheon belong not exclusively to the realm of academic 
historians but to journalists, poets, and dramatists alike. In fact, Chilean Nobel laureate 
Pablo Neruda – whom Gabriel Garcia Marquez referred to as “the greatest poet of the 
twentieth century, in any language” (Fragrance 49) – structured his magnum opus, the Canto 
General (1950), as an epic poem that encompasses the entire sweep of Latin American 
history, from pre-Columbian times to the mid-20th century. Consisting of a vast retelling of 
the various atrocities and injustices visited upon the disadvantaged in Latin America, Neruda 
– like Galeano – presents an objective empirical history of the Americas, not simply by 
incorporating elements of history into his poetry, but instead by writing history through poetry, 
as poetry. Together with Neruda, Galeano’s trans-generic commixing of style, form, and 
mythology belongs to a long and pervasive tradition of history-writing in the South 
Americas, which – although differing greatly in technique and style from Western histories – 
is certainly no less rigorous or intellectually demanding. Galeano, for instance, meticulously 
cites the source material that inspired each vignette in his Memory of Fire trilogy, and the 
bibliography at the end of each volume confirms that Galeano’s research is as diligent as any 
Western academic Historian. “He has re-read the original chroniclers, Columbus, Bernal 
Diaz, Las Casas and the English Dominican Thomas Gage,” notes Dr. Allen Boyer in a 
review for the L.A. Times, adding, “He has also consulted such modern scholars as Jaime 
Vicens Vives, James Lockhard, Alexander Marchant and J. H. Elliott. These historians’ work 
has given Galeano most of his themes and many of his details” (Boyer). 
The point, of course, is not to champion Galeano’s style of history-writing – or any 
writers’, for that matter – over another. Instead, such a cross-cultural comparative analysis is 
meant simply to emphasize the disparity and richness of historical consciousnesses in a 
global context, and to underscore the importance of acknowledging the disparate ways in 
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which our collective understanding of res gestae [the things that happened] interact with and 
inform historia rerum gestarum [the “narration” of those things]. A robust comprehension of 
the ways in which history is experienced and how that experience is subsequently rendered in 
various historical narratives allows us to become more finely attuned to the rhetorical 
techniques – or “modes of persuasion” – that are employed within the historical narratives 
of the truth commission reports.  It helps us call attention to the literary form in which 
conventional histories are presented. After all, as Hayden White famously suggested, 
historians are “nothing more than makers of fictions” (191), charged with “endow[ing] 
history with meaning” (192), any meaning they so choose. 
Comparing and cross-referencing contemporary Western forms of history-writing 
with their Latin American counterparts helps, then, to underscore what we might call the 
“literariness” of all historical documents. In fleshing out precisely how these texts shape and 
modify the ideological biases of their audience, a “literary” reading of truth commission 
histories underscores the rhetorical and narratological nuances of these texts, as well as the 
significant degree of artistry that goes into their composition. In particular, reading Nunca 
Más – which is rendered in a hyper-literary style and incorporating elements of “detective 
fiction” and “legal thrillers” into its form and style, owing to Ernesto Sábato’s involvement 
as lead author – alongside the more traditional form of the Nuremberg Report, allows us to 
discern analogous literary elements in the latter that might otherwise go unnoticed, such as 
characteristics of early “Courtroom Dramas” and twentieth-century propaganda campaigns. 
In fact, as Hayden White demonstrates, while some Western historians have at times 
chosen “nonnarrative, even antinarrative modes of representation, such as the meditation, 
the anatomy, or the epitome” (2), the most common and expected form of history-writing in 
the West is, and always has been, the form that we normally associate with classical 
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storytelling: the historical narrative. The writing of history in this sense, what White calls 
history-as-a-story (2), often employs many of the archetypal narratological structures that we 
find in more explicitly fictive modes of writing. As White suggests, historical narratives are 
often made “more compelling” when their authors organize the historical events according 
to classic literary plot structures, including: tragedies (stories that lead from ideal situations to 
disaster), or comedies (those that lead from bad situations to happy endings); utopias or 
dystopias; stories-within-a-story (such as Scheherazade as a narrative intermediary); or epics 
(a lengthy tale that portrays, in great detail, the myriad cultural values and codes of a given 
society through the singular journey of an exceptional individual character), and fables (a 
condensed, succinct prose story that illustrates a single moral lesson) (See White 5-11).  
Narrative histories, in their many forms, often evoke these and other narratological 
characteristics as well as their many trans-cultural permutations. What brings each historical 
narrative together however, according to White, is our ineluctable desire for stories to orient 
us in the world. Given that this desire is often heightened in the wake of mass trauma, the 
task of forging the so-called “truths” of the past into a common history serves as a valuable 
tool to reconcile a divided county and reconstruct a new transitional society. In its most 
distilled form, this process of forging a common history as a means of re-orienting a 
community following a shared traumatic experience is the essence of transitional justice: a 
looking-toward-the-past in order to promote a series of meaningful and productive political 
advancements in the present. 
Rather than interpreting transitional justice reports solely as the ceremonial 
culmination of a series of judicial processes that objectively record a nation’s march from the 
shadows of trauma, I suggest instead that these unique historiographic texts are better 
understood as being shaped by the rhetorical and narrative devices employed by their 
 32 
authors, and that the politicization of historical knowledge is used by truth commissions to 
influence particular courses of action in the present. By juxtaposing the German, Argentine, 
and Canadian cases, this dissertation compares and cross-references the ways in which 
rhetorical and narratological techniques have participated in the production and 
dissemination of collective or national memories in the wake of their respective national 
traumas. 
 
Chapter Outline:  
 
Chapter One begins, therefore, by situating the origins of transitional justice 
practices with the emergence of the Nuremberg trials. As the founding case of twentieth-
century transitional justice practices – which has since led to the implementation of dozens 
of truth commissions and human rights tribunals as well as the formation of the 
International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and the legitimization of 
Universal Jurisdiction under the auspices of the latter two organizations – the Nuremberg 
trials laid the initial groundwork for the unique history-writing potential of transitional justice 
practices. I therefore begin by examining how the public nature of the trials and their moral, 
political, and historiographical framing of the Nazi years informed a nation’s understanding 
of its past, and the bearing that it had (and continues to have) on the historical narrative(s) of 
post-war “German guilt,” thereby contextualizing West Germany’s Nazi history within 
certain moral parameters and laying the framework for the divided nation’s collective 
memories of the war-time period. 
 This chapter examines the Nuremberg trials and their concomitant report, which was 
overseen by American Brigadier General Telford Taylor, as the careful crafting of an 
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“official memory” of the Nazi years by Allied forces. The Nuremberg trials and Final Report 
produced a state-sanctioned narrative of the historical events which aimed toward facilitating 
the American de-Nazification project in West Germany by brazenly declaring that the 
entirety of the general population was composed of either those who had willingly and 
publicly supported the Nazi regime, or those who privately opposed their ideologies – followed 
by detailed recommendations for how to purge the state of the former. 
 Through a rigorous analysis of the form and structure of the Nuremberg report (which 
was deeply suffused with nearly indecipherable “legalese”), this chapter considers the 
function and performance of truth commission reports as primarily legal documents that 
also work to craft an “official” memory of the historical period under question. This chapter 
therefore explores how, and in what ways, these two types of shared memories work – both 
together, and against one another – by presenting the collective memories that truth 
commissions produce as “official” and contrasting this mnemonic narrative with the activity 
of public memory that occurs both in the public reception of the trials and via journalistic, 
artistic, and literary interpretations of them. 
 The Nuremberg case serves as a pivotal starting-place for an analysis concerning the 
ways in which truth commission reports function as official “state-sanctioned” memory-
works, precisely because of the highly technical legal language with which it is crafted. The 
Final Report on the Nuremberg tribunals – through its administrative style and structure – 
continually evokes its own status as produced and validated by the State through the 
pretense of a newly established international judicial authority. In a related way, I also 
examine the cultural and political significance of the city of Nuremberg, as both the location 
and name of the trials and report. Bearing in mind that Nuremberg was the location of the 
most elaborate and notorious political rally of the Hitler regime, this case study explores the 
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ways in which the trials and the subsequent report were intended to conjure menacing 
images of the Nazi years, while also evoking a certain sense of moral contempt for them. To 
this end, this chapter pays close attention to the manner in which the Nuremberg report 
overtly elicits, emphasizes, and reconstitutes the categories of “shame,” “guilt,” “remorse,” 
and “humiliation” with respect to those individuals who were deemed according to the trials 
and the report to be innocuous “bystanders,” but not necessarily “innocent.” 
 I then consider the consequences of the trials being overseen by foreign occupiers – 
specifically how the particular political and ideological context of the immediate postwar 
years emphasized “punitive” or “retributive” justice as the primary means of redress – by 
weighing a body of literature and film that was produced in the wake of the Nuremberg 
tribunals.12 What effect did this “victor’s justice” have on the collective West German 
psyche? And how might this have played on the way(s) in which the trials continually 
underscored the burden of guilt, shame, and remorse? In what way(s) did the foreign 
governance of the trials allow or prohibit the German people to react with genuine horror to 
the revelations of the Holocaust, along with the rest of the world? And finally, how has this 
emphasis on discipline and retribution framed the literary and artistic narratives that 
followed the trials? 
This chapter examines the political and ethical reverberations from which the 
“official memory” of the trials framed the West German understanding of its own past by 
weighing several novels, memoirs, and films against the historical narrative put forth within 
The Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under Control 
Council Law No. 10. Alongside the historicization of the past in the Final Nuernberg Report, I 
carefully consider academic and journalistic responses, including prominent opinion-pieces 
in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit, as well as literary and filmic works that either challenge or 
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arrogate the “official narrative” of the report, such as Heinrich Böll’s Group Portrait (1971),13 
Günter Grass’ The Tin Drum (1959) and Peeling the Onion (2007), Siegfried Lenz’s The German 
Lesson (1960), Bertolt Brecht’s “An die Nachgeborenen” [“To Those Who Follow in Our 
Wake”] (1939), Peter Weiss’ The Investigation: Oratorio in 11 Cantos (1965), as well as Abby 
Mann’s quintessential film Judgment at Nuremberg (1961).14 Why do some of these works 
arrogate the “official” mnemonic narrative of the Final Report, while others explicitly aim to 
provoke and disarm it? And how are these literary narratives transformed and reshaped 
across generations via new and emerging artistic works in the shadow of the Nuremberg 
Trials? 
In Chapter Two, “Nunca Más: Transitional Justice Reports as Explicit Literary 
Constructions,” I turn to the so-called post-“Dirty War” period of Argentinian history and 
the emergence of what would later be recognized as the world’s first conventional “truth 
commission.” Here, I move from an examination of the ways in which the Nuremberg 
report established the official memory of the Nazi years according to a “punitive” judicial 
framework to the establishment of “restorative” justice in the Argentine case. 
This chapter begins by exploring this issue by way of a thoroughgoing analysis of the 
Nunca Más report prepared by Argentina’s National Commission on Disappeared People – 
the first instantiation of a truth commission and the first major trial held for war crimes since 
the Nuremberg tribunals. As the Nunca Más report demonstrated, it is all too easy for a truth 
commission report to present a highly simplified and controversial version of past events as 
a means of “closing the pages” on a traumatic chapter of history in order to begin the 
process of political and economic “healing.” 
I pay special attention in this case study to the manner in which the Nunca Más 
report overtly elicits, emphasizes, and reconstitutes the categories of “healing,” 
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“forgiveness,” and “reconciliation” (in contrast to the Nuremberg commission, which 
emphasized “shame,” “guilt,” “remorse,” and “humiliation”), and I examine whether the 
emphasis on punitive or restorative justice calls for a specific narrative “style” in the crafting 
of a national memory of traumatic events. Does an emphasis on punitive justice demand an 
overt legal or judicial “style” as a means of justifying the punishments? And, on the other 
hand, does a call for political and cultural restoration (and its ancillary sentiments of 
“forgiveness” and “absolution”) demand a more finessed “narrative” style that engages and 
cajoles its audience in a different manner? And what are the political and ethical 
ramifications of this demand? In attending to these questions, this section focuses on the 
unusual situation that arose from enlisting a popular crime novelist to narrativize the state-
sanctioned legal document that would ultimately serve as the foundation for a national 
memory. 
 As has been well documented, the Nunca Más report ultimately produced a highly 
contentious version of events – in which it was declared that “Argentina was torn by terror 
from both the extreme right and the far left” (1) – which sought to assign legal and moral 
liability to both the perpetrators of the military dictatorship as well as their victims. This 
chapter therefore examines the political, economic, and cultural context within which the 
Nunca Más report was produced, with careful attention paid to the political and ideological 
leverage applied by Raul Alfonsín’s transitional government during its composition. I then 
explore how other equally popular historical narratives of the time are framed and 
interpreted in light of the Nunca Más report. Walsh’s famed nonfiction novel about the 
events leading up to the so-called “Dirty War” simultaneously challenges the “two-evils” 
framework of the Nunca Más report, while also being re-interpreted in an entirely new light 
because of it. 
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 This chapter also considers how other journalistic texts and visual art works have 
worked explicitly to challenge many of the false claims in the Nunca Más report and its “two 
demons” framework. Correspondingly, I also examine the capacity of historical novels to 
challenge the Nunca Más narrative in a similar way, such as Osvaldo Soriano’s Winter Quarters 
(1989) and A Funny Dirty Little War (1986), Manuel Puig’s Kiss of the Spider Woman (1979), 
Patricio Pron’s My Father’s Ghost is Climbing in the Rain (2014), as well as Mariana Enríquez’s 
short-story collection, Things We Lost in the Fire (2017) and the poetry of Juan Gelman. 
In Chapter Three, I then turn to the recently concluded Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, established in response to the legacy of the Indian Residential 
School System. This chapter explores the contentious legal framework according to which 
the TRC was constituted, and the narratological and syntactical effects that these had on the 
production of the Final Report and its framing of victim testimonies. 
While the project of “national reconciliation” is currently unfolding, this chapter 
provides an opportunity to examine the colonial politics that undergird this endeavor as it 
develops in the present moment alongside the slow and measured construction of a new 
national awareness of the residential school system. While the Final TRC Report has quickly 
become the primary document in the proliferation of an ever-emerging national 
consciousness of this shameful chapter in Canadian history, this chapter pays careful 
attention to the unique mode of “looking” that the report fosters. In adhering to the strict 
set of legal mandates that govern the TRC – namely, that the report is required to abstain 
from “naming names” or of intimating, in any other way, the identities of perpetrators – this 
chapter rigorously examines the degree to which the Final Report casts the victims of the 
residential schools in a way that provokes the scopophilic impulses of the non-Indigenous 
reader. 
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In further examining the complicated politics and ethics of “reconciliation,” I focus 
particular attention on the reception by, and responsibility of, non-Aboriginal Canadians with 
regard to acknowledging the nation’s painful past and committing to the process of 
“healing.” The unwillingness of many non-Aboriginal Canadians to participate fully in the 
production of a truly “national” memory that includes the traumatic historic of the 
Indigenous experience has provided a unique political and cultural context for the Canadian 
TRC, which the German and Argentine cases did not share.15 To this end, the Canadian 
TRC provides an important window into the ways in which collective memories operate 
between discrete racial communities, and how truth commission reports demarcate the very 
communities of memory upon which they act. 
This chapter examines the difficulties associated with the promise of reconciliation 
when non-Aboriginal Canadians do not take an active role in the transition to justice by 
weighing the Final Report alongside the small but impactful body of literature and art that 
addresses the Indigenous Residential School System. Jeff Barnaby’s film Rhymes for Young 
Ghouls (2013) and Kent Monkman’s 2017 exhibit, Shame and Prejudice: A Story of Resilience, 
provide poignant cases for the study of this inter-racial obstacle. In addition to these literary, 
filmic, and artistic works, a thoroughgoing analysis of the inclusion of photographs in the 
Official Summary of the Final TRC Report provides a further point of entry into this unique 
problem, insofar as they provoke the non-Aboriginal reader’s voyeuristic gaze and further 
widen the cultural and racial rift. Not unlike the complex interplay between text and 
photographs in James Agee’s and Walker Evans’s documentary project Let Us Now Praise 
Famous Men (1941), I argue that the inclusion of black and white photographs depicting 
poverty-stricken aboriginal youths and the decrepit conditions of the residential schools 
provokes the non-Aboriginal reader’s scopophilic impulses in a way that reestablishes and 
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perpetuates the pre-existing power-relations that have led to the systematic racial oppression 
of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples in the first place. To this end, this chapter analyzes 
the “documentary-style” of the Canadian TRC report (in contrast to the “novelistic” style of 
Nunca Más and the dense “legalese” of the Nuremberg report) in order to examine how this 
style arouses certain non-Aboriginal desires related to the power and pleasures of looking at 
others. 
Finally, this chapter will examine the unique legal context within which the Canadian 
TRC unfolded – unlike the Truth Commissions in Argentina and South Africa, the Canadian 
commission had no power to offer known perpetrators the possibility of amnesty in 
exchange for honest testimony about any abuses that were committed. For this reason, the 
Canadian commission and its concomitant report include only victim testimonies, with little 
to no statements from perpetrators or accomplices. The absence of any testimony or 
confessions from Church authorities, government officials, or virtually any other non-
Aboriginals has thus further differentiated this TRC report from the majority of its 
predecessors, and has led to another impediment to the actualization of a truly national hope 
for reconciliation. Instead, in its failure to compel the perpetrators to participate, the 
Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission has provided an opportunity for non-
Aboriginal Canadians to sustain a harmful tradition of voyeuristic relation to and 
exoticization of the Indigenous experience, and this is reinforced and substantiated by the 
very structure of the final report. 
This chapter concludes with a succinct yet incisive projection toward what the future 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission might present for both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Canadians alike. Considering how specific iterations of the Nunca Más and 
Nuremberg reports have become hegemonic in public discourse as they were continually 
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revised and reinterpreted, this dissertation ends with a critical forecast of how we might 
negotiate the political and cultural vicissitudes of historical narrativization to successfully 
fulfill our shared project of reconciliation. 
 
Headnote – Looking Forward: 
 
As Truth and Reconciliation Commissions continue to multiply throughout the 
world and take on greater influence in the crafting of “memory laws,” “amnesty laws,” and 
other forms of legislated history, such as historical apologies and reparations (particularly in 
the face of the disintegration of the International Criminal Court16), our current historical 
moment represents a critical opportunity to initiate a rigorous interpretive analysis of the 
form and structure of these monumental documents in order to acknowledge the extent to 
which transitional justice processes are instrumental in shaping and re-shaping the social, 
cultural, political, and geographic landscapes of post-conflict nations. 
While an impressive reconciliatory undertaking currently unfolds in Canada, in an 
attempt to at long last acknowledge what chief justice Murray Sinclair has called the “cultural 
genocide” of our country’s Métis, Inuit, and Indigenous populations through the tragic 
history of the residential school system, similar truth commissions have recently concluded 
in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Uruguay, Nigeria, and the former Yugoslavia (to name 
but a few), while the Tunisian Truth and Dignity Commission is currently underway. Based on 
the efficacy of these and many past commissions, comparable undertakings are also being 
considered in Australia, the United States, and Mexico, and many continue to imagine what 
future truth commissions might achieve in Armenia, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and 
France/Algeria. As such, there is an extraordinary urgency to assess critically the intersection 
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of the narrative machinery of the concluding reports of these commissions and the rapidly 
evolving structure of their concomitant legal and constitutional documents, insofar as they 
ineluctably participate in the production of cultural memories and the cultural and ethical 
frameworks of “justice” and “forgiveness.” 
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through an atavistic return to its legal origins – the archive. 
12  There was also a very real fear that their Soviet counterparts in East Germany might 
provide a more agreeable, less-punitive alternative, drawing the German population toward 
their communist adversary. This delicate conciliation will be examined through the works of 
Anna Seghers. 
13  The testimony of characters in the novel that defend the “rational” use of slave 
labour is actually quoted material from the Nuernberg trials/report. 
14  On Böll’s, Grass’, and Lenz’s novels as post-Nuremberg representations of German 
guilt see Anne Sa’adah’s Germany’s Second Chance: Trust, Justice and Democratization. 
15  Both of these cases concerned the entire nations.  In Argentina, however, the Jewish 
community faced a unique set of difficulties with respect to having their cases heard during 
the Trials of the Junta. In response, Spanish judge Baltazar Garzán led a Truth Commission 
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Chapter 1. The Politics of Cultural Remembrance: The Nuremberg Trials and 
the Calculated Manufacturing of a National Memory. 
 
American “victor’s justice” at Nuremberg as the establishment of what Maurice 
Halbwachs calls the “social frameworks of memory” 
 
At the heart of this project lies the basic assumption that human rights tribunals, 
truth commissions, and similar transitional justice practices represent a unique type of 
history-making endeavour that provides the political, moral, and ideological framework for 
how national traumas are “remembered” across successive generations. By recontextualizing 
the past according to the “good/evil” and “victim/perpetrator” binary ethical paradigm of 
the judicial system, transitional justice practices “fix” their violent and traumatic histories 
within the cultural imaginary1 as binding, legally-validated versions of historical events, 
instituting a decisive epistemic and moral rupture with respect to the manner in which a 
community negotiates its shared past. It is precisely this moral “rupture” – a breaking away 
from the immediacy and indeterminacy of the conflict in favour of a narrative that seeks to 
make sense of its complex moral consequences – that directly and incontrovertibly shapes the 
ways in which national traumas are absorbed into the cultural storytelling process. By laying 
a new moral groundwork for how a society looks back upon its past, transitional justice 
practices reconstruct public consciousness according to carefully drawn moral, legal, and 
ideological lines. 
At no time in twentieth-century history was this re-establishment of a new “moral 
framework” of the past on so large, and so public, a stage than during the Nuremberg Trials 
(1945-1949). Given the far-reaching political and ethical stakes of coming to terms with the 
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, the Nuremberg trials represented the struggle for 
post-war German memory, on display for the entire world to see. In formulating a newly 
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conceived international framework for addressing human rights violations, the Allied-led 
Nuremberg proceedings set forth a precarious renegotiation of the past with an eye toward 
an “ideal” political future for West Germany rooted in American neoliberal democratic 
values. 
As the conclusive record of the war crimes proceedings, the Final Report on the 
Nuernberg Trials produced an historical narrative of the Nazi era that would conceptualize a 
“new German citizen” who would embody the ethics and ideological “spirit” of the nation’s 
emerging democratic future, while also helping the Allied victors facilitate the 
implementation of concrete political and economic reform. The Nuernberg Report would do so 
by carefully crafting an historical narrative that not only separated the trauma of the 
Holocaust from the present moment – as an ethical nightmare now fully consigned to “the 
past”2 – but also by making grand moral pronouncements on the severe toll these crimes 
would have on the entire civilized world;3 what the Americans referred to as “the U.S. 
government’s … heavy moral investment in the Nuremberg Trials” (Final Report 100, 115). 
The Final Report would therefore serve as the narrative link connecting the horrors of the 
Third Reich to the new democratic vision for West Germany by chronicling this transition as 
the story of Germany’s march from tyranny to justice – what Aristotle calls a mythos or a plot, 
in the sense in which we speak of the plot of a novel or a play. 
By framing its historical narrative as the seemingly straightforward story of 
Germany’s arduous march toward the apogee of Western neoliberalism, the Final Report 
presented the German people with a renegotiated moral paradigm through which their 
recent past could now be framed as a single disgraceful chapter that must be overcome by all 
citizens in order to move forward. Within this historical narrative, the American prosecutors 
portrayed the Holocaust as the vile subterfuge of Hitler’s inner circle, while also hinting at 
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widespread complicity amongst the general population that precipitated an uncomfortable 
national discussion concerning the re-creation of a more integrative postwar German 
cultural identity. This chapter charts the cultural evolution of this discourse – referred to 
henceforth as “the Guilt Question” – from its initial germination within the context of the 
Nuremberg Trials, through its development as a topic du jour in the national media, to its final 
maturation as a defining characteristic of postwar literary, cinematic, and theatrical 
narratives. This chapter demonstrates that the social, political, and literary realms of postwar 
German society were each linked through the shared norms, values and sentiments of its 
population, and that an aggregate profile of the collective consciousness can be revealed by 
tracing out the homology between the social and political setting in which writers such as 
Günter Grass, Heinrich Böll, Peter Weiss, and Siegfried Lenz lived, and the literary world of 
their art. 
As this chapter maps out, the Nuremberg trials were framed in such a way as to 
implicitly awaken a highly contentious sense of “collective symbolic guilt” amongst the entire 
German population for their perceived complicity in the crimes of the Holocaust.4 The 
Allied directors of the war crimes tribunals initiated such a deeply controversial public 
discourse in order to achieve two key objectives: to induce the German people into 
embracing Western, democratic values and to facilitate the implementation of Allied 
denazification programs. On the one hand, the evocation of the “Guilt Question” was meant 
to rectify what Alan Norrie calls the Nazi regime’s “radical and abhorrent” distortion of the 
German people’s moral compass (196). A recurrent theme in the prosecution’s approach 
throughout the Nuremberg Trials was to reiterate that the Deutsches Reich had “perverted and 
poisoned”5 the general population’s most basic understanding of right and wrong through its 
ideology of hatred and the passing of laws that formally denied Jews, Czechs, and Poles the 
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most basic human rights and protections (Final Report 56, 69). “[In the] absence of a sense of 
shared moral community or consensus,” Norrie writes, “Nuremberg was an attempt to 
restore the sense of a common moral framework [between West Germans and their Allied 
victors]” (196). As Mary Cosgrove adds, “[i]n the defeated post-war political context, guilt 
emerged as a particularly ‘democratic’ emotion and sign of denazification: guilt was exactly 
how repentant Germans should feel” (541). Given that postwar guilt was considered to be “a 
socially legible sign of a post-totalitarian, civilized self” (Cosgrove 541), the invocation of a 
collective guilt was the first step in the Americanization of West Germany.  
This loose association between guilt and civility lead the American press corps into 
the unlikely role of championing former Nazi Party official Albert Speer, praising his modest 
displays of repentance during the trials. As illustrated in an ambitious four-page New York 
Times profile following his sentencing at the initial International Military Tribunal, titled 
“Portrait of the Real Nazi Criminal,” Hitler’s former Minister of Armaments and Munitions 
is portrayed as “courteous, congenial, and informative,” “a genius,” and “the only prominent 
German with the intellectual capacity to analyze history [...] and deduce from it the obvious 
conclusion: that he was guilty” (Portrait SM7). While all other Nazi officials – including Hitler 
and Goering – were denigrated as a coterie of “overrated,” “inflated,” and “outrageous” 
“buffoons” (Portrait SM7), Speer alone received the adulatory praise of the prosecutors and 
journalists at Nuremberg. “[C]ompared with other Nazi grandees,” H.R. Trevor-Roper 
writes, “[Speer] was a phoenix” (Portrait SM7). As the only high-ranking Nazi member to 
publicly express a sense of guilt and repentance during the Nuremberg tribunals, the Allied 
victors upheld Speer as an icon of repentance for the rest of the German people – as a 
“phoenix” who emerged, renewed and dignified, from the ashes of the Nazi empire.  
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The evocation of guilt and repentance was, in this sense, promoted by the Allies as a 
symbolic baptism, in which the German people could publicly renounce their Nazi past and 
emerge reborn in the gleam of neoliberal democracy. According to this cultural paradigm, a 
collective sense of guilt and repentance was seen as essential to the implementation of the 
Allied force’s postwar denazification efforts,6 which were initially intended to rid the 
government, press, judiciary, and commerce sectors of any former Nazi Party members. 
Bearing in mind that the denazification program was largely predicated on the German people 
removing Nazi apologists from influential positions of their own accord, the prosecution’s 
tenacious appeal to the “Guilt Question” was a pioneering – if somewhat duplicitous – 
experiment in social psychology.7 
The Nuremberg Trials would provoke this sense of collective guilt by implicitly 
portraying the defendants in the initial IMT trial – a number of prominent high-ranking Nazi 
officials, including Speer, Rudolph Hess, and Hermann Göring – as representative of an 
entire nation of guilty Germans. The highly controversial discourse that these public 
insinuations provoked, both during and in the years immediately following the trials, was 
aimed at compelling so-called “everyday” Germans into an uncomfortable, and at times 
harrowing, cultural reckoning with their own past. Initially led by a number of eminent 
cultural intellectuals and philosophers during the late 1940s, including Hannah Arendt and 
Karl Jaspers, the post-war “Guilt Question” would later be taken up by journalists and 
politicians in the 1950s, before eventually being fully absorbed into the cultural storytelling 
tradition by leading figures in German literature, theatre, and cinema during the 1960s and 
beyond. As this chapter illustrates, in laying the initial “social frameworks” of collective 
German guilt, the Nuremberg Trials and its Final Report established the foundation for how 
generations of Germans would eventually come to understand their own past. 
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By imbuing the Final Report with a clearly articulated and enduring set of ethical 
tendencies and dispositions – namely, the idea that civilian inaction, compliance, and even 
begrudging acquiescence to the Nazi regime equated to moral (if not criminal) guilt – the 
Allied victors succeeded in crafting a shrewd historical narrative that would implicitly guide 
the ways in which American democratic values became normalized through the processes of 
remembering or retelling, ultimately shaping the landscape of German literature, theatre, and 
cinema for decades to come. 
Insofar as the Allied prosecutors were able to dictate the narrative of the Nazi crimes 
publicly in real time – as they revealed the horrors of the concentration camps to the entire 
world, via the exhibition of uncensored photographic and filmic evidence8 – they were able 
to determine the moral and cultural parameters through which the German people were 
compelled to confront their recent past. The Nuremberg Trials’ invocation of the “Guilt 
Question” functioned, therefore, as the Halbwachian “social frameworks” for West German 
collective memories – as the shared moral and cultural building blocks that determined, from 
the outset, the narrative scope of individual acts of remembrance.9 In this sense, the 
internalization of the “Guilt Question” served as the very source of West German individual 
memories, giving rise to them from their very point of inception, and reinforcing their 
mnemonic foundations as future generations re-produced them through individual acts of 
remembrance and storytelling. 
As Barbara A. Misztal notes, in the Polish Sociological Review, the intimate relationship 
between memory and the law is precisely what enables transitional justice practices to make 
such pronounced historiographic and narratological interventions into the cultural imaginary 
of a nation. “The relationships between law and collective memory,” she writes, “are at the 
foundation of many countries’ original myths […]. For example, legal documents such as the 
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Magna Carta (U.K.) or the Declaration of Independence (U.S.) are essential for 
understanding their respective societies’ beginnings and values” (61). For this reason, Misztal 
suggests, the legal system “is an enormously influential institution of collective memory,” 
adding that, “in many countries, changes in collective memory are legally induced” (61). 
Addressing the specific judicial-mnemonic correlation in the context of the Nuremberg 
trials, she continues: 
In all societies […] courts, through their input into deciding historical 
questions, form collective memory. […] Postwar Europe saw many criminal 
prosecutions, which aimed to influence national collective memories. Despite 
controversies and debates surrounding attempts to punish state-sponsored 
mass murders, their achievements for constructing bases of the new order 
cannot be overlooked […]. For example, the Nuremberg Trials, which 
marked the birth of cosmopolitan law and the institution of crimes against 
humanity, changed the very contents of Germans’ memory of the war period. 
(61-62) 
Specifically, by emphasizing “punitive” justice as the primary means of redress for 
the Nazi atrocities, the Nuremberg tribunals set forth the groundwork for a national 
discourse concerning the “collective symbolic guilt” of the German people, which would 
ultimately facilitate the denazification project of the Allied victors. This model of “justice-as-
retribution,” according to which the Nuremberg tribunals unfolded, helped explicitly to 
contextualize Germany’s horrific past within certain moral parameters, and laid the moral 
and cultural scaffolding for how West Germans would continue to confront the Nazi years.  
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Nuremberg 1945, and the Establishment of the IMT: 
 
In November 1945, six months after the Germans’ unconditional surrender to the 
Allied forces, American Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson was granted a temporary 
leave from Washington to travel to Nuremberg, Germany, in order to serve as Chief of the 
United States Prosecution at the newly established International Military Tribunal (IMT). 
Following the Allies’ capture of the major surviving leaders of the Nazi regime, the IMT was 
to be the first of thirteen trials intended to bring a total of one hundred and twenty-five 
former Nazi officials, industrialists, military personnel, doctors, judges, and various 
“collaborators” to justice for the planning and execution of the Holocaust and other War 
Crimes committed by the Nazi regime. Described by Norman Birkett, one of two British 
judges who presided over the tribunal, as “the greatest trial in history” (Marrus 563), the 
IMT represented not only the first instance of what would soon be known as “transitional 
justice,” but it also provided the conceptual framework for our modern understanding of 
“crimes against humanity.” An international spectacle that received widespread media 
coverage across the world, the IMT concluded with the publication of the Final Report on the 
Nuernberg Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949), a three-hundred page document 
intended to “make the facts [of the Nazi crimes] available to German historians, so that 
future generations of Germans will be able to grasp the full and malignant import of the 
Third Reich, and understand why it proved such a terrible engine of destruction for the 
world and for Germany herself” (Final Report 100). 
Opening at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, the trial of the “Major War Criminals 
of the European Axis” commenced with the reading of a one-hundred page indictment for 
“war crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” “crimes against peace,” and “the planning, 
initiating, and waging of wars of aggression.” In the courtroom were twenty-one 
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defendants10 – the surviving major leaders of the Nazi regime, including Hermann Göring, 
Rudolph Hess, and Albert Speer (Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels having committed suicide 
before they could be apprehended, and Eichmann escaping to Austria). Following each of 
the defendants pleading “not guilty” to the various charges levied against them, the Allied 
prosecution team set about producing document after document meant to demonstrate 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the former members of what they referred to as the “Nazi 
machine” had willingly planned and executed a level of criminality that was “without 
precedent in recorded history” (Final Report 103). Seeing these men, who had once inspired 
so much terror throughout the continent, in the dock – stripped of their medals and insignia 
– demonstrated to the world that the Nuremberg trials represented the overturning of the 
barbarity of the Third Reich, and that retribution would be grounded in the newly minted 
and historically unparalleled judicial might of the IMT. 
The choice of Nuremberg as the site of the trials set the initial tone for a “justice-as-
retribution” model, since it was the infamous Nuremberg laws of 1935 that initially 
established the explicitly anti-Semitic laws that had stripped German Jews of their citizenship 
and excluded them from all aspects of economic, political, and cultural life. More hauntingly, 
from 1933 until 1938, the National Socialist Party held annual rallies at the Nazi Party Rally 
Grounds in Nuremberg – a massive eleven-square kilometer compound consisting of a 
stadium, a congress hall, a “march field,” and several military deployment areas – which 
served as electrifying Nazi propaganda events meant to seduce, deceive, and terrorize the 
general population. Made famous by Leni Riefenstahl’s propaganda film, Triumph of the Will 
(1935), the Nuremberg Rallies came to exemplify the intense fanaticism of Nazi ideology. 
As Justice Jackson put it in his inaugural statement before the International Military 
Tribunal: “these crimes and atrocities were ‘so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating 
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that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot tolerate their being 
repeated’” (Nuernberg Report 103). With this opening declaration, the IMT signaled that the 
justice of the Nuremberg trials would not only represent a changing of the course of history, 
but that History itself would be re-written according to the facts established within the trials, 
themselves.11 
Insofar as the Nuremburg Trials were the founding case of twentieth-century 
transitional justice practices, they represent in many ways a paragon of how legal justice 
practices during times of political transition can inform and shape a nation’s “historicization” 
of its own traumatic past. Owing to the exceedingly public nature of the trials, and their 
moral, political, and historiographic framing of the Nazi years, the Nuremberg tribunals 
profoundly reshaped the West German understanding of its own past and the bearing that it 
had, and continues to have, on the historical narratives of post-war “German guilt” (as well 
as to a lesser extent the awareness and comprehension of that history by the populations of 
the Allied nations, whose own understanding was equally guided by the Nuremberg 
narrative).12 
 At this point, it should be noted as a matter of clarification that in a certain colloquial 
sense there is some confusion regarding exactly what is meant by the “Nuremberg Trials.” 
While the first trial, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) – which was overseen by 
American, British, French, and Russian officials – received the most media attention 
(including several cinematic and literary reinterpretations13), the term in fact refers to the 
aggregate of the IMT as well as the twelve subsequent trials that took place at Nuremberg in 
the following years. While the IMT prosecuted the twenty four highest-ranking Nazi officials 
who had survived the end of the war for what it called “Major” war crimes, and was 
overseen by judges and prosecutors from all four Allied nations, each of the subsidiary trials 
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was conducted solely under American supervision, each attending to a particular civilian 
group or lower-ranking military officers. For instance, the Doctors’ Trial (1946-1947) 
focused on the twenty-three Nazi physicians who oversaw the mass murder of children with 
physical or mental disabilities in occupied territories (the “Aktion T4” program)14 and the 
development of the notorious “medical experiments” in the lethal application of Zyklon B, 
while the defendants in The Judges’ Trial (1947) consisted of fifteen judges and prosecutors 
from the Reich Ministry of Justice deemed responsible for implementing the Nazi “racial 
purity laws.” The IG Farben Trial (1947-1948), Flick Trial (1947), and Krupp Trial (1947-
1948), on the other hand, each tried various industrialists and personnel from notable 
German corporations who had aided the Nazi regime during the war (the dynastic family-
run Krupp corporation who had manufactured the majority of the steel, artillery, 
ammunition, and armaments for the Reich; agents of the Flick Corporation who had used 
slave labour and concentration camp inmates in its mines and factories; and IG Farben, the 
corporation who held the trademark for Zyklon B and other poisonous gases used by the 
Nazis). In addition to these, the subsidiary trials also consisted of the Milch Trial (1947), the 
Pohl Trial (1947), the Hostages Trial (1947-1948), the RuSHA Trial (1947-1948), the High 
Command Trial (1947-1948), the “Ministries” Trial (1948-1949), and the Einsatzgruppen 
Trial (1947-1948), which jointly cut a wide swathe in its targeting of civilians and military 
personal from all realms of German society, including bankers, economists, engineers, 
government officials, and low-ranking field officers. 
 The Final Report on the Nuernberg Trials, which was overseen by American Brigadier 
General Telford Taylor (who also served as Chief Counsel for the Prosecution in each of the 
trials), functions as a comprehensive report on all thirteen tribunals, although the most weight 
is afforded to the initial IMT, since it established both the judicial and cultural precedents 
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according to which the subsequent trials would unfold. 
 Famously dubbed “the greatest trial in history” (Marrus 563), the IMT was uniquely 
instrumental in the production of postwar German collective memories, due in large part to 
the unprecedented and sensational media coverage of the trial (including a famous rumour, 
broadcast throughout occupied Germany and Western Europe by the American Forces 
News Network, that Hitler, himself, had demanded to be admitted into the visitors gallery15). 
While many American and European news outlets sent their most high-profile journalists to 
cover the trials16 – including, among others, Walter Cronkite and William L. Shirer, who was 
awarded a Peabody Award for his coverage – Stalin had also anticipated the sensational 
“show trials” nature of the IMT, choosing to send Andrei Vishinsky – the actual prosecutor 
of the Moscow show trials (Bass 1039) – to serve as Russia’s representative for the 
prosecution. 
 But, while the IMT may have been regarded as a sensational landmark event by 
millions of viewers throughout the rest of the world, the twelve subsequent trials, in fact, 
would have a profound cultural impact on the formation of collective memories within West 
Germany. As Scott Allen Windham suggests, if the IMT demonstrated that executing the 
architects of the Holocaust could attenuate the horrors of the Nazi past, the subsequent 
trials would sound a contradictory note by suggesting that German society was laden with 
untold multitudes of Nazi sympathizers and collaborators (see Windham xv-xvi). Although 
the subsequent trials would drag on for several years and would not feature the same 
headline-capturing defendants as the initial IMT had, each tribunal would in fact play an 
important role in the unfolding of the Nuremberg narrative. 
 Hereafter, unless specifically designating a single trial by name (e.g. the IMT, or the 
“Doctor’s Trial,” etc.), this chapter will refer to the aggregate of all thirteen trials when 
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referencing the “Nuremberg Trials,” as such. Likewise, when referencing the Nuernberg Report 
or “Final Report,” this chapter refers to General Taylor’s Final Report on the Nuernberg Trials 
under Control Council Law No. 10 (which covers all thirteen trials). 
 
 
The Final Report on the Nuremberg Trials as History-Making: 
 
As we will see in the succeeding chapters, although the “final reports” on transitional 
justice practices often begin by carefully crafting a narrative history of the events in question – 
a summary of historical events in a story-based form – the Final Report on the Nuremberg Trials 
does not explicitly do so.17 Instead, the Nuremberg report provides a thoroughgoing historical 
overview of the Allied forces’ political and moral obligation to establish the International 
Military Tribunal in the wake of the unprecedented human rights abuses committed by the 
Nazi regime, and for the founding of the newly developed legal frameworks for the 
prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity that would override the individual domestic laws 
of any single nation. 
Although the official report, written and prepared by Brigadier General Telford 
Taylor (assistant to Chief Counsel Robert H. Jackson), does not explicitly present a 
comprehensive historical narrative of the years under the Third Reich, the document is laden 
with numerous overt references to the urgency for German historians to produce a definitive 
History of the Nazi years based on the findings of the tribunals. In other words, the Americans 
were insistent that a comprehensive history of the Nazi years should be composed by 
Germans, for Germans, but this historical narrative should be founded on the version of 
events that Allied prosecutors devised in the courtroom (one that would imply the shared 
guilt of the entire nation, not just the high-profile defendants sitting in the docks). In urging 
German historians to put the tribunal’s weighty findings to use, Taylor frames both the trials 
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and the report as the underlying arbiter of all “factual evidence” surrounding the Nazi years 
– which, as Taylor argues, “ought to” serve as the groundwork for any “truthful” historical 
record created by and for the German people (Final Report 30). Taylor and his team were 
shrewdly able to ensure the incontestability of their own historical narrative via the 
enactment of Ordinance No. 7 (Article X), which declared that any “fundamental questions of 
historical fact” uncovered during the initial IMT trial regarding “the aggressive character of 
Germany’s wars against Poland, Norway, etc.” (31), would be considered historical 
“certainties,” and would henceforth contribute to a “binding” historical framework 
according to which the testimony of defendants in the twelve subsidiary trials would be 
measured.18 The Final Report therefore served to verify its own authority as arbiter of 
historical “truths,” while simultaneously handing over the responsibility of history-making to 
the German people; as Anne Sa’adah puts it, “to disseminate information, and so to show 
Germans what had been done by Germans in the name of Germany” (156). 
The Nuremberg trials were intended, therefore, to circulate what the Allied victors 
determined to be indelible “historical facts” (Final Report 31) about the precise nature of the 
Nazi crimes to the German people, all the while urging German historians to use that 
evidence to craft their own historical narrative as a matter of moral exigency. By simply 
“[making] the facts available to German historians” (100), the Allied prosecutors cleverly 
avoided asserting ownership over the definitive narrative history of the Nazi years, while still 
maintaining control over the moral framework of those historical “facts” as well as the 
formal and stylistic guidelines for what a notional “History of the Third Reich” ought to 
look like: that is, an evidence-based appraisal of the “moral character” of those who were 
both actively and passively involved in the crimes of the Nazi regime. In this sense, although 
the Final Report did not explicitly present an overarching historical narrative of the Nazi 
 61 
crimes, it did serve as the critical determinant in the crafting of German history, to the extent 
that “historical facts” were validated according to the evidence presented in the courtroom 
and subsequently fixed in the permanent annals of the collective German consciousness via 
the dispersal and reproduction of these facts in newspapers, essays, novels, films, and on 
television. 
In outlining his precise intention to present the Final Report as an enduring history-
making document, Taylor adds: “one thing we can do is to make the facts available to 
German historians, so that future generations of Germans will be able to grasp the full and 
malignant import of the Third Reich, and understand why it proved such a terrible engine of 
destruction for the world and for Germany herself” (100). He continues: 
Never before has such a wealth of tested historical material been put at the 
disposal of scholars, as at Nuernberg. The reports and other documents of 
the German Foreign Office, the Wehrmacht, and other governmental and 
private institutions have been made part of a public record and have been 
subjected to all the explanations and qualifications that the very men who 
wrote these documents chose to advance. This is the raw material of history 
in wonderful profusion. (Final Report 100) 
By providing the German people with the so-called “raw materials of history,” the 
Final Report on the Nuernberg Trials indirectly set forth the building blocks of what would soon 
become the dominant narrative of the Nazi years, from within the carefully crafted moral 
and political framework of the Allied denazification project. 
By using the particular phrase “the raw material of history” – which is re-stated with 
greater emphasis in a later section that foregrounds the supposed moral benefit of the trials 
for the German people (101 and 117) – Taylor evokes a particular understanding of the 
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nature of History that would have been well known by the German historians to which his 
comments were addressed. Through his recurrent use of this phrase, Taylor brings to mind 
renowned German historian and sociologist, Wilhelm Dilthey. A contemporary of Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Max Weber, Dilthey was revered both for his work in securing the academic 
study of History as a human science, and for pioneering a well-known model of the social 
functions of a hermeneutics of history. In an oft-recited passage from his Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. 1, Dilthey writes: “The ‘philosopher who investigates the historical world has to get 
directly in touch with the raw material of history.... He has to subject himself to the same law 
of hard work on the raw material as the historian’ ” (Bulhof 116). According to Dilthey’s 
popular assertion, translated here by Ilse Bulhof, a hermeneutics of history entails a synthesis 
of historiography and anthropology. “Getting in touch with the raw material of history,” 
then, refers to a rigorous exploration of the collective aspirations, assumptions, and 
imagination, of the people in history. By stressing that individuals are as important as the 
empirical observation of historical facts or events, Dilthey advanced a model of history as 
representative of the multifaceted nature of collective consciousness. 
In light of Dilthey’s popular model of the social functions of history, Taylor’s 
comments would have been taken to mean that the history of the Third Reich is, at its very 
heart, the history of the German people – of their collective values, ethics, and aspirations 
throughout the Nazi years – and that the difficult “truths” uncovered during the tribunals 
were not merely meant to be solemnized, but rather, they were to be taken up and used by 
the German people, in an agonizing self-reflective endeavor to craft a cautionary narrative of 
their own political and moral failures. 
In many ways, even though the Nuremberg Report functioned more as a “legal” 
document than an explicitly “historical” one, it did in fact establish a precedent for precisely 
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how transitional justice practices would be absorbed into the cultural storytelling process by 
asserting its own status as the “raw material of history.” In a city and country so utterly 
reduced to rubble, General Taylor’s allegorical framing of the tribunal’s grim findings to 
Dilthian images of “building materials” and “reconstruction” would have further awakened a 
perceived urgency for the German people to “build” a decisive historical narrative of the 
new postwar zeitgeist from the moral and political debris of the Nazi years. 
As Taylor notes in his opening remarks to the IMT: “the United States Government 
has made a heavy moral investment in these trials, and this investment will not show a 
favorable rate of return if the [historical] records are left in the dust on the top shelf out of 
reach” (Final Report 100). According to Taylor, the primary reason for the American’s heavy 
moral investment19 in these trials was the facilitation of what he called, the conscientious “re-
education of Germany” (101). That is, the Allied prosecution’s overt and concerted effort to 
prevail upon the German people the seriousness of their collective moral failings by 
presenting the “historical facts” of the Nazi crimes in an edifying, didactic, and excessively 
moralistic way – “to prevent Germany from ever again upsetting the peace of the world” 
(101). As Taylor explains, the Allied prosecutors had two primary objectives in publishing 
the Final Report on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, which were linked in an unambiguous 
cause-and-effect relation: “To promote the interest of historical truth and to aid in the re-
establishment of democracy in Germany (100-101). In other words, there was a stated 
expectation by the American prosecutors that, were the German people to embrace a 
particular historical narrative of the Nazi years – one that was moralistic and remonstrative, 
not only in its condemnation of Nazi Party officials, but of all Germans who benefitted from 
the Nazi crimes – this would precipitate and expedite the re-establishment of German 
democracy. 
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In this way, from the very outset, one of the primary aims of the Nuremberg Trials 
was the production of a comprehensive history of the Nazi years, by and for the German 
people, in order to encourage and hasten the processes of democratization and 
denazification. It was, in fact, the newly established “Historical Branch” of the U.S. Army 
that collected many of the primary documents and conducted many of the interrogations 
that would later be used as evidence in the prosecution of the Nazi officials during the trials. 
In the midst of the war, the U.S. army – under the recommendation of President Roosevelt 
– founded the Historical Branch in order to document what it envisaged as a massive 
historical record of the Army’s WWII experience, in anticipation that this material would be 
of “great significance” in the direct aftermath. The Historical Branch was subsequently 
assigned to the War Department Special Staff, where it became known as the “Historical 
Division,” and placed under the command of a general officer, Major General Edwin F. 
Harding (Conn 120). Under Harding’s direction, a project was tabled for a multi-volume 
“official history” of the Army’s participation in the war, in order to provide a “great deal of 
detail that the Army itself needed for educational purposes” (Conn 120).20  
Under Harding, the Historical Division began production of the series, The United 
States Army in World War II – better known as the “Green Books” – by collecting documents 
seized during combat, and to “exploit enemy experiences” (Conn 120) of German officers 
who were captured as prisoners of war. These very seized documents and the transcripts of 
these interrogations would provide much of the so-called “raw materials” for the Nuremberg 
trials and its subsequent Final Report. General Taylor, commenting on the use of this material 
in the Final Report, noted that, from the beginning, the purpose for conducting these 
interrogations was with an eye toward their possible use as “historical materials” – as 
opposed to legal evidence for use in the tribunals – affirming, “[these interrogations] were 
 65 
not carried out in the manner of ‘pre-trial interrogations’ as known to American courts, and 
it never would have occurred to the interrogators, for example, to warn the individual being 
questioned that anything he said ‘might be used against him’ [in a court of law]” (Final Report 
59). Instead, these interviews were conducted, from the outset, with the intention of being 
used as “historical” material in the Army’s massive “History of the United States Army in 
World War II” project. That the bulk of the “evidence” used against the Nazi officials during 
the trials was initially gathered for the purpose of crafting a comprehensive historical 
narrative only emphasizes the intimate linkage between the tribunals and their implicit 
historiographic objectives. 
As Taylor notes, because these documents had been initially prepared and collected 
as “historical” material and not explicitly as legal “evidence,” they proved exceptionally useful 
in expediting the political and ethical aims of the Allied prosecutors during the trials (see 
Final Report 59). In noting that many of the Nazi officials who had been interrogated by the 
Historical Division had believed their testimony would be used merely as “historical 
material,” Taylor reveals that many of the captured POWs divulged valuable self-
incriminating information, which would later be used against them during the trials. In the 
Final Report, Taylor writes: 
For the most part, the Germans who were questioned at Nuernberg and 
elsewhere talked with the greatest freedom; indeed they were often much too 
voluble. Needless to say, many of them were worried about the possible 
consequences of their past deeds, and were anxious to give their versions of 
questionable episodes with little or no prompting from the interrogators. In 
their haste to justify, excuse, or mitigate, they were prone to reveal facts or 
circumstances of considerable importance from the standpoint of war 
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crimes, and were often eager to point the finger of suspicion at others if such 
behavior seemed advantageous to them. (Final Report 59) 
Moreover, in a detailed account of his own experience as Chief Historian of the 
Department of the Army, Dr. Stetson Conn notes that the aim of the so-called “Green 
Books,” which he refers to as “the largest undertaking in narrative historical work the 
American nation had ever known,” was not simply an attempt to craft an “official” history 
of the undertakings of the Nazi Party and their top officials, but also as “an attempt to craft 
…an official record of the whole of German society” (116). In other words, this project was 
intended “not merely [as] an [historical] account of battles and campaigns, but of a whole 
national society organized for war, using all of its resources, both human and material” 
(Conn 120). It was from within the heart of this far-reaching socio-cultural historiographic 
template that the Historical Division went about collecting the documents and conducting 
the interrogations that would later be used as “evidence” in the Nuremberg tribunals. 
There was, thus, always already an intimate link between the functionaries of the 
Nuremberg Trials, the directors of the Historical Division of the US Army, and the 
envisioning of a so-called “re-education” process in postwar Germany that would draw an 
explicit linkage between the crimes committed by the Nazi officials and the socio-cultural 
conditions throughout the German state that had seemingly “permitted” such atrocities to 
unfold.21 In the end, it would be this very connection that would ultimately frame the 
underlying discourse on the “collective guilt” of the German people, as the Nuremberg 
“Guilt Question” began to be taken up by newspaper journalists, local and federal 
politicians, historians, philosophers, and ultimately, novelists and filmmakers. 
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On Collective Guilt: 
 
 
“The guilt of the German occupation forces is not only proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
but it casts a pall of shame upon a once highly respected nation and its people.”  
 
(General Telford Taylor, The Final Report on the Nuernberg Trials 206) 
 
In its most basic sense, the Nuremberg Trials demonstrated to the immediate 
postwar world that the Law could give rise to a series of concomitant extrajudicial effects on 
postwar German society by awakening the collective shame, fear, sadness, and guilt of the 
general population. By, framing the trials in terms of strict “punitive” justice – that is, 
making the “punishment” of the criminals a key judicial priority, above rehabilitation or 
reconciliation – the Allied prosecutors were free to extend the moral scope of their verdict 
onto the average German citizen through subtle rhetorical contrivances that insinuated the 
entire nation was “on trial.” This awakening of a “collective symbolic guilt” was invoked 
through the controversial perception that the prosecution were implicitly portraying the 
defendants as representative of a guilty German public – it was, perhaps, the very blatant 
sidestepping of any explicit accusations of public complicity in the initial stages of the IMT 
that would induce the most thundering recrimination of the German people. As Scott Allen 
Windham notes, the issue of the defendants’ representativeness of the wider German 
populace was always implied subtly by the prosecutors, as “an unwritten subtext, rather than 
a manifest topic of discussion” throughout the trials (xx). On the one hand, the prosecution 
went to great lengths to create the pretense of exculpating so-called “everyday” Germans 
from their condemnation of top Nazi officials. On the other hand, however, they repeatedly 
demonstrated an unmistakable incredulity regarding how crimes of this nature and scale 
could possibly have been committed without the passive consent of the entire German 
population, as evident in the rhetoric of the prosecutors throughout the duration of the 
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trials. It was this very polarity – between the actual language of the judges, prosecutors, and 
courtroom journalists and the underlying subtext of their arguments – that provided the 
condemnatory tension from which a very public discussion of the collective guilt of the 
German people arose. 
The intended pretense of “universal exculpation” is most clearly evident in Justice 
Robert H. Jackson’s opening statement to the International Military Tribunal, in which he 
insists: 
We would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate the whole 
German people. We know that the Nazi Party was not put in power by a 
majority of the German vote. We know it came to power by an evil alliance 
between the most extreme of the Nazi revolutionists, the most unrestrained 
of the German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of the German 
militarists .... The German people should know by now that the people of the 
United States hold them in no fear, and in no hate …. Nazi arrogance has 
made the boast of the ‘master race’ a taunt that will be thrown at Germans 
the world over for generations. The Nazi nightmare has given the German 
name a new and sinister significance throughout the world, which will retard 
Germany a century. The German, no less than the non-German world, has 
accounts to settle with these defendants. (Jackson, “Second Day, Wednesday, 
11/21/1945, Part 04,” 98-102) 
 
As Windham suggests, “despite the prosecution’s approach, the question of 
representativeness was always the elephant in the room at Nuremberg” (xv-xvi). “If nothing 
else,” Windham writes, “the sheer number of trials (thirteen) and defendants (125 – many of 
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them essentially accused of aiding and abetting the regime) raised the question of public 
support for Nazi crimes,” adding that in the twelve successor trials, the accused included not 
only “those who had directly committed crimes, such as concentration camp doctors and SS 
leaders, [but also] those whose criminal dealings were much less direct, including 
industrialists, military personnel, judges, and lesser Nazi officials” (xv-xvi). 
The degree to which the perpetrators were to be judged as representative of the 
wider German public and the extent to which Germany was regarded as a “nation of 
Hitlers” was a continual theme of the prosecution’s campaign. As Wulf Kansteiner notes, 
the Nuremberg Trials participated in transforming the individual guilt of everyday Germans 
into a “collective symbolic guilt,” by merging the individual perpetrators of Nazi crimes (the 
defendants in the trials) with the general West German identity (6). 
In addition to the continual subtext of the defendants’ representativeness of the 
wider German populace, the defense’s own argument also hinged on a rationalization that 
the defendants in the twelve successor trials were merely following orders from higher-
ranking officials or, in the case of businessmen and industrialists, that they simply complied 
out of fear of retribution from SS officials. Together, both the dramatic displays of 
incredulity by the prosecutors about the public’s support for the regime alongside the 
defense’s “mea culpa” served to broaden the scope of guilt. As Windham adds, “Seeking to 
counter Taylor’s portrayal of defendants in the Justice Case, for example, defense attorney 
Egon Kubuschok argued that the justices’ guilt was mitigated because their role was simply 
to rubber-stamp the decisions of the Nazi inner circle. Yet in arguing that the justices 
‘merely’ followed directives they knew to be criminal, Kubuschok opened the door to the 
idea that wide circles of Germans had done the same” (xv-xvi). The issue of “collective 
guilt” raised during the Nuremberg trials – what Jeffrey Herf has also termed the 
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“Nuremberg interregnum” (Herf 69-105) – goaded swaths of ordinary Germans into 
arguments amongst one another about the root causes of Nazism, the degree to which a 
sense of collective guilt (if any) ought to be placed upon the shoulders of the masses, and 
about what could have been done to avoid the tragic events carried out under the Third 
Reich, but not about its fundamentally evil nature.22 
 Whatever is to be said of the prosecution’s overt suspicion of what they saw as the 
German people’s tacit consent to the Nazi regime, it was soon clear that the opening of a 
very public debate concerning the issue of “collective guilt” was to be one the primary and 
long-lasting outcomes of the trials. 
Within the discursive space opened up by the so-called “Nuremberg interregnum,” a 
number of highly influential public intellectuals also took up the question of “collective 
guilt.” Karl Jaspers would be one of the first high profile figures to seriously interrogate the 
relation between the Nuremberg defendants and their representativeness of the wider 
German public. During the height of public interest in the Nuremberg trials, Jaspers 
dedicated his 1945-46 winter semester lectures at the Freie Universitat Berlin to the 
intensifying public discourse regarding “collective guilt.” In a short book titled, Die 
Schuldfrage (“The Guilt Question”), published in 1946 at the conclusion of the first IMT trial  
and based on the Berlin lectures, Jaspers argues that the German population ought to be 
regarded as politically responsible for – but not morally guilty of – the mass murder of Jews. 
Distinguishing between the state and the nation, Jaspers declared that citizens of a “state” 
(Burger, a political concept) may be held responsible for the crimes committed under the 
Nazi regime, but the “people” (Volk, a social concept) could not be legally incriminated for 
them, since only individuals are capable of committing crimes that are punishable by law. In 
the wake of the first public Nuremberg trial, Jaspers argues for a type of moral responsibility 
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that would address the politics of the state, writing: “the political condition and the total way 
of life of people are not to be divided” (Jaspers 14). To this end, Jaspers forcefully argues for 
judicial investigations of Nazi perpetrators, while he openly rejects the notion of a collective 
guilt, since the defendants in the Nuremberg trials “in no way stood for the German 
majority” (Jaspers, as quoted in Windham 14). 
In this brief book, Jaspers thus addresses the question of the collective responsibility 
of the German people by firstly distinguishing between four main types of guilt. “Criminal 
guilt,” according to Jaspers, indicates the type of impartial and fair-minded assessment of 
evidence that finds a person (or a group of people) legally responsible for violating certain 
unequivocal state laws. According to this legal definition, which is to be judged on the basis 
of objective proof, both deliberate acts (such as assault or fraud) and passive acts (such as 
negligence) are marked by the same degree of intentionality and, therefore, the same burden 
of “guilt” is applied equally to both. Then there is “Moral Guilt,” which refers to an 
internalized sentiment that rests upon each individual’s own conscience; a feeling of having 
done wrong, or of having failed in some ethical obligation. This feeling is, of course, quite 
mercurial in contrast to the fixity of the legal definition of “Criminal Guilt,” and the 
distinction between negligence and intentionally injurious actions is much more imprecise. 
The third category outlined by Jaspers, “Metaphysical guilt,” is to be regarded, on the other 
hand, as an entailment of Jaspers’s own philosophy of transcendence and lends itself to a 
notion of a universal morality in which all men participate. Of “metaphysical guilt,” Jaspers 
writes, “There exists a solidarity among men as humans that makes each co-responsible for 
every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence 
or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty” (36, italics 
mine). According to this notion, all men have an ethical responsibility to one another which, 
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when not met, manifests as a unique and ubiquitous form of symbolic guilt. His last 
category, “Political guilt,” involves the deeds of politicians and implicates the citizens of a 
state for “having to bear the consequences of the deeds of the state whose power governs 
[them] and under whose order [they] live” (Jaspers 31). Jurisdiction rests, in this instance, 
with the power and will of the victor if the state should be defeated militarily.  
For Jaspers, the problem of “collective guilt” could only be resolved through the 
careful delineation of these discreet yet mutually implicated types of guilt, which had been 
conflated by the Allied prosecutors during the Nuremberg tribunals. According to Jaspers, 
the former Nazi officials who were on trial were undeniably accountable for their “criminal 
guilt” in the concentration camps, but ordinary Germans should only be left to negotiate 
their answerability to the more mercurial forms of “metaphysical” and “political” guilt, 
independent of any externally-imposed legal or moral demands. As Stephen Brockman 
notes: 
In contrast to many ordinary Germans who viewed the Nuremberg trials as 
an affront to the entire German people, Jaspers argues that because the 
Nuremberg tribunal clearly limits the concept of criminal guilt to a relatively 
small number of criminals, it actually relieves the German people of the 
accusation of criminal guilt - while simultaneously making their political guilt 
even clearer. (35) 
At the same time, another prominent German intellectual had also begun to address 
similar objections to the question of “collective guilt” that would inculpate the wider 
population. Writing from exile in New York City in the midst of the IMT, Hannah Arendt 
published her essay, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility” (1945), in the leftwing 
Zionist journal Jewish Frontier. Following Jaspers – her former professor at Heidelberg 
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University – Arendt’s essay centers on a similar distinction between “guilt” and 
“responsibility,” arguing that the conditions of life under the SS were such that it was “nearly 
impossible to distinguish between Nazis and [ordinary] Germans.” Prefiguring a theme that 
she would later expand upon in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Arendt argues that the 
result of the SS terrorizing its own people reduced each individual to either explicitly 
committing the Nazi crimes that were, at that time, on trial in Nuremberg, or of passive 
complicity through a form of moral negligence. The real “extreme horror” to which any 
person of “good will” ought to react, Arendt argues, was not the willing execution of 
millions of citizens, but that, according to the social strata that the Nazi regime established 
throughout Germany, “everyone is either an executioner, a victim, or an automaton, 
marching onward over the corpses of his comrades” (150). Along these lines, Arendt 
concludes that, “everyone, whether or not he is directly active in a murder camp, is forced to 
take part in one way or another in the workings of this machine of mass murder – that is the 
horrible thing” (“Organized Guilt” 150). 
The thrust of Arendt’s retort against American insinuations of collective guilt was 
rooted in a rigorous philosophical investigation of the lived-experience under Nazi rule. 
Since the American victors had not suffered the dreadful realignment of basic moral values 
under Nazi rule as the Germans had, it was impossible for them to comprehend the gradual 
gestation of such degeneracy within everyday, bureaucratic life. Simply by living their lives, 
Arendt suggests, the German people inculcated themselves into the “vast machine of 
administrative mass murder” (150), therefore rendering guilt both everywhere and nowhere. 
“When all are guilty,” she famously declared, “nobody can be judged” (150). For this reason, 
Arendt calls for a philosophical interrogation of the variance between a “collective guilt” and 
a “shared moral responsibility.” For Arendt, while some Germans were unquestionably more 
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“guilty” than others, the terror the SS had inflicted upon its own people had also condemned 
Germans, as a whole, to a certain moral “responsibility” for those crimes. In particular, 
Arendt identifies the upper-crust bourgeoisie – “[who were] sympathetic to Hitler …[and] 
aided his rise to power” (149) for personal gain, or out of ignorance and greed – as bearing a 
distinct measure of responsibility of the Nazi crimes. Yet, insofar as they did not wilfully 
conspire to carry out the horrors of the concentration camps, she asks: “Who would dare 
brand all these ladies and gentlemen of high society as War Criminals?” (150). 
Arendt then bears out this rhetorical line of questioning by directing her readers to 
an excerpt from an interview with a so-called “ordinary” German who is facing execution by 
the Russians for his role as a paymaster at an extermination camp. The undeniable emotional 
highlight of Arendt’s essay, the interview is enlightening for its illustration of the degree to 
which many Germans had trivialized the radical realignment of their basic moral values 
under Nazi rule, incorporating the Reich’s ideology of hatred into their everyday lives. After 
listing the types of activities that he had participated in through his role as paymaster – 
including poisoning inmates and burying them alive – the man expresses genuine outrage 
upon learning that the Russians might put him to death. All he can do is break down in tears 
and ask, “What have I done?” Arendt responds to his plea by suggesting, “Really he had 
done nothing. He had only carried out orders, and since when has it been a crime to carry 
out orders? Since when has it been a virtue to rebel? Since when could one only be decent by 
welcoming death?” (“Organized Guilt” 151). Arendt points out that the man had, in fact, 
simply complied with the orders of his superiors, “for the sake of his pension, his life 
insurance, the security of his wife and children [and thus] was ready to sacrifice his beliefs, 
his honor, and his human dignity” (152) – the very same argument that many defendants in 
the subsequent Nuremberg Trials would base their own public defenses on. In this way, 
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while Arendt condemns the vilification of the entire German nation, she also complicates 
the distinction between “guilt” and “responsibility” in a subtle yet complex way that only the 
German people could appreciate at the time. What struck Arendt was that, for many 
Germans, their passive involvement in the Nazi crimes did not instinctively result in feelings 
of guilt or remorse. Instead, it was not until the Allied victors began publicly interrogating 
the idea of a collective symbolic German guilt within the context of the Nuremberg tribunals 
that such questions arose. 
As the paymaster’s reaction illustrates, the perceived distinction between “guilt” and 
“responsibility” hinged on a similar justification: that simple bureaucratic acquiescence to 
Nazi crimes was a matter of survival for millions of “ordinary” Germans, while criminal 
“guilt” – which is implicitly tied to deliberate acts of clear intent – ought to be reserved only 
for those in positions of authority. The Americans succeeded in unsettling this traditional 
“guilt/responsibility” paradigm, however, by crafting a legal narrative that declared all acts of 
obedience to one’s superiors not only punishable by law, but as an equivalent moral offense, 
as well. As evidenced most explicitly in the Einsatzgruppen Trial (1947-1948) – the tribunal of 
the notorious “SS mobile death squads” that murdered roughly one million Jews in occupied 
territories – any low-ranking lieutenant or captain who carried out orders issued by his 
commanding officer was to be tried and convicted on equal grounds, with nearly all 
sentenced to death by hanging, regardless of their ranking. But while the American 
prosecution’s decision to undermine the “superior orders” plea – what chief prosecutor 
Taylor described as “howling with the wolves” (Final Report 109) – was described as a legal 
and moral necessity based on the severity of the crimes,23 it also provided an incontrovertible 
validation to the “collective guilt” narrative that would expedite and encourage the 
implementation of the denazification efforts (as we will see in the following chapter, in 
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contrast to the American approach, the Argentine commission tasked with prosecuting the 
former military dictatorship for murdering thirty-thousand of its own citizens had, in fact, 
determined it politically and economically advantageous to prevent any mood of “collective 
guilt” from circulating, and therefore, had deliberately structured its war crimes tribunals and 
concomitant narrative history to uphold the “superior orders” plea as a defensible and entirely 
forgivable justification for participation in mass murder). 
In many ways, the Nuremberg defendant’s plea of “superior orders,” which rested 
on the argument that one faced certain death if they failed to comply with senior commands, 
echoed many everyday Germans who had justified their own private acts of conformity or 
inaction as a matter of survival. As David H. Kitterman points out, more than fifteen 
thousand German troops were, indeed, executed for desertion or dereliction of duty by the 
Wehrmacht during the war (455), while scores of business owners claimed to have been 
similarly threatened with violence and/or the loss of property and assets for noncompliance 
to SS orders. For instance, the prosecution summarizes Gustav Krupp’s defense in 
Nuremberg trial No. 10 (The Krupp Trial) as follows: 
To avoid losing my job or the control of my property, I am warranted in 
employing thousands of civilian deportees, prisoners of war, and 
concentration camp inmates, keeping them in a state of involuntary 
servitude; exposing them daily to death or great bodily harm, under 
conditions which did in fact result in the deaths of many of them; and 
working them in an undernourished condition in the production of 
armament intended for use against the people who would liberate them and 
indeed even against the people of their homelands. (Final Report 110) 
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In time, the Nuremberg trials forced everyday Germans to radically reconsider their 
perceived complicity in the Nazi crimes through its carefully renegotiated ethical framework 
that conflated passive complicity with the symbolic weight of  “legal guilt.” In a sense, the 
Nuremberg trials had equated all those Germans who felt they had simply “complied for the 
sake of survival,” in a symbolic way, to the commanding Nazi officials who had been very 
publicly sentenced to death for their crimes during the IMT. As Kim C. Priemel and Alexa 
Stiller note, owing to the obvious equivalence between the defense’s plea of “superior 
orders” and many Germans’ own rationalization for their complicity and inaction during the 
Nazi years, “the Nuremberg trials rapidly turned from an [initial] effort at judicial reckoning 
to [an eventual] forum for protracted negotiations over German history...” (2). 
As the issue of widespread complicity became ever more prominent within 
journalistic and political discourse in the years to come, taking on a much wider cultural 
significance beyond its initial legal purpose, this ambiguity between the legal “guilt” of the 
defendants and the moral “responsibility” of the wider population would be correspondingly 
foregrounded in many literary and cinematic depictions of the trials. 
The cultural resonance of this debate had a particularly striking effect on Bertolt 
Brecht’s and Paul Dessau’s 1939 opera, The Trial of Lucullus, for instance, which portrayed the 
great Roman tyrant on trial before a judge and jury of the underworld following his death. 
Initially conceived during Hitler’s rise as a portentous forewarning of the grand promises of 
powerful despots – despite his infamy for unabated cruelty, Lucullus, like Hitler, boasted of 
his minor accomplishments, particularly the introduction of the cherry tree to Rome – 
Brecht and Dessau were later compelled to rewrite the opera’s final scene in the shadow of 
the Nuremberg trials. The original 1939 version had concluded with the jury withdrawing 
offstage to consider the verdict, which as Hans Peter Obermayer notes, “left to the audience 
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the decision whether or not Lucullus should be received in the Fields of the Blest” (“Yes, to 
Nothingness!” 226). According to Dessau, however, the moral ambivalence provoked by this 
original open-ending had now felt “out of date [in 1949] in view of current political events: 
the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials” (226). In light of the public debate surrounding the 
Nuremberg “Guilt Question,” Dessau and Brecht rewrote the concluding scene – titled Das 
Urteil (“The Verdict”) – to instead portray the chorus, representing the German people, as 
vociferously and unequivocally condemning the former tyrant in a united gesture of their 
shared moral responsibility. As the judge and each of the jurors emphatically condemn 
Lucullus, sending him off to eternal “Nothingness,” even the farmer who benefitted most 
immediately from the introduction of the cherry tree asserts a crystal-clear statement of the 
German people’s post-Nuremberg moral realignment: although they may all be morally 
responsible for the rise of “Lucullus,” it is he who must face up to the guilt of his crimes. 
But while many German writers and artists in the post-Nuremberg climate, like 
Dessau and Brecht, had gone to great lengths to demonstrate their – and their compatriots’ – 
lack of moral ambivalence surrounding the Nazi past, American political, journalistic, and 
artistic intrusions into the debate continually threatened to undermine any self-willed 
German progress on the “Guilt Question.” Particularly inflammatory was the perceived 
goading of the German people in Stanley Kramer’s critically acclaimed film Judgment at 
Nuremberg (1961). Encapsulated by the spirited opening statement made by German defense 
attorney Hans Rolfe – played by Maximilian Schell (who would win the Academy Award for 
Best Actor for this performance) – the film announces its central thesis of “collective 
German Guilt” at the outset, with a moving address that evokes the very same themes that 
Arendt had drawn upon in her 1945 essay. In the film’s climactic opening courtroom scene, 
Rolfe declares: 
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The statement: ‘My country, right or wrong...’ was expressed by a great 
American patriot. It is no less true for a German patriot. Should Ernst 
Janning have carried out the laws of his country? Or should he have refused 
to carry them out and become a traitor? This is the crux of the issue at the 
bottom of this trial. The defense is as dedicated to finding responsibility as is 
the prosecution. For it is not only Ernst Janning who is on trial here... it is the 
German people!   (Judgment at Nuremberg) 
 
As will be examined in greater detail in the following section, Kramer’s film was 
widely regarded within West Germany as epitomizing the arrogant, condescending, and un-
nuanced accusatory tone of the American prosecutors, and for “whitewashing” the moral 
complexities of the debate, which the German public was increasingly solicitous about 
cultivating during the immediate post-Nuremberg period (despite persistent American 
meddling throughout the 1950s). But while the American “Guilt Question” was perceived as 
being marked by a brash and rough-hewn accusatory style, the common German response 
initially evinced a more cautious – and for that reason, more nuanced – negotiation of the 
moral undertones of the debate. This self-styled introspective – perhaps even pensive – 
response, as initially typified by Arendt and Jaspers, would eventually come to constitute the 
boundaries of the German public response to what was considered to be a vulgar accusation 
by their American victors in the years surrounding Nuremberg. As the trials had awakened 
the burden of a “collective guilt” through the implicit rhetorical devices of General Taylor 
and his staff, the public discussions of this question in newspapers, on the radio, and in the 
streets evoked a painful, yet urgent, internal reflection on the part of the German people. 
Despite their supposed air of impartiality inside the courtroom, the American 
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prosecutors did little to hide their suspicion of the German people in licensed newspapers, 
radio addresses, press releases, and leaflets, prompting a series of indignant responses from 
several high-profile German newspaper editors and radio personalities. 
One of the most notable responses came from prominent journalist and editor of 
Die Zeit, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, who, as Mark A. Wolfgram notes, “lash[ed] out at the 
Nuremberg Trials and judges for having created the charge of collective guilt” (Wolfgram 
21). In response to what she called “the collective guilt that foreigners tried to place upon 
the German nation,” Dönhoff writes: “They [the judges at the Nuremberg Trials] portrayed 
everyone who had not deserted [the German Army] as a cad and stamped each who had 
stood up to the enemy [the Allies] a moral coward. How incomprehensible must that have 
been for all those who had endured and believed they had only done their duty” (Wolfgram 
121). 
In a similar vein, on January 22, 1948, Richard Tüngel – then editor-in-chief of the 
same postwar German newspaper, Die Zeit – published an editorial in which he starkly 
criticized the proceedings of the Nuremberg trials and the rumored conduct of the American 
prosecutorial team. Although many of the details that he cited were later proved to be false 
(or at least rumored exaggerations), the worries and apprehensions that he voiced echoed 
those held by many Germans at the time. In accusing the Nuremberg courts of imposing “a 
tragic mockery of American justice” upon the German people and comparing the tribunal’s 
approach to the practices of the special courts under the Third Reich, Tüngel calls for a 
“review of the prosecution’s method by a high-ranking, unbiased agency, so that the German 
people can develop confidence in the Nuremberg Trials” (“Nuremberg Law,” Die Zeit). 
Tüngel condemned the public’s acquiescence to the American dominance of the 
trials and the pervasive public silence in the face of rumors of “innocent witnesses [being] 
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detained for months,” of being “pressured into signing false records,” and of reports of 
“threats and intimidation to which witnesses [were] subject.” “But now,” he writes, “after six 
German lawyers have been arrested in court during the Krupp trial, now, when attorney 
[Ernst] Achenbach is threatened with the same just a few days before his client’s case goes to 
trial, now we can no longer remain silent” (“Nuremberg Law,” Die Zeit). In reflecting the 
same accusatory language that the American lawyers had directed toward much of the public, 
Tüngel declares that, “We do not want to be accused once again of merely watching like 
cowards when we believe that the law is being violated” (“Nuremberg Law,” Die Zeit). 
Instead, his article aims to turn the accusatory eye toward the American prosecutors. He 
concludes: “We accuse. We, who have always hated Hitler and his ‘Third Reich,’ we, who 
have demanded that the guilty of the Nazi system should be severely punished, we now find 
ourselves compelled to stand up and ensure that justice is done in Nuremberg” 
(“Nuremberg Law,” Die Zeit). 
In response to Tüngel’s Editorial, Die Zeit published a response from George S. 
Martin, Deputy Public Relations Officer for the U.S. Office of Chief of Council for War 
Crimes on February 12, 1948. In his response, Martin snidely chides Tüngel and, by proxy, 
the entire German people for whom Tüngel speaks. In a scornful and derisive tone, Martin 
writes: 
To the Editor-in-Chief, Dear Sir: 
It was with great interest that I read Mr. Tüngel’s article “Nuremberg Law” 
in your issue of January 22, 1948. I appreciate the fact that one occasionally 
finds in the German press a journalist who has an opinion of his own and 
also voices it. I appreciate it even more when that opinion is based on fact. 
Your ‘we accuse’ would have resounded in my ears had I not been roused to 
 82 
joviality by the man’s facts and the pathos-laden tone of his article, which 
reminded me so much of the Vo ̈lkischer Beobachter [the official newspaper of 
the Nazi Party]. […] I do not know the length of the detention in the witness 
wing of our court that enabled you to write such a lovely and touching 
description of our interrogation methods. Intimidation, threats, attempts to 
have false records of proceedings signed – you could have copied all of this 
from an old report on the Gestapo, if I didn’t know that you could never 
have published this article […] But the witnesses we have here were detained 
because they were charged by the courts of their own country, namely 
Germany […] And now suddenly you can keep silent no longer because 
Achenbach and six Krupp lawyers have been arrested. Why could you keep 
silent when Achenbach committed the crimes for which the German 
authorities arrested him? […] 
I will skip over the next paragraph of your article, the one in which 
you describe the facts in such a distorted manner that I would feel bad about 
the paper I would waste and about my secretary’s fingers, which I would 
overtax in my response. […] You can criticize the Nuremberg Trials all you 
want; nevertheless, they remain an institution in which one can participate 
with pride. Once you have understood what democracy is, you will also 
understand this. (Martin, “Letter to the Editor”) 
 
As a representative for the American prosecutorial team at the Nuremberg trials, 
Martin’s denigratory response to the worries and consternations of the German public only 
served to reinforce the underlying charges of collective guilt that many Germans had 
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detected in the rhetoric of the Allied judges and lawyers in the courtroom. Despite Justice 
Jackson’s and General Taylor’s fervent reiterations, again and again, that the “German 
people [were] not on trial,” that the Americans had “no purpose to incriminate the whole 
German people,” and that “the people of the United States hold [everyday Germans] in no 
fear, and in no hate,” the continual broaching of this issue (even in such a passive way) 
would be construed as a series of underhanded condemnations of the German public for 
their perceived complicity during the Nazi reign. That this issue was repeatedly raised by the 
American prosecutors throughout the course of each of the Nuremberg trials was regarded 
as definitive proof of an underlying vilification of the German people, even though the topic 
was couched in such passive and conciliatory language. 
While, on the one hand, these comments were certainly regarded as a series of 
concessions to the obligatory comportment and erudition of expected courtroom behaviour, 
they also underscored the ambivalence between legal “guilt” and social “responsibility” that 
even the judges and lawyers had difficulty negotiating. Even within the American 
prosecution team at the initial IMT, General Taylor and Justice Jackson openly disagreed 
about whether or not the Nuremberg trials should indict only high-ranking Nazi officials 
who would be perceived as symbolically separate from so-called “ordinary” Germans, or 
whether common citizens ought to have also been tried on the basis of the failures of their 
“moral character.” While Taylor held that the trials should focus solely on those former Nazi 
officials who represented the core ideology of the “Nazi Party,” Jackson was committed to 
indicting less-notable citizens who had colluded with the regime out of fear, or in the interest 
of what some saw as “self-preservation.” To his mind, the conjectural distinction between 
“guilt” and “responsibility” was not as clear-cut as public intellectuals such as Jaspers and 
Arendt would suggest, and he was unwavering in his efforts to prosecute all those who he 
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saw as being guilty of “moral cowardice” and “criminal irresponsibility.” 
The most notable instance of this disparity followed the acquittal of Hjalmar 
Schacht, the former minister of economics and president of the Reichsbank. Although 
Schacht had resigned as Economics Minister in 1937 over what he called, in his Nuremberg 
defense, “a change of heart regarding the direction of the Third Reich,” and despite his later 
connections to the July 20 resistance circles, and in spite of the fact that he had ended the 
war as an internee at the Ravensbruck concentration camp for his “disloyalty” to the Reich, 
Justice Jackson was adamant that Schacht’s prewar connections to the regime justified a 
conviction of the death penalty at the initial IMT trial. As Anne Sa’adah notes:  
In his closing argument, Jackson used Schacht to summarize the 
contradictions and moral depravity that first explained why men might have 
been drawn into collaboration with a criminal regime, and then allowed such 
men to maintain their innocence. Jackson condemned Schacht in personal 
terms for moral cowardice and criminal irresponsibility. Here, Schacht is not 
a ‘symbol’ or a stand-in for a state that cannot be placed in the dock; he is an 
individual who, faced with moral choices, repeatedly chose poorly, and then, 
when confronted with the reality of his actions, persistently denied that he 
bore any responsibility” (159). 
 
As General Taylor notes in the Final Report, “[Schacht’s] attorney [Dr. Rudolph Dix] 
no doubt spoke from the heart when he urged, on behalf of his clients… that the pressure 
and dangers of the Nazi dictatorship had forced them, out of prudent regard for the 
preservation of their businesses, to take many steps in self-protection which they would not 
have taken in less tense circumstances” (Final Report 48-49). Nonetheless, as the Schacht case 
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demonstrated, Justice Jackson was reluctant to draw a clear distinction between legal and 
symbolic moral guilt and, in doing so, overtly reinforced the charge of “collective guilt” onto 
those Germans who demonstrated what he regarded as a “moral negligence” in failing to 
defy the “Nazi machine.”24 
Jackson, in his dramatic closing statement declared that, “Schacht represents the 
most dangerous and reprehensible type of opportunism – that of the man of influential 
position who is ready to join a movement that he knows to be wrong because he thinks it is 
winning. These defendants … know that their own denials are incredible unless they can 
suggest someone who is guilty” (Jackson, “Closing Arguments” 104). 
This impassioned condemnation of a man whom many Germans had considered to 
be a courageous dissenter of the vicious Nazi ideology represented what many had perceived 
as an underhanded recrimination of the entire population by the Allied prosecutors. 
Jackson’s accusatorial language seemed to sum up the underlying subtext that guided the 
course of the Nuremberg tribunals: as an earnest and seemingly official legal tribunal, the 
primarily American orchestrated proceedings were only able to find those who, “without a 
shadow of a doubt,” could be proved guilty of committing Nazi war crimes; nonetheless, the 
Justices suspected that a much larger segment of the general population was, at least 
symbolically, guilty of some form of complicity, if not outright collaboration. 
But while the rhetoric of the prosecutors within Nuremberg trials was grounded in 
subtext and insinuation, the question of the defendants’ representativeness of the wider 
population was compounded by the larger simultaneous project of denazification, in which 
the Allied forces could be much more heavy-handed in their rhetorical approach. While the 
trials were unfolding in Nuremberg, the American occupation forces had also begun a 
simultaneous campaign of affixing propaganda posters throughout many German cities, 
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featuring intensely graphic photographs of the concentration camps accompanied by slogans 
such as: “These Atrocities: Your Fault!” (Diese Schandtaten: Eure Schuld!) (Fig. 2.1); “This is 
Your Fault” (Das ist eure Schuld); and “Whose Fault?” (Wessen Schuld) (Fig. 2.2). In smaller 
print, one of the posters featured the sensational caption: “In twelve years the Nazi criminals 
tortured, deported and murdered millions of Europeans. Men, women and children were 
hounded by Hitler’s brutish henchmen and tortured to death just because they were Jews, 
Czechs, Russians, Poles or French. You looked calmly on and put up with it in silence. […] 
You looked on and took no action. Why did you not shake the German conscience awake 
with some word of protest, some cry of indignation? That is your great fault – you share in 
the responsibility for this cruel crime!” (Fig. 2.1) As Aleida Assmann notes, the occupation 
forces had sent out a series of directives to Allied press agencies affirming that these posters 
were explicitly meant to convince the German population of their collective responsibility 
for the Nazi genocide, and to thereby contribute to the eradication of pro-Nazi sentiments 
that may have carried on in the post-Nuremberg years (Assman and Frevert 117). 
 
        
Fig. 2.1 Allied Propaganda Poster. Lithograph and letterpress 
Caption: “These shameful deeds: your fault! In twelve years the Nazi criminals tortured, deported and 
murdered millions of Europeans. Men, women and children were hounded by Hitler’s brutish henchmen and 
tortured to death just because they were Jews, Czechs, Russians, Poles or French. You looked calmly on and 
put up with it in silence. […] You looked on and took no action. Why did you not shake the German 
conscience awake with some word of protest, some cry of indignation? That is your great fault – you share in 
the responsibility for this cruel crime!” 
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Source: Imperial War Museum, London. Catalogue number: Art. IWM PST 8350 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Allied Propaganda Poster. Lithograph and letterpress 
Caption: “Excerpt: ...Who is guilty of the atrocities committed against humanity in your midst…?”; “YOU 
ARE GUILTY!” 
Source: National Archives, Baden-Württemberg, Dept. of the State Archives of Freiburg. 
http://www.landesarchiv-bw.de/plink/?f=5-171009-1. Accessed August 4, 2016. 
 
Given that these jarring images and condemnatory messages would surely have been 
interpreted in the shadow of the ongoing Nuremberg trials, the propaganda campaign served 
to conflate the two definitions of “judicial guilt” and a “shared symbolic guilt” in the 
collective psyche of the German people. To this end, the so-called denazification project can 
be considered a continuation of the wider project of transitional justice that the Allied forces 
aimed to achieve in West Germany – in fact, the trials cannot be interpreted apart from the 
denazification propaganda campaign – since a central feature of the transitional justice 
process includes the implementation of laws and ordinances based on the legal justice meted 
out during the judicial inquiries that are meant to both “correct” past injustices and prevent 
further offences from being committed in the future. To this end, the accompanying 
denazification laws and censorship directives aimed at purging German society of all 
remnants of Nazi ideology were a complimentary undertaking alongside, if not a direct result 
of, the Nuremberg Trials. 
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But while the Nuremberg tribunals would require the pretense of a dispassionate and 
even handed judicial prudence to signal an unequivocal transition to the desired post-Nazi 
cultural and political framework that the Allied forces had envisioned, the overtly damning 
propaganda campaign could more blatantly condemn the German public for their perceived 
role in the Nazi genocide. Together, within the context of this twofold campaign, the Allied 
victors worked to engender the collective sentiment that the internalization of a symbolic 
guilt amongst the German people was crucial in order to achieve the comprehensive sense of 
“Justice” that the post-war transition would demand. 
In this sense, the American overseers of the Nuremberg Trials were able to 
reconstruct the crimes, the history of those crimes, and the “evidence” of them on their own 
terms and according to their own socio-ethical paradigm which would then guide the way this 
particular historical narrative would become normalized through the processes of 
remembering or retelling – in other words, the careful controlling of the so-called 
“Nuremberg narrative.” 
 
The German Appropriation of the “Guilt Narrative” and the Ascent of Gruppe 47: 
 
The German reception of the trials was, from the outset, tempered by a very 
complicated set of political and emotional convictions.25 On the one hand, there was indeed a 
pressing need to come to terms with their shared past; but on the other hand, there was a 
pervasive sense of resentment that the judgments being leveled against top officials – and by 
proxy, the German public as a whole – were being overseen by the Allied victors. This 
“external” judgment was, thus, widely regarded as reawakening the national indignity of the 
Treaty of Versailles, which had, decades earlier, institutionalized a similar social framework 
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for the evocation of a collective German guilt. In the wake of the Nuremberg Trials, the 
national program of denazification was widely received in the shadow of Article 231 of the 
Versailles treaty, colloquially known as the “War Guilt Clause.”26 This much-debated article 
of the Versailles treaty, which had forced everyday Germans to atone for their government’s 
war-actions through the meting out of crippling economic reparations, had reawakened the 
ignominious ghosts of the past, and had once again forced the German public to internalize 
a collective sense of responsibility for their government’s criminal actions. In many ways, for 
the older generation of Germans who had already been forced to experience such a large-
scale sense of collective guilt following the First World War, the actions at Nuremberg 
would have built upon this historical precedent in a way that re-ignited the guilt of the past 
(particularly, its having been dispensed by the Allied victors) and re-figure these sentiments 
in the present moment. In this light, the criminal prosecution and removal of high-ranking 
officials from various government sectors during the Nuremberg trials was regarded for this 
generation not only as a slight against the German people, but also as an economic and 
administrative impediment to the postwar reconstruction efforts. 
 This “collective outrage,” as several commentators have noted (notably Mary Nolan 
and Wulf Kansteiner), translated into a relatively widespread refusal during the immediate 
aftermath of the Nuremberg trials to engage in any meticulous self-reflective interrogations 
of the extent to which so-called “ordinary Germans” were implicated in and were the 
beneficiaries of the Nazi crimes. Although a small number of prominent intellectuals, such as 
Jaspers and Arendt, had already begun to wrestle with the conceptual implications of a 
“symbolic guilt,” relatively few writers, artists, or filmmakers had genuinely begun to grapple 
with the concrete reverberations of the “Guilt Question” in the years directly following the 
conclusion of the Nuremberg trials. 
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These attitudes were reinforced by the many postwar hardships that most Germans 
were absorbed in at the time and which recalled the similar set of tribulations they had faced 
in the wake of the First World War. While decades earlier, these hardships had been 
symbolically bound-up with the Versailles Treaty’s austerity measures that reinforced a 
comparable sense of national guilt, once again the German people were facing a crippling 
food shortage, the inundation of many millions of refugees and displaced persons, and the 
utter destruction of cities such as Nuremberg, Dresden, Pforzheim, and Hamburg, all while 
grappling with the question of their own collective responsibility for the Nazi crimes. While 
the wider population digested the symbolic weight of the Nuremberg rulings, most Germans 
found themselves preoccupied by the postwar necessities of locating missing family 
members, finding suitable housing, and procuring enough food to feed their loved ones. 
With many major German cities in ruins, it is no surprise that the bulk of the immediate 
postwar literature sought out ways to illustrate these grave hardships confronted by the 
German population during and after the war, while sidestepping any rigorous examination of 
weighty moral questions. 
From within this desperate situation, a pronounced generational divide unfolded 
within the literary and cultural landscape, in which the older generation (who had lived 
through the previous invocation of symbolic guilt following the Versailles Treaty) sought to 
preserve the Expressionist principles of the Weimar Republic, filtered through the distinct 
language of political exile. Holding on to the weighty philosophical and moral ideals of the 
Weimar era, celebrated writers such as Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Bertolt Brecht, Erich 
Maria Remarque, Anna Seghers, Alice Rühle-Gerstel, and Alfred Döblin – who had each 
escaped Nazi persecution and censorship through self-imposed exile and had, therefore, 
avoided the immediate hardships that most postwar Germans were facing – continued to 
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articulate their experiences from both an intellectually and geographically “removed” 
perspective. Meanwhile, a younger generation who had come of age during the Nazi years 
sought to articulate the harsh reality of the present era via what they perceived as more 
meaningful Naturalist and, perhaps even, nihilist aesthetics. 27 Rejecting the grandiloquent 
language of their exiled predecessors, this new generation of writers attempted to create an 
original literary style that would allow them to “start anew, to proclaim a ‘zero hour’ from 
which to go forward” (21).  As Ernestine Schlant suggests, “In their search for a new 
language, [these] young writers of the ‘literature of the rubble’ [Trümmerliteratur] … 
experimented with a spare, colloquial style in the manner of newly accessible writers like 
Hemingway and Faulkner” (21), while also daring to wrestle with the “guilt” question that 
had been lingering on the horizon of public consciousness during the Nuremberg tribunals. 
Often war veterans, many writers of the newly emerging Trümmerliteratur generation 
had experienced the rise of the Nazi regime as young men and women, and had directly 
faced both the horrors and the magnetism of the regime from within. As drafted soldiers, 
several of these writers had been captured as American prisoners of war – including Günter 
Grass, Wolfgang Bolchert, Alfred Andersch, Hans Werner Richter, and Henrich Böll – 
where they were exposed to both the more restrained prose style of contemporary American 
literature as well as strict anti-fascist “re-education programs” meant to prepare them for 
becoming the future leaders of a liberated Germany.  
While in American POW camps, Andersch and Richter founded the German-
language newspaper Der Ruf (“The Call”), which according to critic Peter Demetz was widely 
regarded as “the most intelligent and liberal” German POW publication in the U.S. and 
occupied Germany (49). After the return of German POW’s, Andersch and Richter 
continued to publish Der Ruf in the American occupation zone, in which their discussion of 
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“topical issues, including collective guilt” were considered to be both “acute and intelligent” 
(Demetz 49). After the publication’s license was revoked by the U.S. authorities in late 1946 
on the grounds that the editors had been “promoting nihilism” – one of the aesthetic traits 
that has since come to define the Group 47 literary style – and because Andersch and 
Richter had subsequently come to criticize and reject American occupation in later editions 
of the journal, the contributors to Der Ruf established the literary association known as 
“Group 47,” which became the launching pad for several prominent authors such as Günter 
Grass and Henrich Böll. The aim of Group 47 was “to develop and use a literary language 
that stood in radical opposition to the complex and ornate prose style characteristic of Nazi-
era propaganda” (Grass, “The Art of Fiction, No. 124.”), alongside the conviction that 
literature would play a decisive role in the moral and intellectual changes in postwar 
Germany – a sentiment echoed in Andersch’s well-received 1948 essay, “Deutsche Literatur in 
der Entscheidung” (“German Literature at the Turning Point”).28 
It was within this cultural landscape that the “literature of the rubble” gained full 
prominence and commercial success among the war-ravaged nation, eventually eclipsing the 
illustrious stature of the previous Weimar generation of writers. The most common leitmotif 
of the German “rubble novel” is its reflection on the moral and political condition of the 
German people in the wake of its Nazi past. The utter devastation of many German cities, 
which provide the setting for these works, serves also as a metaphor for the moral 
devastation of the general population. But, as Robert R. Shandy notes, “rubble metaphors 
gradually gave way to phoenix metaphors” (150), and in time the Group 47 era of writers 
began to present a collective portrait in which Germany might rise from the ashes of 
National Socialism by way of a serious and genuine interrogation of its own culpability and 
involvement in the crimes of the Nazi regime. 
 93 
For these writers, owing to their involvement in the Wehrmacht, the Nuremberg 
tribunals served as the springboard for a critical self-reflection on their generation’s 
involvement in the Nazi crimes and, consequently, the heavy moral burden of a collective 
German guilt through their literary endeavors. In his celebrated and controversial memoir, 
Peeling the Onion (2006), Günter Grass admits that it was not until the Nuremberg trials that 
he truly understood the so-called “truth” about Hitler’s genocidal policies. “It was neither 
the (American) education officer’s arguments nor the overly graphic photographs he showed 
us [in the POW camps] that broke through my obstinacy,” he writes; “no, I did not get over 
my block until a year later, when I heard the voice of my former Hitler Youth leader, Baldur 
von Schirach… coming from the radio. Those accused by the Nuremberg tribunal of being 
war criminals were entitled to take the floor one last time before the verdict was read out. In 
an attempt to exonerate the Hitler Youth, Schirach asserted his ignorance, claiming that he 
and only he was aware of mass extermination as the final solution of the Jewish question. I 
had to believe him. I continued to believe him” (Peeling the Onion 196-197). Although 
conscripted members of the Waffen SS were exempted at the Nuremberg trials for being 
victims of so-called “involuntary servitude,” Schirach’s defense before the court served as 
the personal impetus for what Grass would call, “the German guilt that has lived on from 
generation to generation and must remain forever indelible” (Peeling 196). In reflecting upon 
this experience, he adds: “It was some time before I came gradually to understand and 
hesitantly to admit that I had unknowingly – or, more precisely, unwilling to know – taken 
part in a crime that did not diminish over the years and for which no statute of limitations 
would ever apply, a crime that grieves me still. [The] Guilt and shame it engendered can be 
said, like hunger, to gnaw, gnaw ceaselessly. Hunger I suffered only for a time, but shame…” 
(Grass, Peeling 196).  
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Before the publication of his memoir, Grass had already begun to wrestle with the 
question of “collective guilt” in his earlier essay, “What Shall We Tell Our Children?” (On 
Writing and Politics: 1967-1983). In this piece, Grass refers to the Holocaust broadly as the 
“German crime,” adding: “the past never ceases to be present to us, and we are still asking 
ourselves: How could such a thing happen?” (75). His decision to refer to the Nazi atrocities 
as the “German” crime bespeaks the type of collective responsibility that the Group 47 
writers had tasked themselves with confronting (and which, in many ways, separated them 
from their Weimar predecessors), while his choice of the deictics “we,” “us,” and 
“ourselves” – speaking reflexively in the first-person plural – inculpates the entire German 
population, suggesting that this is our crime, with which we must come-to-terms amongst 
ourselves. He writes: 
For the first time, I was confronted by the question: What explanation shall 
we give our children? It was easy enough to tell them what I had been doing: 
I was a Hitler Youth, aged seventeen at the end of the war and called up with 
the last draft, too young to acquire guilt. But when I was asked, ‘What if you 
had been older?’ it was hard to answer. How could I know for sure what I 
would have done? The belated anti-Nazism of my generation was never 
subjected to the danger test. I could not swear that, if I had been six or seven 
years older, I would not have participated in the great crime. My doubts were 
such that I was plagued by nightmares in which I felt myself to be guilty. The 
dividing line between real and potential action was blurred. (“What Shall We 
Tell Our Children?” 86) 
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Asking more questions than providing any concrete answers, Grass’ rhetoric is 
indicative of a young generation struggling to come to terms with their place in the history of 
the Nazi years. Continuing in this interrogative tone, he argues: “Thirty-five years after 
Auschwitz the problem confronting Germans is once more: What shall we tell our children? 
Or, more precisely: How are parents born after the war… to explain to their own children 
what was done ‘in the name of the German people’ in Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Majdanek? 
What are they to say of the German guilt that has lived on from generation to generation 
and must remain forever indelible?” (“What Shall We Tell Our Children?” 75-76). He 
continues, contemplating why other nations have avoided the oppressive sense of collective 
or national “guilt” for their own respective crimes, while the German people have taken 
upon themselves the full gravity of the Third Reich’s Final Solution:  
Other peoples have been more fortunate in a dubious sort of way – that is, 
more forgetful. No one thinks of holding the Russian people responsible for 
the mass murder committed in the name of the Revolution under Stalin. 
Relatively few citizens of the United States feel responsible today for the 
American war crimes committed in Vietnam. England, France, and Holland 
have successfully forgotten the injustice of their colonial regimes. All that is 
water under the bridge, ancient history, and history goes on. The Germans 
alone cannot evade their responsibility. The more inoffensive they try to 
seem, the greater the dread they inspire in their neighbors. Their economic 
success cannot conceal the moral vacuum engendered by their incomparable 
guilt. No amount of talk about the innocence of the Germans who had not 
yet been born or about the crimes of other peoples can relieve them of their 
guilt. Others point at them, and they point at themselves. With the same 
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merciless pedantry that tolerated, planned, and carried out the genocide of six 
million Jews, they go on asking themselves why it happened, and being asked 
(more urgently with each generation) by their children. As in the Old 
Testament, guilt lives on and is inherited. (“What Shall We Tell Our 
Children?” 76) 
 
It was in this vein that the Trümmerliteratur generation set about intruding upon the 
literary silence of the earlier generation of German writers, throwing themselves (and their 
work) into the highly charged public arena in which opinions regarding collective guilt were a 
daily topic on the political and cultural stage. Through their literary work, this young group 
of writers set about negotiating the so-called “meaning” and “significance” of the Nazi years 
in the shadow of the highly public legal tribunals that had directed their focus on this 
specific generation of Germans. Galvanizing various competing perspectives regarding the 
symbolic “German guilt” that was a daily matter of political and journalistic concern, these 
men and women set about engaging in a belated and impassioned struggle for control over 
the Nazi regime’s legacy, symbols, and its appropriate forms of public commemoration. In 
weaving together the individual and competing “lessons” provoked by the Nuremberg 
judgments into the storytelling fabric of a nation-in-transition, these writers appealed to an 
anxious population who was quickly readying itself to confront the full set of weighty issues 
linking the questions of aesthetic representation to issues of politics, history and public 
memory construction. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Group 47 writers and 
their contemporaries began to challenge the silence and apprehension of the post-
Nuremberg era, and helped prepare the cultural landscape for what would soon become a 
nation’s rigorous and inescapable confrontation with its horrific past. As Mary Nolan writes:  
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If this [interregnum] created a relatively quiet 1950’s for West Germany, the 
past came back to haunt that country with a vengeance thereafter. There was 
the Adolf Eichmann trial and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials in the 1960s, the 
television documentary Holocaust in the 1970s, the so-called historians debate 
of the 1980s, the 1990s controversies around Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners and the photo exhibition ‘War of Annihilation’ about the 
Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and the current debate about Germans as 
victims of the Allied air war. Each trial and public debate aired more aspects 
of the crimes of the Third Reich, each uncovered more about the voices and 
fates of victims, each revealed more about how implicated bystanders and 
beneficiaries were. (Nolan 153) 
 
As each of the successive Nuremberg trials unfolded, the so-called “facts” according 
to which the past was to be historicized became increasingly solidified into the collective 
consciousness of the German people, and was borne out in the novels, plays, and films of 
the Trümmerliteratur (and Trümmerfilm) generation. Taking up what Robert Shandley calls the  
“Seven R’s” that define the “Rubble genre” – redemption, reconciliation, redefinition, re-
stabilization, reintegration, re-construction, and re-privatization (Shandley 150) – this young 
generation of writers and filmmakers exemplified the extent to which the absorption of the 
Nuremberg question of a symbolic “collective guilt” wove itself into the cultural storytelling 
process during Germany’s postwar transitional period. 
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The Absorption of “Collective Guilt” into the Cultural Storytelling Process: 
 
While the 1950s were weighed down by what W.G. Sebald calls the silence in 
postwar German writing, the Sixties were instead constituted by a multitude of works that 
would mark “powerful intervention[s] in German historiography, or more precisely into the 
sense of history and the construction of the past in which Germans… still lived” (Jameson 
vii). In search of a new vision of its own past and the reconstruction of collective identity, 
this period is marked by what Fredric Jameson calls, a “feverish preoccupation with 
historical memory (and also autobiography), with mourning and melancholia, and finally 
with the Holocaust itself” (Jameson ix). 
Whereas much of the silence and apprehension of the earlier decades was at least 
partly rooted in a feeling of resentment from having the question of collective guilt 
“imposed” on them by their foreign victors, the 1960s saw a number of ancillary trials that 
were conducted by Germans themselves, in which the charge of widespread complicity was 
raised from within. The most prominent of these were the so-called Frankfurt “Auschwitz” 
Trials, which took place between 1963 and 1965. The longest trial in German history, the 
Frankfurt tribunals saw twenty-two former guards and officers from the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
extermination camp charged for their roles in the Holocaust under domestic German law – 
as opposed to international “crimes against humanity” laws. 
Whereas the Nuremberg trials had initially raised the question of a symbolic 
collective guilt through the rhetoric of the foreign Allied prosecutors, and the Eichmann 
Trial had insinuated at the possibility of a nation of “little Eichmanns” from abroad in Israel, 
the Frankfurt trials differed from these insofar as they triggered the emergence of a truly 
self-reflective examination of the issue of widespread complicity in the Holocaust by Germans, 
under German law. In highlighting the fact that “many [defendants] had successfully 
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reintegrated themselves into postwar West German society – even living openly under their 
real names,” Scott Allen Windham notes that it was the Auschwitz trials that finally forced 
ordinary Germans to publicly acknowledge that Nazi collaborators and sympathizers “came 
from various economic, social, and political backgrounds, representing multiple strata of 
German society” (Windham xxxii). For the first time, the German people were compelled to 
address these questions on their own terms. 
Insofar as the Frankfurt tribunals built upon and substantiated the themes of “guilt” 
and “representation” first raised at Nuremburg, a number of authors, filmmakers, and 
playwrights accordingly turned to the evocative backdrop of the courtroom-setting to 
interrogate the nation’s increasingly unreserved propensity to reflect on their own collective 
moral negligence under Nazi rule. 
Incorporating elements of the emerging genre of the “courtroom-drama,” a new 
body of works across various media centered on a specific form of dramatic tension 
produced through riveting monologues framed as “oral arguments” and featuring the 
archetypal “tortured soul” who is intimidated into a dramatic confession by a charismatic 
prosecutor. Building upon the recent popularity of American and British documentary 
realism, Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird (1960), Arthur Miller’s The Crucible (1953), Agatha 
Christie’s Witness for the Prosecution (1953), and Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood (1966), several 
authors and filmmakers took up this genre as a way of reconceiving the Nazi Crimes 
Tribunals within the morally and politically contentious landscape of transitional Germany, 
across a multitude of mediums. From Heinrich Böll’s novel Group Portrait With A Lady 
(1971), Hannah Arendt’s study Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), Peter Weiss’ play The Investigation 
(1965), Bertolt Brecht’s opera The Trial of Lucullus (1951), and Wolfgang Staudt’s film The 
Murderers Are Among Us (1946), these works met the question concerning “collective guilt” 
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head-on in a self-reflective attempt to begin the painful process of re-negotiating the past. 
Commenting on several of these works, Windham writes:  
In each case, the defendants are portrayed as representatives of a guilty 
German public, symbols of widespread complicity, silence, and tacit approval 
in the face of Nazi crimes. Produced in an era of documentary realism in the 
arts, each of these works relies on the authority of the legal system and of 
historical fact to legitimize this conclusion: these works usurp the authority 
of the trials they depict, presenting themselves as proxies for the trial that 
should have taken place. (Windham xxxvi) 
 
By taking up the supposed legal and moral authority of the various trials as a literary 
leitmotif, each of these works aimed to equate the trial of Nazi defendants with the wider 
German public who, if only within a literary or filmic sphere, could at last face the judgment 
that their authors deemed to be truly warranted. 
 Heinrich Böll’s celebrated 1971 novel, Group Portrait With A Lady – which the 
Swedish Academy singled out in their press release for his 1972 Nobel Prize as his “magnum 
opus… which so far crowns his work” (“The Nobel Prize”) – is perhaps one of the most 
distinctive examples of this type of literary “reclaiming” of the question of German guilt via 
the “courtroom” genre. A parody of the documentary form, the novel is presented under the 
pretense of being a genuine portrait of a fictional woman, Leni (the lady of the title), 
produced via a meticulous inventory of “testimony” from witnesses (who make up the 
“group portrait”) who had encountered her throughout the Nazi years. Böll goes to 
painstaking lengths to create the pretense that Group Portrait is, in fact, not a novel, but rather 
an authentic documentary account of Leni’s life, which, in many ways, mimics the very style 
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and form of the Final Report on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials in its dry, indexical recording 
of “testimony” and “evidence.” 
 Incorporating a key element of many post-Nuremberg novels – including Johannes 
Mario Simmel’s Ich Gestehe Alles (I Confess) (1953), Ilse Aichinger’s Die größere Hoffnung (The 
Greater Hope) (1948), and Hans Werner Richter’s Sie fielen aus Gottes Hand (They Fell From God’s 
Hand) (1951) – Böll radically breaks from the broad idealism and Classicist aesthetics of the 
Weimar era writers by eschewing any type of flowery appeal to universal emotional 
sentiments in favour of a tedious (perhaps even mundane), detail-oriented satire of the 
documentary form. In stark contrast to the seemingly overwrought affectations of the 
Weimar novelists (whose employment of neo-Romanticist aesthetics has been historically 
linked to the rise of German nationalism29), Böll undercuts any sentimental or melodramatic 
pretense, opting instead for a cold and stodgy chronicling of the collected “facts” about 
Leni’s life. As Mark Story notes, in Böll’s novel “the emotional turmoil of Germans living 
through and after the war is offset by the dry, laconic stand taken by the [narrator], where 
emotions tend to be recorded in a deadened shorthand: T, W, L, and B stand, respectively, 
for Tears, Weeping, Laughter, and Beatitude, and we are referred to encyclopedia definitions 
of these terms…” (Storey 16). 
 Taking up the role of an impartial investigator who interviews other characters in his 
search for the “truth” about Leni, Böll inserts himself – referred to self-deprecatingly as “the 
Au.” (the Author) – as one of the protagonists of the novel. “The Au.” becomes the 
instrument through which the various “witnesses” and “informants” are introduced, one 
after the other, recording even the most innocuous incidents in the hope that they might 
prove valuable in the ostensible investigation, while he (and the readers) painstakingly 
attempt to distinguish between fact and rumour. 
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 While “the Au.” investigates Leni’s mercurial past, he encounters Sister Rahel 
(“Rachel”) Maria Ginzburg, a Jewish nun who has apparently “disgraced” her order, owing 
to her Jewish ancestry and her so-called “notorious” sexual reputation prior to joining the 
convent. As “the Au.” states, she “had not – to put it mildly – lived an entirely platonic life” 
(Group Portrait 365). Rahel, the lone Jewish character in the novel, converted from Judaism to 
Catholicism in 1922, the same year that Hitler was appointed chairman of the National 
Socialist Party after gaining notoriety for his infamous beer hall speeches against German 
Jews. Removed from the classroom for fear that she might “contaminate” her young 
students, Rahel is reduced to the humiliating role of examining the female pupils’ stool each 
morning, where she develops a close relationship to a young Leni. As Leni’s mentor, and the 
model for all that is morally “right” in the novel, Rahel serves as a continual reminder to 
Böll’s readers of the abhorrent anti-Semitic prejudices and abuses of German Jews by their 
parents’ generation.  
 Together, Rahel and “the Au” carry out a meticulous investigation into Leni’s past in 
a manner reminiscent of the Allied prosecution’s approach at the war crimes tribunals, even 
appropriating verbatim testimony from the Nuremberg IMT tribunal and reimagining it as 
though the defendants were testifying directly to “the Au.” Presented as if they are the 
recorded entries in a methodical investigative report, “the Au.’s” collected accounts of Leni 
are presented in a style that parodies the conventional prudence of courtroom rhetoric. As 
he “collects” his various reports on Leni’s past, the narrator constantly equivocates and 
hedges his statements – “At this stage we can do no more than indicate something which, in 
the course of this account may be eventually proved...” (Group Portrait 37) – parodying the 
type of cautious rhetorical “tiptoeing” of the American prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials 
that was meant to demonstrate a certain pretense of judicial objectivity. Nothing is said of 
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Leni that is not substantiated by a “witness,” and we are always told exactly who it is that 
provided the evidence, no matter how inconsequential it may seem. 
Imbued with a surfeit of excerpts from actual historical documents of Nazi 
bureaucracy – including a Nazi military service manual from 1939 and transcripts of 
defendant’s testimony from the first Nuremberg trial – Böll’s Group Portrait doubles down on 
the post-Nuremberg approach to re-appropriating the War Crimes Tribunals in a reimagined 
literary context. By expropriating the actual testimony of several Nuremberg defendants 
(most notably Albert Speer), Böll re-contextualizes the remarks made by former Nazi 
officials – intermixing them with other unrelated probes made by lawyers from both the 
prosecution and defense – in order to fabricate the courtroom dialogue that he envisaged; 
thus, reframing justice in a way that probes the question of German guilt from an explicitly 
German perspective (for instance, the reimagined dialogue between Albert Speer and Dr. 
Fläschner on pages 290-291). 
 In Böll’s literary reimagining, the Nuremberg defendant’s ludicrous attempts to 
justify and rationalize their actions are mirrored in the statements made by so-called 
“ordinary” Germans – including soldiers, academics, musicians, members of the Church, and 
“anonymous exalted personages.” The Au’s interactions with everyday Germans are framed 
as though each character is under investigation; descriptions of prosaic activities are logged 
as “evidence” – including Mrs. Pfeiffer’s possession of “a bottle of the finest sherry” (133) – 
and simple dialogue is described as a character’s “testimony” (72) or, upon saying goodbye, 
is marked as their “concluding remarks” (133). In Böll’s rendering – with the exception of 
Rahel – all characters are seemingly corrupt and their “testimony” is almost always 
suspicious. Together, the various fragments of testimony that the Au. gathers throughout the 
course of his investigation come together as the “building blocks of history” to construct a 
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“group portrait” (albeit, one that reads more like a “report”) of the German people during 
the Nazi years, as though it were the entire nation that were on trial, while Böll and his 
readers sit in judgment. 
 In a similar way, Peter Weiss’ play The Investigation: Oratorio in 11 Cantos (1965), which 
explicitly reproduces the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, also features dialogue and witness 
statements taken verbatim from the trial, of which Weiss was an observer. Premiering two 
months after the German court handed down its convictions, Weiss’ play foregrounds 
certain continuities between the common arguments made by Nazi defendants (of 
complicity out of fear of retribution from SS forces) and the prevailing views of the West 
German public – highlighting the complicated reception by the German public to the 
accusations and convictions handed down by both the foreign and domestic courts. 
The Investigation is set in the courtroom at the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, but Weiss 
did not intend the play to serve as an actual reconstruction of the tribunals. Instead, the play 
was meant to emphasize the disparity between the testimony of the victims and the vacuous 
alibis of the defendants. As he states in the “Author’s Notes” for the play: “no attempt 
should be made to reconstruct the courtroom before which the proceedings of the camp 
trial took place. Any such reconstruction would, in the opinion of the author, be as 
impossible as trying to present the camp itself on stage.” (The Investigation 118.) 
Mirroring Dante’s Divine Comedy, the play is divided into eleven “cantos,” each of 
which is subdivided into three parts – 33 in total – meant to depict the progression of the 
victims from their arrival at Auschwitz to their unspeakable collective fate in the gas 
chambers. Throughout this “progression,” Weiss avoids any semblance of dramatic 
embellishment, focusing instead only on the spoken testimony, which was taken verbatim 
from the trial. Unlike at the historical trial, Weiss’ play reduces the number of defendants 
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from twenty-two to eighteen, while the statements of several hundred witnesses are 
condensed in the play to only nine. Two of the witnesses in Weiss’s adaptation portray 
former Auschwitz officers (although the camp, as well as the Holocaust, are never explicitly 
named) but side with the defendants on moral grounds, while the others are victims who – 
through an unlikely series of coincidences (as they repeatedly emphasize) – survived the 
camp. The victims’ testimonies, which make up the bulk of the dialogue in the play, are 
numbing in their endlessly detailed inventory of the atrocities committed at the 
concentration camp, while the perpetrators counter with derisive denials and clichéd 
rejections of their individual guilt. As Weiss notes, based on his own experience as an 
observer at the Frankfurt Trials: 
Hundreds of witnesses appeared before the court. The confrontations 
between witnesses and defendants, as well as the address to the court by the 
prosecution and the replies by the counsel for the defense, were overcharged 
with emotion. Only a condensation of the evidence can remain on stage. This 
condensation should contain nothing but facts. Personal experience and 
confrontations must give way to anonymity. Inasmuch as the witnesses in the 
play lose their names, they become mere anonymous voices. The nine 
witnesses sum up what hundreds expressed [...] Each of the 18 defendants, 
on the other hand, represents a single and distinct figure. They bear names 
taken from the record of the actual trial. The fact that they bear their own 
names is significant, since they also did so during the time of the events 
under consideration, while the prisoners had lost their names. Yet the bearers 
of these names should not be accused once again in this drama. To the 
author, they have merely lent their names, which here stand as symbols of a 
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system that implicated in its guilt many others who never appeared in court. 
(The Investigation 118-119) 
 
In this way, Weiss reimagines his play as the judicial stage upon which countless 
German collaborators and apologists would be judged, by proxy. In reorganizing and re-
contextualizing the fragments of testimony from the historical trial, Weiss – like Böll – is 
able to reframe the tribunal as one that explicitly links the defendants to a guilty Germany by 
highlighting the complicity, silence, and tacit approval that permeated their testimony. Weiss 
opens up space for an evocative public discussion concerning the actual degree to which 
“ordinary Germans” had room for individual action and responsibility, even under the most 
severe circumstances, by using the legal system and historical facts to undercut the actual 
historical tribunals and reconceive them as putting the entire nation on trial. Weiss’ play 
challenges many of the preconceived justifications that arose out of the resentment and 
indignation triggered by the initial Nuremberg tribunals by challenging the conventional 
defense that thousands of citizens were forced into conformity out of fear of retribution 
from SS forces. Undercutting the notion that the Allied victors could possibly have 
pronounced any type of judgment that was commensurate with the horrors of the 
Holocaust, the play ends before the verdicts are announced, leaving the German audience to 
take up the responsibility of judging for (and amongst) themselves how to adequately 
confront their collective roles in the Nazi crimes. 
Immediately following the premiere of Weiss’ play in 1965, fellow German 
playwright Martin Walser published a scathing review of the media portrayal of the Frankfurt 
Auschwitz Trials, titled “Unser Auschwitz” (“Our Auschwitz”). In his essay, Walser 
condemns the media portrayal of defendants as “devils,” “executioners,” and “predators,” 
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and, unlike the American prosecutors, categorically exculpates the general German public by 
representing Nazi officials as wholly Other. “We [West Germans] have nothing to do with 
these events, with these horrors – we know this for a fact,” Walser writes. “These acts of 
brutality can’t be shared. This trial isn’t about us. It’s not for nothing that the accused are 
called ‘devils’ and ‘executioners’ and ‘beasts of prey’ in the news reports. After all, who 
among us is a devil, an executioner, a beast of prey?” (The Burden 7-8). However, as 
Windham suggests, precisely what makes Walser “uncomfortable is the truth that the 
defendants were, in fact, remarkably like other Germans, even ‘interchangeably similar’” 
(Windham xxxii). 
Thus, the anxiety at the heart of both Böll’s and Weiss’ literary re-imaginations of the 
Nazi war crimes trials, as well as Walser’s review, is that the Holocaust had, in fact, been 
carried out by average Germans and that, in the wake of the initial American judgment, it 
was now time to address this tension on their own terms. 
While the various Nazi crimes tribunals triggered a wave of new moral introspection 
amongst a wide range of German authors and filmmakers, they also served as the impetus 
for other writers and artists to reconsider their past attempts to negotiate the trauma of the 
Nazi years. Bertolt Brecht’s 1939 poem, “An die Nachgeborenen” (“To Those Who Follow in 
Our Wake”) – written at the height of Nazi sympathy in Germany, and at the outbreak of 
the war – appeals to posterity to consider the terrible circumstances in which they lived, 
before condemning his entire generation. This poem, addressed to subsequent generations, 
implores future Germans to consider the complicated perils of his time, and to take heed 
before denouncing all of Germany. 
You, who shall resurface following the flood 
In which we have perished, 
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Contemplate – 
When you speak of our weaknesses, 
Also the dark time 
That you have escaped. 
But you, when at last the time comes 
That man can aid his fellow man, 
Should think upon us 
With leniency. 
(Brecht, 722) 
The apprehensive tone with which Brecht, in 1939, implores future Germans to look 
upon his generation “with leniency” can be read in direct contrast to the more searing nature 
of his later re-staging (with composer Paul Dessau) of The Trial of Lucullus (1951),30 which, 
like Böll and Weiss, takes up the “courtroom” leitmotif as a means of confronting the past. 
Originally written by Brecht as a short radio play in 1940, it was reworked as an opera with 
music by Dessau directly following the conclusion of the Nuremberg Trials. In a way, 
Brecht’s 1951 re-staging of his earlier work might be regarded as his own attempt to appeal 
to the generation that he had called, in his 1939 poem, the Nachgeborenen.  
Like Weiss and Böll, Brecht’s reimagining of the Nazi war crimes trials served to 
reconstitute the judgment and sentence of the trials beyond the moral framework of the 
Allied prosecution at Nuremberg. Composed and received very much in the shadow of the 
IMT, the play’s abhorrence of dictatorship could hardly be stronger. In Brecht’s metonymic 
adaptation of the trial of Roman dictator Lucullus, various witnesses establish “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” that his sole humanitarian achievement, the introducing of the cherry tree 
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to Rome, hardly reconciles the loss of 80,000 lives under his savagery. He must, instead, be 
consigned to eternal nothingness, as the plebeian jury gains its justice. In this reimagined 
literary context, the play’s chorus – standing in for the entire German nation – is granted a 
symbolic do-over; the chance to perform a collective, unequivocal renunciation of Hitler’s 
Nazi regime, via the proxy Lucullus, which they had failed to do in the historical moment. 
As a parabolic gesture of their newly awakened ethical maturity, the second-chance 
repudiation afforded by Brecht’s and Desau’s opera is furthermore reimagined as coming 
from the hearts of the German people, of their own accord, as opposed to being publicly 
dragooned into penitence by their foreign occupiers. 
THE FISHWIFE:  
Yes, to Nothingness!  
THE TEACHER:  
Yes, to nothingness!  
THE BAKER  
Yes, to nothingness!  
THE SPEAKER:  
And they look at the farmer  
The praiser of the cherry tree.  
What say you, farmer? (Silence)  
THE FARMER:  
Yes, to nothingness!  
ALL:  
Yes, to nothingness With him and all his kind!  
(“The Trial of Lucullus” 129) 
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Whereas Brecht’s dramatic re-conception of the Nuremberg trials centres on an 
imaginary sense of satisfaction garnered from the fictional judgment of Nazi officials by a 
jury of German citizens – as an entirely German act of redress – Stanley Kramer’s film 
Judgment at Nuremberg (1961), instead, perpetuated the initial anxieties and resentments that 
arose in response to the overseeing of the tribunals by Allied victors. In Kramer’s acclaimed 
adaptation of the “greatest trial in history,” the American ascendancy over the tribunals is 
actually exaggerated for its Hollywood audience, reigniting the charges of collective 
complicity from their foreign victors. 
Nominated for eleven Academy Awards, including Best Picture, Best Director, twice 
for Best Actor (Maximilian Schell and Spencer Tracy), and both Best Supporting Actor 
(Montgomery Clift) and Actress (Judy Garland), the film was a major success both in the 
United States and internationally. Controversially, however, Kramer had decided to premiere 
Judgment at Nuremberg in Berlin, rather than in the U.S., on December 14, 1961 – just one day 
before Adolf Eichmann was to be sentenced in Israel – and asked his entire star-studded cast 
to be present (all but Burt Lancaster attending). At a time when tensions were particularly 
high about the perceived image of Germans around the world – especially in the United 
States, where the Eichmann trial was widely broadcast – the premiere of Kramer’s highly 
anticipated film threatened to undermine any perceived progress on the “Guilt Question” 
following a decade of burdensome public debate and inner-reflection.  
Centering on the question of German complicity and widespread guilt, the film was 
widely regarded within West Germany as perpetuating the condescending, patronizing, and 
derisive American attitudes that had lingered in the hearts of Germans since the conclusion 
of the initial IMT, and was lambasted for its seemingly un-nuanced, anti-German rhetoric. 
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Many German officials worried that the film had “whitewashed” the complexities of the 
symbolic guilt that Germans had painstakingly grappled with for decades and were fearful 
that “Judgment at Nuremberg could potentially threaten years of careful [self-reflective] work” 
in this regard (Etheridge 162). As Brian C. Etheridge notes, many Germans considered 
Judgment at Nuremberg to be “part of what they increasingly referred to as an antideutsche well, or 
anti-German wave, in the American mass media” (162). In this way, “the film about the 
Nuremberg trials threatened to resurrect old war narratives of the German people that 
painted them as arrogant, servile, crude, and ultimately unrepentant for their crimes” 
(Etheridge 162). In an exhaustive survey of how Judgment at Nuremberg registered in West 
German film reviews, Robert G. Moeller notes the general condemnatory tone that most 
critics took: 
Kramer’s didacticism became tiresome, his zeal at addressing such a broad 
range of problems left him unable to resolve any of them, and his three-hour 
plus attempt to ‘master the past’ ended up mastering very little. Most of what 
Kramer and Mann had to offer, critics implied, West Germans already knew 
and in fact knew better than these interlocutors from the other side of the 
Atlantic. (Moeller 508) 
 
While many West German writers, such as Böll and Weiss, personified the more 
cautious and nuanced style of negotiating the “Guilt Question” that had gradually developed 
throughout the 1950s, Kramer’s film threatened to undo much of this work by perpetuating 
a crude and unsophisticated American caricature of the Nuremberg defendants as 
representative of an entire guilty nation. 
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Seeking to undercut these charges, West-Berlin Mayor, Willy Brandt, stated at the 
premiere of the film: 
We cannot deny the fact, and we do not want to deny it, that the roots of the 
present position of our people, our country, and our city lie in this fact: that 
we did not prevent right from being trampled underfoot during the time of 
the Nazi power […] It will probably be difficult for us to watch and hear this 
film. But we will not shut our eyes to it. I hope that world-wide discussion 
will be aroused by both this film and this city, and that this will contribute to 
the strengthening of right and justice. (Starr 236) 
 
Despite Brandt’s efforts, the West Berlin premiere of the film was met with a 
“stunned silence,” followed by applause, but only from the non-German press (Nixon).  As 
Kramer later noted, “The film was totally rejected: it never did three cents’ business in 
Germany. It played so many empty houses, it just stopped. People asked how could I, an 
American, try to rekindle German guilt? Well, I said that it would indeed have been better if 
the Germans had made it, but the fact is they didn’t. So I did” (Von Tunselmann, “Poetic 
Justice for Holocaust perpetrators”).  
The problem, however, was that – as Böll, Weiss, and many others had already 
demonstrated – many German writers and filmmakers had, in fact, been actively engaged in 
this exact type of endeavour. Alongside the Trümmerliteratur genre – which Böll, Grass, and 
others had exemplified – this period of German cultural expression also gave rise to the 
corresponding Trümmerfilm movement (“Rubble film”). Most notable, perhaps, was 
Wolfgang Staudte’s acclaimed 1946 film, “Die Mörder sind unter uns” (The Murderers Are 
Among Us). 
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Confronting the same underlying theme of Kramer’s film – that the perpetrators of 
Nazi crimes were not only to be found amongst the elite of Nazi society, but that they had 
been more or less absorbed into all stratums of postwar society – The Murderers Are Among 
Us probed the legacies of guilt and trauma amongst ordinary Germans, from within the 
sophisticated self-reflective viewpoint of the generation who had come of age within the 
Third Reich. 
Juxtaposing the war crimes tribunals with an idealistic fantasy of vigilante justice – a 
theme that several cinematic and literary works following the Argentine and Canadian truth 
commissions would also address, such as Ariel Dorfman’s play Death and the Maiden (1990) 
and Jeff Barnaby’s film Rhymes for Young Ghouls (2013) – The Murderers Are Among Us fully 
encapsulated the American “Guilt Question” narrative, reflecting back the Nuremberg 
precept that “decent” everyday Germans ought to root out former Nazi sympathizers for the 
sake of German democratic progress.31 
As Dori Laub notes: 
The film opens with a slogan that it ostensibly contradicts: “Never forget, 
guilty are they.” This slogan implies that the arch-criminals, the defendants at 
the Nuremberg trials, are the ones to blame. The contradiction in the movie 
is that “they” are not the only ones, as its title suggests. What the film does… 
is to enlarge the circle of guilt [...] It is only a matter of searching more 
thoroughly for the hidden, disguised murderers; once cleansed, Germany will 
be whole again. (Laub70) 
 
The film tells the story of Hans, a former military surgeon who returns home to 
Berlin after the war to find his home (and many others) in ruins, and 
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excruciating memories of his wartime experiences. After descending into alcoholism, Hans 
reunites with his former concentration camp captain, Ferdinand Brückner, who has now 
reintegrated himself into postwar society as a successful businessman – fashioning old 
military helmets into flowerpots. After recognizing that Brückner is unrepentant for the 
murder of over a hundred Polish civilians on Christmas Eve of 1942 in a small village on the 
Eastern Front, Hans – nauseated by Brückner’s arrogance and unabashed remorselessness – 
plots to kill him in order to bring a sense of “retributive justice” to both Brückner’s victims 
and for the countless German soldiers who were coerced into committing and witnessing 
similar egregious acts. At the last minute, Susanne Wallner, a Jewish concentration camp 
survivor, intercedes and persuades Hans to reconsider, and instead the two decide to have 
Brückner put on trial for war crimes. In illustrating both the mercurial sense of guilt and the 
pathological inclination to address a certain shared responsibility and victimhood that many 
postwar Germans had experienced, Hans ultimately relinquishes his desire for personal 
revenge in favour of a particular type of legal justice that the new generation of German 
writers and filmmakers had imagined. 
Underlining the intricate and ambiguous nature of the perpetrator figure, Hans’s 
actions underscore that, by originally casting himself as both judge and executioner, he runs 
the risk of becoming a perpetrator, himself. In this way, Staudte’s film probes the 
controversial manner in which the Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg had also become 
perpetrators, themselves, by passing lethal judgment on their German counterparts in a way 
that Kramer’s film failed to acknowledge. 
Whereas many German critics and reporters loudly condemned Kramer for stirring 
up the ghosts of the past and for fuelling hatred against their country, Staudte’s film was 
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generally well-received for its more nuanced and delicate analysis of collective responsibility 
and the search for “justice” in transitional Germany. 
Serving as an important marker in the ongoing conflict over the nature of collective 
German memory and the meaning of symbolic guilt, The Murderers Are Among Us marked one 
of the first genuine post-Nuremberg aesthetic interventions to open up a discursive space 
within which so-called “everyday Germans” could self-reflect on the “Guilt Question.” 
Reflecting on the film, German-Bulgarian director, Angel Wagenstein, noted, “For me 
[Staudte] was the first ambassador, who through his film renewed our faith in a nation 
capable of self-reflection, of looking into the mirror and acknowledging its own guilt, of 
making a confession that very few nations would be able to make” (Brockman 209).  
 The lasting significance of Staudte’s film was its ability to capture the particular set 
of moral anxieties that truly defined the post-Nuremberg period in German history – 
perhaps more clearly, even, than Weiss’s play, Grass’s novel, or Brecht’s opera. Hans’ moral 
dilemma was, in many ways, Germany’s collective dilemma, as the entire nation’s shared 
reservations regarding the capacity for the law to adequately address the complex 
constellation of socio-ethical anxieties that arose from the shadow of the Third Reich, and 
whether any type of “legal justice” could possibly amount to the political and cultural 
resolution to their Nazi past that many Germans had imagined. 
Of course, the work that confronted these anxieties most directly was Hannah 
Arendt’s renowned 1963 study, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. A 
comprehensive report on the war crimes trial of infamous SS lieutenant-colonel Adolph 
Eichmann, Arendt’s work blurred the lines between literary non-fiction, philosophical 
treatise, and political tract. Published eighteen years after her foundational examination of 
the question of “collective symbolic guilt” during the initial Nuremberg trial, Arendt’s study 
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of the Eichmann trial addresses many of the same themes, although this time modelling 
itself along the lines of what would later become known as “literary-journalistic” courtroom 
dramas, such as Capote’s In Cold Blood. 
In her “report,” Arendt addresses three main issues: firstly, the arrest of Eichmann 
by Mossad agents in Argentina and his subsequent trial in Jerusalem, paying close attention 
to Eichmann’s courtroom behaviour, as well as that of Chief Prosecutor Gideon Hausner; 
secondly, the forced complicity of the Jewish Councils (Judenrate) established by SS forces in 
occupied territories, in which certain “selected” members of Jewish ghettos were coerced 
into regulating the conduct of Jewish populations, and eventually, in organizing and 
mobilizing the deportation of Jews to their ultimate fate at the European extermination 
camps; and finally, the question concerning the widespread complicity of what she calls 
“ordinary Germans” during the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. According to Seyla 
Benhabib: 
Eichmann becomes for [Arendt] a paradigm case for analyzing how neither 
particularly evil nor particularly smart people could get caught in the 
machinery of evil and commit the deeds they did. It is the coming together of 
these narratives with her philosophical thesis concerning the ‘banality of evil’ 
that baffled her readers […] it seemed as if Arendt was accusing her own 
people and their leaders of being complicitous in the Holocaust while 
exculpating Eichmann and other Germans through naming their deeds 
‘banal’. (Benhabib 36-37) 
 
However, whereas many readers initially interpreted Arendt’s coining of the term 
“the banality of evil” in this way – as inferring a direct correlation between the calculated 
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horrors devised and carried out by Nazi officials (such as Eichmann) and the German public 
who had seemingly yielded to a tacit consent of the Nazi crimes – Shoshana Felman, instead, 
suggests that the “banality of evil,” in fact refers not to a psychological condition, but rather, 
to a legal and political one (The Juridical Unconscious 107-108). Felman writes: 
In describing Eichmann’s …all-too-credible self-justification by the total 
absence of motive for the mass murder that he passionately carried out (mens 
rea), Arendt’s question is not, ‘How can evil (Eichmann) be so banal?’ but, 
‘How can the banality of evil be addressed in legal terms and by legal means?’ 
On what new legal grounds can the law mete out the utmost punishment 
precisely to banality or to the lack of mens rea? (The Juridical Unconscious 108) 
In other words, Arendt’s primary concern in Eichmann in Jerusalem is in fact the 
degree to which the law is – if at all – an adequate vehicle from which to reconcile the deep-
rooted anxieties surrounding the German public’s self-perceived collective behaviour under 
the brutality of the Nazi machine. In other words, Arendt’s main concern is whether, as 
Felman notes, “evil is linguistically and legally banal […] Arendt asks, can the law become an 
anchor and a guarantee, a guardian of humanity? […] When language itself becomes 
subsumed by the banality of evil, how can the law keep meaning to the word ‘humanity’?” (108). In 
the wake of an exhaustingly repetitive (and seemingly redundant) torrent of Nazi war crimes 
trials, Arendt is in fact probing how a crime that is regarded as being entirely 
“unprecedented” in modern history could possibly be tried and judged within a judicial 
paradigm that is grounded in “a discipline of precedents?” 
After all, before the Eichmann trial, the public had already been subjected to a 
benumbing torrent of preceding trials, including: the initial IMT (1945-1946), the Dachau 
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trials (1945-1947), the Doctors’ Trial (1946-1947), the Milch Trial (1947), the Flossenbürg 
Trial (1946-1947), the Judges’ Trial (1947), the Pohl Trial (1947), the Flick Trial (1947), the 
IG Farben Trial (1947-1948), the Hostages Trial (1947-1948), the RuSHA Trial (1947-1948), 
the Einsatzgruppen Trial (1947-1948), the Krupp Trial (1947-1948), the High Command 
Trial (1947-1948), and the “Ministries” Trial (1948-1949),  and were on the verge of the 
highly publicized Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials (1963-1965) and the Sobibór trial (1965-
1966).32 Within this deadening stream of war crimes trials, Arendt’s study reawakened 
question of whether the legal system, itself, was an adequate forum for exploring the ethical 
intricacies of such an unprecedented horror, or if, instead, this was an issue for which the 
German must grapple with in a collective, yet deeply intimate, way. 
In the wake of the pandemonium evoked by the Eichmann trial, Daniel Goldhagen’s 
seminal book Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996) awoke 
what was perhaps the most uneasy negotiation of German “collective guilt.” Suggesting that 
a deep-rooted anti-Semitism had not only permeated German society for centuries, but that 
this xenophobia was a fundamental characteristic of German identity, Goldhagen’s book 
alleged that all Hitler and the Nazi regime did was to simply let loose the deeply rooted 
murderous sentiments that had been seething within the German people since at least the 
mid sixteenth-Century, if not earlier. In this sense, Goldhagen’s book explicitly played into 
the “German guilt” framework by candidly condemning German society on the whole for 
fostering the seeds that made the emergence of the Nazi party ideology possible in the first 
place. Despite being widely criticized initially by the German press, Goldhagen’s book 
quickly became a bestseller among ordinary Germans, selling eighty-thousand copies in the 
first week and over three-thousand copies a week during his initial publicity tour 
(Grossmann 115), sparking an explicit national discussion on a topic which had, until that 
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point, been largely considered an unspoken taboo. Goldhagen’s book went on to win the 
prestigious Democracy Prize of the Journal for German and International Politics (Germany’s 
largest political periodical) and was eventually praised by many German media outlets for, 
after decades of reticent discomfiture, launching a passionate national discussion about the 
Holocaust and German collective guilt (“Holocaust Writer in Storm”). 
Thus, the self-reflexive debates about Vergangenheitsbewältigung – a portmanteau of 
vergangenheit (“the past”) and bewältigung (“to come to terms with”) – had at long last reached 
its cultural zenith, nearly fifty years after the Allied victors had so unabashedly browbeaten 
the general public with overt and damning assertions of collective guilt. In the wake of this 
initial period of latency following the emergence of the “collective guilt question” during the 
Nuremberg trials, many prominent German writers and filmmakers had ultimately come to 
engage with these issues on what they believed to be, “their own terms” – although the 
impetus to do so had been fervently sown by their foreign occupiers decades prior. 
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Chapter 1 Notes 
 
1  The term “Cultural Imaginary” refers here to Majid Yar’s notion of the nation as an 
Anderson-esque imagined community, whose culture and sense of collectiveness is “given 
concrete form … in the discourse of the arts, literature, film, journalism, and so on” (Yar 2-
3). In other words, the “Cultural Imaginary” refers to the sense of nationhood that is 
constructed through the narratives, myths of origin, symbols, rituals, and collective 
memories of the people who see themselves as part of that group. 
2  For example, the final report on the Nuremberg trials is instilled with the “spirit” of 
post-war democratic values, which distinguishes its present moment from the former 
national trauma of Nazism. In this sense, the report is not only history-making, but it also 
signals the ideological and ethical “transition” from the traumatic past to an ideal future 
vision of a rehabilitated and revitalized Germany. 
3  While matters of impartiality and objectivity often deter the historian away from 
rendering explicit moral pronouncements on past events, the Holocaust presented a singular 
difficulty for many Western historians. Surely, it would seem inhumane to describe such 
events in morally neutral terms, yet to moralize history is to deem the interpreter of history, 
as Tzvetan Todorov puts it, the “custodian of moral values” (“The Morality of the 
Historian” 11). This, of course, is precisely the role that the Allied prosecutors envisioned 
for themselves; a sort of hybrid legal-historical authority. Yet, even in such consequential 
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judicial matters, most judges and prosecutors – following the precedent set by Lord Acton in 
1905 (see Oliver Richardson, “Lord Acton…”) – assume that any moral judgments ought to 
be delivered as obiter dicta (Latin for “by the way,” a remark in a ruling that is “said in 
passing”). The Final Report on the Nuernberg Trials held to neither of these conventions, opting 
instead to make what we might call, the “moralizing of German history,” a priority in its 
narrative approach. 
4  As this chapter will demonstrate, while the question concerning collective German 
complicity is widely accepted today,at the time of the Nuremberg tribunals it was a 
scandalous accusation, since a large number of Germans did not perceive themselves as 
willing accomplices, but instead as victims of the Nazi party. It was only after the Americans 
levelled their charges of “collective guilt” that this dialogue engendered a very public debate 
amongst the German people (as a sort of internal questioning of their own actions during 
the wasr), which was then borne out in the literature, film, and theatre of the time. 
5  This question was raised explicitly by the Allied prosecutors during several of the 
Successor Trials as a justification for their particular legal approach. See The Final Nuernberg 
Report, pp.’s 56, 69, 132, 172. 
6  For a detailed appraisal of the political function of “guilt” in the context of both the 
Nuremberg Trials and denazification programs, see Parkinson, 2015. 
7  For a succinct survey of how collective guilt motivates a community to act in unison 
– be it politically, economically, or culturally – see Mark A. Ferguson and Nyla R. 
Branscombe, “The Social Psychology of Collective Guilt,” in Collective Emotions, eds Christian 
von Scheve and Mikko Salmela. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. 
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8  The most sensational of these displays occurred on November 29, 1945, when 
American prosecutors exhibited an hour-long documentary film titled, Nazi Concentration 
Camps. Justice Jackson introduced the film in his opening statement: “We will show you 
these concentration camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied armies found them when 
they arrived […]. Our proof will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of your 
sleep […]. I am one who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion and 
skepticism. But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I venture to predict not one 
word I have spoken will be denied” (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International 
Military Tribunal: Proceedings, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Volume 2, p. 130). At the 
film’s conclusion, when the lights came up in the Palace of Justice, all assembled – including 
judges, the defendants, their attorneys, and members of the press – sat in stunned silence. 
The immense visual impact of this evidence was a turning point in the IMT trial and its 
twelve successor tribunals. 
9  As Halbwachs explicates, the “social frameworks” of collective memories are 
external to us, imposed on us from outside, always already conditioning us to recall the past 
according to their specific predetermined conceptual parameters (see Halbwachs 38). 
10  Although twenty-three defendants were indicted in total, Martin Bormann was tried 
in absentia, while Robert Ley committed suicide in his prison cell while awaiting trial within 
weeks of the trial’s commencement. 
11  For a detailed analysis of what Kallis calls the “hyperbolic historical fictions” 
promulgated during the Nazi years via the Reich’s propaganda machine, see: Kallis, Aristotle. 
Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
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12  As evidenced by Abbey Mann’s highly successful Judgment at Nuremberg and several of 
the media reports produced by American journalists covering the trials, U.S. audiences seem 
to have been equally influenced by the Nuremberg prosecutors’ invocation of the “Guilt 
Question” in their own appraisal of the German people’s responsibility for the Nazi crimes. 
Although this research is expressly concerned with how American and Allied legal, 
historiographic, and artistic interventionism was received by West German citizens – and 
how this impacted their own efforts to negotiate their recent past – one might also set about 
examining how the Trials impacted the collective memories in the U.S., Britain, and beyond. 
It is, however, important to note that Germans would have certainly been aware that the 
invocation of the “Guilt Question” was being entertained abroad, and the fear of being 
regarded as “a nation of Hitlers” presumably had a significant impact on their own 
internalization of this question. This will be discussed in the section of this chapter 
concerning the reception of Mann’s film within West Germany. 
13  Including abbey Mann and Stanley Kramer’s film Judgment at Nuremberg (1961), which 
was nominated for eleven Academy Awards and its 2001 stage adaptation for Broadway, 
directed by John Tillinger and starring Maximilian Schell and George Grizzard; Yve’s 
Simoneau’s television miniseries Nuremberg (2000), starring Alec Baldwin, Max von Sydow, 
and Christopher Plummer; William F. Buckley Jr.’s novel Nuremberg: The Reckoning (2002); 
and Len Deighton’s bestselling spy novel Winter (1987). 
14  As stated in the Final Report, the so-called ‘euthanasia’ program, “involved the 
systematic and secret execution of the aged, insane, incurably ill, of deformed children and 
other persons, by gas, lethal injections, and diverse other means in nursing homes, hospitals 
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and asylums. Such persons were regarded as ‘useless eaters’ and a burden to the German war 
machine” (164). 
15  See the transcript for Corporal Sy Bernhard’s radio broadcast for AFN (American 
Forces Network) on November 19, 1945: “There’s another yarn that’s going around this 
fancy latrine circuit... a story about a bedraggled, broken-down character trying to convince 
courthouse guards that he should be admitted without one of the blue pass-cards - 
something, believe me, that just isn’t done. Well, the scuttlebutt has it that this unshaven 
Heinie started getting browned off after his pleading did him no good. Then in complete 
desperation, a familiar ranting began: ‘I demand to get into the trial. I started the whole 
thing. My name is Hitler’” (Burson, “Pre-Trial Transcript”). 
16  Leading up to the IMT, the Palace of Justice was renovated to include both a 
visitors’ gallery and a press gallery, and was wired with state-of-the-art recording equipment 
that also allowed for simultaneous translation. 
17  However, the report did aim to provide a thoroughgoing historical overview of the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal and the founding of the legal 
frameworks that would guide the proceedings for the trial of the twenty-three Nazi officials, 
including Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, and Albert Speer. 
18  See Ordinance No. 7 (Article X), pp. 28-32 in the Final Report to the Secretary of the Army 
on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials. 
19  This phrase is repeated again on p. 115 
20  Here, we see again the linkage made between the crafting of an “official” history and 
its intended usage for “educational” purposes – as General Taylor outlines in the Final Report 
on the Nuremberg Trials. 
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21  In fact, many former Nazi officials who had co-operated with the US army during 
the Nuremberg trials would later find employment with the Historical Division. For 
instance, General Franz Halder, Chief of the Supreme High Command of the German Army 
from 1938 until 1942, served as a prosecution witness for Telford Taylor in the “High 
Command Trial” of 1948 (the last of the twelve American trials at Nuremberg). His personal 
diary, which began in early August 1939 and covered the whole course of the war up to the 
beginnings of the Stalingrad disaster, was treated as being of prime historic value to the 
Historical Division, and was used as primary evidence in the High Command Trial. Halder 
would later take up an advisory role with the Historical Division during the nineteen-fifties, 
counseling the U.S. Army on the redevelopment of the post-war German army, for which he 
would ultimately be awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the second highest medal 
provided to civilian employees by the U.S. military. 
22  See: Elliot Neaman’s review of Herf’s thesis on the “Nuremberg interregnum” in 
AJS Review [24.2 (1999): 415–417]. 
23  See Taylor’s consideration of the full “circumstances, pressures, and fears which 
influenced or were alleged to have influenced” the actions of the defendants, and their 
justification that “they lived in fear of Nazi tyranny and were obliged to comply with 
government policy” (Final Report 109), and the bearing that these considerations had on the 
Flick and Krupp trials (pp. 109-110).  
24  As William Maley (“The Atmospherics of the Nuremberg Trial” 9) and Zachary D. 
Kaufman (United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics, 
112) each speculate, the acquittal of three defendants: Schacht, Von Papen, and Fritsche, 
may have been part of a calculated attempt to present an air of impartiality and authenticity 
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to the trials for the sake of the German people. In other words, since the trials were 
coordinated and undertaken by the victorious nations, as a means to charge the defeated 
nation with laws drafted by themselves and in a tribunal consisting of judges from their own 
states, the only way to present a veneer of legitimacy was to, perhaps, acquit a small number 
of low-profile defendants (on the basis of insufficient proof) so as to paint the trials, as a 
whole, with a brush of objectivity and impartiality. 
25  For a detailed survey of how transitional justice processes engage public emotional 
responses – including resentment and indignation – in the service of the democratization 
project, see: Mihaela Mihai, “Socializing Negative Emotions: Transitional Criminal Trials in 
the Service of Democracy.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, 2011, pp. 111–131.   
26  For a detailed analysis of how the Nuremberg Trials were received in light of the 
Versailles Treaty, see: Maguire, Peter. Law and War: International Law and American History. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, pp. 114-140. 
27  In fact, much of the “literature of the rubble” that emerged in this immediate 
postwar period focused on the scarcity of food and the “everyday” difficulties of life in the 
ruins of the war-torn country. Wolfgang Borchert’s short story “Das Brot” (The Bread) and 
Heinrich Böll’s short story “Stranger, Bear Word to the Spartans…” are each centered 
around the food-shortage situation. 
28  In W.G. Sebald’s “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea” (in On the Natural 
History of Destruction), Sebald accuses Andersch of using his literature to present a more 
palatable version of his life (particularly his controversial conduct under the Nazi regime) 
that made it sound more acceptable to a post-Nazi and post-Nuremberg public. 
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29  For a detailed analysis of the historical link between neo-Romanticist aesthetics and 
the rise of German nationalism see: Huckvale, David. Visconti and the German Dream: 
Romanticism, Wagner and the Nazi Catastrophe in Film. Jefferson: McFarland, 2012; Richter, 
Simon J. The Literature of Weimar Classicism. Rochester: Camden House, 2005; and 
Stephenson, Roger H. Studies in Weimar Classicism: Writing as Symbolic Form. Bern: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2010. 
30  The 1951 re-staging of The Trial of Lucullus as an opera, following the original radio-
play version mentioned earlier on pp. 77-78, took on a much more caustic tone in light of 
the public accusations of collective complicity during the Nuremberg Trials. 
31  In fact, the narrative arc of Dorfman’s play is strikingly comparable to Staudte’s film. 
In Death and the Maiden, Paulina, a young woman living under an unnamed dictatorship 
(Dorfman, an Argentine, had fled his country during the first junta of the 1970s to 
neighbouring Chile, where he then suffered under the Pinochet regime), is blindfolded 
tortured, and repeatedly raped during a prolonged period of interrogation. Years later, after 
the dictator has been ousted, the woman is happily married – even though her past still 
haunts her – to Gerardo, the chief prosecutor of the former dictator in the country’s truth 
commission tribunal. One evening, Gerardo brings home a Good Samaritan – who claims to 
be a respectable doctor – who stopped to help him fix a flat tire. However, when the man 
enters her home, Paulina recognizes him – remembering his voice, his smell, and the 
particular idioms he uses in conversation – as the man who tortured and raped her. Holding 
the doctor at gunpoint and threatening to torture and kill him unless he confesses to her 
husband, Paulina’s vigilante revenge fantasy is contrasted with Gerardo’s composed 
insistence on bringing the man before the war crimes tribunal. When the man ultimately 
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confesses to being her former torturer and rapists – and that he had in fact enjoyed violating 
her as he played Schuman’s Death and the Maiden quartet – Paulina declares that she has been 
freed from the burden of her past, and ultimately resolves not to kill him, but to let her 
husband try him in the courtroom. 
32  These would also be followed by the nine subsequent Nazi war crimes trials that 
would take place between the mid-1980’s and carry on into the early Twenty-first Century 
(including the infamous trial of Klaus Barbie, the “Butcher of Lyon,” in 1987). 
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Chapter 2. Nunca Más: Transitional Justice Reports as Explicit 
Literary Constructions 
 
 
“I don’t write history. I make it. I can remake it as I please, adjusting, stressing, enriching its 
meaning and truth” (Augusto Roa Bastos, I, the Supreme 194) 
 
 
 
 If the Nazi war crimes tribunals demonstrated to the world that transitional justice 
practices were capable of making radical narratological and historiographic interventions into 
the ways in which a nation “remembered” its traumatic past, then the events that would 
unfold throughout Argentina in the 1970s and 80s would reveal the utmost extent to which 
such interventions could drastically reinvent the cultural storytelling process. Whereas the 
Nuremberg tribunals made narrative interventions into the realm of German collective-
memory by widening the sphere of guilt and likening bystander-inaction to the crimes of 
Nazi criminals, the Argentine Nunca Más report would go a step further by demonstrating 
that recent history could be entirely re-written for explicit political and economic aims, under 
the aegis of the transitional process. By focusing its energies away from dry, legal 
explanations of international jurisprudence and instead toward a novelistic re-construction of 
the nation’s recent past, the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (hereafter 
referred to as CONADEP, translated as the “National Commission on the Disappearance of 
Persons”) would demonstrate to the world the full extent to which transitional justice could 
radically reconfigure how a nation remembered its traumatic past. 
 Building upon the success of the Nuremberg case, Argentina’s 1985 “Trial of the 
Juntas” stood to be just the second instance since post-transition Germany in which a 
national government would formally prosecute its former leaders for atrocities committed 
against its own citizens.1 But while the Nuremberg report established the official memory of 
 130 
the Nazi years according to a “punitive” judicial framework, the Argentine case would 
instead represent the first instance of a “restorative” transitional justice model. 
In 1976, following a violent coup to overthrow the democratically-elected 
government of President Juan Domingo Péron, a newly established right-wing military junta 
led by Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla instituted a horrifying campaign of violent 
repression against tens of thousands of citizens suspected of having political ties to the left-
wing branch of the Péronist Party or the communist guerilla organization known as the 
Montoneros. Unfolding within the cruel legacy of the Cold War in the Latin Americas, these 
brutal measures would come to be known as the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (the 
“Process of National Reorganization”),2 intended to rid Argentine society of what the 
dictatorship saw as the corrupt and anti-Argentine communist sympathies that were gaining 
momentum across the region following the Cuban Revolution. Aiming to restore Argentina 
to what the leaders of the right-wing junta saw as its so-called former glory, the regime 
initiated a vicious program of forced disappearances, illegal detainments in clandestine 
concentration camps, and the torture, rape, and murder of thousands of so-called 
“subversives” (many of whom, it would later be discovered, had no ties to any known radical 
organizations). Ernesto Sábato, the President of CONADEP and the lead author of its 
report, Nunca Más (“Never Again”), notes in the prologue: 
All sectors [of Argentine society] fell into the net: trade union leaders fighting 
for better wages; youngsters in student unions, journalists who did not 
support the regime; psychologists and sociologists simply for belonging to 
suspicious professions; young pacifists, nuns and priests who had taken the 
teachings of Christ to shanty areas; the friends of these people, too, and the 
friends of friends, plus others whose names were given out of motives of 
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personal vengeance, or by the kidnapped under torture. The vast majority of 
them were innocent not only of any acts of terrorism, but even of belonging 
to the fighting units of the guerrilla organizations. (Nunca Más 4)3 
 
As a system of “cleansing” Argentine society of what the military regarded as 
dissident communist ideologies, the junta declared that they were engaged in an alleged 
“Dirty War” (a term that erroneously implies both sides were equal and willing combatants) 
against un-Argentine moral and political perversion that was being endorsed by a cadre of 
“terrorist” mercenaries – although, as Jorge Rafael Videla, the first dictator of the junta, 
famously stated, “a terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb; it is anyone who 
spreads ideas that are contrary to Western or Christian civilization” (Bouvard 37).  
Included in the military’s unspeakable methods of repression were the forced 
disappearance of victims (military units would often raid a victim’s home in broad daylight, 
beating and torturing family-members and seizing their target, followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge the person’s fate or whereabouts); public rape (often, the wives of suspected 
“leftist-sympathizers” would be arrested and publicly raped until the whereabouts of their 
husbands were revealed), the flaying and burning-alive of prisoners; the employment of 
medieval torture practices (including inserting red-hot pokers into victims’ body cavities and 
the removal of fingernails or eyelids); the use of electric cattle-prods on pregnant women; 
the use of unmarked mass graves to dispose of bodies without any documentation or 
identification records; the abduction and illegal adoption of children by military families 
(many of whom were born of rape in clandestine prison camps); and ultimately, the 
notorious “death flights,” in which thousands of prisoners were drugged, stripped naked, 
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and thrown from military aircrafts to their ultimate deaths in the Río de la Plata.4 As Sábato 
observes: 
From the moment of their abduction, the victims lost all rights. Deprived of 
all communication with the outside world, held in unknown places, subjected 
to barbaric tortures, kept ignorant of their immediate or ultimate fate, they 
risked being either thrown into a river or the sea; weighed down with blocks 
of cement, or burned to ashes. They were not mere objects, however, and 
still possessed all the human attributes: they could feel pain, could remember 
a mother, child or spouse, could feel infinite shame at being raped in public. 
They were people not only possessed of this sense of boundless anguish and 
fear, but also, and perhaps indeed because of feelings such as these, they 
were people who, in some corner of their soul, still clung to an absurd notion 
of hope. (Nunca Más 4) 
 
Following the return to democracy in 1983, the newly elected government led by 
President Raúl Alfonsín was tasked with bringing justice to the estimated thirty-thousand 
“Disappeared,”5 while at the same time restoring a fractured nation that had been torn apart 
by years of unspeakable violence and repression. Thirty-eight years after the inauguration of 
the first Nuremberg Trial, the Argentine people were faced with a similar task of uncovering 
truths and achieving justice in a post-traumatic transitional context. 
However, like the German case before it,6 the Argentine transitional process was 
complicated from the very outset by three central challenges. Firstly, an impassioned 
nationwide movement, led by the families of the desaparecidos, was pressuring the government 
to take action against members of the former dictatorship, demanding that a formal 
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Nuremberg-style court be established to hear individual cases. However, secondly, the 
Argentine economy was on the brink of collapse,7 with enormous outstanding foreign debts 
and the industrial and agricultural sectors in disrepair – both of which would have been 
severely hampered by the inauguration of a series of costly human rights tribunals. Lastly, 
owing to the enactment of a series of controversial self-amnesty provisions that the former 
regime had enacted just prior to agreeing to hand over power, the vast majority of those 
military officers associated with the former dictatorship had been allowed to remain in their 
positions within the armed forces, resulting in the lingering ominous threat of another 
potential military coup (Tedesco 25).  
Like the Allied occupiers in Germany, the Alfonsín administration was faced with 
the problem of having many high-ranking military officials who remained loyal to the former 
dictatorship’s far-right ideology after the return to democracy. However, unlike the 
American denazification program, Alfonsín’s new administration settled for a more subtle 
approach to subduing this faction, opting instead to serve as a political and ideological 
intermediary between the former authoritarian regime and the human rights groups who 
publicly opposed them. 
President Alfonsín was, therefore, faced with a difficult dilemma: while his new 
administration on the whole was eager to demonstrate its willingness to admonish the 
leaders of the dictatorship for their recent human rights violations, it also had genuine 
reservations about provoking another display of military force by the former regime’s 
loyalists if members of the former juntas were perceived as being publicly humiliated in a 
series of high-profile human rights trials (see Tedesco 25). Given the frequency with which 
the military had forcibly seized control of the government over the past half-century (there 
had been six military coups d’état between 1930 and 1976) and the ignominious 
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circumstances surrounding the recent transition to democracy (the regime was only hectored 
into relinquishing control after an embarrassing defeat in the Falklands War) many within 
Alfonsín’s administration were hesitant to place all of the blame for the so-called “Dirty 
War” on the Armed Forces. In time, these initial apprehensions would prove warranted, 
when a faction of far-right loyalists within the military – nicknamed Los Carapintadas (“The 
Painted faces”) – staged a series of violent uprisings to protest the impending trials and what 
they saw as the media’s vilification of the former dictatorship, demanding that the State 
“refrain from bringing any legal action against them and vindicate their struggle against 
‘subversion’” (Crenzel, The Memory of the Argentina Disappearances 100). Although these 
uprisings ultimately failed to overthrow the democratically elected government, the 
insurrections were a grave reminder of the enduring threat that the military presented to the 
restoration of democracy. 
In light of the looming risk of antagonizing the military leaders, Alfonsín found 
himself in the paradoxical situation of being obliged to bring the former juntas to justice for 
the “disappearances” and murders, while simultaneously striving to temper the public 
condemnation of that very same junta in order to preserve and sustain the delicate cradle of 
democracy. 
In light of these challenges, the newly elected President was compelled to negotiate a 
number of concessions with the military leadership, based on the hope that they would act in 
good faith with the new democratic government. First, he offered the Armed Forces an 
opportunity for what he called “self-cleansing” (Tedesco 26), asking the military leaders to 
take disciplinary action against the most egregious human rights violators during the Proceso, 
stripping them of their rank and dismissing them from their positions. Secondly, he passed a 
new law that required the high military court – los Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas (the 
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Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) – to prosecute “those members of the security 
forces, the police, and the penitentiary service, who operated under the orders of the Armed 
Forces,” for any previous violation of pre-existing Argentine laws (Tedesco 26). Alfonsín 
had hoped that these two initiatives, intended to allow the military an opportunity to redress 
the crimes of the Proceso internally, would placate the leaders of the Armed Forces (while also 
craftily ensuring that the operating costs for the human rights trials would be covered by the 
military’s internal budget and, thus, not hinder their efforts to stabilize the national 
economy). 
Despite Alfonsín’s best intentions, however, the military judges failed to act in good 
faith with the new government. Taking advantage of the recently enacted self-amnesty laws, 
the military court rushed through what amounted to a mock enquiry of its own high-ranking 
members. In its initial hearing, the Supreme Council unsurprisingly found “insufficient 
evidence” of military responsibility for the tortures and disappearances, besides certain 
“negligible” proof that some members could be found “indirectly responsible” (Oberdorfer 
“Alfonsín Foresees Civil Trial”).8 While the military court’s decision precipitated a vociferous 
public backlash, several anonymous military sources eventually cited “grave concerns for the 
judges’ safety” (Oberdorfer) as the reason for the court’s reluctance to prosecute its own 
members. During the weeks leading up to the internal inquiry, it was reported that a number 
of judges received “anonymous death threats” from members of the Armed Forces, while 
the court-appointed prosecutors reportedly “received mailed envelopes containing three 
feathers – a military code for cowardice” (Oberdorfer). 
Following the military’s ostensible self-exoneration, President Alfonsín faced 
increasing pressure from several human rights groups, including the Madres and Abuelas de la 
Plaza de Mayo (the “Mothers” and “Grandmothers” of the Disappeared), to ensure some 
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sense of justice for the victims of the Proceso. In the wake of growing public demonstrations 
against the perceived military impunity, Alfonsín agreed to transfer the human rights trials 
from the High Military Court to a branch of Federal Appeals Courts in Buenos Aires 
province. However, owing to an obscure ambiguity in the jurisdictional relation between the 
two courts, Alfonsín’s decision now meant that any civilian (or the families of any of the over 
thirty thousand “disappeared”) could now open a court case against any member of the 
armed forces – regardless of their rank – whereby new evidence would be heard, new 
charges could be laid, and prior sentences could be reversed (Schumacher 1080). 
Anticipating the opening of tens of thousands of new civil cases and predicting that the 
operating costs of the ensuing flood of civil trials would have a devastating effect on the 
government’s efforts to stabilize the economy – which was now in a state of insolvency with 
the International Monetary Fund for failing to repay international debts incurred by the 
former dictatorship (de Beaufort Wijnholds 102) – President Alfonsín was, once again, 
forced to rethink his government’s approach to transitional justice.9 
Following a visit from IMF officials in August of 1983 – during which executives 
from the economic fund threatened to end a newly established austerity program unless the 
Alfonsín government was able to reign-in federal and provincial spending and put an end to 
deep-rooted profligacy and corruption (de Beaufort Wijnholds 103) – the new President was 
once again pressured to abandon the thousands of costly civil trials, in exchange, this time 
for a small handful of high-profile cases against the nine former leaders of the juntas. While 
the withdrawal of the civilian court cases threatened to undermine the new administration’s 
efforts to conciliate the victims and their families, Alfonsín pledged (in a speech before 
delegates of his party’s National Committee) that although only the nine senior-most military 
officials of the juntas would be tried, victims and witnesses would still have the opportunity 
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to testify in the courtroom and that their depositions would be televised in order to allow 
their testimonios to be heard by the entire country (Osiel 30). This new approach would 
ultimately allow the Alfonsín government to tread a fine-line between: a) providing the 
public with a sweeping sense of justice; b) working towards stabilizing the national economy; 
and c) sparing the vast majority of mid to low-ranking military officers from the public 
humiliation and castigation that might trigger another violent coup attempt by placing the 
majority of the blame on only the nine leaders of the Armed Forces. 
In order to achieve this delicate balance of desired outcomes, however, the 
government would first have to drastically transform public opinion in a way that lessened 
the blame on the former military regime, thereby persuading the Argentine public to 
relinquish their collective desire for Nuremberg-style retribution against a vast military 
apparatus that had terrorized them for nearly a decade. History, in other words, would have 
to be re-written. 
On December 13 of that year, four months after the IMF visit, Alfonsín drew up 
three Presidential Decrees that would do just that. First, Decree 157 charged seven leaders of 
prominent left-wing guerrilla organizations, including the Montoneros and Ejército Revolucionario 
del Pueblo (“The People’s Revolutionary Army”) – which was founded as a small, 
underground network of resistance fighters in response to the military regime’s brutal 
oppression – with conspiracy, homicide, and public incitement to commit felonies during the 
reign of the juntas. Next, Decree 158 court-martialed the nine leaders of the dictatorship on 
charges of homicide, kidnapping and torture. Under the latter decree, only the commanders 
of each of the Armed Forces’ three branches – the Lieutenant General of the Army, the 
Chief Admiral of the Navy, and the Brigadier General of the Air Force  – during the 
dictatorship’s three juntas would be charged,10 while thousands of subordinate officers were 
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officially exempted.11 Together, these two decrees ordered the parallel criminal indictments 
of both the leaders of the right-wing military dictatorship and the commanders of the leftist 
resistance groups – and in fact, as “a gesture of evenhandedness” (Stites Mor 81), suggested 
that the latter had actually started the conflict. 
Immediately, several human rights groups publicly denounced the packaging of the 
decrees together as a single dictate, on the grounds that it erroneously ascribed “equal 
responsibility to both the perpetrators and their victims” (Moyano 91). In response to these 
initial public protests, Alfonsín then passed Decree 187 two days later on Dec. 15, 
mandating the establishment of CONADEP, which would be erroneously promoted as an 
independent and neutral investigative body meant to represent the interests of the victims. 
Under Decree 187, the Commission was instructed to work together with the human rights 
groups (who had opposed the “equal responsibility” theory) to conduct an investigation into 
and produce a report on the forced disappearances that occurred during the Processo (Phelps 
83). But, while the commission was instructed to work alongside several human rights 
groups in gathering information and conducting the investigations, the executive committee 
– under the direction of novelist Ernesto Sábato, who was hand-picked by Alfonsín – would 
maintain absolute creative control over the final report and the direction of its mandated 
“equal blame” narrative.12 
As the chief investigative body tasked with determining the origins, scope, and 
lasting consequences of the so-called “Dirty War,” CONADEP’s mission would be forever 
tied to the invocation of Decrees 157 and 158, as it would serve as the official vehicle to 
validate the discursive strategy of assigning equal blame to both the dictatorial regime and 
those individuals who dared to take a stand against it. Under the aegis of CONADEP, the 
story of the years of terror would soon be re-inscribed as the Manichean struggle between 
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the extreme left and the far right, and the “Theory of the Two Demons” – as it would come 
to be known – would become indelibly etched in the cultural memories of the nation. 
Based on Decree 187, CONADEP was given six months to carry out two separate, 
yet correlated, endeavors: a) to investigate the fate of the desaparecidos (the victims of forced 
disappearances) and other human rights violations, and b) to document its findings in a 
comprehensive report that would be delivered to Alfonsín in 1984. Following the 
completion of their assignment, and based on the findings of this report, the government 
would then launch the human rights trials against the sixteen individuals named in Decrees 
157 and 158 (seven from the “left” and nine from the “right”), using the information and 
statistics produced by the Nunca Más report as the central body of evidence against the 
perpetrators in the courtroom. 
Similar to the Nazi war crimes tribunals, the discourse surrounding the impending 
“Trial of the Juntas” centered upon a widely acknowledged twofold public perception: on 
the one hand, owing to the fanatical secrecy under which the dictatorship operated and the 
resultant destruction of nearly all government records, the public looked toward the 
impending trials as the moment in which the many rumours of unspeakable violence would, 
at long last, be either confirmed or repudiated. On the other hand, a sweeping sense of 
incredulity that such heinous acts could have been committed on so large a scale without 
considerable public knowledge underscored the urgency for CONADEP to once-and-for-all 
provide the nation with a definitive account of the violence and disappearances, including 
what role, if any, so-called “ordinary” citizens who were unassociated with the guerilla 
organizations had played. Unlike the Nuremberg case, however, the leaders of the Argentine 
transitional government understood the enormous impact that a shrewdly crafted and 
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carefully curated historical narrative would have in bringing together the traumatized nation 
under the looming weight of the impending trials. 
Anticipating that the forthcoming trials would be highly complex and deeply 
acrimonious – not least of which because of the enactment of the self-amnesty laws that had 
been ratified shortly before handing over power – President Alfonsín appointed several 
prominent authors (including novelists, journalists, and philosophers) to CONADEP in 
order to maximize the narrative potential of the Nunca Más report.13 By divorcing the 
investigative, history-writing task of the Nunca Más report from the menial practicalities of 
the Appeals Court, the authors-cum-commissioners would be free to invoke the spirit of 
Alfonsín’s “Two Demons” strategy by ascribing equal responsibility to both the perpetrators 
and the victims. 
In addition to appointing several well-known writers to the executive committee, 
Alfonsín’s attempt to re-write history as the supposed struggle between two warring factions 
of political extremists would be aided by what is perhaps the singular and defining 
characteristic of the Argentine transitional justice process. Owing to the fact that it was 
commissioned prior to the “Trial of the Juntas,” Nunca Más reversed the typical sequence of 
transitional justice mechanisms. Whereas most “official reports” on transitional justice 
proceedings generally follow the conclusion of judicial trials – for instance, the South African 
TRC Report or the Chilean Rettig Report, which served to encapsulate both the legal action 
and the court’s rulings, while using the evidence produced during the trials to establish an 
accurate historical record of the traumatic period – the Nunca Más report was, instead, 
produced in anticipation of the tribunals, and the evidence that the Commission uncovered (as 
well as the “Two Demons” historical narrative that the report produced) were subsequently 
used by the prosecution during the trials as the very basis for their litigation. The events 
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narrated in Nunca Más – artfully composed by a team of novelists and journalists – were 
taken as incontrovertible “historical facts” during the trials, serving as the basis for the 
prosecution’s charges against the former members of the military junta, who then 
reproduced and performed Nunca Más’ “equal blame” narrative on the public stage of the 
courtroom. In this sense, the order of transitional justice operations were reversed, with the 
“official report” serving as the foundation for the tribunals, after having already been widely 
read by a vast segment of the population (topping several bestseller lists in the months 
following its publication) and having been wholly absorbed into the cultural fabric of the 
nation. 
The reasons for this “reversal” were varied. The Argentine public yearned for any 
sort of information concerning the disappearances of their compañeros immediately following 
the end of hostilities, since the Proceso was carried out under an extreme cloak of secrecy and 
misinformation. At the same time, President Alfonsín had a pressing need to demonstrate to 
the public that he was willing to take immediate concrete action to rebuke the members of 
the junta, many of whom were perceived as still operating with absolute impunity from their 
positions in the military. 
Likewise, since the President’s decision to allow civilian witnesses to testify during 
the impending trials14 meant that the “Trial of the Juntas” would surely take several years to 
complete,15 the Alfonsín government settled on the inauguration of the ostensibly 
independent CONADEP commission as a means of jump-starting the transitional justice 
process ahead of any concrete legal action against the leaders of the former dictatorship.  
Whether intentional or not, the reversal of operations would have a monumental 
impact on the public’s adoption of the “Two Demons” theory, since it allowed the narrative 
to be circulated widely before being substantiated by the rigors of evidence in the 
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courtroom. However, given that Nunca Más was envisioned as a precursor to the impending 
trials, the authors were therefore not bound to any previously established legal provisions, 
meaning Sábato and his team – including celebrated investigative journalist Magdalena Ruiz 
Guiñazú, who served as the “star” anchorwoman for the dictatorship’s propaganda news 
network, Station 11, during the juntas16 – enjoyed their customary degree of literary license 
when narrating the commission’s investigations. 
Owing to the sensational nature of the crimes, the almost utter lack of material 
evidence, and the intense public demand for any type of information concerning the fates of 
the desaparecidos, Sábato and his team were able to report on the tortures and disappearances 
with an unrestrained measure of histrionic flair. Despite repeated claims by the authors that 
“the Commission was set up not to sit in judgment, because that is the task of the 
constitutionally appointed judges” (i, italics mine),17 the Nunca Más narrative would, in the 
end, make several solemn and incriminating declarations of criminal guilt and moral 
culpability on both “sides.” 
For most Argentinians, Nunca Más represented their first exposure to any “official” 
information regarding the horrors committed by the dictatorship, and the emotional weight 
of the victim testimony, in concert with the perceived authority of the commission, 
bestowed an air of officialdom upon its narrative as the single authoritative historical 
account of the Proceso. Owing to the perceived legitimacy of the report, public perceptions of 
the ensuing trials were dictated by the prosecution’s ability to take up the spirit of the “Two 
Demons” theory and their capacity to frame their legal action around the version of events 
that Nunca Más had already popularized. Although President Alfonsín’s attempt to equalize 
blame for the years of terror was rooted in the legal purview of Decrees 157 and 158 – 
intended to appease the volatile military leadership and thereby ward off the possibility of 
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another potential coup – it was the Nunca Más report that, in fact, did much of the heavy 
lifting when it came to swaying public opinion and rewriting history.18 
Insofar as it was not produced as a retroactive encapsulation of the formal judicial 
proceedings, Nunca Más’ narrative was therefore not beholden to the same standards of 
evidence as the prosecution would soon be. By the same token, its form and structure was 
also exempt from the conventional stylistic limitations of legal analysis and bureaucratic 
language that had inhibited the Nuremberg Report before it. Unlike its German predecessor, 
Nunca Más was free to take up a much more “literary style” in its effort to craft an historical 
account that would appease the traumatized public, employing a host of literary and 
rhetorical devices as a means of imbuing the report with a sense of suspense and drama. 
Despite the Commission recording over nine thousand depositions (Speck 493), examining 
in detail the records of morgues and cemeteries across the country, opening mass graves, and 
carrying out newly developing forensic investigations (Nunca Más 428-37), the commission 
was, nonetheless, still severely hampered by an overwhelming absence of material evidence. 
In this absence, the inquiry became, above all, a narrative reconstruction of the years of 
terror. 
 
Ernesto Sábato and the Invention of the Truth Commission Narrative: 
 
In selecting internationally renowned novelist Ernesto Sábato to serve as chairman 
of CONADEP, President Alfonsín ensured that Nunca Más would succeed in crafting a 
public memory of the so-called “Dirty War” that, unlike the Nuremberg Report, would appeal 
to the traumatized public and provide an all-encompassing mnemonic framework for how 
the nation would remember, honour, and mourn the desaparecidos. 
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Sábato, along with Jorge Luis Borges, Ricardo Piglia, and Julio Cortázar, was one of 
the most well-known and esteemed Argentinian writers of his generation. Although his 
journey to literary success was a circuitous one – he would first abandon a promising career 
as an atomic physicist, for which he had earned a PhD in 1937 – Sábato eventually 
composed three highly acclaimed novels, each written in entirely disparate styles and genres.  
One year after earning his doctorate, Sábato accepted a research fellowship at the 
prestigious Joliot-Curie Physics Laboratories in Paris, where he met and befriended several 
central members of the French Surrealist movement, including writers André Breton and 
Paul Éluard, and visual artists Victor Brauner, Oscar Domínguez and Wilfredo Lam (Bach 
15). However, despite his years spent in the inner circle of the Surrealist group, Sábato never 
embraced the group’s aesthetic sensibilities. Aside from a single stand-alone chapter in On 
Heroes and Tombs – the so-called novel-within-a-novel, titled “Report on the Blind,” which is 
said to be his sole tribute to Surrealism – Sábato would instead be more closely associated 
with the “Bourgeois Realist” movement of his native country. But while Breton and his 
group did not have a significant impact on the Argentinian’s artistic direction, they did, 
however, have a profound effect on Sábato’s political evolution, encouraging and 
contributing to his abrupt break with the communist party in 1939 (Sábato, “Hombres y 
engranajes” 112).19 
Upon returning to Argentina in 1940, Sábato taught for three years in the Physics 
department at the University of Buenos Aires before fully committing himself to a career as 
an author two years later. Although he began by writing a series of political and cultural 
essays for a number of small cultural magazines, Sábato soon developed a highly regarded 
international reputation as a writer of both “serious” classical novels as well as popular 
psychological thrillers and crime dramas suffused with deep existentialist themes. While his 
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novels attracted the praise of major literary figures – including Albert Camus, Graham 
Greene, and Thomas Mann (three authors with whom his works were often compared) – it 
was his work during the dictatorship forming the human rights organization, Movimento para 
la recuperación de niños desaparecidos (“Movement for the Recovery of Disappeared Children”), 
that positioned Sábato as a natural choice to serve as the lead author of the highly 
anticipated CONADEP report.20 What’s more, Sábato’s widely known centrist political 
views, which were very much at the heart of his public image as an “intellectual” writer, 
situated him as the ideal champion of President Alfonsín’s tendentious “Two Demons” 
theory. 
For years, Sábato’s politics were at the very forefront of his fame, which, as Colm 
Tóibín notes, led to him being regarded as “not only a central figure in the literary life of 
Argentina […] but in its political and civil life as well” (“Introduction” v). Sábato’s early 
involvement with the communist movement in Argentina, which was highly publicized at 
the time, was followed by a later period of dissilusionment and outspoken criticism of the 
left. His public denunciation of the Péron government – along with his contemporaries 
Borges and Silvina Ocampo – saw him removed from his teaching positions at the 
University of Buenos Aires (Bach 16) and face a two-month prison sentence for 
“expressions of disrespect” (Oberhelman 39) in 1942. Along with Borges, Sábato then 
surprised many of his followers when – breaking from the traditional leftist proclivities of 
the creative class – they openly welcomed the 1976 military coup, earning both writers the 
praise and support of the far-right dictatorship (Roniger and Sznajder 144-145).21 But, 
whereas Borges would eventually have a dramatic change of heart and publicly denounce the 
dictatorship’s violent and repressive tactics, Sábato maintained temperate relations with the 
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regime throughout the duration of the Proceso (while simultaneously working alongside 
human rights groups on the left to locate missing children). 
At a time when many younger writers throughout the region were gaining 
international recognition for their outspoken leftist views – including Gabriel García 
Márquez, Mario Vargas Llosa, and José Donoso – Sábato instead attempted to play the part 
of eminence grise; a sort of prudent and pragmatic elder-figure who inveighed against extreme 
politics from both “sides.” Frequently citing his incongruous political experiences as a young 
man – he had been raised in a well-known and affluent conservative family, but had also 
served briefly as the secretary of the Argentine Communist Youth Federation – the 
celebrated author would eventually come to envision himself as an icon of centrist 
composure in a country with a long and turbulent history of political extremes. 
From his earliest days in Paris, Sábato’s self-professed “centrist” politics were 
interminably at the forefront of his carefully-curated public image, as evidenced by the 
author-profile composed by his good friend Helen Lane for the English-translation of his 
magnum opus, On Heroes and Tombs (1981). “Involved actively in Communism in his youth,” 
the profile reads, “his opposition to Stalin led Sábato to [later] reject the movement. Since 
then, he has fought all forms of oppression, from the left as well as the right, supporting his 
principal of ‘social justice and liberty.’ During the worst years of the Argentine dictatorship,22 
he refused to emigrate, even under the threat of death, and continued to denounce both 
terrorism and repression” (Sábato 1981, dust-jacket). Given Sábato’s decades-long public 
campaign against the so-called radical terrorism of the far left and the draconian tyranny of 
the extreme right, the outspoken novelist was a logical choice to serve as lead-investigator 
and chief author of President Alfonsín’s impending “Two Demons” report, which sought to 
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rewrite the story of the Proceso as the battle between two equally sinister extremist factions on 
opposite sides of the political spectrum. 
Hailed by critics as “the nation’s conscience” (Bach 14), Sábato routinely toured the 
country, speaking and lecturing on contemporary political and moral issues. While he was 
often called upon to respond to important national political debates – producing scathing 
editorial polemics like El otro rostro del peronismo (“The Other Face of Péronism”) – his turgid 
political persona also folded neatly into his popular literary works. As with his public life, 
politics and the theme of partisan extremism was always at the forefront of Sábato’s heuristic 
and often pedantic novels. Despite continued attempts to align himself with the popular 
existentialist writers of the 1940s and 50s, his novels are instead characterized more by their 
bold and naked didacticism than by any universal expressions of Sysyphean Absurdism.  
Born in 1911, Sábato belonged to the Indigenista23 school of writers, which preceded 
the more famous Latin American “Boom Generation,” an era of Argentine prose fiction that 
has since been maligned for its “overly regionalistic and Manichean …representation of 
political and social realities” (Barry 41). Like other members of this earlier generation, 
Sábato’s fiction is often encumbered by an enervating and sanctimonious moralism, borne 
out with a prosaic reliance on both “Bourgeois realism” and campesino (peasant farmer) 
vernacular and provincialisms.24 It is no surprise then, that – although he always considered 
himself “fundamentally a novelist” (Fox 4) – Sábato always found his greatest success as a 
writer in the form of the homiletic political essay. In addition to his trio of novels – The 
Tunnel (1948), On Heroes and Tombs (1961), and Abaddón the Exterminator (1974) – Sábato 
published fourteen collections of essays on a variety of political and philosophical topics 
specific to the Argentine social landscape of his time. 
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A prolific political essayist, Sábato was famously frustrated by the aesthetic strictures 
of the novel. In an “Author’s Note” that precedes each of his novels, Sábato confesses to 
having always lacked “faith and confidence” in his abilities as a pure novelist, and to having 
burned or otherwise destroyed the “majority of [his] manuscripts” (“Author’s Notes,” On 
Heroes and Tombs) because they failed to meet his exacting standards for a heuristic and 
moralizing literature. In light of his frustrations as a prose writer, his alleged 
experimentations in narrative, form, and genre – which often saw his novels miscategorized 
as belonging to the younger Boom movement, as opposed the more spartan Indigenista 
school – come across as more of a struggle to couch his overriding ideological hypotheses in 
a suitable aesthetic carapace, than an effort to explore the frontiers of literary expression. 
While some critics have generously credited him with “producing a new literary genre: the 
‘essayistic novel’” (Urbina i), others – such as Robert Coover and Salman Rushdie – have 
been much less sympathetic to his literary efforts, with the former suggesting that Sábato’s 
characters simply serve as “the mouthpiece for the author’s own essayistic sentiments” 
(“Oedipus in Argentina”). Alluding to the haughty didacticism of his novels, Coover 
famously added: “Sabato likes to quote Flaubert’s famous line, ‘Madame Bovary, c’est moi,’ as 
a kind of working principle. But it is clearly the ‘moi,’ not Madame Bovary, that most 
interests him” (“Oedipus”). 
Despite his frustrations as a novelist, Sábato often spoke candidly about his 
unceasing obsession with writing la gran novela Argentina (“the great Argentine novel”).25 
Above all, he aspired to equal his literary hero, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, by writing an Argentine 
version of Crime and Punishment; a novel that would answer the question, “What is 
Argentina?” (Fox 4). For Sábato, Dostoyevsky’s novels are remarkable precisely because they 
are “profoundly and essentially Russian,” they “give a vision of the reality of that country 
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that not even a set of a thousand essays could give” (Fox 4) – which, of course, is what 
Sábato always strove to accomplish in his own literary endeavors. In praising the Russian 
master, Sábato reveals an important underlying factor in his own struggles as a novelist: 
according to Sábato’s didactic principals, novels must always be instructive – they must reveal 
truths and teach their audience, over and above any aesthetic value. As Coover notes, “His 
great model is Dostoyevsky, ‘a tortured writer for whom style is less important than truth,” 
because for both Sábato and Dostoyevsky, “writers are teachers, prophets, saints, and 
martyrs – or they are nothing” (“Oedipus”). 
While Sábato succeeded as both a lecturer and an essayist in “conveying truths” and 
serving as his “nation’s conscience,” he continually struggled to marry the didactic and the 
aesthetic within the margins of his novels. To this end, his appointment as president of 
CONADEP represented a serendipitous juncture in his path toward la gran novela Argentina. 
While he would provide the commission with a bona fide spokesperson – an ostensible 
moral authority, whose politics corresponded perfectly with the preconceived “Two 
Demons” hypothesis – the Nunca Más report would also supply Sábato with the long awaited 
opportunity to integrate his serious-minded didacticism with a captivating story of national 
importance. 
Unfettered by the aesthetic limitations of the novel, Nunca Más would ultimately 
provide Sábato with the opportunity to answer the question, “What is Argentina?,” by 
allowing him to re-write his country’s violent history in the vision of his own imperious 
political and ethical ideals. Like his earlier novels – typified by his unique moralizing brand of 
historical fiction – the story of the Proceso would be officially re-inscribed as a profound 
moral fable, centering on the existential anguish of the common man, caught up in a world-
historic struggle between two evil factions. Under the creative direction of Sábato – whose 
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novels often borrowed heavily from biblical and Greco-Roman mythology – Nunca Más’ 
“Two Demons” narrative would evoke whispers of Zeus and Prometheus, rewriting the 
history of the Proceso as a pseudo-parable of the two warring gods who wreaked havoc on 
Athenian civilization. From its opening sentence, which declares, “During the 1970s, 
Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme right and the far left” (i), Sábato’s 
narrative succeeds in distilling the many-sided events of the Proceso down to a well-wrought 
Manichean literary trope, imbuing the historical events with the “immense seriousness” and 
“moral authority” for which he was renowned (Tóibín v). As the author’s friend and 
collaborator Nick Caistor notes, in his 2011 obituary for the author:26 
Although in other countries the selection of Sábato to preside over the 
commission might have seemed ludicrous, there was no doubt that a writer 
of fiction represented the best hope Argentina had of finding an impartial 
figure who could be trusted to weigh the evidence… Sábato’s preface27 to the 
ghastly testimonies … was a model of outraged sobriety and a clear 
statement that respect for individual human rights must be the cornerstone 
of any decent society. (Caistor “Obituary”) 
 
Despite Sábato’s massive popularity as a writer and his obvious political 
compatibility for the role, some members of CONADEP were, nevertheless, wary that his 
involvement might result in an overtly aesthetic vision for the Nunca Más report – after all, 
his most recent novel, Abaddón the Exterminator (1974), was his most formally experimental, 
to date. As both a political instrument to be drawn upon during the impending trials and as a 
framework for the collective remembrance of future generations, several commissioners 
worried that Sábato – in his leading role as Chief Commissioner of CONADEP – might take 
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certain narrative liberties in his handling of Nunca Más, leading to internal disagreements 
about the narrative style that the report should take up.28 
Commission members Graciela Fernández Meijide and Noemí Labrune, who were 
appointed to head the depositions department of CONADEP, initially proposed a basic, 
unassuming informational structure for the final report that would remain faithful to its 
primary function as a judicial instrument. Under their proposal, the report would simply 
fulfill five rudimentary functions. It would: a) present the commission’s findings in 
accordance with its own clearly mandated legal objectives; b) set forth detailed and analytic 
descriptions of the evidence that would be submitted to the courts; c) submit a list of 
perpetrators identified according to three levels of culpability;29 d) establish a comprehensive 
list of victims grouped by socio-demographic and occupational categories; and finally e) 
present a series of diagrams depicting the physical layout of each of the clandestine 
concentration camps and surrounding areas (Crenzel, The Memory 66). This structure, 
modeled on previous reports assembled by various human rights organizations during the 
dictatorship – particularly by the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights – was predicated on the idea that the Nunca Más report should 
serve as a straightforward and unadorned blueprint for the prosecution during the 
impending trials, with the focal-point being a simple and unembellished index of the crimes. 
As such, Meijide’s and Labrune’s model favored the use of the report as an easily accessible, 
evidence-based political and judicial tool – similar to the final version of the Nuremberg Report 
– and put little stock in its potential as a narrative-framework for a national memory of the 
Proceso for generations to come. 
On the other hand, Sábato envisioned the report as an original, “vivid” showpiece, 
that would serve as a “symbolic testament… to the savagery and repression that was 
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unleashed, a reminder so that it will never happen again” (Crenzel, The Memory 66). In his 
proposal, which was ultimately accepted by the commission, Nunca Más “would not be 
technical in nature” (Ibid 66), but would instead weave a suspenseful historical narrative 
around the graphic victim testimonies gathered by CONADEP. 
Beset with competing narrative visions, the Commissioners quickly found themselves 
facing a critical and unprecedented aesthetic decision. As equal parts historical narrative, 
investigative report, and legal conspectus, there were no prior stylistic templates upon which 
the commissioners could base Nunca Más. As Teresa Godwin Phelps notes, “We must 
remember, the authors of the Argentine report were inventing the form, and the choices that 
they made …have significantly impacted the form of truth commission reports that 
followed” (Phelps 85). Owing to Sábato’s popularity as a novelist, the commissioners were 
well aware of the degree of narrative scrutiny that his involvement would confer upon the 
report. While the celebrated novelist certainly envisioned Nunca Más as a golden opportunity 
to tell the definitive story of twentieth-century Argentina, several of his collaborators were 
justifiably concerned that his involvement might imbue the report with an “overly literary” 
resonance (see: Crenzel, The Memory 68). 
With time, these concerns have certainly proven warranted. Upon the report’s initial 
publication in Argentina (where it immediately topped several bestseller lists), many 
international publishing houses requested to publish translated versions of Nunca Más as a 
“novel.” As Emilio Crenzel points out, a host of mistaken assumptions based on “Sábato’s 
prestige as a novelist” led to several requests from the “fiction departments” of foreign 
publishing houses asking to translate and publish Nunca Más as a mass-market paperback 
between March and August of 1985 (108). As Crenzel notes: 
The fiction department of Finland’s OTAVA Publishing Company offered 
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to purchase the rights to what it called ‘Ernesto Sábato’s Nunca Más novel’; 
and Denmark’s Lindhardt and Ringhof Publishers put in a similar request to 
publish ‘Ernesto Sábato’s Non Comas book, as did the Swedish publishing 
house Brombergs Borforlagab [renowned for publishing the novels of Isaac 
Bashevis Singer, Octavio Paz, and more recently J.M. Coetzee and Jonathan 
Franzen]. (108) 
 
In addition to these initial mistaken assumptions, many retrospectives of Sábato’s 
literary career often count Nunca Más among his most celebrated works, frequently 
mentioning the report in the same breath as his trio of novels. In time, Sábato’s handling of 
Nunca Más has become inseparable from the high-minded moral overtones of his fictional 
works, making it impossible to read the report apart from them. As Colm Tóibín admits in 
his introduction to the English translation of Sábato’s first novel, The Tunnel: “it is fascinating 
to read El Tunnel from 1948 in conjunction with the sober and detailed [Nunca Más] report 
which Sábato and his commission produced in 1984,” bearing in mind certain equivalences 
between the two works – “the style, so controlled and factual, and the content, which [both] 
deal with a world where violence, disorder and megalomania reigned” (Tóibín viii-ix). 
José Saramago echoes this sentiment in his tribute to the Argentinian novelist, 
published on the eve of his ninety-eighth birthday, when he alludes to Sábato’s four major 
works: the three novels, as well as his “book of the victims’ testimonies” (Notebook 218). 
Drawing a thematic analogy between all four works – which each, in their own way, deal 
with the volatile political landscape leading up to and during the Proceso – Saramago applauds 
Sábato’s unique ability to penetrate “the labyrinthine corridors of his readers’ souls” by 
forcing them “to hear the cries of his conscience […] during the apocalypse of bloody 
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repression inflicted upon the Argentine people” (218), audaciously adding: “I am certain that 
the century we have left behind will become known as the century of Sábato, at least as 
much as Kafka or Proust” (219). 
While Sábato’s peers were quick to draw parallels between his works of fiction and 
his handling of the Nunca Más report, the literary establishment was perhaps even more 
eager. While Sábato had published each of his three novels in 1948 (The Tunnel), 1961 (On 
Heroes and Tombs), and 1974 (Abaddón the Exterminator), respectively, it was not until the 
publication of Nunca Más in 1984 that the Argentinian author received the illustrious Miguel 
de Cervantes Literary Award – the highest and most prestigious award given for Spanish-
language literature – securing his position amongst such literary heavyweights and fellow 
laureados de Cervantes as his one time friend and countryman Borges,30 as well as Nobel 
Laureates Mario Vargas Llosa, Carlos Fuentes, and Camilo José Cela. In fact, this impressive 
honour came only months after Sábato was also voted a finalist for the 1984 Neustadt 
International Prize for Literature – another highly esteemed international literary prize, often 
compared with the Nobel – losing narrowly to the eventual winner, Paavo Haavikko.31 While 
the Cervantes award – which he called “el más alto honor de mi vida” (“the highest honour of 
my life”) (“Ceremonia de Cervantes”) – guaranteed Sábato the literary recognition he had 
long desired, its incontrovertible connection to Nunca Más highlights both the significant 
impact of the report’s narrative artistry, as well as the prevailing readerly perceptions of the 
work. 
If Nunca Más is now considered amongst Sábato’s highly acclaimed literary works – 
and, indeed, as the basis for his prestigious Cervantes award – it is because the commission 
eventually consented to Sábato’s novelistic vision for the report, giving rise to an imaginative 
narrative expression of the Proceso that would dramatically re-shape the cultural memories of 
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the violence and repression for decades to come. 
Under Sábato’s creative vision, an evocative prologue would initially establish the 
report as the ultimate crime thriller in which the celebrated author, himself, plays the role of 
detective: “investigating the fate of the people who disappeared during those ill-omened 
years” (Nunca Más i), and “[piecing] together a shadowy jigsaw, years after the events had 
taken place, when all the clues had been deliberately destroyed, all documentary evidence 
burned, and buildings demolished” (i). Under Sábato’s proposal, the atmospheric prologue 
would set the stage for the drama of the report by sketching a preliminary portrait of the 
“spirit” of terror that gripped the nation during the 1970s. This would then be followed by 
detailed chapter-by-chapter investigations into each type of grisly crime (“Abduction,” 
“Torture,” “Extermination”), populated by a colourful cast of perpetrators and witnesses. 
Finally, running parallel to the commission’s central narrative would be a secondary plot, 
presented as short, vignette-style testimonios of the brutal violence suffered by actual victims, 
based on the personal depositions and case-files that CONADEP had gathered. These 
testimonies would punctuate the central narrative, providing graphic, first-hand evidence of 
the violence from those victims who had managed to survive, while Sábato’s parallel central 
narrative would deliver solemn philosophical and moral meditations on the wickedness that 
befell the nation. The result would be two intersecting narrative voices – Sábato’s third-
person omniscient storyteller, and a chorus of survivors – whose dual storylines varyingly 
draw readers in close to the brutal violence and pull us back out in undulating waves of 
drama and tension. As a shrewd form of narrative craftsmanship, this structure would 
ultimately succeed in marrying the evidence-based documents and depositions – upon which 
the judicial prosecutors would rely, and which Meijide and Labrune favoured – with the type 
of compelling master-narrative that Sábato envisioned. 
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While a small number of critics would eventually praise Sábato and his co-authors 
for their solemn and restrained approach to handling such dour material – for assuming a 
“descriptive and instructive tone… without resorting to artifices or literary devices” 
(Crenzel, The Memory 92) – a careful review of Nunca Más, in fact, reveals a great deal of 
understated rhetorical and literary artistry that Sábato had previously employed, to similar 
effect, in his earlier novels. 
 
Sábato’s Literary Impact on the CONADEP Report: Nunca Más  as a Novelistic Re-
Construction of the Proceso. 
 
In the previous chapter, my primary focus was on the subtle and implicit set of 
rhetorical techniques employed by the Allied prosecution throughout the course of the 
Nuremberg Trials (and the concomitant nationwide denazification propaganda campaign), in a 
furtive attempt to sway the West German population away from any lingering fidelity to 
Nazi ideology and toward embracing Western, neoliberal values. While, in time, the West 
German denazification project proved to be a success, the outcome was dependent, by and 
large, on the general public’s internalization of Allied charges of “collective complicity” and 
their ensuing incorporation of this shared sentiment into a newly forming collective postwar 
identity. The process, in other words, was a slow burn. The “Guilt Question” was 
introduced by foreign victors, it was initially rejected by the general populace before slowly 
and hesitantly – it would, in fact, take an entire generation – finding its place at the center of 
a larger national dialogue. From the public stage of the Nuremberg courtroom, General 
Taylor called on the German people to wrestle with the question of “collective guilt,” and to 
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eventually – when the time was right – narrate their own history of the Nazi years, with a 
degree of self-reflective earnestness. 
This was not the case with the Nunca Más report. 
The “Two Demons” narrative did not penetrate the collective Argentine psyche 
slowly, or gradually. It was not the product of a cautious and measured national discourse 
that steadily played-out in newspapers and on television, nor in public forums or town halls. 
The Argentine people did not fold the “equal blame” hypothesis gently into the shared, 
cultural storytelling fabric of their nation, but rather, had it thrust upon them in a single, 
remarkable cultural moment. Prior to the unveiling of the Nunca Más report, the “Two 
Demons” thesis had never before cropped up in a novel here, nor a poem or song there. 
Instead, it appeared readymade, as a fully fleshed-out and sensational story in the immediate 
aftermath of the horrific violence of the Proceso. From the skilled hands of a celebrated crime 
novelist, Argentina’s most violent shared trauma was immediately reflected back to its 
people in the form of a graphic, morally-laden fable that few people recognized, yet many 
wanted to believe. 
As mentioned above, John Hersey once famously declared that a community’s 
shared knowledge of historical events is, more often than not, shaped by historical novels as 
opposed to conventional histories and journalistic reporting. One rationale for this thought 
is that great novels – Tolstoy’s War and Peace, for instance, or Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge 
of Courage – benefit from the privilege of posterity. As the vicissitudes of lived-memories 
fade, a single, stable narrative endures. The latter, in other words, replaces the former. The 
Bezukhovs and Rostovs stand-in for all Russians, furnishing the nation’s collective psyche 
with a mnemonic facsimile that approximates – even incorporates – the individual lived-
memories, which continue to recede in the evanescence of time. This process, which Hersey 
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so astutely describes, is therefore dependent on the larghetto of time, a necessary distance 
between what Hegel calls res gestae [the historical events] and historia rerum gestarum [the 
“narration” of those event]. Tolstoy published War and Peace fifty-seven years after 
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, while Crane’s The Red Badge of Courage appeared three decades 
after the conclusion of the American Civil War. Moreover, it would be many more years 
before our shared knowledge of those events would be imputed to either novel. 
Yet, Nunca Más did not emerge in the European or American literary landscape, 
where the generic boundaries between “history” and “fiction” are so stringently defined 
(what Eduardo Galeano had earlier referred to as “the frontiers that, according to literature’s 
customs officers, separate the forms,” 13). Instead, Sábato’s “Non Comas book” or “Nunca 
Más novel” – as various European publishers had pre-emptively referred to it – emerged 
from within a rich Latin American literary landscape, made famous for its fantastical 
entwining of history and fantasy, and its evocative depictions of the savage dictatorial 
violence that had ravaged the continent. Nunca Más, under Sábato’s direction would express 
a closer affinity to the uniquely Latin American genre of “Dictator Novels”32 – which often 
emerged in the very midst of authoritarian violence, in real time33 – than with Tolstoy’s or 
Crane’s historical masterpieces.34 
Nunca Más – in its “novelistic” rendering of immediate history – was able audaciously 
to flout any appeal to posterity, because it emerged at a time and place with a long and 
fascinating history of “novelistic” histories being written in and of the moment; where poetry 
and journalism, novels and history, all converged in a logical coalescence of cultural 
production. In the skilled hands of Sábato, the Nunca Más report approached recent history 
as fiction, as though the horrors of the Proceso were always already a series of Pirandello-esque 
scenes and characters awaiting their author. 
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Just six months after President Alfonsín passed Decree 187, Nunca Más bestowed on 
the general public a compelling historical narrative of the years of terror, suffused with all 
the captivating qualities of the “suspense novel” for which Sábato was known. 
Like his previous novel, On Heroes and Tombs (1961),35 Nunca Más opens with an 
evocative and edifying prologue that establishes the moral and political stakes for the 
remainder of the work.36 Replete with Sábato’s distinctive euphuistic prose and pretentious 
moralizing, the prologue announces its “Two Demons” thesis in its opening line: “During 
the 1970s, Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme right and the far left” (i). He 
then continues: 
This phenomenon was not unique to our country. Italy, for example, 
has suffered for many years from the heartless attacks of Fascist groups, the 
Red Brigades, and other similar organizations. Never at any time, however, 
did that country abandon the principles of law in its fight against these 
terrorists, and it managed to resolve the problem through the normal courts 
of law, guaranteeing the accused all their rights of a fair hearing. When Aldo 
Moro was kidnapped, a member of the security forces suggested to General 
Della Chiesa that a suspect who apparently knew a lot be tortured. The 
general replied with the memorable words: ‘Italy can survive the loss of Aldo 
Moro. It would not survive the introduction of torture.’   
The same cannot be said of our country. The armed forces 
responded to the terrorists’ crimes with a terrorism far worse than the one 
they were combating, and after 24 March 1976 they could count on the 
power and impunity of an absolute state, which they misused to abduct, 
torture and kill thousands of human beings. (Nunca Más, “Prologue” i) 
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Rather than contextualizing the violence of the Proceso according to Argentina’s long 
and bloody history of state violence against poor, working class students and workers, 
Sábato instead likens the Proceso to the well-known case in which Italy’s former Prime 
Minister, Aldo Moro, was kidnapped and murdered by a group of communist mercenaries.37 
The problem, however, was that the Italian case – which generated an urgent international 
response from the American government and its many Cold War allies – did, in fact, unfold 
within the context of a left-right revolutionary struggle. The nation, which was governed by a 
democratically-elected administration at the time, was indeed torn by two opposing guerilla 
factions – one that had remained faithful to the fascist principles of Mussolini’s former 
Partito Nazionale Fascista and the other, the Brigate Rosse, who sought to establish a 
revolutionary communist state through armed struggle. During the 1970s, these two 
notorious insurrectionary groups engaged in a violent struggle for influence over elected 
officials, with the climax being the kidnapping and eventual murder of Moro. However, by 
likening the Argentine situation to the Italian case, Sábato obscures the crucial difference 
that the Proceso began, unfolded, and ended within the context of a brutal and unlawful 
military dictatorship that was predicated on the very idea of violently suppressing any and all 
public sympathy for Socialist and anti-Christian values (including support for worker’s 
unions and enrollment in university courses that make mention of any leftist material38). 
Unlike Italy, the entire Argentine nation was already subject to the brutal tyranny, 
violence, and absolute rule of the far-right authoritarian regime, and as such, the suggestion 
that “[t]he armed forces responded to the [leftist] terrorists’ crimes with a terrorism far 
worse than the one they were combating” (Nunca Más, “Prologue” i) misleadingly implies 
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both an historical equivalence (several of the counter-authoritarian groups emerged years 
after the coup) and an evenness of power and influence that simply did not exist. 
 Within this specious contextual framing, the years of terror under the military juntas 
would be fixed in the shared memory of Argentinians as a type of Manichean conflict 
between two extreme and savage groups. The forced disappearances, barbaric torture 
practices, the systematic rape of thousands of victims, and the unimaginable practice of 
drugging men, women, and children (some as young as nine years of age) and dumping them 
into the Río de la Plata were all framed as a series of unfortunate, heavy-handed responses 
by the military regime who were retaliating against a seemingly equally sinister threat to 
traditional Argentine values. What the military did has no excuse, the prologue foretells, but 
they were not the sole actors. 
 In this light, Sábato’s overwrought prologue then establishes the stakes of the 
CONADEP investigation (as well as the impending trials, which would be founded upon the 
information uncovered in the Nunca Más report) with comparable histrionic flair, suggesting 
that the nation’s very “survival” rests upon the Commission’s ability to heal the intense 
wounds of the previous decade. Ignoring the reality that the 1976 coup was, in fact, the sixth 
time the military had forcibly and unlawfully seized control of the government in the 
previous half-century (and that the nation had manage to “survive” each of the previous 
regime changes), the prologue signals the underlying moral message of Sábato’s “Two 
Demons” hypothesis. Spuriously suggesting that a move toward political centrism and 
neoliberal temperance – to the exclusion of anything else – will finally and definitively deliver 
Argentina from its most recent trauma, Sábato adds: 
Great catastrophes are always instructive. The tragedy which began 
with the military dictatorship in March 1976, the most terrible our nation has 
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ever suffered, will undoubtedly serve to help us understand that it is only 
democracy which can save a people from horror on this scale, only 
democracy which can keep and safeguard the sacred, essential rights of man. 
Only with democracy will we be certain that NEVER AGAIN will events 
such as these, which have made Argentina so sadly infamous throughout the 
world, be repeated in our nation. (Nunca Más, “Prologue” i) 
 
Like On Heroes and Tombs before it, the Nunca Más prologue functions as a 
hermeneutic overture, guiding and informing the rest of the report according to its ominous 
foretellings. For nakedly didactic writers such as Sábato, the prologue provides an effective 
method of heralding the political and ethical undertones of a work, while still maintaining 
the pretense of fictional storytelling (as opposed to reverting to an overt sermonizing or 
disquisitional tone, as was his preference). A favourite technique of moralizing playwrights 
such as Marlowe or Shakespeare, the prologue establishes an unimpeachable air of authority, 
allowing its author to guard against misreadings by alerting his audience to the social and 
political commentary at the very heart of its narrative.39 As in its early Elizabethan context,40 
Sábato makes use of the prologue in order to alter the reception of Nunca Más in advance by 
speaking directly to the audience about the work’s underlying moral and political themes.41 
In light of its prologuist foretellings, Nunca Más unfolds as an overwrought moral 
fable, in which the many survivors and witnesses, whose testimonios make up the emotional 
heart of the text, are to be read as the voices of the so-called “leftist terrorists” – whose 
“terrorism” was met with an even greater terrorism by the state. 
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As a paratext to Nunca Más – existing apart from it, yet providing a critical 
commentary or hermeneutic blueprint for it – the prologue also establishes Sábato as 
uniquely qualified authority on the horrors of the Proceso. As Gerard Genette suggests, the 
prologue operates as “a fringe of the printed text which, in reality, controls one’s whole 
reading of the text” and exerts a commanding “influence on the public, an influence that … 
is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it” 
(Paratexts 2). To the extent that the prologue exerts considerable “influence on the public” – 
persuading readers to interpret the text’s themes and messages in a precise way – it is a 
consummate Aristotelian rhetorical devise through which Sábato is able to craft his “Two 
Demons” narrative.42 It is that rare literary device, in other words, that allows its author to 
address all three of the primary Classical elements of rhetorical persuasion, at once: a) by 
appealing to the emotional and psychological makeup of Sábato’s “Audience” (those 
supposedly “innocent” and unimpeachable Argentinians who have been “victimized” by the 
violence of the left and the right); b) exploiting the specific contextual “moment and place” 
(Kairos) in which the argument is being made (the immediate aftermath of the horrors of the 
Proceso); and c) all the while laying the foundations for an engaging literary “style” (To Prepon) 
with which the “Two Demons” narrative will be clothed (the interweaving of the individual 
testimonios into Sábato’s overarching meditation on the “spirit of terror” that gripped the 
nation). 
Lastly, upon establishing the moral and political framework through which the 
remainder of the report is intended to be read, Sábato then goes out of his way to exonerate 
the majority of the Argentine public from the horrors that marked society. Argentina, as a 
whole, is depicted as a collective of external observers of the terror, innocent of any 
involvement in the so-called “guerrilla terrorism” (Nunca Más, “Prologue” i) or of the brutal 
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state violence. The prologue therefore proposes a “we” that took no part in the brutality and 
is, therefore, unburdened from any moral culpability or criminal guilt. In so doing, Sábato 
establishes an intimate bond with his readers, categorizing them amongst the “innocent” and 
“vulnerable” multitude, thereby further separating them from the victims and survivors 
whose individual testimonios make up the bulk of the report. 
As Daniel Feierstein and Douglas Town note, “[t]he hegemonic vision that emerged 
[from the Nunca Más prologue] was one of an ‘innocent’ society caught between two 
opposing types of violence: left-wing ‘terrorist’ violence and the repressive state violence 
carried out mostly by the armed forces” (140). Just as many Germans claimed following the 
end of World War II, within the purview of this “Two Demons” thesis, the collective 
inaction of large swathes of bystanders could therefore be justified as a matter of survival. 
One could argue that this separation of society – not only from the violence, but also from 
the criminal and ethical accountability for the violence – was precisely why the Nunca Más 
vision was so widely corroborated by the general public. The notion of “collective 
victimization” (as opposed to the “collective guilt” imposed by the Nuremberg narrative) 
appeased the moral sensibilities of many Argentinians with the thought that everybody, with 
the exception of left-wing “terrorists” and right-wing “fascists,” had been a victim. As 
Feierstein writes: 
One could argue that this alienation of society as a whole from the 
genocide in which it was involved, and which everybody participated, in one 
way or another – as perpetrators, accomplices, passive bystanders, or victims 
– was precisely why this [“Two Demons”] vision achieved such a broad 
consensus. The notion of ‘collective victimization’ soothed the consciences 
of many Argentines with the thought that everybody (with the exception of 
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left and right ‘terrorist groups’) had been a victim and so nobody needed to 
question his or her role in the genocide. (Feierstein 141) 
 
However, by unconditionally separating the whole of society from the supposed 
primary actors of the “Dirty War,”43 Sábato not only reiterates the erroneous hegemonic 
vision of an innocent society caught between two savage combatants; he also reinforces the 
idea that a majority of this supposedly “innocent” collective were oblivious to the heinous, 
inhuman violence that had taken place across the country, often in full public view.44 Of 
course, as the individual testimonios illustrate, this assertion was categorically false. As Sábato 
points out in the “Prologue”: “The abductions were precisely organized operations, 
sometimes occurring at the victim’s place of work, sometimes in the street in broad daylight. 
They involved the open deployment of military personnel, who were given a free hand by 
the local police stations” (Nunca Más i). Still, by insinuating that a large swathe of his 
audience remained at best incredulous, and at worst oblivious to the gruesome facts and 
details of the violence, Sábato accomplishes two crucial functions. Firstly, he establishes 
Nunca Más as event – as the necessary occasion in which the entire nation is simultaneously 
called upon to collectively reckon with the murder, torture, rape, and disappearance of tens 
of thousands of their fellow citizens. Secondly – and most importantly from a narrative and 
rhetorical perspective – Sábato also establishes the hermeneutic framework for how his 
readers are meant to negotiate the report’s dual narrative threads.  
By absolving the majority of the Argentine public, and thereby insinuating their 
collective ignorance, Sábato therefore establishes himself (and his overarching central 
plotline) as a permanent narrative intermediary; an ostensible middleman who will, in the 
forthcoming pages of the report, introduce the victim-stories to the reader. Insofar as the 
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reader is constituted as an unknowing victim – naïve and unknowledgeable about the brutal 
details of the murders and disappearances – Sábato’s presumed “authority” on the subject is 
therefore required in order for the public to fully grasp the momentousness of the trauma. In 
this way, Sábato lays the foundations for an interpretive paradigm, in which the thousands of 
victim-testimonies that CONADEP had collected would fold neatly into his preordained 
“equal blame” hypothesis. While the individual case-studies would propel the drama and 
action of the report, Sábato’s prologue and overarching narrative would be free to “establish 
the report’s master narrative with its unflinching and sometimes contentious tone” (Phelps 
85). 
Sábato then establishes the report’s impending narrative framework in the first 
section, inauspiciously titled “The Repression,” in which the individual testimonios punctuate 
his overarching “spiritual” commentary as a series of Sheherazade-esque stories-within-a-
story. Each section consists of an introduction to one element of the violence – 
“Abduction,” “Torture,” “Extermination,” “Impunity” – in which Sábato provides a 
haughty meditation on the nature of each crime and recapitulates the overall “equal blame” 
explanation for the terror, while individual excerpts from victim depositions punctuate his 
framing-device with lurid depictions of the state’s “excessive measures” (Nunca Más, 
“Prologue” i). While Sábato provides Nunca Más with the all-engrossing, primary historical 
narrative of the military violence in a detached, third-person, past-tense voice, it is the 
personal, first person narratives of real-life victims that inject Nunca Más with an authentic 
sense of personal suffering. Sábato’s frame-narrative, which extends the authoritative and 
euphuistic locutionary tone of the previous “prologue,” therefore contextualizes each of the 
testimonios, presenting them with haughty, often condescending, moralizing commentary45 and 
introducing each of the victims according to their name, age, and often, job (which serve as 
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cunning class and political markers to reinforce the “Two Demons” theory. An entire 
section, for instance, is dedicated to disappeared “Trade Unionists,” which the dictatorship 
had characterized as a “terrorist” profession). 
In a masterful opening gesture, Sábato sets the parallel narratives apart from one 
another with the ominous forewarning that, “Many of the events described in this report will 
be hard to believe” (Nunca Más 9).46 With this opening injunction, Sábato establishes a 
hierarchy of truthfulness between his overarching historical explanations of the violence and 
the first-hand testimonios by supposed “leftist terrorists.” 
While the prologue’s “rhetoric of authority” established Sábato as a uniquely 
informed and qualified commentator on the horrors of the Proceso – having collected “several 
thousand statements and testimonies,” verified or established “the existence of hundreds of 
secret detention centres,” and compiled “over 50,000 pages of documentation” (Nunca Más, 
“Prologue” i) – the individual testimonial episodes are instead characterized as “hard to 
believe” and “open to question” (Nunca Más 2). The emotionally charged victim-testimonies 
are therefore portrayed as subsidiary to Sábato’s overarching explanatory narrative, simply 
meant to authenticate his controversial Manichean narrative.47 
At times, in fact, (and despite the opening exhortation that “Many of the events 
described in this report will be hard to believe”) the Commission felt that certain particularly 
gruesome acts were so inconceivably obscene that they might cast an air of suspicion upon the 
entire scope of the investigations.48 According to a press release put out by Secretary of Legal 
Affairs, Alberto Mansur, and Secretary of Procedures, Raúl Aragón, the Commission 
admitted that they had refrained from including certain cases from the report for fear that 
their particularly excessive savagery would render the Nunca Más report too unbelievable. As 
Mansur and Aragón note, “the Commission members decided to exclude certain acts – such 
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as the skinning of prisoners while they were still alive and the raping of one female prisoner 
by dozens of soldiers, which continued even after she was dead – as they felt that their 
extreme cruelty rendered them implausible and would compromise the credibility of the 
entire report in the eyes of the population” (Crenzel, The Memory 67).49 
Nonetheless, by pointing to specific isolated “events” described in the victim 
testimonios as the sole object of potential incredulity (to the exclusion of everything else) – and 
suggesting that that they are to be read with a separate degree of readerly suspicion – Sábato 
ostensibly shields his central historical narrative from such readerly suspicion, while 
subjecting the detail-oriented case-files to a more compromising degree of scepticism.50 The 
reader is tacitly instructed to read Sábato’s central narrative as a sincere and candid depiction 
of the “spirit” of terror, while it is acknowledged that the individual case studies are 
somewhat vulnerable to the vagaries of survivor-testimony.51 In other words, Sábato’s 
pretentious and moralizing “expository” plotline is set-up to be read passively and 
respectfully – as a philosophical or political treatise might be – while the testimonio plotline is 
to be read novelistically – as one would, a work of fiction.52 
While Sábato’s wider historical narrative provides readers with a sense of 
omniscience by placing us in a present, post-“Dirty War,” backward-looking viewpoint – 
“The first act in the drama of disappearance,” he explains, “began with the sudden bursting 
into their homes of the groups responsible for the abduction” (11) – the first-person 
testimonies wrench readers back into the limited, real-time perspective of victims as they 
experienced their horrendous persecution at the hands of the military: 
I was tortured both in Arana and in Bánfield. In Arana they applied the electric prod to 
my mouth, my gums and my genitals. They even tore a nail off one of my toes with tweezers. 
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In Bánfield they did not use electric prods on me any more, but I was beaten with sticks 
and pricked with needles. It was common not to eat for several days. And for long periods 
they tied me up with a rope round my neck. [Nunca Más 320] 
Unlike Sábato’s omniscient narrator, whose overarching narrative benefits from the 
clarity of hindsight and the detailed findings of the investigations, each individual testimonio is 
instead bound by the immediacy of the victim’s circumstances – the first-person testimonies 
are saturated by the unknown, by the dread and foreboding of someone confined within a 
dark, isolated prison cell. In contrast to the central narrative, the testimonios are therefore 
based entirely on conjecture and guesswork – as each victim anxiously awaits news of their 
loved-ones – thus elevating their novelistic feel. 
The artful juxtaposition of these two contrasting narratives allows Sábato to take up 
a more grandiloquent didactic prose-style within the overarching historical narrative, while 
the victims describe the brutal techniques employed by the military dictatorship in stark, 
methodical detail, meant to substantiate Sábato’s “Two Demons” thesis. Whereas the 
individual testimonios are constituted by a clinical, austere tone that is strictly functional in its 
articulation of the crimes, Sábato’s descriptive language is, on the other hand, at times 
metaphysical, perhaps even bordering on liturgical, in its illustration of the general “spirit of 
terror” within which the crimes were committed. This unmistakable difference in prose-
styles, between the case-stories and the central overarching narrative, gives rise to a striking 
readerly experience in which readers are ushered between contrasting locutionary tones, with 
each tone invoking its own respective mood and feel. 
Whereas the austere and unadorned descriptive language of the victim-testimony is 
often numbing in its repetitive, mechanical inventorying of the appalling crimes, the lyrical 
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inflection of the main narrative, on the other hand, offers a much-needed form of respite for 
the reader. In this way, the two narrative threads interact with and against one another to 
mitigate any sort of empathetic fatigue, providing alternating moments of respite from the 
horrors of the testimony. While the testimonio narrative-thread horrifies and outrages its 
readers, Sábato’s high-handed didacticism distracts; giving rise to a throbbing, melancholic 
rhythm in which the author’s underlying “lessons” unfold in varying intervals of severity, 
ultimately offering a modest form of emotional reprieve from the endless clinical 
descriptions of sheer wretchedness. 
On the one hand, the individual case-files repeatedly feature stark, utilitarian 
descriptive language. For instance, in Dr. Norberto Liwsky’s (file No. 7397) testimonial 
account, as in nearly all others found within Nunca Más, the descriptive language stands in 
direct and abrupt contrast to the lyrical style of Sábato’s central narrative. Instead, the 
harrowing statements of torture and rape are communicated in cold, solemnly restrained 
language:53 
For days they applied electric shocks to my gums, nipples, genitals, abdomen and ears… 
They then began to beat me systematically and rhythmically with wooden sticks on my 
back, the backs of my thighs, my calves and the soles of my feet… In between torture 
sessions they left me hanging by my arms from hooks fixed in the wall of the cell where they 
had thrown me […] At one point when I was face-down on the torture table, they lifted my 
head then removed my blindfold to show me a bloodstained rag […] they told me it was a 
pair of my wife’s knickers. No other explanation was given. […] On two or three 
occasions they also burnt me with a metal instrument. One day they put me face-down on 
the torture table, tied me up […] and began to strip the skin from the soles of my feet […] 
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In the midst of all this …they tied me up and began to torture my testicles. Another day 
they took me out of my cell and, despite my swollen testicles, placed me face-down again. 
They tied me up and raped me slowly and deliberately by introducing a metal object into my 
anus. They then passed an electric current through the object. (Nunca Más 22-23) 
 
On the other hand – in direct contrast to the laconic, desolate prose of the victim-
statements – Sábato provides a much more vivid portrayal of the “general atmosphere” of 
the disappearances in the central narrative, around which the depositions are peppered.54 
Indulging in certain rhetorical liberties, Sábato provides lyrical meditations on each of the 
graphic testimonial episodes– embellishing, dramatizing, and drawing melancholic analogies 
to otherworldly imagery – for instance, imagining a mythical Hadean scene in one 
particularly rhapsodic excerpt: “The victims were then taken to a chamber over whose 
doorway might well have been inscribed the words Dante read on the gates of Hell: ‘Abandon 
hope, all ye who enter here’” (Nunca Más 3). Such arresting lyrical embroidery – which would not 
be uncommon in one of Sábato’s novels, but is comparatively out of keeping with a 
traditional judicial report – illustrates the type of rhetorical latitude with which the 
overarching historical narrative is fashioned. 
As a consequence of this vacillation between an all-knowing narrator and the 
individual victims’ limited points of view, Nunca Más creates an entrancing bond of empathy 
between the victims and readers, drawing us into the terrifying lived-moments of personal 
anguish and suspense, before nudging us back out to the present, post-dictatorship moment. 
Mindful of the redundancy of so many cases, Sábato’s central narrator occasionally foregoes 
a lengthy set-up and simply allows the nearness of the victims’ circumstances to carry the 
emotional weight of the report. At one point, Sábato’s omniscient narrator starkly informs 
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us: “With the testimony of Carlos Hugo Basso (file No. 7725), we return to the now 
notorious La Perla and La Ribera camps. Basso was abducted on 10 November 1976 in the 
Alto Alberti district of the town of Córdoba. Following the usual procedure, with blows and 
a journey on the floor of a car under his captors’ feet, they arrived at the secret detention 
center” (38). The abbreviated narration simply sets the stage for what then amounts to a type 
of testimonial monologue by the victim, himself:  
They opened the door, which, from the noise it made, was probably metal. One of those 
taking me warned me that I was shortly to meet the ‘Priest,’ who would be in charge of 
‘taking my confession.’ This person they called ‘Priest’ must have been quite big, since as 
soon as I went in, he grabbed me by the sides and lifted me in the air… They undressed me 
and tied my hands and feet to a metal bed-frame they called a ‘grill’ [the original Spanish 
report uses the word “Asado,” the traditional Argentine celebration in which men gather 
for a barbeque]. For what must have been an hour, they applied electric currents to the 
most sensitive parts of my body: genitals, hips, knees, neck, gums. Afterwards, somebody 
applied a stethoscope to my chest and they untied me. I found I couldn’t walk, but they 
dragged me 20 or 30 metres to a mattress in a large room against a wall where I remained 
until the following day. (Nunca Más 38) 
 
Set apart from Sábato’s often effusive and lyrical counter-narrative, these spine-
chilling scenes accentuate presumed ideological distance between “ordinary” Argentinians 
and the actors on “both sides” of the violence. Sábato’s cool, sophisticated, and rational 
condemnation of the grotesque, un-censored violence heightens the perceived gap between 
the supposedly “innocent” world of the everyday reader, and the sinister world of the two 
Demons. Within the purview of the overarching “equal blame” thesis, readers are tempted 
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to imagine the equivalent violence that the so-called “leftist terrorist” might have enacted 
upon their military adversaries, inviting imaginary reversals of the graphic accounts of 
victims having their fingernails and teeth violently ripped from them, of flayings, and brutal 
descriptions of anal and vaginal rape. 
Contrary to Meijide’s and Labrune’s proposal, Sábato took exception to the idea of 
describing the horrifying crimes in terms of impersonal tables, indexes, and statistics. 
Instead, Sábato envisioned the report as an attempt to “honour” the victims by presenting a 
realistic and uncensored account of the “perverse imagination” with which their brutal 
tortures were devised (Nunca Más 20). The report, under Sábato’s supervision, centered on 
uncensored, “vivid accounts” of the crimes, highlighted by “testimonies, photographs, and 
descriptions of exemplary cases” (Crenzel, The Memory 66).  “In drawing up this report,” 
Sábato’s omniscient narrator confesses, “we wondered about the best way to deal with the 
theme [of torture] so that this chapter did not turn into merely an encyclopedia of horror” 
(Nunca Más 20). By centering the report on the personal narratives of real-life victims, Sábato 
aimed to illuminate the individual human beings who were caught up in what he called, “an 
immense display of the most degrading and indescribable acts of degradation,” believing this 
would “give the report a unique narrative strength that would ground its credibility and its 
chances of reaching a mass readership” (Crenzel, The Memory 66).55  
Rather than encumbering the reader with a dry, impersonal index of unnamed 
victims or expostulating about the “moral failures” of the State in abstract, lachrymose 
language as the Nuremberg Report had – alluding to the Holocaust abstractly as a “terrible 
engine of destruction” (101) that destroyed “the lives of countless millions” (135) – Sábato 
and his team instead opted to present their victims individually, in “a domestic and familiar 
light” (Crenzel, The Memory 82). Victims would be introduced by their full name, occupation, 
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and hometown, and would tell their stories in their own voice. In this way, Sábato appealed 
to the novelistic form, by introducing his victims as though they were fully-developed 
characters in a novel, whose plot-lines converge and intersect with one another as they meet 
in clandestine prison-cells or by family members searching for their own loved ones. 
In part, this “novelistic” style was a result of the peculiar set of circumstances and 
restrictions faced by the Commission throughout the course of their investigations. Upon 
collecting tens of thousands of depositions from survivors, “for eight hours a day, from 
Monday to Friday” (Nunca Más 431) – both at their headquarters in downtown Buenos 
Aires, as well as having representatives travel “the countryside to collect stories from people 
in remote regions” (Nunca Más 431), and even travelling to Uruguay, Peru, Mexico, and 
Spain to hear from those in exile – the Commissioners were then faced with the Herculean 
assignment of cross-referencing and fact-checking the tens of thousands of testimonios they 
had gathered. 
Each deposition received “a number, corresponding to a file of supporting material – 
newspaper clippings, letters to loved ones, …and anything else that would help the 
Commission verify and validate the details of the story told” (Nunca Más 431). However, 
owing to a dearth of secondary materials, the most effective method of corroborating the 
testimonies was to cross-reference them with one-another: arranging depositions according 
to date of disappearance and location of captivity, if known, and then searching individual 
testimonies for any mention of other victims with the same designation (Crenzel, The Memory 
49). If two or more survivors testified to having been incarcerated at the same time and 
location, their depositions were surveyed for any mention of having seen or interacted with 
one another. In this way, “evidence was pieced together from the testimony of different 
survivors, whenever they coincided in certain details, such as the names used to refer to the 
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area or location of a clandestine center, its personnel, or other prisoners” (Crenzel, The 
Memory 49). “Because of its heterogeneity,” Emilio Crenzel recalls, “these testimonies [those 
that successfully verified the whereabouts of other victims] were instrumental in expanding 
evidence, confirming other testimonies, and generating new ones” (The Memory 49). 
While this method of corroborating testimonies would prove highly effective for the 
Commissioners, it also inadvertently contributed to the “novelistic” style that Sábato had 
envisioned for the report. In addition to expediting the Commission’s efforts to substantiate 
individual testimonies, this strategy also provides Nunca Más with its narrative scaffolding, 
depicting a shadowy web of detainees being shuffled from one clandestine prison to another, 
crossing paths in dark prison-cells and helping one another pass information to comrades 
and loved ones back home. 
This was the case with Monsignor Enrique Angelelli, a well-known Bishop of the 
Diocese of La Rioja, who had allegedly died in a car accident mere hours after publicly 
denouncing the military in August, 1976. Despite the Bishop having been involved in a car 
accident, his body and briefcase (which contained letters to the Archbishop regarding the 
persecution of local “left-sympathizing” priests) were never recovered from the scene, 
leading the Commissioners to conclude that his death was, in fact, “a brutal assassination” by 
the regime (NM 350). Despite the high profile nature of Angelelli’s case at the time, the 
investigators were unable to confirm the fate of the Bishop; that is, until a fortuitous 
encounter with a seemingly unrelated victim, journalist Plutarco Antonio Schaller (File No. 
4952), who had been abducted that same year because of his work with the left-leaning 
newspaper El Indipendiente. As Schaller recalls: 
During one of the interrogations [at a clandestine prison in Cordoba], Captain Marcó and 
Captain Goenaga told me that the Bishop of La Rioja would be killed.... In August of the 
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same year, because of my poor physical state as a result of tortures, I was transferred to the 
Presidente Plaza Hospital. While I was there, the body of Angelelli was brought in one 
night for a series of autopsies. The people who were guarding me, members of the Provincial 
Police, alluding to the death of the Bishop, said things like ‘this had to happen to this 
communist priest son of a bitch.’ (Nunca Más 352) 
 
Although Schaller and Angelelli’s entire relationship consisted of a brief coincidental 
encounter – a momentary glimpse of the Bishop’s corpse and an overheard admission by his 
murderers – their individual plot lines become indelibly intertwined in the Nunca Más report 
to great dramatic effect. 
Capitalizing on the fortuitous effect of this fact-checking method, Sábato shrewdly 
allows the energies of suspense and anticipation to become the key dynamics that drive the 
Nunca Más narrative, when the continuation of one character’s story is delayed until their fate 
is revealed through the testimony of another character. By forcing readers to wait to find out 
whether a particular victim is saved or not, Sábato is able to create new forms of subjectivity 
for his victims by delaying the progression of the story through the transference of fear and 
tension onto the reader.56 This technique is further heightened by the introductory 
exhortation that many of the victims were “still missing” at the time of publication, although 
“some have been seen in secret detention centres” (Nunca Más 284). The trenchant 
immediacy of the narrative – rooted in the knowledge that many of the real-life characters 
within the report were still being searched for by the Commissioners – therefore draws its 
readers into the unpredictable, threatening world of Sábato’s literary imagination. By 
centering much of the action on those cases that were still open at the time of publication, 
characters and readers shared an ongoing sense of uncertainty about the future, encapsulated 
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and accentuated by Sábato’s masterful employment of the cliffhanging pause and the 
dramatic increasing or decreasing of pace. 
As a result of favoring those testimonies that revolve around such chance-
encounters, the narrative structure of the report reads more like a deliberately contrived 
novel, in which characters are slowly developed independently of one another before various 
narrative threads come together in a climactic dénouement. Not unlike the multiple narrative 
structures of William Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying or George Eliot’s Middlemarch, Nunca Más 
cleverly interweaves multiple loosely parallel stories, engendering propulsive narrative 
tensions and deliberately foreshadowing the fates of unrelated victims. As survivors catch 
brief glimpses of other desaparecidos, or recall the distinctive sounds of church-bells outside 
their cell walls or the sweet smell of candy in the air – for instance, the Fronterita Detention 
Camp was located only three hundred metres from the local Sugar Mill – perceptive readers 
begin to place them at the locations previously described by other victims, in their own 
respective storylines. 
At other times, it is the torturers who serve as the narrative links between multiple 
victims’ plotlines. As the Commissioners discovered throughout the course of their 
investigations, perpetrators would often assign one another “nicknames” in an attempt to 
conceal their true identities from their victims57 (many of whom were often kept blindfolded 
or “hooded” throughout the course of their internment). The perpetrator’s nicknames thus 
became verbal masks, meant to shield their true identities from their targets, which, when 
repeated within the pages of Nunca Más, also serve to heighten the literariness of the 
narrative. 
While recording victim depositions across the country, Commissioners quickly 
discovered that many survivors were determined to name their torturers or otherwise 
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describe them in as much detail as possible. In addition to this testimonial “outing,” several 
members of the human rights groups who had been assisting the depositions department set 
about “selecting the testimonies that identified the greatest number of perpetrators by name” 
(Crenzel, The Memory 69). This testimonial unmasking led to what some Commission 
members referred to as “a new narration problem: the presentation of the accused” in the 
report (The Memory 68). Bearing in mind that the “Two Demons” approach was largely 
predicated on an effort to mollify members of the armed forces – to shield them from scorn 
and humiliation, so as to maintain a degree of amity between the new democratic State and 
its military – the public naming-of-names threatened to neutralize the reconciliatory effect of 
the entire process. As noted by Crenzel, after rumors began circulating in early 1984 that 
“the report would include a list of individuals responsible for the disappearances” – which 
resulted in discernable “unrest in military circles” (The Memory 68) – Sábato was faced with 
another important narrative decision. Either Nunca Más would risk humiliating members of 
the armed forces58 – conceivably provoking members of Los Carapintadas into another 
violent military uprising – or redact the names from the testimonios altogether, which, as 
Sábato acknowledged, would inevitably lead to readerly mistrust of both the report and its 
authors. Based on the threat of the former, “the commission had initially decided not to 
identify the perpetrators, omitting their names entirely “(Crenzel, The Memory 68). However, 
when news that the perpetrators’ names would be concealed was leaked to the press, the 
Commission faced intense public outcry: Senate leader Vicente Saadi, from the left-wing 
Péronist Party, demanded that CONADEP release the names (Crenzel, The Memory 68), 
while Supreme Court justice Ricardo Colombres declared that “there were no legal reasons 
for excluding the names,” especially if it were “the witnesses who named them” (Crenzel, 
The Memory 69). 
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In the end, the Commission settled on a clever solution to the problem. While the 
report would identify the names of border guards, small-town police or security officers, and 
members of the penitentiary service, when it came to military or navy officers, Sábato and 
his co-authors would favour those testimonies that depicted them by their nicknames. 
However, an unintentional consequence of this approach is the “novelistic” or 
“cinematic” effect the nicknames have on the narrative. Protagonists referred to as “The 
Snake,” “Potbelly,” or “The Judge” read more like characters in a popular pulp magazine 
than an imperious human rights report, evoking the aliases and monikers of famous real-life 
criminals or echoes of nineteenth-century gaucho stories. 
In a literary context, the imposition of a deprecatory nickname can often identify a 
character as an archetypal scapegoat or anti-villain figure, and is an efficient method of 
typifying secondary characters – like “the Kid” or “the Slasher” in Borges’ gaucho story 
“Streetcorner Man” (1935) – since it projects a precise visual image that assists in the 
reader’s immediate recognition of the figure in question.  
Within the pages of Nunca Más, the use of nicknames work to locate victims with no 
apparent connection to one another within a particular time and place. When survivors 
allude to their mutual torturers by the nicknames that members of the police and military 
forces had playfully given one another – such as, “Blondie,” “Potbelly,” “Dummy,” (25)59 or 
“La Negra” (47), each of whom are identified by their victims according to their particular 
brand of ruthlessness – they bring the report’s dramatis personae to life. For instance, both Dr. 
Norbert Liwsky (File No. 7397) (Nunca Más 25) and Lidia Esther Biscarte (File No. 5604) 
(Nunca Más 44) recall being brutally abused by a torturer referred to as the “Snake” (Víbora), 
while others make mention of “the ‘female voice’,” who is variously described as “a well-
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known officer of the Gendarmeria who spoke in falsetto and [who would] stroke one’s testicles 
in anticipation of his task” (Nunca Más 31). 
By presenting its real-life subjects as fully developed and often recurring characters in 
the drama of the Processo, Nunca Más establishes an air of familiarity between the reader and 
victims. When readers are introduced to a pair of torturers nicknamed “the German” (44) 
and “the Spaniard” (45), for instance – the former known for “stick[ing] a length of pipe” in 
his victims’ anuses, while the latter would then “rescue” his partner’s victims in order to 
“talk” (code for coercing them into giving up the whereabouts of family members) – the 
astute reader then brings to mind an earlier testimony, in which a torturer named “The 
Frenchman” operated with a nearly identical modus operandi at the same detention camp. 
Through the convergence and intersection of these individual plot lines, readers associate the 
victim-testimonies featuring “the German,” “the Spaniard,” and “the Frenchman,” gradually 
piecing together a harrowing depiction of an intricate system of oppression. The nicknames 
– like the report’s unforeseen emphasis on chance-encounters – inadvertently adds depth 
and mystery to the Nunca Más narrative by presuming a backstory to these “characters,” 
thereby contributing to the unique world-building nature of its historical narrative.60 
 
Ernesto Sábato and the Triumph of the Nunca Más Narrative: 
 
While it was clear that readers’ assumptions about Nunca Más were drastically 
influenced by his involvement, Sábato deftly lived up to these expectations by employing his 
considerable literary artistry, injecting Nunca Más with the same narrative richness that his 
readers expected from his many fictional works. Indeed, Nunca Más proved to be one of 
Sábato’s most successful works insofar as it presented the general public with a suspenseful 
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historical narrative of the so-called “Dirty War” that was suffused with all the narrative 
depth of his earlier crime novels. Only, this story was presented as the official, fixed, and 
“Truthful” version of recent Argentine history,61 as validated by the nation’s highest court. 
Owing to the success with which Sábato was able to imbue the report with his 
characteristic literary flair, Nunca Más was a massive cultural success, both within and beyond 
Argentina. Paving the way for the similar literary success of other subsequent truth 
commission reports,62 Nunca Más’s dramatic structure transformed the way that government 
reports would recast the mnemonic landscape of post-transitional societies. 
Upon its publication, Nunca Más was not only an instant bestseller – with its first run 
of fourty-thousand copies selling out in two days (Crenzel, The Memory 97) – it was an 
outright cultural phenomenon.63 As historian Tulio Halperin Donghi remembers, it was 
common to spot thousands of Argentine men and women carrying the report with them on 
buses, subways, in restaurants, and cafés immediately following its publication. Particularly, 
he notes, “[it] became the favourite reading of hordes of (Argentine) tourists who converged 
on Mar del Plata during the summer, making copies of the Informe as much a part of the 
beach scene as bottles of suntan lotion” (Graziano 50). 
Nunca Más was a ubiquitous presence throughout the entire country, immediately 
spawning dozens of translations, several televised political debates based on its findings, a 
host of tendentious artistic interpretations (most notably León Ferrari’s collage and oil 
renderings of the report), two feature films within the first year of its publication [Luis 
Penzo’s Oscar-winning La Historia Official and Héctor Olivera’s La Noche de los Lápices (“The 
Night of the Long Pencils”)], and a widely viewed television-documentary version of the 
Nunca Más report. “On the night it aired,” Emilio Crenzel notes, “the [documentary] 
program had the highest rating in the country, with 1,640,000 viewers, more than the 
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combined audience of all the other programs on the same time slot” (Crenzel, The Memory 
63). The immense success and popularity of the Nunca Más report – both the hardcopy 
version and the television-documentary – would ultimately demonstrate to the world that the 
history-writing aspect of the transitional justice process could be much more instrumental in 
the “truth-seeking” and “justice-making” endeavors of transitional governments than the 
ostentatious staging of public trials. 
Dominating both the public and private lives of Argentinians and eliciting daily op-
eds, and nightly news features, Nunca Más had at long last provided the Argentine public 
with a long-yearned-for sense of clarity and emotional release after nearly a decade of horror. 
But the report was also something else – it was gripping! The compelling narrative style of 
Nunca Más made it read more like a lurid suspense novel than a typically didactic legal report, 
aided by Sábato’s distinctive literary talents, which provided the report with a particularly 
engrossing dramatic structure. As an official government report that aimed to summarize 
years of terror and brutality into a single transparent narrative, Nunca Más achieved what 
most traditional administrative or legal texts before it had failed to achieve: people actually 
wanted to read it. 
 
The “Two-Demons” Narrative of Nunca Más: 
 
The problem, however, was that Sábato’s grippingly novelistic narrative, 
encapsulated by his infamous prologue, told a version of events that very few Argentinians 
actually recognized. Despite the regime’s claims that they only pursued “members of political 
organizations who carried out acts of terrorism” (NM 448), the vast majority of victims 
never had any links to such activity, but were nevertheless subjected to horrific torture 
because they opposed the military dictatorship. Spurious criminal charges of “terrorist 
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activities” were trumped-up and leveled against anyone who dared to challenge the violence 
and tyranny of the regime, many of which – despite having been withdrawn, dismissed, or 
conditionally stayed after the return to democracy – still remain to this day on the victims’ 
personal records. In addition to the immediate threat of torture and disappearance, these 
charges also provoked a great deal of public humiliation for the families of those branded as 
“traitors to the fatherland,” “Marxist-Leninist atheists,” and “enemies of Western, Christian 
values” (Nunca Más 4) by the governing regime. However, despite the Commissioners of 
CONADEP discovering that the vast majority of these criminal charges were entirely 
unfounded, the Nunca Más report reproduced the dictatorship’s victim-blaming strategy – 
and the concomitant humiliation that coincided with being branded a “terrorist criminal” – 
while also giving credence to the misleading pretense that they were engaged in a legitimate 
“Dirty War” with a group of equally-matched and willing combatants. 
Nearly all of the victims whose testimonies form the individual “case-files” in the 
report had been accused by the regime of having certain “associations” with ultra-leftist 
guerilla groups, including Dr. Liwsky. Of course, it would later be proved that Liwsky, who 
was in fact a simple pharmacist, did not have any ties to any radical guerilla organizations. Nor 
did most other victims, like Jacobo Chester, who was an employee of the Department of 
Statistics and Hospital Registration at the Posadas National Hospital in Buenos Aires. 
Nonetheless, these public accusations served to openly discredit the victims at the time and 
validate the extreme cruelty of the junta as they waged their supposed “Dirty War” against 
so-called radical terrorists. General Reynaldo Bignone – the last dictator of the juntas before 
the transition to democracy in 1983 – had publicly accused Chester, like Dr. Liwsky before 
him, of being a so-called “radical leftist.” Although nearly all of these charges have since 
been dismissed, the fact that the Nunca Más report predominantly features testimony from 
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only those individuals who had been publicly branded as “radicals” at the time of the 
repression paints a reductively dualistic portrait of the years of terror. By giving the 
impression that nearly all of the victims (whose depositions form the “case-story” vignettes) 
were individuals who had been formally accused of being “radical leftists,” the report raises 
the reader’s suspicions and affirms what has since come to be known as the Dos Demonios 
(“Two Demons”) narrative. 
While Sábato does briefly acknowledge that “the vast majority of (victims) were 
innocent not only of any acts of terrorism, but even of belonging to the fighting units of the 
guerrilla organizations,” he nevertheless focuses the narrative attention on the latter, who – 
in his words – “chose to fight it out, and either died in shootouts or committed suicide 
before they could be captured. Few [guerillas] were alive by the time they were in the hands 
of the repressive forces” (Nunca Más 4). Although the “Two Demons” theory is explicitly 
undermined at the end of the report – on the second-to-last page of Nunca Más (quite 
literally, page 448 of 449) – the overall narrative of the report (especially Sábato’s celebrated 
prologue) otherwise perpetuates this deeply troubling interpretation of events.64 
As M.F. Carmody notes, while Nunca Más’ overall “Two Demons” narrative was 
contested by several human rights groups, “its essence was broadly accepted within 
Argentine society, evidenced by the popular [post-Nunca Más] phrase ‘algo habrán hecho’ 
(“They must have done something”), used to explain a person’s disappearance or 
apprehension at the hands of the military state” (13). The “Two Demons” theory 
perpetuated the military’s insistence that their horrific system of violence was predicated on 
the existence of an all-out war between two equally responsible sides, even if the definition 
of a “terrorist” was drastically exaggerated in order to justify the “Two Demons” narrative. 
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“Framed in this way,” Carmody notes, “Nunca Más presented the story of the recent past to 
the Argentine public, where it was widely consumed” (13). 
However, the political and cultural landscape of Argentina in the years leading up to 
and during the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional was much more complex than Sábato’s 
version of the Nunca Más report implied. What occurred in Argentina was, in fact, the result 
of a highly labyrinthine constellation of both domestic and foreign socio-political and 
economic factors, which unfolded within the general landscape of the Cold War and within 
the specific context of Operations Condor and Charly, as overseen by the Johnson, Nixon, 
and Ford administrations. What it was certainly not, in any case, was a straightforward 
Manichean confrontation between two unassuming militant factions. 
The Nunca Más report makes no effort, however, to place the violence of the 
“Process of National Reorganization” into its proper historical context, and no explanation 
of the root causes of the repression were given. By ignoring the surfeit of socio-political and 
economic events leading up to the 1976 coup, the report merely portrays the disappearances 
and violence as a product of the emergence of an unprecedented cabal of “terrorists” and an 
equally sinister “military State” which “misused [its] power and impunity to [respond] to the 
terrorists’ crimes with a terrorism far worse than the one they were combating” (1). 
Whitewashing the deep-rooted political and class divisions as well as the toxic 
machismo chauvinism which provoked much of the violence that marked Argentine society 
for decades leading up to the 1976 coup, the report puts forward a version of events in 
which the two adversarial groups emerged without warning or precedent, and who were each 
categorically separated from the rest of “society,” which is represented as a separate 
monolithic whole.  
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Even the report’s title, “Nunca Más” (“Never Again”),65 in its own way, failed to 
properly historicize the political and cultural context of twentieth-century Argentine society. 
By implying that the return to democracy in 1983 marked a conclusive turning point for the 
nation, the “Nunca Más” argument suggests that the re-establishment of democracy would 
categorically ensure that the threat of a military dictatorship would never again be repeated.66 
Despite the stirring evocation of the widespread hope and optimism that the fall of the 
juntas represented for the Argentine people, this declaration turns a deaf ear to the fact that 
during the fifty-three years between the first coup in 1930 and the fall of the last dictatorship 
in 1983, military juntas had ruled the country for nearly half that time (twenty-five years), 
imposing fourteen dictators under the title of “president,” equating to one every 1.7 years on 
average. Such glaring disregard for the nation’s recent political history did more to 
perpetuate the “Two Demons” narrative – by disavowing both the fascism of the military 
regime and the “communism” of the so-called terrorists, in favour of the “democracy” of 
Alfonsín’s transitional government – than it did to corroborate it’s own “Never Again” 
thesis. 
By presenting the recent past as though it were a truly legitimate conflict between 
two sinister groups, the executive Commission (under the guardianship of President 
Alfonsín) was able to promote the illusion that the end of the Truth Commission (followed 
by the publishing of this official report) marked a decisive moment for Argentina as it 
extricated itself from decades of political violence and set about returning to democracy and 
social stability. In doing so, however, at a time before most survivors had the opportunity to 
tell their stories outside of the auspices of the government-marshaled Nunca Más report, this 
“Dirty War” narrative exonerated the majority of Argentine society from all blame67 by 
failing to account for the destructive complicity of the greater part of ordinary middle and 
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upper-class Argentinians, as well as the Catholic church and many large foreign 
corporations.68 
By attributing all responsibility to only a few would-be “violent extremists” (from 
both “sides”), millions of common citizens were effectively erased from the National 
Commission’s official report and were therefore absolved of any blame for what had taken 
place before, during, and after the dictatorship. In fact, Sábato went out of his way to 
absolve the general public on the third page of his prologue, writing: “A feeling of complete 
vulnerability spread throughout Argentine society, coupled with the fear that anyone, 
however innocent, might become a victim of the never-ending witch-hunt. Some reacted 
with alarm. Others tended, consciously or unconsciously, to justify the horror. ‘There must 
be a reason for it,’ they would whisper, as though trying to propitiate awesome and 
inscrutable gods, regarding the children or parents of the disappeared as plague-bearers” 
(Nunca Más 3-4). 
Furthermore, in absolving the general public of all responsibility during these 
unspeakable years, the Nunca Más report failed to account for the complicated system of 
class and racial prejudices that had plagued Argentine society for centuries, and which were 
perhaps at their most pernicious during these years. It would not be until the publication of 
several survivors’ testimonies, along with the uncovering of hundreds of the so-called 
“clandestine” detention centres in the coming decade, that the pangs of conscience would 
fully register on a national scale in the form of a collective sense of remorse.69 However, 
owing at least in part to the riveting style and form of Sábato’s writing (and his status as one 
of the nation’s leading novelists), this version of events was afforded undue credence in the 
initial years following the return to democracy, and has come to be regarded as the official 
historical account of those years. 
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In many ways, the Nunca Más report flattened out these many disparate socio-
political conditions and reduced the history of the Argentine conflict to an easily digestible 
struggle between two equally vicious adversaries. Instead of depicting the military regime’s 
absolute and unrestrained persecution of its own citizens based on decades of intensifying 
economic, cultural, and regional hostilities, the events were stripped down to only their most 
rudimentary underpinnings. 
Framed by Sábato’s celebrated prologue, Nunca Más’ “Two Demons” thesis would 
draw a mendacious false equivalency between the dictatorship and those who refused to 
submit to it, while also spuriously distancing the civilian population from the hostilities, 
altogether. Unlike the moral interventions of the Nuremberg Report (which sought to 
retroactively inculpate the entire civilian population in the crimes of the Nazi regime), the 
Nunca Más report instead aimed to absolve all bystanders, while attributing the bloodshed and 
trauma to the pernicious work of two higher powers: the military juntas and the so-called 
communist “terrorists” who opposed them. 
But while the stripped-down story of two extreme political factions battling on the 
streets of Buenos Aires certainly made for a much more compelling narrative than the 
tedious history of trade unions and cabinet-elections, much of the moral nuance surrounding 
the popular resistance movements was concomitantly whitewashed from the report. All acts 
of political resistance against the dictatorship were reinterpreted in the report as violent 
“terrorist crimes” carried out by seemingly corrupt anti-Argentine youths (Nunca Más 1). 
Despite Nunca Más’ claim, however, civilian resistance in fact came in a multitude of 
forms – from citizens of all ages and all ends of the political spectrum, and from remote 
provincial villages to the busy barrios of Buenos Aires and Córdoba. Yet, within the 
strictures of the “Two Demons” narrative, any and all opposition efforts were swallowed up 
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under the sinister banner of the Montoneros.  Many of the cultural and political circumstances 
surrounding the emergence of the various resistance groups – including their roots in rural, 
poverty-stricken communities, and the fact that many of them were organized in large part 
by groups of women following the national popularity of Eva Péron’s suffrage movement of 
the 40s and 50s – were stripped of all ethical currency, instead being portrayed in the report 
as a single, unified and “equally violent” opponent of the juntas. 
Ultimately, this simplified moral narrative would allow the Alfonsín government to 
symbolically move on from the trauma of the “Dirty War” and implement a series of laws 
intended to put an end to the costly civil trials, allowing them to then funnel government 
resources into programs that would aid in the rebuilding of the national economy instead of 
attending to the collective abreaction of a national trauma. 
However, Nunca Más’s leveling out of blame, between the military forces who 
perpetrated the violence and those individuals who chose to oppose such oppression, 
established a new ethical framework through which the trauma of the “Dirty War” would be 
remembered. Assigning equal blame to the civilian groups who dared to oppose the violent 
acts of the juntas would permanently recast these women and men as equally hostile 
instigators of the brutal violence that unfolded, while, more tellingly, those who chose not to 
act were heralded as the true heroes of the resistance. Whereas the Nuremberg Report reframed 
the moral landscape of the Nazi years by suggesting that inaction on the part of the general 
population constituted a form of moral negligence – equating innocent bystanders to willing 
Nazi executioners in an effort to facilitate the implementation of denazification laws – Nunca 
Más implied the opposite in order to accelerate the implementation of the “Law of Due 
Obedience” and the “Full Stop Law.”70 According to the Argentine report, inaction on the 
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part of millions of Argentines was construed as evidence of their peaceful non-
combativeness and nonpartisan neutrality in the face of two hostile oppressors. 
 
Challenging the “Two Demons” Narrative After 1984: Argentine Literature and Film 
in the Shadow of Nunca Más . 
 
While the Nunca Más report flattened out the diverse socio-political circumstances 
leading up to the violence by disconnecting the so-called “Dirty War” from its wider 
historical context, several prominent Argentine writers addressed the same historical events 
in a much more nuanced and morally assiduous way, addressing the events in their full 
complexity without reducing the narrative to a simple story of “good” vs. “evil.” 
 A diverse array of writers and artists – many of whom had been threatened with death 
by the dictatorship – would produce their own stories of resistance and opposition, including 
Thomas Eloy Martinez, Luisa Valenzuela, Osvaldo Soriano, Haroldo Conti (who was 
“disappeared” in 1976), Ariel Dorfman, and Manuel Puig. 
 Puig, who had escaped to Mexico in 1973 amid the intensifying hostilities following 
the Ezeiza Airport Massacre (and after the publication of his previous novel, The Buenos Aires 
Affair, in which he brazenly criticized the previous military regime), wrote what many 
consider to be the most poignant allegorical novel of the military dictatorship just months 
before the coup of 1976. El Beso de la Mujer Araña (“Kiss of the Spider Woman”) depicts the 
potent undercurrents of destructive masculinity and chauvinism that precipitated the “Dirty 
War” via the burgeoning friendship between two men who had each been illegally 
imprisoned by the dictatorship – Valentín for belonging to a violent Marxist revolutionary 
group resembling the Montoneros and Molina for being a so-called “homosexual offender.” 
 Published in 1976, Kiss of the Spider Woman pre-emptively challenges Nunca Más’ 
 191 
erroneous historical isolationism by illustrating that the violence, abductions, and murder of 
the Proceso in fact began years before Sábato’s report had claimed. Depicting the brutal tactics 
administered by the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance – the far-right death squad, 
equivalent to the Nazi Einsatzgruppen – that had officially begun in 1973, and founded by 
several military members who would go on to hold leadership roles during the dictatorship, 
Puig’s novel was immediately banned by Jorge Rafael Videla’s regime upon publication 
(Levine 302). 
 Set, to a large extent, within a single cell in the Villa Devoto prison in Buenos Aires, 
the novel consists almost entirely of a single continual dialogue between the two male 
prisoners as they endure the daily purgatory of waiting for their inevitable torture and/or 
assassination at the hands of their military captors. Kiss of the Spider Woman challenges Nunca 
Más’ “Two Demons” narrative through its colourful illustration of the two main characters – 
neither of whom truly embodies the menacing image of the radical “terrorist revolutionaries” 
that the military had warned of, and which Sábato’s “equal blame” theory perpetuates. 
 Centering on the role of gender-politics in contemporary Latino culture, Valentín’s 
revolutionary spirit is typified in the novel by what we might call a form of benign naiveté 
and machismo chauvinism, as opposed to the type of dangerous political-extremism that the 
military regimes – and by proxy the Nunca Más report – had warned of. Far from 
epitomizing a violent political militant, Valentín’s political maneuvering – like many of the 
young men caught up in the revolutionary spirit of the 70s and 80s – is portrayed, instead, as 
a means of performing his generation’s uniquely Argentine brand of masculinity. For Puig, 
Valentín’s Marxist political struggles serve as an outlet for expressing the particular codes of 
male behavior – namely the very public demonstrations of virility, bravado, and headstrong 
truculence – that have traditionally organized Argentine society. By equating the 
 192 
revolutionary actions of both the far Left and the far Right with outward expressions of 
machismo culture, Kiss of the Spider Woman re-contextualizes the so-called “Dirty War,” not as a 
Manichean confrontation between Good and Evil (as Sábato’s final report does), but instead 
as the inevitable manifestation of a hyper-aggressive and hegemonic masculinity that 
dominated an historically patriarchal society. For Puig, it was not the emergence of two 
equally sinister and historically unprecedented groups that “tore the nation apart,” as Nunca 
Más declares. Rather, Kiss of the Spider Woman challenges the “Two Demons” theory by re-
contextualizing the “Process of National Reorganization” as the manifestation of century-old 
cultural myths of the rugged Latino man, famed for his dominance, self-assertiveness, and 
violent demonstrations of authority, that converged at a particularly volatile historical 
moment in a series of violent macho outbursts. Wholly couched in the political turmoil of 
the 1970s, Kiss of the Spider Woman reframes the disappearances, torture, and violent rapes 
carried out by the junta – together with the violent backlash from resistance groups – as 
concordant symptoms of an overly masculinized nation. 
 Through the character of Molina – who self-identifies as a “Queen” and “a cat 
woman… a hundred percent female” – Valentín’s machismo persona is gradually undercut, as 
his cell-mate slowly deconstructs his hyper-masculine facade. In a continual attempt to take 
their minds off their shared torment, Molina recounts to Valentín the plots of several 
saccharine Hollywood films from his youth, rendering a series of colourful cinematic 
vignettes that are pregnant with a host of allegorical references to both the nation’s political 
situation and to the vicissitudes of machismo and marianismo gender roles that guide the body 
politic. As Molina’s narration of each film begins, the two initially relate to the respective 
male and female leads according to traditional archetypal gender constructions – Valentín to 
a rugged racecar driver in one story and a mafia boss in another, while Molina self-identifies 
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with the female love-interests to such traditionally masculine characters. Gradually however, 
within the safety and isolation of the prison cell, the roles begin to reverse as Puig (via 
Molina) deconstructs the machismo masculinity that had provoked decades of political 
violence throughout the country. Continually associating the violence of the dictatorship to 
public displays of Latino maleness, Puig constructs a poignant study of the so-called “Dirty 
War” that is stripped of the popular justification that it was a “legitimate war” fought 
between two hostile groups, instead reframing the violence in light of structural male-to-
male relations. In support of these observations, Puig incorporates a number of long 
footnotes on psychoanalytic theory, implying that the queering of Argentine male-identity 
represents a panacea for the nation’s unceasing political turmoil. Mirroring Sábato’s own 
endless footnoting and digressive philosophizing in the Nunca Más report, Kiss of the Spider 
Woman soft-pedals the report’s didactic tone and defies its reductive thesis that the violence 
of the “Dirty War” was historically unprecedented and, therefore, entirely unpredictable. 
Instead, Puig’s novel reveals the political violence as centuries in the making; as the 
culmination of age-old hyper-masculine paradigms built up to an inevitable crescendo of 
terror and trauma. 
 While the Nunca Más report fails to acknowledge the fact that the brutal torture and 
rape of thousands of women were perpetrated exclusively by male officers – many of whom 
were tortured simply because their husbands, brothers, or fathers were suspected of being 
members of the Montoneros – Puig’s novel underscores these acts as the gendered-
performance of a masculine entitlement (and power) to inflict pain on the female body. Kiss 
of the Spider Woman dramatizes the specifically Argentinian gender-based forms of cruelty that 
military officers were trained in (See: Nunca Más 442) as the festering misogyny of toxic 
machismo culture, giving men exclusive license to rape, torture, and slaughter thousands of 
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women under the pretence of liberating their country from anti-Argentine corruption and 
sedition. 
 Like Puig, Molina spent his youth luxuriating in foreign films as a means of 
disengaging from a world that had abandoned him. But the films, which provide a form of 
escapism for Molina, also entrap him in his culture, reinforcing and perpetuating the gender 
norms that he sees as destructive to the Argentinian national psyche. Reflecting on the perils 
of immersing oneself in art as a means of escapism, Puig makes use of the filmic episodes, in 
a metafictional manner, to address the complicated relationship that literature and art played 
during the reality of the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. While many exiled writers chose to 
use their fiction as a way of “reporting on the truth” during the years of repression and 
censorship, the risk that their efforts might simply be utilized as a “form of escape” for the 
victims – as opposed to triggering some type of concrete resistance – was a risk that Puig 
was acutely conscious of. This danger is cleverly negotiated in Kiss of the Spider Woman, insofar 
as the films allow Molina and Valentín to transcend their cell and become the catalysts 
through which their respective worldviews are deconstructed. As Valentín suggests, “It can 
be a vice, always trying to escape from reality like that, it’s like taking drugs or something. 
Because, listen to me: reality isn’t restricted by this cell we live in. If you read something, if 
you study something, you transcend any cell you’re inside of. That’s why I read and why I 
study every day” (Kiss 78). For Puig, the prison cell serves as an artful metaphor for the 
nation as a whole, suggesting that all of Argentina is entrapped in a prison cell of machismo 
political turmoil, which can be transcended only through a critical engagement in 
transformative dialogue and the sharing of counter-normative ideas. 
 In direct contradistinction to Nunca Más’s methodical attempt to impose a sense of 
rational order onto the violence and trauma of the “Dirty War,” Kiss of the Spider Woman 
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demonstrates that the brutality was anything but “reasonable.” While Nunca Más’ “Two 
Demons” allegory perpetuates the central trope of masculine hegemony in Argentinian 
society by framing the “Dirty War” according to a traditional dualistic Manichean paradigm, 
Puig subverts this narrative by introducing a form of political and gendered polymorphism. 
If the violence of the outside world is “rationalized” as a world-historic struggle between two 
willing combatants, then the privacy of the prison cell permits both men to embrace a more 
protean vision in which both victims and perpetrators are regarded outside of the dualistic 
good/evil, innocent/guilty, or male/female dialectics. In this way, Puig destabilizes the “Two 
Demons” theory and, in doing so, delegitimizes the popular justification that all participants 
were somehow obliged to take up arms in the name of their country. By re-contextualizing 
the chaos and barbarity of the “Dirty War” as the wholly irrational manifestation of archaic 
myths of machismo hypermasculinity, Puig underscores the utter senselessness of the violence, 
and provides a counter-narrative through which his readers might transcend their collective 
“prison cell.” The liberating power of the deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction of 
machismo masculinity into a polymorphous, mutable machismo-marianismo gender hybridity is 
liberating for Valentín, and by proxy, as Puig suggests, for the entire nation. Augmented by 
Puig’s footnotes on Freud’s notion of the “polymorphous perverse” – the idea that men are 
capable of achieving gratification outside of socially normative gendered behaviours – 
Valentín’s moment of ecstasy ultimately destabilizes his machismo veneer, laying the 
groundwork for the abnegation of his, and his country’s, violent political compulsions. 
But if the profusion of footnotes and academic references that frame Puig’s novel 
are meant to present his thesis as a cerebral and serious approach to reading against the grain 
of the “Two Demons” narrative – one that would provide a roadmap for concrete political 
action, and not merely a means of emotional escapism – other writers chose to respond to 
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Nunca Más’ rationalization of the terror in more sardonic and derisive ways, mocking the 
sheer hubris of the report’s attempts to make sense of the violence. 
Whereas the authors of Nunca Más had felt compelled to expunge certain 
“particularly gruesome” acts from the report out of fear that they might seem 
“unbelievable,” Osvaldo Soriano’s two post-Nunca Más novels – A Funny Little Dirty War 
(1986) and Winter Quarters (1989) – force their readers to confront only the most repulsive 
and shocking reports of violence and torture from that period, with the unlikely license of 
humour as a shield against such readerly incredulity. Soriano’s satirical works, which are 
comprised of a seemingly endless barrage of increasingly violent scenarios, manage to 
capture the unique vagaries of the total breakdown of political discourse in 1970s Argentina 
in a way that neither Puig’s cerebral cultural analysis, nor Sábato’s staid historical narrative, 
arrive at. Like several earlier Spanish-language picaresque novels, Soriano’s works palliate the 
grotesque violence by intercutting it with dark and obscene humour, similar to the crude 
sexual innuendo, scatological jokes, and lewd language found in the original versions of 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Delicado’s Portrait of a Lusty Andalusian Woman, and López de 
Úbeda’s The Mischievous Justina. The end result is a scathing portrait of society’s dark 
underbelly – comprised of equal parts tragedy and farce – that abstains from Nunca Más’ 
hopeful vision of the nation as a civilized and genteel community that had been temporarily 
“torn by terror” by two sinister factions. Instead, Soriano’s Argentina is exclusively 
populated by hordes of corrupt degenerates who willingly and riotously act upon their most 
vile and depraved impulses. In other words, Soriano’s novels undercut the “Two Demons” 
thesis by substituting it with a portrait of an entire nation of demons. 
Writing from exile in Brussels, Soriano’s novels are steeped in the famed surrealist 
humour of classical Argentine literature – in the tradition of Borges, Adolfo Bioy Casares, 
 197 
and Silvina Ocampo – while also veering into the realm of the abject grotesque. Like Borges, 
Soriano’s humour relies on broad slapstick scenarios; the juxtaposition of absurd, screwball 
situations with fast-paced, usually violent action; a general indifference to insinuations of 
horror and vulgarity; and continuous non-sequiturs to destabilize readerly expectations. The 
difference, however, is that if obscene innuendo is only ever alluded to in Borges’ or Casares’ 
works – such as priests and nuns who secretly write lewd letters to one other – Soriano’s 
distinctive comedic effect arises out of his insistence on illustrating the obscene or gruesome 
in extreme, painstaking detail. 
Like the Nunca Más report, Soriano’s novels are suffused with countless scenes of 
extreme violence, including graphic accounts of rape, murder, torture, and bodily mutilation. 
In fact, several explicit scenes in A Funny Little Dirty War appear to be faithful reproductions 
of actual victim testimonies taken from the report, itself. One chapter, for instance, opens 
with a scene that is nearly identical to the particularly gruesome incident recounted by Dr. 
Liwsky in Nunca Más, in which he describes: “[being penetrated] with a metal instrument, 
something like a red-hot nail... they put me face-down on the torture table… They tied me 
up and raped me slowly and deliberately by introducing a metal object into my anus... I 
wished with all my heart that they would kill me as soon as possible” (Nunca Más 22-23). In 
Soriano’s novel, this scene is ascribed to Ignacio: 
Everything was swaying to and fro. Somebody caught hold of one of his legs 
and dragged him a couple of yards, then two men heaved him up onto what he 
thought was probably a desk. He closed his eyes and tried to distinguish the 
voices mingling round his head, but couldn’t make sense of the noises. ...His 
own scream gave him a feeling of horror. Eventually, by gripping the edges of 
the desk, he managed to raise his eyelids. He saw a red, smoking tip. Solid fire 
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pressed into him […] and he longed for death to rescue him from the nightmare. 
(A Funny Little Dirty War 71-72). 
 
While the nature and intensity of the violence is indistinguishable between the Nunca 
Más report and Soriano’s fictional rendering, the latter accentuates the utter senselessness of 
these crimes through its interminable rhythm and momentum. Soriano’s novels eschew any 
pretention of plot or character development, opting instead for a constant, unadulterated 
barrage of arrant violence. In their facetious and seemingly blithe handling of such shocking 
grotesquery, Soriano’s novels evoke parallels to Voltaire’s Candide or perhaps the Marquis de 
Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom, serving as a type of a Hobbesian critique of the rationalism that 
pervades the Nunca Más report. Whereas Sábato’s overriding narrative attempts to explain 
the basis and motivation for such cruelty in between testimonial episodes, what we observe 
in Soriano’s novels is a particular ability to transmute brutal social injustice into comic form 
by framing historically real violence as though it were the contrivance of a surreal Borgesian 
fantasy. By refraining from any attempt to make sense of the violence, Soriano’s novels reveal 
the dark human impulses beneath the horrors of the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. 
The first of Soriano’s post-Nunca Más novels, A Funny Little Dirty War (1983), 
represents the capstone of this form of grotesque political satire. Depicting the relatively 
plotless criminal misadventures of a cast of lower-class (Péronist) anti-heroes, A Funny Little 
Dirty War reduces the violence of the 1970s down to a forty-eight-hour, mock-heroic village 
war populated by an ensemble of sadistic and rakish opportunists. The novel opens when 
Ricardo, the mayor of a small village, plots with a local spin doctor to have his deputy-
mayor, Mateo – whose increasing popularity threatens Ricardo’s decades-long hold on the 
mayorship – kicked out of office. Ricardo’s devious and unfounded accusation that Mateo 
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secretly belongs to an underground communist camarilla provokes widespread public outrage, 
causing provincial allegiances to shift, and triggers an hysterical Crucible-esque witch-hunt. 
Stemming from this initial allegation, the novel quickly and absurdly descends into an all-out 
civil war in which an endless cast of self-described “Péronists” subject one another to a cycle 
of vile murderous rampages while preposterously accusing one-another of “communist 
allegiances” and “disloyalty to the nation” in order to justify their increasingly arbitrary 
attacks. As the novel illustrates, the seemingly banal charge of harboring “communist 
allegiances” – an accusation that each of the victims in the Nunca Más report were leveled 
with by their military captors – was, in fact, a much more treacherous and politically canny 
maneuver than Sábato’s final report acknowledges. While the Nunca Más report embellishes 
the myth of secret networks of communist terror cells in order to validate its own “Two 
Demons” thesis, Soriano’s novel reveals how these seemingly banal accusations, in fact, 
provided a callous – yet culturally acceptable – excuse for everyday citizens to act out their 
most violent and sadistic fantasies upon one another. 
Through its hyper-distillation of the violence of the previous decade, Soriano’s novel 
paints a scornful, and at times stomach-churning, caricature of the “Dirty War,” in which 
every Argentine citizen is a constant participant in the increasingly twisted violence of the 
State. By forcing all of society into the belly of an appalling, monstrous world and 
implicating each one of us in the farce, A Funny Little Dirty War refuses to grant its readers 
any sense of moral superiority by separating them from the violence. By implicating all of 
society in the carnivalesque violence – as opposed to the outside-looking-in position that 
Nunca Más fosters through its society-as-victim model – Soriano’s novel refuses to appease 
the consciences of those bystanders who preferred to think of themselves as innocent 
victims of the supposedly two-sided violence. Instead, in Soriano’s grotesque world, every 
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Argentinian is swallowed up by the devilish violence, preventing the reader from ever truly 
distancing him or herself – both politically or morally – from the action. 
By implicating every citizen in the depravity and wickedness, A Funny Little Dirty War 
undercuts the implicit and erroneous guarantee at the core of Nunca Más’ “Two Demons” 
thesis: the notion that society’s return to democratic rule will ensure that such horrors will 
Never Again be repeated. Through its farcical depiction of Hobbesian lawlessness, A Funny 
Little Dirty War repudiates Nunca Más’ “Never Again” promise, instead suggesting that we are 
all driven by the dark, sadistic impulses that gave rise to the cold-blooded cruelty of those 
years, and suggests that – given the right opportunity – this horror could most certainly 
happen again. By subverting the moral thesis at the heart of Nunca Más’s “Two Demons” 
hypothesis, Soriano both releases the victims from the spurious charge of being equally 
willful and violent combatants, while also holding accountable those bystanders who 
embraced the scapegoating of students and resistence fighters as a means of shrouding their 
own moral negligence in the face of a brutal dictatorial regime. 
In Soriano’s nightmarish world, the total collapse of the Social Contract has plunged 
society back into its originary state of nature, where man lives in “continual fear and danger 
of a violent death” (Hobbes 70). Soriano’s grotesque satire vividly depicts what Hobbes 
famously referred to as “a war of everyone against everyone” (72) (bellum omnium contra 
omnes), in which – in the absence of law and political order provided by a stable government 
– everyone is free to plunder, rape, and murder one another. Within this nightmarish vision, 
A Funny Little Dirty War demonstrates the extreme hubris of Nunca Más’ “Never Again” 
promise and asks whether the public tribunals carried out under CONADEP could possibly 
represent enough of a cultural corrective to curtail the deep-seated trauma inflicted by the 
juntas. 
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As the violence of Soriano’s novel escalates at a feverish pace, so too does the sheer 
absurdity that spurs on the action. Modest gardeners are promoted to “Provincial Director 
of Parks and Gardens” in return for political loyalty, police officers are paid off with 
cigarettes and cheap wine, and elementary school teachers go to war against a far-right death 
squad. Nearly every paragraph is teeming with vivid images of explosions and gunfire, of 
“vomit, puss, piss” (Updike 544) and spurting blood; of necks being sawn through, skulls 
being cracked open, and limbs being removed. Yet, despite the relentless graphic depictions 
of blood and violence, the novel’s action plays out more like an extended Monty Python 
sketch skit than any serious war story. Commenting on the novel, John Updike notes, “it is 
all action, and the action is virtually all ugly. In little more than a hundred pages, the attempt 
of one petty official to oust another farcically, inexorably, horribly sweeps a small Argentine 
town into a local holocaust of violence and murder… It is pure slapstick in which people 
actually bleed” (544). 
As the violence escalates, the chorus of barbarity is rendered increasingly ludicrous, 
producing in the reader a confused and uneasy tension between laughter, fear, and disgust. 
After each sadistic assault, a rival character shouts “Long live Péron!” in increasingly 
carnivalesque furor, until ultimately only three men remain, barely clinging to their last traces 
of life. In Soriano’s novels, Nunca Más’ prevailing Manichean narrative is supplanted by an 
hysterical circus of transposable individuals whose allegiances are repeatedly formed and re-
formed according to their personal desires for power, wills to survive, opportunities for 
financial gain (or in one case, the offer of a free tank of gas), and in some instances, simply 
out of sheer boredom. Contrary to Nunca Más’ “Two Demons” narrative, which insists that 
the violence was carried out exclusively by “terrorists,” “guerillas,” and “tyrants,” Soriano’s 
novels reveal how the volatile power structures formed within the confines of an 
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authoritarian state can – and do – indoctrinate and manipulate all citizens into extending this 
violence beyond the public sphere and into the private. 
 Like the historical events that Soriano’s novels lampoon, it is often difficult for the 
reader to keep track of who is allied with whom at any given moment. Amidst the endless 
carousel of violence and grotesque mayhem, the reader is constantly disoriented, allowing 
Soriano ultimately to hit upon a fundamental truth that the CONADEP report misses, 
namely the sheer senselessness of the violence and oppression, as all sides grow increasingly 
agitated. Evolving from the comic and the grotesque (one character takes it upon himself to 
fly his small plane, used to fertilize crops, over the scene of a brutal police shootout, 
dropping loads of manure on unsuspecting belligerents and bystanders from all sides, all “in 
the name of Péron!”) to the tragic (all but three grotesquely maimed protagonists are killed 
before the end of the novel), A Funny Little Dirty War eventually subverts its own satirical 
approach with its solemn and devastating denouement. While satirizing the particular vices, 
follies, and shortcomings that he saw as governing his society, Soriano’s novel makes no 
effort to shame individuals, the government, or society into a false hope of moral or cultural 
improvement. Instead, like Chaucer’s “The Pardoner’s Tale” (in which three men set out to 
avenge a friend’s death by killing the Angel of Death, until, out of greed and the promise of 
fortune, they each murder one another), A Funny Little Dirty War simply moralizes its subject 
matter through the grotesque absurdity of its tragic end. Without ever becoming polemic in 
tone or instructing its readers through the voice of a single incorruptible narrator, Soriano’s 
novels simply rely on the gradual escalation of human lasciviousness rendered grotesque to 
provide a moral exemplum. 
In 1995, another notable satirist – visual artist León Ferrari – would also impugn the 
“moral leveling” thesis of the CONADEP report, albeit in a much more direct and 
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provocative manner than Soriano. In light of a series of events that renewed interest in 
Nunca Más that year,71 daily newspaper Página/12 elected to reprint Sábato’s report in its 
entirety in serialized form – dividing it into thirty installments, each featuring reproductions 
of the original report. As Emilio Crenzel notes, the Página/12 edition’s print run of seventy-
five thousand (the second largest, after the original print edition) combined with a revitalized 
public and educational interest in it, made theirs “the most important edition” of the report 
yet (“el Nunca Más en fascículos” 87). In addition to the printed reproductions, the Página/12 
editors also enlisted acclaimed artist and recent Guggenheim fellow León Ferrari to produce 
a series of accompanying collages to be included with the text. Ferrari, whose son Ariel was 
disappeared by the junta in 1977 and who had been forced into exile during the dictatorship 
for a series of condemnatory articles he had published against the regime in Página/12,72 
would produce a series of highly incendiary and satirical images, eventually drawing the 
public ire of Pope John Paul II while the archbishop of Buenos Aires “called on believers to 
condemn his work” (Porterfield 99). 
Ferrari’s provocative collages, simply and sardonically titled “Nunca Más,” juxtapose 
hellish images from Classical and renaissance paintings with photos of Argentinian and Nazi 
soldiers, popes, archbishops, and newspaper clippings from the time of the dictatorship. The 
aim was to highlight the collaboration between the Catholic and Jesuit churches and the 
dictatorship – a highly contentious topic that Nunca Más failed to address. 
The cover page of the Página/12 edition of Nunca Más, for instance, overlays a photo 
of the dictatorship’s military leaders, posed in a dignified ceremonial salute, atop a 
reproduction of Gustave Doré’s “Deluge” (1860) (See Fig 3.1). In Doré’s image, which 
depicts a Biblical scene of the Genesis flood narrative, countless men and women scramble 
and claw at one another to escape a violent death, their naked bodies heaped and twisted 
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upon two protruding rocks while others are washed away into the centre where the military 
leaders are situated. Overtop of the image, Ferrari includes the original text from Sábato’s 
initial print version, suggesting that Ferrari’s version is an updating of the former, as 
opposed to a substitute. 
 
Fig 3.1 León Ferrari “The Deluge by Doré, 1860 + Military Junta (Photo: Public Records Office)” (1995). 
Digital Print on Paper. Never Again. London, Tate Modern. 
 
Other images are much more direct in their foregrounding of the relationship 
between the church and regime. One (Fig 3.2), features a photograph of General Videla (the 
first dictator of the Proceso) and Naval Commander Emilio Eduardo Massera being blessed 
by Cardinal Juan Carlos Aramburu. Aramburu, along with Jorge Mario Bergoglio (who was 
later elected as Pope Francis), would later face charges of crimes against humanity for their 
collusion with the regime, both during and after the dictatorship. The photographic image is 
overlayed atop Doré’s depiction of Danté’s Inferno, again repeating the hellish, underworld 
imagery of “demons.” Another (Fig 3.3), sets two nearly identical images side by side, the 
first depicting Adolf Hitler warmly greeting Benedictine monk Alban Schachteitner and 
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Reichbishop Ludwig Müller, the other of the dictator Videla similarly greeting Cardinal 
Aramburu. 
 
 
 
Fig 3.2 León Ferrari “Videla, Massera, Agosti and Cardinal Aramburu (Photo: Loicono) + Danté’s Inferno by 
Doré, 1860” (1995). Digital Print on Paper. Never Again. London, Tate Modern. 
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Fig 3.3 León Ferrari “Hitler Greets the Catholic Abbott Schachteitner and Muller, Reich Bishop + Jorge 
Videla Greets Cardinal Aramburu” (1995). Digital Print on Paper. Never Again. London, Tate Modern. 
 
 
Fig 3.5 León Ferrari. Six of the artist’s “Nunca Más” collages, report of the CONADEP, edited by Página/12 
(1995). Digital Print on Paper. Never Again. www.arte-online.net/ 
 
While Ferrari’s “Nunca Más” collages were condemned by top Church and military 
officials upon their release, he was also praised by many of his countrymen for the audacity 
with which his visual interventions challenged Nunca Más’ silence on the issue of complicity 
between the church and the juntas.73 However, the most vociferous response to his images 
came nearly three decades later, in 2004, when they were included in a highly publicized 
retrospective of his work at the Centro Culturel de la Recoleta.74 By then, Ferrari’s 
international reputation had skyrocketed; he was, along with Guillermo Kuitca, one of the 
nation’s most celebrated visual artists. The exhibition, “which many qualify as one of the key 
art historical events in Argentina over the last hundred years” (Porterfield 99), drew more 
than seventy thousand visitors, as well as a mass of international press coverage. On the 
third day of the exhibit, a group of young radical right-wing Catholics entered the cultural 
center shouting, ‘Viva Cristo Rey’ (“Long Live Christ the King”). The protestors destroyed 
some of the works, including the “Nunca Más” prints, as well as the glass bottles that 
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comprised Ferrari’s piece “1492-1992, Quinto Centenario de la Conquista” – a work lamenting 
the arrival of Catholicism in the Americas. The protestors then menaced other spectators 
with the broken shards and demanded the exhibit be shut down. As Todd Porterfield notes: 
The exhibition was closed for two days and lawsuits were brought against the 
exhibition, notably by the Asociacion Cristo Sacerdote (The Association of 
Christian Priests), which enumerated the show’s profanations: “51 insults to 
Jesus Christ; 24 to the Virgin Mary; 27 to the angels and saints; three directed 
to God, and seven to the Pope.” (Porterfield 99) 
 
The resultant media spectacle ultimately elevated Ferrari’s international reputation – 
following the Recoleta scandal, he won the prestigious Golden Lion at the Venice Biennale 
and secured solo shows that included the “Nunca Más” series at the Tate Modern in London 
(2007),75 the Museum of Modern Art in New York (2009), and the Reina Sofia in Madrid 
(2009-2010), before being granted the Konex Award for Visual Arts in 2012 as the most 
important Argentine artist of the last decade. But it also demonstrated that, even three 
decades later, a shadow still hung over Argentina and its memories of the Disappeared.  
While artists like Ferrari, Soriano, and Puig endeavored to challenge Nunca Más’ 
fallacious “Two Demons” narrative – portraying the events according to the more complex 
set of political, religious, class-based, and gendered circumstances that contributed to the rise 
of the violence – the Recoleta scandal also demonstrated that Sábato’s mendacious “equal 
blame” thesis found new cultural value amongst a younger generation of Argentinians in the 
2000s. 
This generation includes an emerging group of artists and writers who were born 
during the 1970s or 80s, and who have lived their entire lives under an ominous cloud of 
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uncertainty. Much of this uncertainty is rooted in recent revelations that, unbeknownst to 
them, hundreds of children had been raised, not by their biological parents, but by their 
parents’ murderers – about 500 of them, in a widely accepted estimate76 – thus inspiring a 
menacing sense of disquietude throughout that generation’s social groups; a creeping 
wariness that people may not be who they seem, or that even one’s own parents may not be 
their own. The range of psychological reactions to these revelations have been far-ranging, 
with some children rejecting the revelations altogether, while others have turned to the 
radical leftist politics for which their parents died, as their only means of connection with 
them. “Some children,” writes Clyde Haberman, “on discovering their true identities, have 
resisted leaving the only parents they know…. Then again, some grandchildren are 
comforted to learn that they were not abandoned by their biological parents, as they long 
believed” (“Children of Argentina’s Disappeared”). 
In Mariana Enríquez’s short stories, her characters occupy an Argentina scarred by 
the violence of the 1970s and 80s. Her first collection to be translated into English, Things 
We Lost in the Fire, mixes elements of Argentine history with the pathos of gothic horror 
stories, giving rise to a modern depiction of young Argentinians oppressed by the spectre of 
the Proceso. One story in Things We Lost, “The Inn,” builds gradually toward an impassioned 
and inevitable sexual encounter between a pair of teenage girls, before, on the very last page, 
the couple is violently interrupted by the ghosts of the Disappeared, shouting, pounding and 
crying, and shining flashlights through their bedroom window. In another, “The Spiderweb,” 
the suffocating presence of military soldiers in a rural countryside is mirrored by an outbreak 
of deadly spiders bearing “pink crosses” on their backs (95). In nearly all of her stories, the 
children protagonists are alone, having rejected or been rejected by their parents. In a recent 
interview with NPR, Enríquez states: 
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I did not try specifically to write about the dictatorship and its consequences 
in the present, but I couldn’t hide away from it when [it] kept appearing in 
the stories. I’m 43; I’m a bit older than the children of the disappeared, but 
not all of them because some have my age, some are older etc. But what 
always haunted me once I knew the stories of these children is that there’s a 
question of identity. I mean, I went to school with children that I don’t know 
if they were who they were, if their parents were who they were, if they were 
raised by their parents or by the killers of their parents, or were given by the 
killers to other families. So there is a ghostly quality to everyday life. So it’s 
almost like something is floating in the air – something that is not resolved. 
And there is a fear, a real fear that was in the air, that kind of got through my 
skin. (Enríquez NPR) 
 
 
In Enríquez’s stories, her young protagonists are continually haunted by the demons 
of the Proceso. Her characters are tormented by the menacing presence of “both sides,” but 
the demons are never really present; they only ever appear as hallucinations or visions, as a 
sort of spiritual dread hanging over her entire generation. Like Enríquez, Patricio Pron was 
born amidst the violence and tyranny of the Proceso. And like her stories, his novels are filled 
with youthful Argentinians addicted to drugs – paroxetine, benzodiazepines, and sleeping 
pills – as a way of escaping their past. Pron’s 2011 novel, My Father’s Ghost is Climbing in the 
Rain (translated to English in 2013 by Mara Faye Lethem), depicts a child’s compulsive 
investigation into his father’s past. 
When Pron’s unnamed narrator, who had been living in Germany, returns to 
Argentina to attend to his father who recently fell into a coma, he discovers a concealed 
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folder filled with newspaper clippings and photographs depicting a disappeared brother and 
sister, Alberto José and Alicia Burdisso.77 Having discovered his father’s interest in the 
disappeared siblings, the narrator embarks on an obsessive and increasingly neurotic 
investigation into his father’s connection with them. Who were Alberto and Alicia? Why did 
they disappear? Did his father want to help them? Or did he murder them?  
From the moment of discovery, an impressive stream of suspense and uncertainty 
drive the plot. Like Enríquez’s protagonists, the narrator is haunted by the violence of his 
parents’ generation. And like many writers of his era, his suffocation under the weight of 
history is guided by the dangerous binary perpetuated by Nunca Más’ “Two Demons” thesis. 
In Pron’s novel, the only possible outcomes of his search are, either: his father was a 
revolutionary freedom fighter who fought against tyranny, or he was a member of the far-
right death squads. In Pron’s rendering of history, you were either with Péron or against him.  
Ultimately, it is his father’s tastes in literature that clue the reader in to which side he 
was on. As the narrator itemizes the contents of his father’s bookshelf, he discovers: 
“Another Episode in the Class War … My Life for Peron! … Operation Massacre … Now or Never … 
The Tactical Manual … The Little Red Book” (29). Authors found in his father’s library: Julio 
Cortazar, Leopoldo Marechal, Juan Péron, Rodolfo Walsh, and Mao Zedong. Authors 
absent: Silvina Bullrich (often disparagingly referred to as “the great bourgeois lady”), Beatriz 
Guido, Ezequiel Martinez Estrada, Victoria Ocampo, and Ernesto Sábato78 (29-30). In a later 
section, the narrator notes that his father had underlined only one sentence of one of the 
books: “I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race: I have kept faith” (33), which 
compels him to reflect on the difference between his and his parents’ generations:  
I hadn’t fought, … no one in my generation had fought; something or 
someone had already inflicted a defeat on us and we drank or took pills or 
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wasted time in a thousand and one ways as a mode of hastening an end […] 
my father’s generation had been different, but, once again, there was 
something in that difference that was also a meeting point, a thread that went 
through the years and brought us together in spite of everything and was 
horrifically Argentine: the feeling of parents and children being united in 
defeat. (34) 
 
As Pron’s unnamed narrator illustrates, the ultimate legacy of Sábato’s insidious 
“Two Demons” theory is perhaps the unconscious division of Argentine society into “the 
demons on the left” or “the demons on the right.” By crafting an unfounded narrative that 
portrayed the horrors of the Proceso as a result of two equal “terrorisms,” Sábato fomented a 
false moral equivalency between absolute state violence and the reactionary resistance to it. 
In doing so, later generations – who have internalized this theory – are now dividing their 
world according to its precepts. In negotiating the trauma of the past, many young 
Argentinians are now effectively “picking sides” in a putative moral enterprise. Since, 
according to Sábato’s historical narration of the Proceso, the violence was equal “on both 
sides,” there is thus less stigma in attempting to morally excuse the dictatorship for their 
unspeakable oppression. In recent years, in fact, several prominent figures have publicly 
repeated many of Nunca Más’ most dangerous “Two Demons” misconceptions as a means 
of distancing their generation from the perceived militantism of the 1970s and 80s. 
In 2011, controversial poet Santiago Llach – the author of eight books of poetry and 
regular contributor to a number of popular men’s magazines – publicly attacked acclaimed 
poet-laureate Juan Gelman for his association with the leftist resistance movement during 
the dictatorship. Gelman – who is arguably Argentina’s best-known living poet79 – was 
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forced into exile by the juntas after his son and pregnant daughter-in-law were disappeared 
by the regime. From exile in Mexico and Europe, Gelman published thirteen collections of 
poems that directly confronted the horrors of the Proceso, often pseudonymously attributing 
his works to actual desaparecidos by borrowing their names from lists of the “Disappeared.”80 
Upon returning to Argentina in 2000, Gelman managed to locate his granddaughter, who 
was born before her mother’s murder and illegally given to a pro-dictatorship family.81 The 
return of one of the nation’s most treasured poets, along with the fervid media attention 
surrounding the discovery of his granddaughter, thrust Gelman back into the public 
spotlight, where he was targeted by a handful of younger literary and academic figures for his 
previous resistance to the authoritarian regime. As part of a wider critique of the supposed 
role of the left during the period of state repression, Llach and philosopher Oscar del Barco 
attacked Gelman’s status as a “poet-martyr,” erroneously accusing him of belonging to 
groups that “killed innocent people” and repeating the “Two Demons” thesis that all those 
who resisted the dictatorship were death-dealing terrorists. 
In an interview with journalist Germán Carrasco, Llach asserted: “Este tipo, que cada 
año nos regala un libro más horrible que el anterior, formó parte de un delirio organizado por los jóvenes de 
clase media que mató a inocentes propios y ajenos.” (“This guy [Gelman], who each year gives us a 
book more horrible that his last, was part of a hysteria organized by young middle-class 
leftists who killed innocent people and others”) (Carrasco, “Santiago Llach,” translation 
mine). Following this initial accusation, Llach then reiterates one of the most controversial 
and pernicious falsehoods disseminated by the Nunca Más report: “La dictadura desapareció a lo 
sumo a 8000 personas, eso lo sabe todo el que esté un poco informado. Pero las organizaciones de derechos 
humanos tienen el leit motiv de los 30000 desaparecidos … Y creo que legalmente es difícil argüir que se 
trató de un genocidio” (“The dictatorship killed at the most 8,000 people, anyone who is even 
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slightly informed knows this. But Human rights organizations have the idea of 30,000 
disappeared … it’s hard to argue that it was a genocide, so they increased the number [to 
30,000]”) (Ibid.). 
This erroneous claim, which has been refuted by Amnesty International and the U.S. 
State Department among others, is based on Sábato’s assertion in the prologue to Nunca 
Más: “We have discovered close to 9,000 of these unfortunate people who were abandoned 
by the world. We have reason to believe that the true figure is much higher. Many families 
were reluctant to report a disappearance for fear of reprisals. Some still hesitate, fearing a 
resurgence of these evil forces” (i).82 While the CONDAP commissioners were indeed only 
able to corroborate a small fraction of the cases in the limited scope of their investigations, 
and with their meagre resources, Nunca Más’ misleading and deeply troubling “official” 
depiction of the genocide as a seemingly negligible clash between two willing adversaries 
continues to determine the national discourse on the Proceso. To this day, despite the many 
substantial and public challenges to it, Nunca Más endures as the seemingly state-sanctioned 
and authoritative master-narrative on those years of terror. 
 Propitiously, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Nunca Más report, in 
February 2006, Eudeba re-issued a special commemorative edition of the report that 
included an additional preface by the National Human Rights Secretariat. The new preface, 
ordered by then President, Néstor Kirchnerch, included language intended to correct the 
“Two Demons” thesis. 
Es preciso dejar claramente estalecido - porque lo require la construción del futuro sobre 
bases firme - que es inaceptable pretender justificar el terrorismo de Estado como una suerte 
de juego de violencias contrapuestas, como si fuera posible buscar una simetría justificatoria 
en la acción de particulares frente al apartamiento de los fines propios de la Nación y del 
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Estado que son irrenunciables. (“It must be clearly established – because we must 
construct our future on solid ground – that it is unacceptable to justify state 
terrorism as a kind of game of contrasting violence, because when a nation 
and state deviate from functions that are inherent to them and cannot be 
renounced, there is no justification to be found in any symmetry of individual 
actions.”) (Nunca Más, 2006 edition 8, translation mine) 
 
 
In an interview with Pagina/12, undersecretary of Human Rights, Rodolfo 
Mattarollo, explained the reason behind the new preface: 
El prólogo histórico del Nunca Más está recorrido de un extremo a otro por la doctrina de 
los dos demonios. Si bien sostiene que hubo un terrorismo que fue más grave que el otro, 
dice que hubo dos terrorismos y que uno fue la causa del otro: la llamada violencia de abajo 
fue la que generó la violencia de arriba, que fue peor, más condenable porque se practicaba 
desde el Estado, pero fue en respuesta a una violencia de abajo. Esto nos parece una 
falsedad. (“The historical prologue of Nunca Más is permeated from one end 
to the other by the theory of the two demons. While it claims that there was 
one terrorism that was worse than the other, it says that there were two 
terrorisms and that one was the cause of the other: the so-called violence 
from below was what generated the violence from above – which was worse, 
more condemnable because it was practiced from the State – but it was in 
response to violence from below. This seems to us a falsehood.”)  
(Ginsberg, translation mine) 
 
Mattarollo then adds: 
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Nos pareció que equivalía en Argentina a lo que se llama el negacionismo en Europa 
respecto de los crímenes de los nazis. Así como en Europa hay una frontera que parece que 
no se debería sobrepasar por cuestiones éticas, nos parecía que en Argentina ésa era la 
frontera. (“In the historical prologue of the CONADEP report, there was an 
attempt to justify state terrorism… We thought it was the Argentine 
equivalence to what is called Holocaust denial in Europe regarding the 
crimes of the Nazis. Just as in Europe, there is an ethical line that must not 
be crossed, in Argentina the ‘two demons’ theory was that line.”) (Ginsberg). 
 
Alongside the new preface, Eudeba’s 2006 edition also included several corrections 
and updates to Sábato’s report, including a new section that now includes the names of the 
disappeared and an updated list of the clandestine detention centers, which went from 365 
to 498. 
In defense of Sábato’s original prologue, fellow CONADEP member, Magdalena 
Ruiz Guiñazú – who served as the “star” anchorwoman for the dictatorship’s propaganda 
news network, Station 11, during the juntas – criticized the addition of the new preface to 
the 2006 edition. “No sólo es una insolencia hacia Sábato” (“Not only is it an insult towards 
Sábato”), Ruiz Guiñazú told La Nacion, “sino que también es una grave falta histórica creer que el 
Nunca Más constituye una apología de la teoría de los dos demonios”(“but it is also a serious historical 
failure to believe that Nunca Más is an apology for the theory of the two demons”) (Galak 
“Controversia por el prólogo,” translation mine). She added that several jurists, and even officials 
from Kirchner’s government, had offered their support for Sábato. 
In response to Guiñazú, the president of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Hebe de 
Bonafini, praised the new edition of Nunca Más and called Sábato’s text “shit” (Galak).83 
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Chapter 2 Notes 
 
1  The first was the 1975 Greek “Junta Trials.” Although the Greek transitional 
government did not publish a comprehensive report on the proceedings of these trials, 
Amnesty International did produce its own independent report on the third and final court 
case, the so-called “Torturer’s Trial.” It should also be noted that Bolivia’s National 
Commission for the Investigation of Disappearances was founded contemporaneously with the 
Argentine Commission (while similar transitional justice processes would soon unfold in 
several other Latin American countries, including Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala).  
2  The junta’s name is ironic, since it did just the opposite of reorganizing: “The 
decentralized nature of the regime’s apparatus conferred on the violence an aspect of 
terrifying randomness, whose ultimate effect was the shattering of whatever sense of 
collectivity might have survived the first round-up of intellectuals, labor leaders, and 
guerillas” (Colá 127). 
3  Unless noted otherwise, all quotations from Nunca Más refer to the English 
translation of the original 1986 edition, published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
4  As former military officer Adolfo Scilingo revealed, senior military officers had told 
participants in the flights that the Catholic Church hierarchy sanctioned the “death flights” 
as “a Christian form of death,” since it was the sea that killed them, not a man under God 
(Verbitsky 27). Several military chaplains are reported to have even “bless[ed] the drugged 
bodies of [victims] marked for execution as they were loaded onto military planes, from 
which they were then hurled to their deaths” (Anderson). The Church’s history of providing 
moral support for the juntas has been well documented. The current Pope, Francis, who was 
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a Provincial Superior of the Jesuit Church at the time, has faced numerous accusations of 
having actively pointed out so-called “left-leaning” priests to the Military, several of whom 
were later “disappeared.” His predecessor, Archbishop Juan Carlos Aramburu, openly sided 
with the military’s stated need for a purge, in which freethinking priests and nuns were also 
killed. In 1955, a faction of radical Christians within the Air Force adorned their aircrafts 
with crosses and other church symbols, before flying over the Plaza de Mayo and dropping 
aerial bombs on a crowd gathered see President Péron give a speech. 308 civilians were 
killed. 
5  Although the first edition of the Nunca Más report estimated a total of 8,960 
“disappeared” (NM 447), various human rights groups (including the Madres de los Plaza de 
Mayo and Amnesty International) have since suggested the total number of murdered or 
“disappeared” to be greater than 30,000. While reports from the U.S. State Department 
suggest a number of 22,000 (see: Diaz and Filipe A-8), the most commonly cited number 
today remains 30,000. For a detailed analysis of the disparity surrounding these numbers, see: 
Brysk, Alison. “The Politics of Measurement: The Contested Count of the Disappeared in 
Argentina.” Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 676-692. 
6  Like the Allied occupiers in Germany, the Alfonsín administration was faced with 
the problem of having many high-ranking officials who remained loyal to the former 
dictatorship’s ideology after the return to democracy. However, unlike the American 
denazification program, the new Argentine administration settled for a more subtle approach 
to subduing this faction, opting instead to serve as a political and ideological intermediary 
between the former authoritarian regime and the human rights groups who opposed them. 
This dynamic is covered in detail in the following sections. 
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7  For Alfonsín’s transitional government, the most critical obstacle to establishing a 
successful and prosperous democracy (besides the mollification of the armed forces) was the 
stabilization of the crumbling national economy. As a result of the “huge foreign debt that 
the old dictatorial regime had contracted” through its excessive and “irresponsible” military 
spending (Alfonsín 15) – including “a near war with Chile in 1978 that sent the dictatorship 
on an arms-buying spree, feeding uncontrolled deficits” (Schumacher 1077) – the nation’s 
economy was teetering on the brink of collapse. By the end of the dictatorship, domestic 
industries had begun to crumble and inflation had risen to an astonishing annual rate of over 
one thousand percent, causing the value of the peso to plummet to record lows (Neiburg 
608). In a futile attempt to compensate for the soaring inflation, General Galtieri – the last 
leader of the dictatorship – introduced a new peso (with ten-thousand old pesos exchanged 
for each new one), but efforts to stem the problems were thwarted when, in late 1982, 
Argentina came into conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (Islas 
Malvinas). 
8  For an extensive review of the initial “internal” inquiry conducted by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, see: Perelli, Carina. “Settling Accounts with Blood Memory: 
The Case of Argentina.” Social Research, vol. 59, no. 2, 1992, pp. 415–451. 
9  Following Mexico’s sovereign default of 1982, the majority of Latin American 
countries were thrust into an acute debt crisis, often referred to collectively as the “Lost 
Decade,” where their foreign debt exceeded their earning power and they were not able to 
repay it. Following Mexico’s inability to service its debts, General Galtieri approached the 
IMF for financial assistance. See: de Beaufort Wijnholds, J. Onno. “The Argentine Drama: A 
View from the IMF Board,” in The Crisis that Was Not Prevented: Lessons for Argentina, the IMF, 
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and Globalisation. Eds Jan Joost Teunissen and Age Akkerman. Forum on Debt and 
Development: The Hague, 2003. pp. 101-115. 
10  During the dictatorship, which lasted from 1976-1983, there were three successive 
“juntas” (de-facto administrative councils). As such, the three leaders of each of the three 
juntas were charged under Decree 158. Thus, nine men were arraigned in total: Lieutenant 
General Jorge Rafael Videla (Army), Chief Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera (Navy), 
Brigadier General Orlando Ramón Agosti (Air Force); Lieutenant General Roberto Eduardo 
Viola (Army), Chief Admiral Armando Lambruschini (Navy), Brigadier General Omar 
Graffigna (Air Force); Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri (Army), Chief Admiral Jorge 
Anaya (Navy), and Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo (Air Force). 
11  This would later be made official in 1987 with the passing of the Due Obedience 
law, which officially dictated that all officers and their subordinates – including common 
personnel of the Armed Forces, the Police, the Penitentiary Service and other security 
agencies – could not be legally punished for crimes committed during the dictatorship, since 
they were merely obeying orders from their superiors. 
12  Although the commission was instructed to work with several human rights groups, 
only one – La Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (“The Permanent Assembly for 
Human Rights”) – participated because of opposition to Alfonsín’s “Two Demons” 
hypothesis. See: Crenzel 2008, 179. 
13  These included, among others: novelist Ernesto Sábato, author and journalist 
Magdalena Ruiz Guiñazú, educator Hilario Fernández Long, and philosopher Gregorio 
Klimovsky. 
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14  Witnesses could register to testify before local representatives from CONADEP. 
While the Commission collected over seven thousand testimonies, the prosecution chose 
“the 700 most representative and provable cases” to be read during the trials (Speck 493). 
15  Indeed, they continue even to this day, since President Néstor Kirchner reopened 
the trials in 2006. 
16  Following the return to democracy, Ruiz Guiñazú became an ardent spokesperson 
for the desaparecidos and their families, becoming the first high profile journalist to give voice 
to the Madres de Plaza de Mayo on her radio program. She would later be awarded prestigious 
Orders of Merit from both the French and Italian governments for her defense of universal 
human rights. 
17  As Sábato points out in the introduction to Nunca Más, “[President] Alfonsín had 
made two commitments to the nation [following the return of democracy]: to investigate the 
disappearances, and to prosecute those responsible. The Commission (CONADEP) was 
charged only with the former: it was not a judicial body, and its report, Nunca Más, made no 
judgments of individual responsibility” (Nunca Más xvii). In other words, the report was 
simply meant to investigate and report on “the fate of the people who disappeared during 
those ill-omened years” (Nunca Más i), while any judgments of criminal guilt and 
responsibility would be administered by the courts. Nunca Más was to provide the story of 
the victims, in other words, while the ensuing tribunals would attend to the legal particulars. 
18  President Alfonsín, in a 1992 speech delivered at the Salzburg Conference on Justice 
in Times of Transition, stated: “There was a tradition in Argentina that after each 
dictatorship, the crimes and abuses committed by the authoritarian government would go 
unpunished. My administration, moved by an urgent ethical imperative, for the first time 
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opened the judicial channels so that the extreme violations of human rights perpetrated by 
both revolutionary terrorism and state terrorism could be investigated and judged by an 
independent judicial body. Thus the impunity of the powerful would come to an end” 
(Alfonsín 15-16. Italics mine). 
19  In 1951, Sábato published an essay, “Hombres y engranajes” (“Man and Mechanisms”), 
detailing his disillusionment with Socialism and the Communist International organization, 
citing Bréton’s influence. For a detailed account of Bréton’s and the Surrealist’s initial 
embracing, and subsequent renunciation, of the Communist International ideals, see: Short, 
Robert S. “The Politics of Surrealism, 1920-36.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 2, 
1966, pp. 3–25. 
20  While it might seem somewhat unconventional to the Western eye for a novelist to 
be appointed to such a prominent government position, there is, in fact, a long history of 
Latin American writers serving in such roles. As Elena Poniatowsky and Carlos Rerez note: 
“Romulo Gallegos and Juan Bosch have been presidents of their countries. Ernesto 
Cardenal was Nicaraguan minister of culture. Gabriel Garcia Marquez has numerous times 
been offered the presidency of his country and declined in the same guayabera in which he 
received the Nobel Prize. Successive [Mexican] governments have offered Octavio Paz 
official posts, and his name has been mentioned, along with that of Carlos Fuentes, to head 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following in the tradition of writer-diplomats throughout the 
history of Latin America: Alfonso Reyes, Pablo Neruda, Enrique Gonzalez Martinez, Miguel 
Angel Asturias. Recently, Mario Vargas Llosa was a candidate for president of the republic 
of Peru, and if Cardenismo triumphs in Mexico, surely Carlos Monsivais will be named to the 
Ministry of the Interior or as chief of police.” (“Memory and Identity” 76) 
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21  Following the successful coup, Sábato and Borges famously attended a dinner held 
by the regime’s first dictator, General Jorge Rafael Videla, after which Sábato publicly 
declared that he was “impressed” by Videla, commenting that the dictator “was a cultured 
man” (Bowen “Sábato: Literature’s Conscience”). 
22  The term “dictatorship” refers here to the Péron government, which many on the 
right categorized as an authoritarian regime. This remains a highly contentious issue for 
many Argentines. Sábato’s English biographer, Harley Dean Oberhelman, reiterates this 
view, often referring to “the dictator Péron” and his “ruthless wife Eva” (see Oberhelman 
39). The generational debate regarding the Péron years is brilliantly illustrated in Patricio 
Pron’s novel, My Father’s Ghost is Climbing in the Rain (2013). 
23  The Indigenista or “Nativist” literary movement refers to the “pre-Boom” generation 
of writers across the Spanish Americas (as well as Brazil). While both schools were mainly 
comprised of middle-class white males, the Indigenista movement was considered to be highly 
derivative of European literature, was distinguished by its conventional linear plots, and 
centered on expressions of regional social and political issues – whether national, provincial, 
transnational (ie. Andean), or continental. On the other hand, “Boom” literature is often 
identified by experiments in form and narration, the use of magical realism and other surreal 
or fantastical elements, and modernist nonlinear temporal structures. While a great deal of 
Boom novels are also overtly political – specifically the sub-genre of Dictator Novels – their 
politics tend toward a more nuanced representation than the black-and-white, Manichean 
portrayal of the earlier generation. 
24  Following the popularization of socialist and communist ideals across the post-
WWII Americas, peasantry and rural life became widely romanticized. Like many writers of 
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his generation, Sábato’s novels often contrasted the gaucho-ethics of poor, working-class 
Argentines and campesinos with the decadence of the “old” bourgeois aristocracy. 
25  See Sábato’s interview with Geoffrey Fox, “Fiction and Politics: Interview with 
Ernesto Sábato,” in The Threepenny Review (1988), for a detailed account of his lofty literary 
aspirations, as well as his effusive admiration of Dostoyevsky. 
26  Caistor also served as translator of the English version of Nunca Más. 
27  Here, Caistor misclassifies the Nunca Más “prologue” as a “preface.” As will be 
discussed, there is a critical distinction to be made between a preface and a prologue. 
28  For a detailed account of some of the “narration problems” discussed by specific 
members of the Commission – including how to avoid having the report read “too much 
like a summary of court files”; whether the report’s linguistic style (such as discernable 
markers of social class or the use of technical language) would appeal to all readers or deter 
certain demographics; and the most suitable order with which to “map out the sequence of 
abduction, torture, and disappearance”– see: Crenzel, The Memory 68. 
29  For a detailed account of these “levels of culpability,” see: Graciela Fernandez 
Meijide, “The Role of Historical Enquiry in Creating Accountability for Human Rights 
Abuses,” Third World Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1992, p. 269. 
30  As Maarten Van Delden notes, “Sabato spent much of his career in the shadow of 
Borges. When somebody once mentioned to Borges that Sabato was being promoted by his 
Italian publisher as ‘the rival of Borges,’ Borges merely observed that no one had ever 
described him as ‘the rival of Sabato’” (“Sábato: Author of ‘Death and the Compass’” 44). 
31  See: Riggan, William. “The 1984 Jurors and Their Candidates for the Neustadt 
International Prize for Literature” World Literature Today 58.1 (Winter 1984): p54. 
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32  For instance: Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism 
(1845), Miguel Ángel Asturias’ El Señor Presidente (1963), Alejo Carpentier’s Reasons of State 
(1974), Frankétienne’s Ready to Burst (1975), Gabriel García Márquez’s The Autumn of the 
Patriarch (1975) and The General in His Labyrinth (1990), Augusto Roa Bastos’ I, the Supreme 
(1974), Julio Cortázar’s A Manual for Manuel (1978), Luisa Valenzuela’s The Lizard’s Tail 
(1983), Julia Alvarez’s In the Time of the Butterflies (1999), Mario Vargas Llosa’s The Feast of the 
Goat (2000), and Roberto Bolaño’s By Night in Chile (2003). 
33  While several “Dictator Novels” were written in real-time – typically from exile – 
authors often based their narratives on an amalgam of various regional tyrants or regimes in 
order to avoid violent retaliation (for both them and their families). For instance, Marquez’s 
novel, which is based on an amalgam of several Latin American dictators (including Juan 
Vincente Gómez of Venezuela, and Augusto Pinochet of Chile), was written from Barcelona 
with a watchful eye on the escalating situation in Chile and Colombia. Likewise, Carpentier’s 
Reasons of State, about the Machado regime in Cuba, was written from the author’s exile in 
Paris, where he fled after a brief stint in prison for opposing the Machado dictatorship. On 
the other hand, Bastos’ I, the Supreme was composed during a period of political exile spent in 
both Argentina and France, from where he observed the horrors of the Alfredo Stroessner 
regime in his native Paraguay. Similarly, Vargas Llosa’s The Feast of the Goat was written about 
Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo as the author bore witness from both Peru and Spain; 
Cortàzar’s A Manual for Manuel was written from exile in Paris; and Bolaño’s By Night in Chile 
and Distant Star both reflect the author’s experiences witnessing the Pinochet regime while 
living abroad in Mexico. 
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34  A famous anecdote – almost mythical by now, in its countless renderings – depicts 
Carlos Fuentes gathering together a legendary group of Latin American authors in a Mexican 
pub, some time around 1970 (Monterroso, who may or may not have been in attendance, 
says it was 1968), to address the continent’s many current and past dictators. Fuentes, 
together with Peru’s Mario Vargas Llosa, Argentina’s Julio Cortázar, Colombia’s Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez, Cuba’s Alejo Carpentier, Paraguay’s Augusto Roa Bastos, and Chile’s José 
Donoso (other versions include Guatemala’s Augusto Monterroso, Venezuela’s Miguel 
Otero Silva, and the Dominican Republic’s Juan Bosch), would each compose a short 
novella – “no more than 50 pages” each– depicting “their favorite national tyrant” (Fuentes, 
“Despot”), which would then be collected and published in a volume resembling Edmund 
Wilson’s literary portraits of American Civil War figures, Patriotic Gore (1962). As Fuentes 
recalls, “The collective volume would be called Los Padres de las Patrias (“The Fathers of the 
Fatherlands”), and the French publisher Claude Gallimard took it up instantly” (Fuentes, 
“Despot”). The volume never did materialize, but its near-mythical status in the Latin 
American cultural imaginary helped propel the genre to a renaissance in the 1970s – when 
many Central and South American nations once again suffered under brutal right-wing 
dictatorships as a part of Operation Condor. Many of the writers in attendance – all males, it 
should be noted – did go on to publish their own “Dictator Novel,” in time. Given Sábato’s 
forthright desire to be regarded as a literary equal to the likes of Fuentes, Marquez, Vargas 
Llosa, and Donoso, and his candid admissions of occasional bouts of jealousy, it is 
interesting to read Nunca Más in the context of this genre. 
35  Comprised of a supposed excerpt from a missing police report, the prologue to On 
Heroes seduces readers with the revelation that they are about to embark on the story of a 
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grisly murder-suicide: the shooting of Fernando Olmos – the patriarch of an “old” and 
“prominent” Buenos Aires family – by his daughter Alejandra, who then burned down her 
family’s once-grand ancestral home in a brutal act of self-immolation. In a gesture that 
anticipates Nunca Más’ opening salvo – which proclaims that all of “Argentina was torn by 
terror” by the left and right – On Heroes’ prologue begins with a similar assertion that all of 
Buenos Aires had been “shocked” by this terrible crime, in which a handful of socially-
isolated radicals wreaked havoc on the capital. [As Carolyn Coles Thorburn notes, in several 
of his fictional and non-fictional works, Sábato has demonstrated a clear propensity to draw 
on the archetypal image of the isolated hero: “in which the hero experiences the ritual of 
social expulsion,” becoming “tragically separated from society” (iii-iv). The social isolation of 
Fernando, Alejandra, and Martin, anticipates Sábato’s characterization of both the so-called 
leftist “terrorists” and the military dictatorship in the Nunca Más report, as two anomalous, 
interloping forces that exist outside of and terrorize the civilized community.]  
Sábato draws on these initial assertions, in both texts, to establish a unique position of 
narrative authority; the prologue-figure warns us that these gruesome and shocking crimes 
are fraught with portentous moral and political significance, which – if readers are patient 
and attentive – will now be carefully explained throughout the remainder of the work.  
Both the novel and the report begin with an authoritative prologue-figure (a police detective 
in On Heroes and the lead investigator of the Commission in Nunca Más) informing readers 
that Argentina has been devastated by a brutal act of political violence that threatens the very 
survival and prosperity of the nation. With bold histrionic flare, the seemingly judicious and 
all-knowing prologue-figure (a Sábato-like personage in the novel, and Sábato-the-man in the 
report) then suggests he, alone, possesses the wisdom and moral propriety to deliver the 
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nation from this threat. In On Heroes, this figure is not only in possession of crucial 
“classified” and previously undisclosed information regarding Alejandra’s crime – the 
curious “Report on the Blind,” which Fernando had drafted on the night of his death, 
concerning a mysterious “blind cult” whom he suspects of attempting to control the world  
– but he also claims to be singularly qualified to interpret the portentous and “sinister” 
political meaning of the violence. 
36  According to interviews conducted by Emilio Crenzel following Nunca Más’ first two 
publication runs, more than fifty-percent of readers only read Sabato’s prologue (Memory 98), 
while another thirty-percent read the prologue and specific sections, “mostly those dealing 
with the disappearance of famous people” (98) and “only one in ten readers finished the 
entire book” (143). While it is possible that Crenzel’s data simply points to a general 
disinterest by the Argentine public in wading through a dense, statistic-laden government 
report, it may also be indicative of a widespread apprehension to rehash the gruesome details 
of the tortures, rapes, and murders so immediately following the cessation of violence. What 
Crenzel’s data fails to indicate, however, is the extent to which Sábato’s formal and stylistic 
framing of the dual narratives facilitates – perhaps even encourages – this type of piecemeal 
reading. “In contrast to their limited reading,” Crenzel notes, “most [respondents] vividly 
recalled the actual moment they bought the book and how they showed it proudly to friends 
and acquaintances” (Memory 98-99). 
37  Italian philosopher, Antonio Negri, was famously arrested for supposedly 
masterminding Moro’s kidnap and attempting to overthrow the government, before being 
exonerated and released a year later. 
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38  Although university courses on “Péronism” were officially prohibited by the military 
regime, massive reforms to the university structure implemented during Péron’s rule made it 
difficult for the junta to police these policies. 
These reforms, implemented at all universities, included the nationwide legislation of 
free tuition (followed by a massive media-campaign to encourage members of the lower 
classes to attend university) and a radical new tripartite system of governance in which equal 
parts – students, faculty, and alumni – would govern each university with equal authority. 
These radical Péronist reforms resulted in large swaths of the “working class” entering 
universities, who now also had the authority to dictate one third of the curriculum – giving 
rise to a pronounced increase in unpublicized courses on Leftist and Populist ideologies, and 
the implementation of many student organizations that aligned themselves with worker’s 
unions. 
 During this time, the state-controlled media (under the auspices of the military 
regime) had increasingly begun to fabricate a false association between the growing student 
movements and the activities of fringe guerilla groups, such as the “Montoneros.” Within 
the wider Latin-American context of revolutionary movements – especially the Cuban 
Revolution, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement in Bolivia, and The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (FARC) of Colombia – many right-wing governments had begun to crack 
down on what they considered to be any form of “leftist” dissent among their populations, 
often beginning with students and worker’s unions who had no real associations with 
militant guerilla organizations. Often, activists participating in legitimate civil rights or 
student movements (akin to their counterparts in North America and Europe during the 
1960s) were branded as “subversives” or “agitators,” and were thus falsely associated with 
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the small number of violent fringe revolutionary movements operating across the continent. 
As future dictator Rafael Videla stated, “A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a 
bomb; it is anyone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western or Christian civilization” 
(Bouvard, 37). Within this fraught Cold War-context, many young non-violent activists were 
caught up in the repressive violence of the increasingly common military juntas across the 
region (most of which were backed by the American C.I.A. as a part of “Operation Condor” 
in a systematic attempt to eradicate communist or Soviet influence and ideas in the 
Americas). 
This military-dictatorship ended when, in 1958, the junta held a limited form of 
elections that were overseen by the Armed Forces, and the centre-left “Intransigent Radical 
Civic Union Party” (who had been endorsed by Péron while in exile) was elected. However, 
only four years later on March 29, 1962, another coup led by General Raúl Poggi ousted the 
RCUI, replacing the democratically-elected government with yet another military-backed 
dictatorship – [Although supported by the Armed Forces, the 1958 coup was notable in that 
it represented the first (and only) time that a civilian dictator, José María Guido, would 
assume the role of de facto President following a military coup]. This junta ended just one year 
later, in 1963, when elections were once again called (in which Péronist parties were once 
again banned) and the moderately reorganized Radical Civic Union Party (now called the 
Radical Civic Union of the People) was re-elected under the leadership of Arturo Illia. 
On March 17, 1965, during the elected presidency of Illia, a legislative election was called, 
which would drastically reorganize the executive branch of the Argentine government. 
“Péronists” – who Illia had temporarily allowed to participate in the Cabinet election in an 
attempt to win the support of the trade unions – succeeded in electing a surprising majority 
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fifty-two cabinet ministers, while rumours began to circulate among party members of 
Péron’s return (Rock 211). Deeply unnerving the Argentine Armed Forces, yet another 
coup, this time led by General Juan Carlos Onganía, quickly overthrew Illia’s elected 
government on June 28, 1966. This seizure of power was largely a reaction based on the 
misguided fear that the newly elected “Péronist” cabinet ministers would foster the growth 
of both trade unions and increasing civil rights movements among students. In order to 
“justify” the coup, the military once again disseminated fabricated reports of associations 
between these groups and the small and relatively obscure group of radical fringe guerilla 
organizations operating in a handful of rural provinces.   
On the basis of such fear mongering, Onganía sent the military into the University of 
Buenos Aires on July 29, 1966, on what is now ominously referred to as La Noche de los 
Lápices Largos (“The Night of the Long Pencils”). This event was depicted in Hector 
Olivera’s 1986 film “Night of the Pencils.” Specifically targeting the ‘Faculty of Philosophy and 
Letters’ and the ‘Faculty of Natural Sciences,’ the forces furiously attacked and illegally 
imprisoned over four hundred faculty and students (with at least six students ultimately 
murdered by their captors), while destroying all of the labs and the main library. The incident 
was later highlighted during the trials against the Junta, when one of the surviving students, 
Pablo Díaz, gave his testimony (Robben 214). Onganía had believed that many of the so-
called “subversive” ideologies inimical to the military Juntas began at the University, and was 
convinced that by subduing the inflammatory rhetoric of students and faculty bodies, he 
could stifle the actions of the unassociated armed groups and unions. During the raid, the 
Dean of Natural Sciences, Rolando Garcia, came out to defend the University, and was 
subsequently beaten nearly to death with a police baton, cracking his skull open. Following 
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this massacre, Garcia, along with a large number of faculty members (including over three-
hundred scientists), fled the country in a mass voluntary exodus; an event which is now 
referred to as “The Flight of the Brains.” 
What is particularly important to note here is that, from this moment on, all 
students, faculty members, and union workers were officially labeled “subversives” by the 
military junta – in the same category as armed guerrillas – and subsequently targeted during a 
series of increasingly violent actions across the country. 
  Following “The Night of the Long Pencils,” a series of mass protests, especially in 
the provinces of Rosario and Córdoba, took place involving both students and union 
workers. General strikes were called, and thousands of workers organized demonstrations in 
the streets for political freedom and to put an end to the military dictatorship. At this time, 
these worker’s unions were the main – if not the only – organized peaceful opposition to the 
military regime. However, in May of 1969, there was a vicious backlash from the military 
during one of these protests, and several hundred workers were killed (an event that is now 
referred to as the “Córdobazo uprising”). After the Córdoba incident, additional protests 
began to spring up across the entire country (not only by students and workers, but also for 
the first time involving common citizens – including bankers, business owners, and members 
of the Catholic church), which would eventually lead to the removal of Onganía from power 
and initiate another national election. 
Owing to the massacres at the University of Buenos Aires in 1966 (“The Night of 
the Long Batons”), and the incidents at Córdoba and Rosario in 1969 (as well as the 
influence of the May 1968 events in France), the support and sympathy for worker’s unions 
was at its height in Argentina – even amongst those classes and demographics who would 
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normally not otherwise affiliate with them. Simultaneously, the industrial sector was 
booming (particularly the steel and car industries), so, as the popular theory goes: with the 
growth of the industrial class, the strengthening organization and influence of unions, and 
the increasing education of the “lower classes,” the conditions for the “return of the Left” 
were in place. 
The 1973 election would represent a crucial turning point for the country, since the 
prohibition against “Péronist” political parties had finally ended and they were now officially 
allowed to take part in the popular vote (although Péron, himself, was indefinitely forbidden 
from participating). In order to circumvent the veto on Perón’s participation, Héctor 
Cámpora ran as Péron’s stand-in, ultimately capturing the popular vote largely on the 
support of the left-wing branch of the Péronist party. For the first time since 1955 the 
Péronists were officially back in power, clearing the path for Péron’s return from exile. 
The right-wing faction of the party, however, had felt betrayed by Cámpora’s electoral 
platform, which pledged to boost worker’s unions while prioritizing the nationalization of 
many industrial sectors. On the basis of Cámpora’s platform, a deep political rift within the 
Péronist party developed between the working classes and the landowning elites. On the day 
of Perón’s return, in the midst of a large gathering of left-wing Péronists (estimated to be 
more than three and a half million) who had assembled at the Ezeiza Airport in Buenos 
Aires to welcome him, camouflaged snipers from the right-wing branch of the party opened 
fire on the crowd, killing at least thirteen members of the Péronist Youth Organization and 
the “Montoneros,” and injuring more than three-hundred and sixty supporters. Following 
the “Ezeiza Massacre,” Cámpora stepped down and Péron was once again inaugurated as 
President, with his second wife, Isabel, this time serving as Vice President. As the country 
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was increasingly shaken by growing political discord – not only between various classes, but 
now even within the same political parties – Péron was seen as the only person capable of 
stabilizing the increasingly divided nation. However, in July 1974, less than two years after 
resuming his Presidency, Péron suffered a series of fatal heart attacks and Isabel was sworn-
in as his successor. Almost immediately, the new President began to crack down on the 
Leftist wing of the Péronist movement in order to phase in her own more conservative 
platform. Ignoring her husband’s wishes that she promote his longtime political rival, 
Ricardo Balbín, to a prominent role in her Cabinet following her husband’s death, Isabel 
Péron instead promoted notorious hardline conservative José López Rega to the role of 
Minister of Social Welfare. Before long, she and Rega would establish the “Argentine 
Anticommunist Alliance” – a far-right death squad established to initiate a series of violent 
repressive measures against members of the left wing faction of the party, as well as 
students, civil rights activists, journalists, priests, and unionists – signaling the true starting 
point for what has since come to be known as the “Dirty War.” 
When Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla’s 1976 coup deposed Isabel Péron, the 
Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (“Process of National Reorganization”) was intensified, and 
the series of horrific events outlined in Sábato’s Nunca Más report were now officially set in 
motion. 
39  Consider, for instance, the unique “moral and poetic authority” of Shakespeare’s 
famous prologue to Romeo and Juliet. Like all great prologues, it establishes the scene (In fair 
Verona, where we lay our scene), the principal characters and a brief synopsis of the action (from 
two households, both alike in dignity … A pair of star-cross’d lovers take their life), as well as an explicit 
call for the audience’s attention (Is now the two hours’ traffic of our stage; The which, if you with 
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patient ears attend… our toil shall strive to mend). More importantly, the prologue performs the 
crucial function of informing its audience that the play will, in fact, be a tragedy – about the 
fearful passage of their death-mark’d love – which, owing to the light-hearted romantic tone of the 
first two acts, would not otherwise be apparent. This crucial perambulatory detail guides the 
viewer’s reception of the entire work, without which, the first half of the play would likely be 
received as a romantic comedy, and the second half, perhaps, as an Elizabethan revenge 
tragedy. By way of the prologue, however, the audience is alerted, from the outset, to the 
play’s “tragic” omens and its attendant moral and political lessons regarding blood feuds and 
civil disorder. 
40  As Bruster and Weimann suggest, the prologue’s origins can be traced back to early 
Elizabethan theatre, in which a costumed actor would “introduce the play and its particulars, 
including its themes and moral messages” (Buster and Weimann 14) prior to the opening act. 
Although certain antecedents of the prologue can be traced back, from early Greek and 
Roman theatre through to the Middle Ages (see Bruster and Weimann pp. 10-14), the 
“prologue” as it is known today took shape on the early Elizabethan stage and was 
popularized by the likes of Marlowe, Shakespeare, Johnson, and their contemporaries. See 
Bruster and Weimann (2004) for a detailed history of the origins and development of the 
Prologue. 
41  Ultimately, the prologue signals that the novel consists of both a manifest and a latent 
content – the extrinsic “story” and the hidden “political meaning” that subsists beneath its 
surface. For Sábato, however, the latent meaning always takes precedence over the manifest 
content, effectually elevating his didacticism above any diegetic elements in a hierarchical 
chain of command. In other words, the supposed latent “political meaning” functions as a 
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pre-determined signifier, which expropriates and overdetermines the novel’s plot (in the 
same way that the Oedipal paradigm overdetermines the latent content of a dream-work). 
For this reason, the prologue is a necessary rhetorical device for Sábato, in that it alerts his 
readers to the report’s overarching political and moral messages, while also maintaining the 
pretense that it is – or approximates, in style and tone – a work of fiction (as opposed to an 
essay or lecture). 
42  It should be noted that, as the prelude to a documentary human rights report, the 
prologue to Nunca Más operates on a contradictory plane of authorial conviction than the 
prologue to a work of fiction, since a non-fiction text is contingent upon an implicit 
agreement between the author and reader regarding the text’s presumed veracity. The action 
of the report, it is assumed, takes place in the lived-world and, as such, does not require the 
prologue’s typical “transitional” function of shepherding readers across what we might call 
“the threshold of the make-believe.” For this reason, non-fiction or documentary texts are 
rarely preceded by a “prologue” as such, opting instead for the more typical “preface” (in 
which the author details how or why they came to write the book, notes the sources of 
primary information, or acknowledges individuals who may have assisted in research, etc.) or 
a “foreword” (in which someone other than the author provides a critical introduction to the 
text, often to lend credibility to the book). 
While the Nunca Más prologue does contain certain elements of both the “preface” 
and the “foreword” – Sábato, who of course was the public figure meant to lend credibility 
to Commission, begins by referencing how CONADEP came to collect their information 
and ultimately publish their report – it is irrefutably “prologue-esque” in both name and 
function. It’s primary purpose is to establish the “scene” – to reconfigure recent history in 
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accordance with the “Two Demons” thesis – and introduce the primary actors – both the 
Montonero guerrillas, many of whom, Sábato fallaciously tells us, “chose to fight it out, and 
either died in shootouts or committed suicide before they could be captured” (i) and the 
armed forces, who, he explains, “responded to the terrorists’ crimes with a terrorism far 
worse than the one they were combating” (i). By employing an explicitly literary prologue as 
paratext to the Nunca Más report, Sábato capitalizes on its unique “transitional” and world-
establishing authority to “set the stage” for his controversial interpretation of the Proceso as a 
dramatic Manichean confrontation between the far left and extreme right. Rather than 
setting the stage for an overtly fictional story, Nunca Más’ prologue is employed more subtly, 
to shrewdly re-fashion and re-orient the everyday world – separating historical events from 
their material contexts and over-embellishing or dramatizing imagined conflicts between 
imagined adversaries. 
Likewise, whereas a “report” is read in an entirely different way than a novel – a 
novel typically being read cover-to-cover with the expectation that the plot will advance 
according to a particular dramatic structure, from the first page to the last – a government or 
legal report is often read in a much more unsystematic or piecemeal way, often not in its 
entirety at all. To this end, the prologue to Nunca Más was also required to serve as an 
historical and cultural summary of the whole. The Nunca Más prologue, as Sábato anticipated, 
would be many readers’ first definitive contact with the story of the Proceso, and as such, 
would carry the majority of the emotional weight of the solemn “Two Demons” hypothesis. 
43  The leftist “terrorists” who often “chose to fight it out, and either died in shootouts 
or committed suicide before they could be captured” (i) and the armed forces, who 
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“responded with a terrorism far worse than the one they were combating… in the name of 
national security” and “Western, Christian values” (i), as Sábato puts it. 
44  This assumption of ignorance, of course, opens up further space for Alfonsín’s 
“Two Demons” thesis to become the dominant explanation of recent history. Even if this 
version of events did not correspond to the majority of Argentinian’s actual lived-
experiences, it would provide an exonerating narrative that would soothe their collective 
conscience. With this crafty manoeuvre, Sábato was free to establish the moral resonance for 
the remainder of the report, and elevate his own spiritual interpretation of the events above 
any of the material evidence that would follow. He writes: “The enormity of what took place 
in Argentina, involving the transgression of the most fundamental human rights, is sure, still, 
to produce that disbelief which some used at the time to defend themselves from pain and 
horror. In so doing, they also avoided the responsibility born of knowledge and awareness, 
because the question necessarily follows: how can we prevent it happening again?” 
(“Prologue” i). 
45  Sábato’s contemplative, prayerful meditations on the shocking victim-testimonies – 
delivered with such sophisticated eloquence – resulted in his being credited with coining 
several unforgettable monikers for the military’s brutal tactics, including “death flights,” “los 
muriendos” (a play on the Spanish words for both ‘dying’ and ‘placing a hood over a victim’s 
head’), and the setting of what he calls “mousetraps.” Within the overarching central 
narrative, Sábato provides the reader with a series of general synopses of these crimes, as 
well as the setting and atmosphere of the various concentration camps around the country. 
Infamous detention centers, such as ESMA (Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada), Garage 
Olimpo (which was portrayed in Marco Bechis’ 1999 film of the same name), and Club 
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Atlético, are encapsulated in the central narrative, which then draw connections between, 
and provide context for, the individual testimonies. 
46  A common narrative device in many suspense or crime novels, Sábato’s celebrated 
thriller El Túnel (1948) – which serves as an extended confession to the reader of the 
narrator’s murder of a young woman – opens with a similar injunction. In the opening pages 
of The Tunnel, the narrator pleads with the readers to put their trust in his motives for 
confessing. “You may wonder what has motivated me to write this account of my crime,” he 
begins, “and, especially, why I want to publish it. I know the human soul well enough to 
predict that some of you will believe it is from vanity” (Sábato 2011, 3). With this 
concession, he establishes an intimate one-to-one relationship with the readers, evoking their 
own personal suspicions and biases, before conceding, “I am sure that none of them would 
miss the chance to read to the very end the story of a crime” (Sábato 2011, 5). 
47  The testimonios, in other words, simply punctuate Sábato’s historical narrative, 
deepening and enhancing it, but are portrayed as being tenuous and open to question apart 
from it. The prologue, as the conclusive summary of Sábato’s central narrative, is thus 
elevated above the individual stories of personal suffering, suggesting that readers might read 
one of the gruesome testimonios, or possibly a few – as many as their threshold of empathy 
allows – but the report’s true insights are to be found in Sábato’s sententious spiritual 
meditations on them. 
48  By revealing these apprehensions regarding certain “unimaginable” crimes to the 
public prior to the report’s release and subsequently hinting at the slightest possibility of 
certain details being “hard to believe,” Nunca Más invokes the vicissitudes of the “unreliable 
narrator” and draws the reader’s attention to his or her pre-existing biases and prior 
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conceptual knowledge of the crimes (or, in most cases, the lack thereof). Particularly, when 
framed alongside the commensurate claim that “everything in this report did indeed 
happen,” the invocation of the unreliable narrator is received in an artful, understated 
manner; one which does not compromise the integrity or veracity of the report, but 
nonetheless establishes a somewhat muted mutual concession between the reader and 
narrator with respect to the exasperating lack of information surrounding the crimes and, by 
proxy, the arduous task of the narrator(s). 
49  In this way, this narrative device establishes an intimate one-to-one relationship 
between readers and the ostensible narrator, where the former are no longer peripheral 
observers of the facts layed out before them, but rather the main subject of the author’s 
attention. By addressing readers in this manner, Sábato unsettles his readers out of any sort 
of voyeuristic-passivity. Readers are no longer able to simply gape at the savage accounts of 
torture described in the report (with an air of passive detachment), but are compelled into an 
empathetic relationship with the individuals outlined in the victim-files. By provoking such a 
critical reading of the individual case-stories – set apart from, yet contextualized by Sábato’s 
overarching historical narrative – Nunca Más demands that its readers pay heed to the 
atrocious details laid before them with the same sense of rigor that the Commissioners 
exercised in conducting their investigations. 
50  Following the initial forewarning that “Many of the events described in this report 
will be hard to believe,” the narrator then doubles-down on the opening injunction, adding: 
“With this first stage of investigations complete, the Commission on Disappeared People 
takes the weighty but necessary responsibility for affirming that everything set out in this 
report did indeed happen, even if some of the details of individual cases may be open to question” 
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(Nunca Más 9, italics mine). The implicit message to the reader is that somewhere between 
the “witnessing” of these seemingly unbelievable horrors and the “conveying” of them, 
exists an inevitable epistemological disjunction that necessitates the bridging of the two via 
some form of narrative intervention. It is, therefore, the solemn task of the narrator, to 
present the victim-testimony to the readers. 
51  In several ways, this opening exhortation borrows heavily from one of Sábato’s 
literary idols – and most vocal admirers – Albert Camus.  Camus’ 1947 novel, The Plague, 
opens with a similar injunction, in which the narrator addresses the reader in a similar 
manner in order to establish his role as an informed and honest “eyewitness” to history: 
“To some, these events will seem quite natural; to others, all but incredible. But, obviously, a 
narrator cannot take account of these differences of outlook. His business is only to say: 
‘This is what happened,’ when he knows that it actually did happen, that it closely affected 
the life of a whole populace, and that there are thousands of eyewitnesses who can appraise 
in their hearts the truth of what he writes” (The Plague 4). 
52  While Sábato provides Nunca Más with the all-engrossing, primary historical narrative 
of the military violence in a detached third-person voice, it is the personal, first person 
narratives of real-life victims – set off from the main narrative in italics, not unlike the 
historical vignettes in On Heroes and Tombs – that bear the real weight of the action and 
suspense throughout the report. Introduced in short vignette-style testimonials interspersed 
throughout Sábato’s overarching narrative, the statements are based on the actual affidavits 
submitted by real-life victims, injecting Nunca Más with an authentic sense of personal 
suffering and humanizing Sábato’s detached perspective by bringing the reader in close to 
the action in real time. 
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53  Such stark, laconic descriptions of the unimaginably sadistic abuse that thousands of 
victims endured lend the isolated “victim-files” an air of deadening melancholia – as if the 
mere ability to recount such torture has been reduced to only the most crude, spartan 
language. These testimonios feature no sentimental embellishments, no existential overtures or 
spiritual digressions; only the most minimal, sober itemization of the wicked abuses 
experienced at the hands of their own government. And yet, as implied by the opening 
injunction, it is precisely these austere “individual cases” that the reader is instructed to 
approach with an air of caution, because “some of the details may be open to question.” 
They will be “hard to believe.” 
54  In this way, the narrative structure of Nunca Más works by framing these somber, 
detail-oriented depositions against Sábato’s more broad, literary historical overview of the 
central frame-story. The report’s success as a history-making instrument hinges upon how 
the two narrative lines interact with, and against, one another. The stark declaration of Dr. 
Liwsky, that “No other explanation was given,” is instead spelled out in the loose, haunting terms 
of the central narrative, in which the narrator interprets that: “It was not an excess of 
repressive activity, it was not a mistake. It was the implementation of a cold-blooded 
decision” (Nunca Más 209-210). 
55  Prior to the report’s publication, what little information most Argentinians had 
received about the fates of the “Disappeared” had often come from tenuous underground 
news outlets, like the Agencia de Noticias Clandestina (Clandestine News Agency) created by 
journalist Rodolfo Walsh in 1976, which only provided fragmentary and often 
unsubstantiated dispatches when available. What set Nunca Más apart from these earlier 
sources was the way it personalized the victims, allowing them to tell their own stories in 
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their own words. As Teresa Godwin Phelps notes, “the sheer volume of the text [Nunca Más] 
given over to [victim’s] stories is both surprising and telling. The beginning of Part One, 
which delineates the abductions and tortures that occurred, is at least half given over to the 
voices of victims and their relatives, these victims speaking with and above the imposing din 
of the master narrative” (85). 
56  In his characteristic style, Sábato also attempts to contain this suspense by 
subordinating it to the domain of moral injunctions and edifying didacticism, often 
tampering such dramatic cliffhangers with orotund injunctions such as: “‘Woe to those who 
abuse a child,’ say the Scriptures. Never, perhaps, has this maxim become such a horrific 
reality as in the cases related in this chapter” (Nunca Más 286). Despite his frequent appeals 
to the sacrosanct, however – which attempt to force an inexact parallel between the suspense 
of the narrative and the high-minded ethical mission of CONADEP – Sábato’s spiritual and 
moralistic interventions come across, more often than not, as more seditious than moralistic. 
57  This was especially the case in smaller rural towns, where some torturers were 
recognized by their voice, as Miño Retamozo (File No. 3721) recalls. After being transferred 
from a large prison in Buenos Aires to a remote detention centre in the northeastern corner 
of the country, Retamozo noted: “as Formosa was a town with a population of about 
100,000, I found that most of those there knew the identity of the torturers” (32). 
58  As Sábato argued, the public outing of military officers “would make anyone in the 
military who read it feel ashamed and unable to dismiss it as lies” (Crenzel, The Memory 68). 
59  Both Dr. Norbert Liwsky (File No. 7397) (p. 25) and Lidia Esther Biscarte (File No. 
5604) (p. 44), for instance, recall being tormented by Víbora (Snake). 
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60  It is perhaps ironic that, in the end, such fortuitous circumstances – the inadvertent 
foregrounding of random chance-encounters between prisoners, and the necessary decision 
to give prominence to only those depositions populated by “nicknamed” perpetrators as a 
means of justifying the “Two Demons” thesis – provided Nunca Más with the profound 
literary and narrative depth that Sábato had desired for the report. Nevertheless, in the end 
Sábato succeeded in crafting the “profoundly and essentially Argentine” story that he had 
long endeavored to produce. 
61  By virtue of their very name, “Truth Commission Reports” assert a certain claim to 
unimpeachable historical accuracy. 
62  Including From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador (which topped many 
international bestseller lists upon its release in 1993); the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa Report, which helped earn Desmond Tutu the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize; and the 
9/11 Commission Report which garnered significant praise as “an improbable literary triumph” 
(Richard Posner, The New York Times), while topping several bestseller lists and becoming a 
finalist for the 2004 National Book Awards’ non-fiction category. 
63  Naturally, much of the report’s initial demand was a result of the public’s nervous 
anticipation and the hope that it might finally lift the long-standing veil of silence and 
misinformation surrounding the disappearances. But, as Emilio Crenzel notes, Nunca Más’ 
lasting success was predicated on its unforeseen ability to “restore the humanity of the 
disappeared” (Memory 82) by humanizing both the victims and the perpetrators of the Processo. 
64  The penultimate page of the report states the following: Among the victims still 
missing and those who were subsequently released from secret detention centres are people 
from all walks of life: Blue-collar workers 30.2 %, Students 21.0 %, White-collar workers 
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17.9 %, Professionals 10.7 %, Teachers 5.7 %, Self-employed and others 5.0 %, Housewives 
3.8 %, Military conscripts and members of the security forces 2.5 %, Journalists 1.6 %, 
Actors, performers, etc. 1.3 %, Nuns, priests, etc. 0.3 %. We can state categorically – 
contrary to what the executors of this sinister plan maintain – that they did not pursue only 
the members of political organizations who carried out acts of terrorism. Among the victims 
are thousands who never had any links with such activity but were nevertheless subjected to 
horrific torture because they opposed the military dictatorship, took part in union or student 
activities, were well-known intellectuals who questioned state terrorism, or simply because 
they were relatives, friends, or names included in the address book of someone considered 
subversive” (Nunca Más 448). 
65  It should be noted that the slogan, “Never Again,” also became a widely used mantra 
in the context of the Holocaust during the 1980s. Aside from being adopted as the official 
slogan of the Jewish Defense League, it was also the title of a bestselling history of the 
Holocaust by Martin Gilbert in 2000. 
66  However, this lack of historical reference to the country’s recent political history 
(which had already seen six coups d’état in the last half-century: in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 
1966, and 1976) ignored the long history of democratically-elected governments being 
periodically overthrown by military juntas, and more importantly, the influence of foreign 
interventionism (most notably by the United States) that had endorsed many of these 
takeovers. Taking no account of the rate of occurrence with which democracy had been 
recurrently displaced by dictatorships in Argentina, Nunca Más nonetheless declares 
conclusively that: “[I]t is only democracy which can save a people from horror on this scale, 
only democracy which can keep and safeguard the sacred, essential rights of man. Only with 
 246 
                                                                                                                                            
democracy will we be certain that NEVER AGAIN will events such as these, which have 
made Argentina so sadly infamous throughout the world, be repeated in our nation” (Nunca 
Más 6). 
67  As well as lower ranking members of the military; international corporations who 
lent their support (and assets) to the regime; and the many international forces (including the 
Uruguayan military, the French oversees forces in Algeria, and the CIA who helped train the 
Argentine military in torture and other repressive tactics). 
68  Several large American corporations, including Ford and Gillette among others, 
assisted the dictatorship by supplying vehicles (the military units were exclusive supplied 
with army green Ford Falcons, the mere sight of which quickly became a source of terror for 
the general public, for fear of being carried off to certain death) or by allowing them to use 
their factories as “torture centers” in exchange for the military’s suppression of labour 
unions that threatened to decrease profits. See: Ian Steinman’s “When Ford Built a Torture 
Chamber,” for a detailed account of the Ford Company’s complicity with the dictatorship.  
69  Many of the detention centres (including both ESMA and Garage Olimpo) were 
quite literally surrounded on all sides by multi-level apartment buildings, houses, businesses, 
schools and churches. Victims would later recall being able to keep track of time by listening 
to school children and churchgoers as they played and gathered just outside the walls of their 
cells. Given the droves of similar accounts, a collective sense of incredulity has permeated 
Argentine society based on the rationale that those same citizens must have also heard the 
prisoners’ screams and cries as they endured years of gruesome torture. 
70  The “Full Stop Law,” passed by the National Congress in 1986 mandated the end of 
all investigations and criminal prosecutions of people accused of political violence during the 
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dictatorship and up to the restoration of democratic rule on December 10, 1983. The “Law 
of Due Obedience,” on the other hand, dictated that it must be assumed, without admitting 
proof to the contrary, that all officers and their subordinates (including common personnel 
of the Armed Forces, the Police, the Penitentiary Service, and other security agencies) 
cannot be legally punished by crimes committed during the dictatorship, as they were acting 
out of due obedience – that is, obeying orders from their superiors. Together, these two laws 
aimed to put an end to the costly trials that had nearly exhausted federal resources and had 
paralyzed the legal system and from 1983 to 1986. 
71  A series of events in 1995 once again brought Nunca Más to the cultural fore. Firstly, 
a former petty naval officer, Adolfo Scilingo, shocked the country when he contacted 
acclaimed investigative-journalist Horacio Verbitsky about confessing to his participation in 
the notorious “death flights.” As the first person to break the military’s strict code of silence, 
Scilingo’s graphic and unreserved confessions – including the revelation that the Catholic 
Church had sanctioned specific methods of murder that the dictatorship had engaged in – 
roused public memories and reignited a national discussion about military impunity. At the 
same time, the Supreme Court opened a series of prosecutions against those who trafficked 
in babies whose mothers were disappeared and killed during the dictatorship, while months 
earlier, the ruling Justicialist party had ordered the Nunca Más report to become a mandatory 
part of high school curriculum (Feitlowitz 247-249). 
72  As Andrea Giunta and Liliana Piñeiro note, in 1976, before Ferrari left Argentina in 
exile, “he glued on paper sheets all articles published in that city about tied, burnt, or shot 
bodies appearing in Argentinian localities. When the dictatorship ended, Ferrari photocopied 
those newspaper articles, bound them together, and entitled them Nosotros no Sabiamos (We 
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Didn’t Know), the very phrase that many people uttered when the existence of hundreds of 
concentration camps in Argentina was revealed.” (Giunta and Piñeiro 11) 
73  See: Porterfield 104-107. 
74  Recoleta is a very wealthy and historically Catholic neighbourhood, where many 
influential supporters of the military still live. 
75  Later, the Tate Modern acquired all thirty original collages from the “Nunca Más” 
series. 
76  See Haberman, “Children of Argentina’s ‘Disappeared’ Reclaim Past, With Help.” 
New York Times. 
77  Like Juan Gelman, Pron adopted the names of his disappeared characters from a list 
of actual victims. Alberto José and Alicia Burdisso, who were real people murdered by the 
dictatorship, are the only characters in Pron’s novel who are given names. 
78  Earlier in his novel, the narrator refers to Sábato as: “a dying, talentless Argentine 
writer… who is not the writer of The Aleph [Borges], around whom we all inevitably revolve, 
but rather the author of On Heroes and Tombs, someone who spent his whole life believing 
that he was talented and important and morally unquestionable and who at the very end 
discovers that he’s completely without talent and behaved ridiculously and brunched with 
dictators, and then he feels ashamed and wants his country’s literature to be at the level of 
his miserable body of work so that it wasn’t written in vain and might even have one or two 
followers” (8). 
79  Like Sábato, Gelman was awarded the Cervantes Prize in 2007, and in 2010 was 
shortlisted with John Ashbery for the Nobel Prize in Literature. 
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80  Gelman’s practice of adopting the pseudonymous identities of actual desaparecidos 
allows him to speak as one of the disappeared, not only giving voice to the victims, but 
speaking directly to the dictators from the grave. For instance, in 1981, Gelman published 
Los Poemas de José Galván, a collection written under the eponymous pseudonym of señor 
Galván, who, according to Gelman, was disappeared by the dictatorship in 1978. In an 
author’s note preceding the collection, Gelman writes (under his own name): “It’s my duty to 
pass on these poems that reached me by chance or by miracle. Their author disappeared toward the end of 
1978 in Argentina, murdered or kidnapped by the military dictators. We knew of his imprisonments and 
exiles under other dictatorships and of a handful of poems he published in out-of-the-way literary magazines 
in the city of Buenos Aires” (Dark Times Filled With Light 130). 
81  In the UK, Gelman’s case was brought to public attention by, among others, 
Graham Greene, who wrote a letter to the Independent (September 24, 1987) supporting 
Gelman’s pleas to return to Argentina to discover the whereabouts of his disappeared 
relatives. Gelman’s letter to Greene requesting his support, with copious annotations by 
Greene, can be found in the Leeds University Library’s Fay and Geoffrey Elliott Collection. 
82  See endnote #4 above for a detailed account of the discrepancy in figures regarding 
the Disappeared. 
83  “Sabato junto a Tróccoli hicieron esa mierda para hablar de dos demonios” (“Sábato, together 
with [former interior minister, Antonio] Tróccoli made up that two demons shit”), said 
Bonafini, “Nuestros hijos no eran demonios. Eran revolucionarios, guerrilleros, maravillosos y únicos que 
defendieron a la Patria” (“Our children were not demons, they were revolutionaries, guerrillas, 
wonderful and unique people who defended the country”) (Galak, translation mine). 
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Chapter 3: The Canadian TRC and the Scopic Drive; the Reader as Voyeur: 
 
If Nunca Más’s success as a history-writing endeavour was predicated on the degree 
to which the entire country – at least initially – embraced the “Two Demons” narrative, then 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) would offer a contrasting 
insight into the particular set of challenges facing a nation that did not confront its traumatic 
history as a single, unified community of “survivors.” In Argentina’s case, the transitional 
justice project was successful precisely because Nunca Más represented the type of carefully 
crafted historical narrative around which the entire nation could unite in the wake of its 
shared trauma. And it was able to do so because, indeed, every Argentine had borne witness 
– in some way or another – to the horrors of the Processo; neighbours and coworkers were 
“disappeared,” police and military units were paraded through their streets, and the appalling 
events in neighbouring communities unfolded nightly on the evening news. But while Nunca 
Más’s “restorative justice” framework would clarify and contextualize a decade of unresolved 
traumatic events by categorizing all of its readers as the innocent victims of the juntas – 
bridging an empathetic gap by classifying the average Argentine citizen in the same category 
as the desaparecidos and their families – the Canadian TRC was established amidst a much 
more shrouded and culturally divisive climate, impeding any similar type of empathetic 
bridging and, therefore, necessitating a “reconciliatory” cultural and judicial framework.1 
Unlike the State terror of the Argentine juntas, the horrors of the Canadian 
residential school system unfolded across the country for nearly one-hundred-and-fifty years 
without ever fully permeating the mainstream media or making a significant impression on 
the collective psyche of non-Indigenous Canadians. As a result, whereas Nunca Más begins 
 251 
by addressing every Argentine citizen – stating that all of Argentina “was torn by terror from 
both the extreme right and the far left” – the Canadian report instead negotiates the history 
of the IRS system by speaking to two distinct and disengaged communities of readers: a) the 
many successive generations of Indigenous Canadians who endured and survived the trauma 
of the residential school system, and b) non-Indigenous Canadians who, to this day, remain 
geographically, culturally, and emotionally removed from the effects of the residential school 
system, and who have therefore remained largely unresponsive to the century-long 
persecution of their fellow citizens. 
For many non-Indigenous Canadians, this report would be their first comprehensive 
exposure to the tragedy of the residential school system. In fact, according to a recent 
Environics Institute study measuring “Canadian Public Opinions on Aboriginal Peoples,” 
only fifty-one percent of non-Aboriginal Canadians had “read or heard anything about” 
(Environics Institute, 2016) the Residential School System prior to the launch of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in 2008. As the Environics study (and its very name) 
suggests, this deep-rooted cultural division between Indigenous and settler Canadians not 
only represents the ideological foundation upon which the implementation of the Indian 
Residential School system’s xenophobic practices were instituted in the first place, but it also 
continues to determine the contemporary contextual framework according to which the 
Canadian public have (and continue to be able to) turn a blind eye to its tragic legacy. 
The staggering lack of knowledge regarding the brutal treatment of Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples within the Indian Residential School system is the first of several 
distinctions that sets it apart from all other truth commissions around the world. Owing to 
this disunity, the typical function of truth commissions – to signal the closure of one 
traumatic historical chapter and to gesture toward the dawning of a new transitional phase – 
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was superseded by what the Canadian commissioners called an edifying “truth seeking” 
mission. That is, the Canadian TRC first would have to educate non-Indigenous Canadians 
about their nation’s protracted history of colonial repression and the ongoing repercussions 
of the legacy of the residential school system, before the work of national reconciliation 
could begin in earnest. 
To this end, the Canadian TRC was envisioned as a much different project than its 
Argentine counterpart, with a dual set of objectives. On the one hand, it was conceived of as 
an opportunity for generations of Indigenous victims of the residential school system to tell 
their stories in a platform that would be acknowledged and supported by the federal 
government, on a national stage. On the other hand, the TRC and its report were also 
envisaged as an educational tool for those settler Canadians who remained relatively 
untouched by (and unknowledgeable about) the barbarity of the IRS system and who were, 
therefore, largely incognizant of both the far-reaching intergenerational repercussions on 
Aboriginal communities and of their own role(s) to play in the forthcoming project of 
national reconciliation. 
Given that the Final Report has quickly become the primary document for the ways 
in which many settler Canadians have, in fact, come to know (and will subsequently come to 
remember, across generations) this tragic chapter of Canadian history, this historiographic 
text represents an acute and necessary prerequisite to reconciliation. However, from the 
opening paragraph of its initial volume (Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future), the Final 
Report reveals the degree to which the legacy of the residential school system is constituted 
by the persistent inimical relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples and 
the vision of “Canada” as an imagined settler community. The report opens: 
Canada’s residential school system for Aboriginal children was an education  
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system in name only for much of its existence. These residential schools were  
created for the purpose of separating Aboriginal children from their families,  
in order to minimize and weaken family ties and cultural linkages, and to  
indoctrinate children into a new culture – the culture of the legally dominant  
Euro-Christian Canadian society, led by Canada’s first prime minister, Sir  
John A. Macdonald. The schools were in existence for well over 100 years,  
and many successive generations of children from the same communities and  
families endured the experience of them. That experience was hidden for  
most of Canada’s history, until Survivors of the system were finally able to  
find the strength, courage, and support to bring their experiences to light in  
several thousand court cases that ultimately led to the largest class-action  
lawsuit in Canada’s history. (Honouring the Truth v) 
 
In underscoring that the tragic legacy of the residential school system was “hidden 
for most of Canada’s history” (italics mine), Honouring the Truth highlights the cultural and 
political partitioning of a supposedly discrete “Aboriginal history” from what it calls 
“Canada’s history” – suggesting that the two distinct “histories” have always run parallel (or 
perhaps even in opposition) to one another, instead of unfolding together as one. In so 
doing, Honouring the Truth sets itself apart from other truth commission reports, such as 
Nunca Más, in terms of the manner in which the reader is addressed. 
Owing to this unique cultural separation, the Final Report addresses its readers in a 
very different way than the Nunca Más report. If the Argentine report united all of its readers 
together by classifying the average citizen in the same category as the desaparecidos and their 
families, the Canadian TRC was instead envisioned as being the initial tool that might bridge 
 254 
the so-called empathetic gap between its two sets of readers. That is, rather than being 
conceived of as a type of concluding dénouement to signal the closure of an all-
encompassing chapter of Canadian history, the Final Report was instead “intended to be the 
initial reference point” in a national discussion on reconciliation between two culturally 
estranged groups. Unlike the Nunca Más report, which brought to an end years of intensely 
public trials, investigative reports, and formal accusations, the Canadian TRC report would 
have to serve, initially, as an introductory guide to the reader – carefully illustrating the deep-
rooted history of colonial repression, the recurrent breach of modern treaties, the history of 
Indigenous land claims and the struggle for rights to self-governance, through to the Indian 
Residential School system and contemporary legal and cultural disputes that have now, at 
long last, led to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008. 
 
A Brief Timeline, from the Founding of the Indian Residential School System  
to the Birth of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
 
In many ways, the Canadian TRC was unlike any other in modern history. While 
other Truth and Reconciliation Commissions – such as those in Chile, South Africa, Ghana, 
Morocco, and the former Yugoslavia – had each framed their transitional justice proceedings 
around the prospect of criminal prosecution, the Canadian TRC was instead established as 
an entirely non-prosecutory undertaking. There was never any intention to bring criminal 
charges against the perpetrators of what has since been called the systematic “cultural 
genocide” of Canada’s Indigenous population. As opposed to other TRCs, which either 
functioned as criminal inquiries with powers to subpoena or indict perpetrators of state-
crimes, or at the very least, to make judicial recommendations to affiliated domestic tribunals 
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based on their findings,2 the Canadian TRC was instead established solely as a symbolic 
“truth-finding mission.” 
From the outset, the aim of the Canadian TRC was solely “to promote awareness 
and public education” by “acknowledg[ing] the experiences, impacts and consequences” of 
the residential school system (Section ‘N’ Mandate). In this sense, the Canadian TRC 
deviated from other truth commissions around the world insofar as it eschewed the 
traditional guiding framework: “truth” plus “criminal justice” leads to “reconciliation.” Instead, 
by renouncing all claims to “criminal justice,” the Canadian TRC would depend entirely on 
the power of the “truth-telling” process in order to lay the groundwork for national 
reconciliation. 
The reason for establishing the TRC as an entirely non-prosecutorial endeavour is 
owing to the unique set of circumstances around which the Commission was established. As 
opposed to most other truth commissions, which are typically established in response to the 
immediate conclusion of a national trauma – such as the overthrow of an authoritarian 
regime or the end of apartheid – the Canadian TRC was instead established as part of the 
negotiated settlement of a class-action lawsuit between survivors of the IRS system and the 
federal government, decades after the last residential school had been closed. Whereas the 
establishment of other truth commissions have been regarded as a necessary measure in 
bringing justice and closure to a recent trauma affecting an entire nation, the right to 
implement the Canadian TRC was, in fact, conceded by the federal government after the two 
parties had negotiated the terms of the settlement agreement, effectively resolving the 
lawsuit without a trial. 
As a supplement to the monetary compensation for survivors of the residential 
school system, the Government of Canada “agreed that an historic Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission will be established to contribute to truth, healing and reconciliation” (Section 
‘N’). As outlined in the original mandate for the establishment of the TRC, the “national 
project of reconciliation” would not only refer to the tragic legacy of the IRS system, but 
would also refer to the longstanding history of colonial repression between the Government 
of Canada and its Indigenous population,3 both prior to and following the official operation 
of residential schools. 
Formally established in 1870 (although several of the schools had been operating for 
many years prior) and lasting until 1996, the Canadian Residential School System was a 
network of mandatory boarding schools in which approximately 150,000 First Nations, 
Métis, and Inuit children were forcibly – and often violently – removed from their families 
by white RCMP officers or “Indian Agents” (officers of the Department of Indian Affairs) 
and transferred to one of one hundred and thirty-nine schools across the country (most 
notably during the “Sixties Scoop”).4 Section 141 of the Indian Act outlawed the hiring of 
lawyers and other forms of legal counsel by First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples, allowing 
the parents of these children no legal recourse, under any circumstances, to challenge this 
abhorrent practice. 
The aim of the system was the implementation of “forced assimilation,” meant to 
strip Indigenous peoples of what the government saw as the “savage” and “primitive” 
cultural practices, by “educating” and “civilizing” them instead in the Euro-Canadian 
tradition. Forcibly taken from their families and separated from their siblings, the children 
were then deprived of their ancestral languages and culture; routinely exposed to physical 
and sexual abuse for both disciplinary and sadistic purposes; subjected to unspeakably cruel 
“medical experiments” including nutritional deprivation and forced sterilization studies, and 
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pharmaceutical experimentation; and in many cases left to die and buried in unmarked mass 
graves. 
Operating as a federally-run “educational” system for more than one-hundred-and-
twenty years (nearly three times as long as the South African apartheid), the Indian 
Residential School system’s policies of cultural genocide have, in the words of the 
Commissioners, “left deep scars on the lives of [Canada’s] Aboriginal people, on Aboriginal 
communities… and have deeply damaged the relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples” (Honouring the Truth, 183). 
However, in spite of the unimaginably cruel and sadistic practices that were 
systematically employed within the IRS system – and the xenophobic ideological 
underpinnings instituted by the Government of Canada – the realities of this State 
repression scarcely permeated the collective imagination of white settler Canada. Despite a 
small handful of instances in which the residential school system made an impression on the 
collective psyche of Euro-Canada, its dark legacy has gone largely unrecognized by much of 
the country.  
One of the first instances of national exposure – a now-famous article in the 
February 1967 edition of Maclean’s magazine concerning the death of twelve-year-old Chanie 
Wenjack (“The Lonely Death of Chanie Wenjack,” Maclean’s, 1967) – received a moderate 
amount of coverage when it was first published, although the case was ultimately framed by 
the Department of Indian Affairs as an unfortunate aberration within an otherwise reputable 
and advantageous system. Following the publication of the article, which outlined how the 
young boy succumbed to starvation and hypothermia after fleeing the wretched conditions 
of the Cecilia Jeffrey Residential School, Departmental officials prepared a briefing note to 
be read in the House of Commons stating that the Kenora, Ontario school “served the 
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Indian people with care and concern,” and suggesting “[the fact] that Charles [sic] Wenjack 
became lonely and ran away is not exceptional, for other children regardless of their origin, 
have the same feelings and reactions when separated from family and familiar surroundings” 
(Milloy 289). Eschewing any formal acknowledgment of the sickening abuse experienced by 
“students” at the Cecilia Jeffrey residential school from which Chanie ran away, the 
parliamentary briefing note succeeded in mollifying any concerns from the media, and the 
case soon faded from public attention. Not until the early nineteen-nineties did the horrors 
of the Indian Residential School system once again achieve a significant (albeit, once again, 
fleeting) degree of public attention on a national level. 
Decades later, following the 1990 Oka Crisis, in which the Canadian military became 
embroiled in a violent seventy-eight day standoff with the Mohawks of Kanesatake over the 
town’s plan to develop a golf course on sacred Mohawk burial grounds, the deep-rooted and 
antagonistic cultural divisions between Indigenous and settler Canadians were once again 
spotlighted on a national scale. As the situation continued to escalate, media coverage of the 
standoff was increasingly framed as the inevitable clash between two discrete and 
irreconcilable cultures. A now-famous photograph (see Fig. 4.1) of a young white military 
officer (who would be later hailed as a “National hero”) and a masked Mohawk warrior 
staring at one another in an intense face-to-face confrontation was widely printed in 
newspapers across the country (and has since been celebrated as one of the most iconic 
photographs in Canadian history), while video footage of residents of Châteauguay, Québec 
burning an effigy of a Mohawk warrior while chanting “sauvages” (savages) reached a seldom 
seen degree of national attention on nightly newscasts. Together, these and other images 
from Oka became highly emblematic symbols of the deep-rooted and increasingly 
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antagonistic relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians across the 
country. 
 
Fig. 4.1 Komulainen, Shaney. “Face to Face.” 1990. Photograph. The Canadian Press. 
 
An event that thoroughly shook Canada’s complacency about Indigenous rights to 
the core, the Oka Crisis became the catalyst for the chain of events that would ultimately 
lead to the establishment of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Shortly after an end to the siege had been negotiated, in a letter to the Premiers of 
the Northern Territories, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney wrote: 
The summer’s events must not be allowed to over-shadow the commitment  
that my government has made to addressing the concerns of aboriginal [sic]  
people.... These grievances raise issues that deeply affect all Canadians and  
therefore must be resolved by all Canadians working together.... The  
government’s agenda responds to the demands of aboriginal peoples and has  
four parts: resolving land claims; improving the economic and social  
conditions on reserves; defining a new relationship between aboriginal  
peoples and governments; and addressing the concerns of Canada’s  
aboriginal peoples in contemporary Canadian life. Consultation with  
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aboriginal peoples and respect for the fiduciary responsibilities of the Crown  
are integral parts of the process. The federal government is determined to  
create a new relationship among aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians,  
based on dignity, trust, and respect. (Honouring the Truth 186) 
 
In a first-step to addressing these four areas, under succeeding Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien, the federal government established a Royal Commission to look into the state of 
affairs of Indigenous peoples in Canada, which, as the Commissioners would later note, 
“provided a glimpse into just how bad things had become” (Honouring the Truth 186). In 1996 
– the same year that the last residential school closed its doors for good – the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) issued its final 4,000-page report, in which it set 
out a 20-year agenda for implementing changes with 440 recommendations to the federal 
government, of which the legacy of the residential schools was the topic of one entire 
chapter. In this report, the Royal Commission put forward what it called a “bold and 
comprehensive vision of Reconciliation” in what it regarded to be the singular pathway 
toward renewing this relationship, and which it hoped and expected the Government of 
Canada to participate. This would be the first time that the term “reconciliation” would be 
formally proposed as an official policy in the Government of Canada’s efforts to renew and 
repair its relationships with Indigenous communities. 
A year later, in response to the RCAP, the federal government unveiled Gathering 
Strength: Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan – a long-term, broad-based policy approach to 
renewing the relationship between the Government of Canada and Indigenous Canadians, 
based on the recommendations previously made in the RCAP report. A key focal point of 
Gathering Strength would be its own “Statement of Reconciliation,” in which the Government 
of Canada formally acknowledged its role in the development and administration of 
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residential schools and apologized to those victims who had been physically and sexually 
abused while being forced to attend them. Through the office of the Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, the federal government formally acknowledged, for the 
first time since Confederation: 
One aspect of our relationship with Aboriginal people over this period that  
requires particular attention is the Residential School system. This system  
separated many children from their families and communities and […] left  
legacies of personal pain and distress that continue to reverberate in  
Aboriginal communities to this day. Tragically, some children were the  
victims of physical and sexual abuse. The Government of Canada  
acknowledges the role it played in the development and administration of  
these schools. Particularly to those individuals who experienced the tragedy  
of sexual and physical abuse at residential schools […] To those of you who  
suffered this tragedy at residential schools, we are deeply sorry. In dealing  
with the legacies of the Residential School system, the Government of  
Canada proposes to work with First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, the  
Churches and other interested parties to resolve the longstanding issues that  
must be addressed. We need to work together on a healing strategy to assist  
individuals and communities in dealing with the consequences of this sad era  
of our history. (Gathering Strength) 
 
Ultimately, this formal apology on behalf of the federal government (along with 
several separate apologies from various Church denominations) would open the door for 
former victims to now name the Government of Canada and these major Church 
denominations as respondents in a series formal class-action lawsuits. Immediately following 
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the unveiling of Gathering Strength, the litigation list naming the Government of Canada and 
major Church denominations grew to 7,500 and continued to grow rapidly (“A Timeline of 
Residential Schools,” CBC News). 
In response to this growing list of suits, in 2001 the Canadian government began 
formal negotiations with the Anglican, Catholic, United, and Presbyterian churches to design 
what it envisioned as a mutual compensation plan that would settle the increasing list of civil 
suits filed by former residential school victims. By October of that year, the government had 
agreed to pay up to seventy percent of settlements to former victims with what it referred to 
as “validated claims” (“A Timeline of Residential Schools”), while the Church organizations 
would cover the remaining thirty-percent. Less than three months later, the Anglican 
Diocese of Cariboo in British Columbia was forced to declare bankruptcy, arguing that it 
could no longer pay claims related to residential school lawsuits (“B.C. church goes 
bankrupt,” CBC News). Following the announcement in Cariboo, four church groups 
(including the Presbyterian and Anglican Churches) initialized an agreement-in-principle with 
the federal government to conclusively share in the compensation of former victims.  
As the list of class-action suits continued to grow to nearly eighty-six thousand 
plaintiffs, the federal government then appointed Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci as 
their representative to lead the final discussions toward ratifying this settlement agreement 
between the government, former victims of residential schools, and the various Church 
denominations. After a short period of negotiations, a series of leaked documents in 2006 
suggested that the federal government was close to ratifying what was rumored to be a two-
billion-dollar compensation package for all living victims of the residential school system. 
This rumored agreement would represent a landmark compensation deal for former 
residential school students, ending what Assembly of First Nations Chief Phil Fontaine 
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called a one hundred and fifty-year “journey of tears, hardship and pain” (“Residential 
School Payout a ‘Symbolic’ Apology,” CBC News). 
 
The Establishment of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Unique Legal Restrictions of the “Section ‘N’ Mandate”: 
 
On May 10, 2006, the Canadian government officially announced the approval of the 
“Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement,” the largest class-action settlement in 
Canadian history. The agreement, which was ratified by all parties involved – including the 
victims and their legal counsel; the Assembly of First Nations and Inuit representatives; the 
Presbyterian, Anglican, Catholic, and United Church of Canada organizations; and the 
Canadian federal government – committed the federal government to a massive 
compensation package. The main components of this settlement included: a) the “Common 
Experience Payment,” a blanket compensation averaging $28,000 for all former residential 
school victims (up from the $10,000 outlined in the earlier leaked documents); b) the 
“Independent Assessment Process,” a separate fund for specific “claims of sexual abuses, 
serious physical abuse, and other wrongful acts” with a maximum payment of $275,000; c) a 
$350 million grant5 to establish the Aboriginal Healing Fund, intended to address the legacy 
of physical and sexual abuse suffered in the residential school system, including its inter-
generational impacts; d) a twenty-million dollar Indian Residential School Commemoration 
Fund; and finally, e) the establishment of a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” that 
would formally acknowledge the “impacts and consequences” of the Indian Residential 
School system (“Schedule ‘N’ Mandate”). 
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As outlined in the official Mandate for the Establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (referred to as the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate”), “The [Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission] will build upon the ‘Statement of Reconciliation’ dated January 
7, 1998,” suggesting a clear and unambiguous connection between the RCAP report (1997), 
Gathering Strength: Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan (1998), and the forthcoming TRC. 
According to this mandate, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was to be 
funded for a period of five years6 by “monies set aside for the compensation owed to Indian 
Residential School survivors, which the Canadian government is required to pay under the 
IRSSA” (Gaertner 135). The funds allocated to the TRC were to be then distributed and 
managed in such a way that, over the course of the five-year period, a number of events 
would take place across the country that would provide survivors with the opportunity to 
gather and share their “stories of survival” with the commission and amongst their 
communities in order to educate settler Canadians on the legacy and impact of the residential 
school system. The testimonies would then be included in a forthcoming multi-volume 
“Final Report” that would serve as “an historic document” for the national project of 
healing and reconciliation. 
However, given that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established as 
one of the five meticulously negotiated components of the class-action settlement 
agreement, the Government of Canada – one of the primary perpetrators of the Indian 
Residential School system, and a potential defendant in what might have been a traditional 
criminal tribunal – was able to negotiate the legal parameters according to which the TRC 
would operate. In doing so, the Canadian government was able to institute what amount to a 
set of rigid self-amnesty clauses and publication bans in the official Mandate for the 
establishment of the truth commission, which would protect itself and all other potential 
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defendants (including church organizations and members of the RCMP) from any future 
incriminatory or prosecutory actions. In essence, the mandate ensured that no survivor 
would be able to “name names” in their testimony, which could be used to identify 
individuals accused of having committed a crime, and that the testimony recorded by the 
commission would not be used in any further “public inquiry” or “formal legal processes,” 
effectively limiting the TRC to a symbolic, community-based truth sharing initiative. 
Additionally, the federal government would be seen as taking the seemingly magnanimous 
step of giving their blessing to the establishment of an official truth commission that would, 
to all appearances and at long last, acknowledge what it regarded (in a grand understatement) 
as a “sad chapter in our history” (Harper, Statement of Apology), all-the-while furtively ensuring 
its own immunity from any future domestic legal action beyond the initial class-action 
lawsuit.7 
This strict set of legal restrictions mandated in “Schedule N,” consequently imposed 
a set of radical impositions on both the “truth-telling” aspect of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, as well as the production of the Final Report’s historical 
narrative. Insofar as survivor-testimony was “not to include the naming of individuals and 
institutions associated with wrongdoing,” residential school survivors were instructed to alter 
their testimony in such a way as to avoid pointing a finger at their abusers or openly 
insinuating the “guilt” of any Government or Church official – including the teachers, 
priests, and sisters who operated the schools. Furthermore, as is often the case when a civil 
lawsuit is settled without trial, by agreeing to the settlement the federal government was 
exculpated from any legally binding admissions of fault or wrongdoing in the underlying 
issue (referred to as compensation on a ‘no fault’ basis). Although Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper did offer a perfunctory – and highly criticized – symbolic apology on behalf of the 
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Government of Canada for its role in the establishment and operation of the Indian 
Residential School system,8 the 2006 Settlement Agreement formally safeguarded the federal 
government from any future domestic legal prosecution. 
Specifically, according to the “Schedule ‘N’: Mandate for the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission” of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, it is 
mandated that: 
  Pursuant to the Court-approved final settlement agreement and the class 
action judgments, the Commissioners: 
 (b) shall not hold formal hearings, nor act as a public inquiry, nor conduct a 
formal legal process; 
   (c)  shall not possess subpoena powers, and do not have powers to compel 
attendance or participation in any of its activities or events. Participation in all 
Commission events and activities is entirely voluntary; 
   (f)  shall perform their duties… without making any findings of expressing  
   any conclusion or recommendation, regarding the misconduct of any person, 
unless such findings or information has already been established through 
legal proceedings, by admission, or by public disclosure by the individual. 
Further, the Commission shall not make any reference in any of its activities 
or in its report …to the possible civil or criminal liability of any person or 
organization, unless such findings or information about the individual or 
institution has already been established through legal proceedings; 
  (h)  shall not name names in their events, activities, public statements, report 
or recommendations, or make use of personal information … which identify 
a person, without the express consent of that individual [..] Other 
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information that could be used to identify individuals shall be anonymized to 
the extent possible. (“Schedule ‘N’ Mandate”) 
   
In light of these restrictions, survivors were required to alter their testimony so as to 
refrain from any type of accusatory language. At the Montreal TRC event in 2013, for 
instance, survivors were encouraged to “tell your truth,”9 which as David Garneau notes, 
meant the telling of “subjective experiences, feelings, and perceptions, rather than the 
relating of facts” (34). Survivors were informed that their testimony would not have any legal 
standing, in the sense that they could not be used in legal prosecution nor be followed up by 
criminal investigations, but that they would instead be used in the production of a set of 
“legacy documents” that would have cultural and symbolic importance. 
As a largely symbolic form of healing, without the formal leverage of legal 
prosecution, the Canadian TRC would have to rely almost exclusively on the narrative 
potential of the multi-volume Final Report, and its intended status as a set of “legacy 
documents,” in order to make its cultural and ethical interventions into the collective 
memoryscape of the nation – a settler nation which, as TRC commissioner Marie Wilson 
suggested, would rather remain “comfortably blind” to these injustices (Lalonde, “Canadians 
‘Comfortably Blind’ about Residential Schools’ Damage”). 
In lieu of the potential for any possible legal action against the perpetrators, the Final 
Report would have to become that vehicle according to which the horrors of the residential 
schools would break through the public’s “comfortable blindness.” In other words, the 
report would be tasked with making visible the Truths of the IRS system. And indeed, as 
Wilson’s statement indicates, this type of “visual” metaphor would dominate the national 
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discussion on “reconciliation” in the years surrounding the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. As Naomi Angel and Pauline Wakeham point out:  
reconciliation is often conceptualized in terms of shifting dynamics of  
visibility through which past injustices that were once kept ‘out of sight’ are  
brought to the foreground of national consciousness, thereby ostensibly  
transforming relations of seeing and being seen between dominant and  
aggrieved parties. (Angel and Wakeham 93) 
 
However, in many ways the educational value of this narrative endeavor would be 
undercut by the very same legal restrictions implemented by the “Schedule ‘N’” mandate. 
While the aim of the TRC report was to allow the victims of the residential school system to 
be heard and seen by white Canadians in order to have their stories form the bulk of the 
residential school narrative, the scrupulous set of legal restrictions, according to which the 
truth commission was constituted, unfortunately precipitated what we might call an 
“unbalanced form of hearing and seeing.” By delimiting the Commission’s capacity to 
prosecute those responsible for the establishment and operation of the residential schools, 
the Canadian government effectively ensured that the Canadian public would only be able to 
focus their collective gaze on the victims and never the perpetrators. In essence, by 
prohibiting any type of legal prosecution – of even of a handful of symbolic figures, as the 
Argentine commission had – the only characters included in the historical narrative were the 
child-victims, while the government officials, RCMP officers, Indian agents, or parish priests 
who had participated in the century-long genocidal crimes, were only alluded to using to a 
series of indistinguishable indefinite pronouns, such as “they,” “he,” or “her.” By way of the 
“Schedule ‘N’ Mandate,” in other words, the perpetrators were reduced to a set of shadowy, 
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almost mythical figures, upon whom the reader is never allowed to direct his or her judging 
gaze. The public, in essence, is deprived of the opportunity to point a collective finger at any 
of the perpetrators, or to experience the related shame and/or guilt associated with the 
public criminal prosecution of a government or Church official. 
By denying the public the opportunity to direct their judging gaze upon an actual 
living offender and say, “that is the person responsible, and they have now been punished 
accordingly,” the Canadian government succeeded in disrupting the reader’s ethical response 
to the IRS. Since we, the readers, can only ever imagine an Indian agent seizing a young child 
from his mother’s grasp, or the parish priest mercilessly beating a schoolboy for speaking his 
birth language – instead of training our actual, visceral gaze upon them – we are therefore 
denied the opportunity to intuitively flesh out a full and rigorous ethical response to the 
harrowing testimony provided by the survivors. 
Since the Canadian TRC did not function in a way that granted its chief adjudicators 
the authority to offer perpetrators certain amnesty provisions in exchange for testimony or 
apologies (as many of its predecessors have), the Canadian Final Report is therefore severely 
hindered by a deficit of the personal perspectives of perpetrators (particularly in contrast to 
the testimony from over 6,750 survivors). Instead, a type of ersatz-amnesty was applied to the 
Canadian TRC from the outset, undercutting the traditional authority of truth 
Commissioners to negotiate the exchange of legal amnesty for perpetrator testimony or 
formal confessions. By declaring that, “the Commissioners …shall not possess subpoena 
powers, and do not have powers to compel attendance or participation in any of its activities 
or events,” the Government of Canada effectively ensured that the Final Report would 
consist, almost exclusively, of victim testimony – creating a distinctively one-sided historical 
narrative. 
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As a result, in constructing an accurate account that would include both victim and 
perpetrator perspectives, the authors of the Canadian Final Report, were tasked with the 
demanding, yet laudable, task of having to craft a truthful historical narrative by weaving the 
thousands of victim testimonies it gathered, together with a smattering of previously 
archived historical documents and voluntarily-surrendered Church records in order to create 
the impression of a seemingly two-sided, conciliatory historical narrative that suggested that 
all parties were equally invested in the “uncovering of Truths.”  
For instance, in the “History” chapter of Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: 
Summary of the Final Report on the TRC of Canada, the reader is presented with a seamlessly 
written historical narrative that appears to weave both perpetrator and victim testimonies 
together in a vivid, “conversational” illustration of the residential school experience – as 
though both sides are participating equally in the historiographic project of the TRC. 
Interspersing both perspectives in an eloquent and engaging narrative account, the chapter 
reads as a genuine dialogical exchange between both parties. In a section that explores why 
certain staff members were drawn to work in the residential schools, for example, the reader 
finds what appear to be the personal accounts by former staff members presented alongside 
the individual memories of former students. Here, each paragraph is accentuated with 
passages from the victim testimonies collected by the TRC (some of which feature 
document case numbers), alongside similar-looking quotations attributed to church and 
government officials. However, while the victims’ testimonies are indeed derived from the 
TRC hearings at which survivors provided vivid accounts of their past experiences, the 
seemingly comparable staff-member “testimonies” are nearly always quoted passages from 
previously published memoirs, historical biographies, or academic studies (some of which 
were published as long as ninety-one years ago).10 Although the body of the narrative reads 
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as a traditional historical report – ostensibly drawing on witnesses representing all viewpoints 
– a quick study of the works-cited section reveals the significant degree of artistry that went 
into the production of the Final Report. 
Despite producing such a commendable historical narrative from such limited 
resources, the Final Report indeed suffers from a severe dearth of perpetrator testimony and 
confessions, which often serve as the emotional and political centerpiece of many other final 
reports (particularly the Argentine Nunca Más report and the Chilean Rettig Report). 
 Moreover, in addition to the loss of any emotional weight that perpetrator-
confessions might provide, the strict constraints against inculpating any individual 
perpetrators restricts the reader’s gaze to focusing solely on the victims of the crimes. In 
effect, by forbidding victims to speak about their unique and traumatic experiences in a way 
that allows them to utter the names of their abusers, the “Schedule ‘N’” Mandate reduces 
their testimony to nothing more than an austere description of the acts of abuse themselves, 
as opposed to a description of the heinous men and women who enacted these crimes upon 
thousands of helpless children. In this sense, the specific legal restrictions set out in 
“Schedule ‘N’” produce a unique brand of “testimony” – what Garneau calls “a spectacle of 
individual pain for settler consumption” (34) – that completely removes the abuser from the 
testimonial description of the crimes. 
This subject-less testimony, as I argue below, arouses white readers’ scopophilic 
desires by ensuring that their unreciprocated gaze is only ever directed toward the victims 
and their striking experiences of abuse and maltreatment. This type of unreciprocated 
“looking,” I suggest, represents a form of banal possession, in which the white 
reader/viewer enacts his or her visual power over the others in a way that simultaneously 
acknowledges and refuses them (by letting them be seen, but only ever as victims). The 
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scopophilic gaze, in this context, becomes the dominant platform for the exchange of 
colonial power relations that have defined the relationship between Indigenous and settler 
Canadians for centuries, and within the critical context of the TRC, undermines the national 
project of reconciliation. 
 
The Scopophilic Syntax of the Final Report: 
 
As a result of these unusual legal restrictions, a unique syntax arises within the pages 
of the Final Report, which works upon the reader in a number of subtle, yet persuasive, ways. 
In keeping with the injunction against the “naming of names” (or of even alluding to the 
criminal activities of any specific perpetrator), the editors and authors of the Final Report 
were forced into a rather unnatural and strained syntax when describing the endless list of 
physical, sexual, and psychological abuses inflicted upon the residential school victims. 
Specifically, the report is guided by a rare, grammatically atypical structure that relies on the 
almost exclusive use of verbs in the “truncated passive voice.” In other words, nearly the 
entirety of the ten-volume report – totaling roughly four thousand pages – is arranged 
according to the irregular phraseology of one of the most uncommon verb-structures in 
both the English and French languages, a verb-form that serves to describe the action of a 
scene without ever alluding to the subject who performs that action.11 
A useful rhetorical tool in cases when a speaker wants to intentionally avoid laying 
blame, the truncated passive voice is commonly utilized in military or government press-
releases or news broadcasts in order to evoke a favourable interpretation of events. For 
instance, the familiar notification, “The soldiers were killed by friendly fire,” is a much less 
caustic way of pointing out that military officers were killed by their own people who 
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accidentally shot at them. In the truncated passive form, the subjects of the sentence (fellow 
military officers who fired on their compatriots) are altogether removed from the report, and 
the action is described in a much more understated and placid way, cajoling its audience away 
from any instinct to lay blame and toward a more mollifying acceptance of the events. 
In those rare cases throughout the report in which the truncated passive voice is not 
used, on the other hand, it is instead replaced with the equally cumbersome editorial 
injunction that simply (and rather bluntly) redacts the name of the perpetrator from the 
testimony, retroactively. 
Along these two lines, when describing a case of physical abuse in a way that refrains 
from mentioning the perpetrator of the crime, for instance, the editors of the Final Report 
could opt for one of the following courses of action: a) she could employ the clumsy 
editorial injunction, “[name redacted],”12 or b) she could shift from the use of the active 
voice (in which the traditional subject-verb relation abides) to the truncated passive voice (in 
which the subject is removed from the sentence altogether). For instance, the phrase “Father 
John kicked Sam” might be replaced with either: a) “[name redacted] kicked Sam,” or b) 
“Sam was kicked.” However, whereas the former option signals to the reader that the 
identity of the perpetrator is known but that his or her name has been obfuscated by the 
editor(s) for a particular reason (likely a legal one), the latter option simply nullifies the role 
of the perpetrator altogether, re-directing the reader’s attention solely toward the victim and 
the abuse that he or she has suffered. In other words, the contextual relationship of the verb 
to its subject and object is rearranged entirely, such that the exclusive focus of the sentence 
is now on the agent upon whom the verb is enacted. In the first example, “Father John kicked 
Sam,” the active verb-form emphasizes the role of the subject (Father John) and his function 
as the doer or the verb; the readers’ attention is directed toward acknowledging the fact that 
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Father John has perpetrated a crime against Sam, allowing us to direct our judgments of 
blame and responsibility toward him. In the second example, however, we are simply told 
that “Sam has been kicked.” There is, of course, an implied perpetrator here as well, 
although the arrangement of the truncated passive verb-form directs the reader’s attention 
away from this fact altogether, and redirects it solely toward the agent to whom the action is 
being subjected (while highlighting the verb action itself).13 In the mind’s eye of readers, in 
other words, the focus of the sentence is always only centered on the victim (Sam), and 
therefore, there exists no subject (or perpetrator) toward which any possible judgments of 
blame or responsibility can be directed. In fact, any acknowledgment of the perpetrator’s 
very existence is entirely expunged from the sentence, and any effort to re-introduce the 
subject necessitates a degree of mental labour on the part of the reader; that is, the burden of 
unraveling the thorny syntactical arrangement of the victim-testimony in a way that re-
introduces a degree of moral culpability to the crimes is transferred away from the role of 
the narrator and onto the reader. 
Although the action in each version of the previous sentence remains identical, the 
focus of the reader’s attention is radically altered by way of the subtle shift from an active to 
a passive syntax. However, in order to comply with the strict legal restrictions of the TRC 
Mandate, the reporting of the crimes and abuses in the Final Report are communicated almost 
exclusively via the “truncated passive voice,” continually drawing the reader’s attention away 
from the perpetrator(s) and toward the victims and the crimes committed against them. The 
result of this unique syntactical structure is a narrative form that implicitly provokes the 
reader’s colonial and scopophilic impulses, inviting the readers to simply gawk at an 
unceasing excess of harrowing abuses without providing us with any outlet toward which to 
direct our judgments of blame or responsibility. 
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In most instances, the victim-testimony is framed by an indistinct editorial outline 
that only vaguely gestures at the general type of abuse that the child experienced – i.e. 
“sexual abuse,” “rape,” or “physically beaten.” Always presented in the truncated passive 
form, these editorial-framings serve to introduce the survivor’s testimony to the reader in a 
way that adheres to the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate” (by steering clear of any possible language 
that might reveal the identity of the child’s abuser), while also connecting each of the 
survivor’s statements together into an historical narrative that illustrates the systematic 
pattern of sexual and physical assault suffered in residential schools across the country. 
However, when taken in their totality, these editorial-introductions tend to lull the 
reader into an uncomfortable “descriptive” rhythm, in which a seemingly unending 
inventory of ill-defined and perpetrator-less crimes begin to pulse and throb across the pages 
of the report, progressively distancing the reader’s gaze away from the perpetrators. With the 
unvarying use of the “truncated passive form” fixing the reader’s attention solely upon the 
victims, each page builds upon the last in stimulating the scopophilic impulses14 of the settler-
Canadian audience. The standard formula for introducing victim testimony unfolds as such: 
“Victim-X revealed that she was physically beaten at residential school-Y in such-and-such a 
town. ‘When I was seven years old, one of the nuns pulled me aside….’” This template of an 
“ill-defined editorial introduction” that provides the reader with the victim’s name, age, a 
vague classification of the abuse suffered, and the location of the residential school attended, 
followed by a brief (often only one or two sentences) extract of the survivor’s oral testimony, 
constitutes the bulk of the testimonial segments of the report. However, owing to the 
unvarying rhythm of this formula (over six-thousand victims provided testimony), together 
with the continual use of the truncated passive form in both the “introductions” and the 
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“victim testimonies,” the reader is increasingly invited to ogle, in a progressively licentious 
manner, at the repeated descriptions of ostensibly “perpetratorless” victim-abuse. 
On almost each page of the volume entitled, The Survivors Speak, for instance, the 
reader is inundated with an invariable inventory of nearly identical stories, each of which are 
constituted by an editorial injunction in the form of the “truncated passive form.” In 
describing the crimes inflicted upon the residential school victims, the author-cum-editors of 
the report alter each testimony with the passive “Person-X said she was” or “who was,” etc. 
– effectively removing the subject from the sentence and reframing (or at least, introducing) 
the testimony as a third-person, passive narrative: “Lynda Pahpasay McDonald said she was 
sexually molested by a staff member of the Roman Catholic school in Kenora…” (160); “Larry 
Roger Listener, who was abused when he attended residential school in Alberta, said…” (160); 
“Mary Vivier, who was abused at the Fort Frances school…” (160); “Norman Courchene said 
he was sexually abused by a supervisor while he was on a field trip from the Fort Alexander 
school…” (160); “Amelia Galligos-Thomas said she was sexually abused by a staff member at 
the Sechelt, British Columbia, school…” (160); “When he went home for the Christmas 
break, Ivan George told his father he was being abused at the Mission school…” (161); “Lorna 
Morgan said she was sexually molested…” (161); “When he was an adult, Ben Pratt told his 
mother about the abuse that he and other students were being subjected to at Gordon’s 
[residential school in Punnichy, Saskatchewan]…” (161); “Michael Muskego said he was 
sexually abused by a staff member at the Roman Catholic residential school near The Pas in 
the 1960’s…” (161-162), and so on. These narrative interventions are then supplemented by 
corresponding “truncated passive form” testimonies, which further reinforce the 
grammatical illusion that each of these crimes were perpetrator-less, or at the very least, that 
the crimes were far more important than who had committed them: “I thought that I was the 
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only one that it was happening to” (160); “things start happening, and then you don’t realize it 
at that age, but you are being sexually abused, in fact, you are being raped” (160); “I thought it 
was, you know, this is what happened, like, to everybody, so I never said nothing” (160); “So, 
that went on for years of me being sexually assaulted” (161); “I told her something just happened 
to me, somebody did something to me” (162). 
For a counter-example, we might compare the “truncated passive” voice of the 
Canadian TRC testimonies with the typical syntactical structure of those from the Nunca Más 
report (which was, of course, not regulated by any such legal provisions prohibiting the 
“naming of names”). For instance, Luis Alberto Urquiza’s statement (case file No. 3847): 
In the early hours of the 16th I was taken to the toilet by the officer on duty, 
Francisco Gontero, who, from a distance of four or five meters, loaded his 45-
calibre gun and fired three shots, one of which went through my right leg at 
the height of my knee. I was left standing bleeding, for some twenty minutes. 
The same person then ripped my trousers and poked a stick and then his finger 
into the wound. When other people arrived, [Gontero] said that I had tried to 
grab the gun from him and escape. (Nunca Más 28) 
 
In Señor Urquiza’s testimony, all but the initial verb is presented in its natural 
“active” form, allowing Urquiza to paint a picture of his experience from a perspective in 
which his abuser is the focal point. The reader can easily imagine officer Francisco Gontero 
loading his gun, pointing it at Urquiza, and shooting him in the knee, before callously poking 
his finger into the wound and fabricating a story about the prisoner’s failed escape-attempt. 
The linguistic equivalent to a series of close-up shots of officer Gontero’s face in a film 
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scene, the “active” verb form clearly allows the viewer to direct both her visceral gaze, as 
well as her judgments of responsibility and blame, toward the offending officer. 
However, if we were to rewrite Señor Urquiza’s testimony in the “truncated passive” 
voice of the Canadian TRC Report, the reader would be implicitly limited to visualizing only 
a vague, shadowy perpetrator-figure as he or she is entirely obscured from the reader’s frame 
of reference and the focus of attention is solely directed upon the victim as they submit to the 
Subject-less action. Taking up the passive syntax of the Canadian report, we might re-
describe the scene as follows: 
Urquiza said he was taken to the toilet where he was shot with a 45-calibre gun  
three times with one entering his leg just above the knee. He told us he was 
then left bleeding for some twenty minutes, before having his trousers ripped and his 
wound poked, first with a stick and then with a finger. When other people 
arrived, it was claimed that Urquiza had attempted to grab an officer’s gun, in 
an effort to escape. 
 
In both cases, the events – and the order in which they occurred – remain identical, 
but the focus of the action has shifted entirely. In Señor Urquiza’s actual testimony, the 
reader’s attention is directly focused on officer Gontero, since Urquiza’s use of the “active” 
verb-forms place his torturer in the role of the primary subject who performs the action. By 
providing the reader with Gontero’s real name and placing him in the central role of the 
subject who performs the action, Urquiza’s testimony allows the reader to easily imagine the 
perpetrator acting with full agency upon his victim, therefore enabling us to direct the fullness 
of our moral judgments of responsibility and blame onto the officer. Our readerly attention 
is focused, in this case, predominantly on the ethical and criminal transgressions perpetrated 
 279 
by officer Gontero, triggering a robust and dynamic moral response from the 
reader/listener. Gontero, as an agent of the State, is, in the reader’s mind(s), guilty of 
violating our legal and ethical standards, and therefore must be held accountable. The very 
syntactical arrangement of the sentence, therefore, provides the reader with a preliminary 
truth (based on Señor Urquiza’s testimony), that in turn arouses a resultant demand for justice 
(“Gontero must be held responsible!”), and which, when taken together, consequently lay 
the groundwork for reconciliation. 
In the latter example, however, the “truncated passive” verb-forms unfortunately 
preclude the reader from performing any of these moral evaluations – at least in the same 
way. The identity of the officer is entirely obfuscated, and the readers’ attention is instead 
directed solely toward the victim to whom the action is being subjected. In effect, the 
discursive point of view is reversed, drawing the reader’s attention solely to the victim and the 
heinous crimes being committed against them. 
When the editors of the Final Report are continually forced to make use of the 
truncated passive phraseology (owing to the “Section ‘N’ Mandate”) – placing the offenders 
in the background and the victims in the foreground – the ensuing implication is that the 
crimes are much more significant than the person(s) who committed them.15 Through sheer 
repetition, this assertion guides the tenor of the entire Final Report, the syntactical structure 
of the report continually signaling to the reader that – in broad, general terms – the nature of 
the collective crimes committed against the victims of the residential school system are much 
more important than the people, agencies, or State that committed them. Therefore, through the very 
syntactical arrangement of this unique historiographic document, readers are implicitly 
instructed to direct all of their moral and political energies toward “acknowled[ing] the… 
experiences” (Schedule ‘N’) of the First Nations, Métis, and Inuit children who were forced to 
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attend the residential schools; meaning, acknowledging the “experiences” of being 
systematically abused, both physically and sexually, as a state-sanctioned disciplinary 
apparatus. 
This rhetorical strategy – intentional or not – thus re-inscribes the overall project of 
reconciliation as solely an enterprise of acknowledgment, implicitly suggesting that the act of 
merely sympathizing with victims of the Residential School system amounts to the successful 
fulfillment of the reconciliatory project. In light of the deep-seated history of Canada’s one-
sided settler-Indigenous power relations and the many ways in which these are latently 
inculcated into our very modes of seeing and hearing, the exhibition of Indigenous suffering 
amounts to a type of “Godiva ride”16 – or what Garneau calls the “spectacles of individual 
pain for settler consumption” (34) – in which the victims are paraded before the reader while 
the perpetrators are subtly exculpated through their very absence. 
In the Final TRC Report volume titled The Survivors Speak, for instance, readers are 
presented with a series of despicable testimonial accounts in which young children are 
continually molested by a number of unnamed priests. However, owing to the perpetual 
anonymity of the perpetrators, these accounts do little to quell readers’ moral objections. 
Instead, although such heinous accounts certainly arouse readers’ moral outrage, without a 
specific subject (with a real name and a face) toward whom our judgments of blame and 
responsibility may be directed, the scene is rendered little more than a graphic exhibition of 
pain and shame. 
These abbreviated testimonial fragments offer readers only a brief glimpse into the 
horrifying experiences of the systematic sexual molestation that thousands of children faced 
in their daily interactions with church officials while at the residential schools.17 In contrast 
to the “truncated passive” accounts in the Final Report, consider Joseph Auguste “Augie” 
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Merasty’s description of a similar experience in his memoir, The Education of Augie Merasty: A 
Residential School Memoir (2015). In Merasty’s memoir, in which he is not beholden to the 
“Section ‘N’” mandate against the “naming-of-names,” he is free to describe (in the 
traditional “active” verb-form) his experience of being molested by Brother Lepeigne while 
at the St. Therese Residential School in Sturgeon Landing, Manitoba. In a chapter simply 
named after his assailant “Lepeigne,” Merasty graphically details his first experience with 
Lepeigne, when Augie was just eight-years old. After the priest cornered the young boy in a 
washroom, Mastery recalls: 
He took me by the right wrist and grabbed my other arm and wrapped my little fingers  
around his hard penis and rubbed back and forth, masturbating himself. I felt  
his semen on my hand, and he still didn’t let go until he made me swear not to tell  
anyone. I started screaming, as if someone was trying to kill me. He held his  
hand over my mouth and almost choked me with his other hand and told me he  
would give me a beating with the three-foot garden hose if I ever told  
anyone. Then Lepeigne dragged me across the bathroom and threatened to  
throw me out the window. (48-49, emphasis mine) 
 
Mastery’s testimony – which concludes with him recalling that from that day on, Lepeigne 
would then detain him and six other boys in the upstairs dormitory each morning and 
viciously beat them with a garden hose in order to dissuade them from ever speaking of their 
abuse – directs the reader’s attention invariably toward his assailant. Every verb is presented 
in the “active” form, repeatedly reminding readers that this man, Brother Lepeigne, wantonly 
committed these crimes – not simply that a small child had them done to him, anonymously. 
Although both reports evoke the reader’s moral outrage, only the latter example allows its 
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readers to envision the perpetrator, Lepeigne, as a real-life criminal acting with full agency 
upon his young ward. 
In this way, the vicissitudes of testimonial syntax exert a subtle yet significant degree 
of influence over readers’ moral and empathetic instincts, implicitly guiding the ways in 
which we regard the pain of others. In a 1995 study conducted by Henley, Miller, and 
Beazley, “Syntax, Semantics, and Sexual Violence: Agency and the Passive Voice,” a 
computerized content analysis of US newspaper articles was performed, which found that 
verbs indicating violent crimes were much more frequently used in the passive voice than the 
active. In these cases, the study found that the legal restrictions prohibiting the reporting of 
an alleged perpetrator’s name – including publication restrictions, defamation claims, and the 
voir dire rule – had the greatest impact on editorial choices to use the passive verb-form in 
place of the active. As Bohner suggests, “at the time of a newspaper crime report, the 
perpetrator is often not known or has not been legally convicted, [so] it may logically be 
impossible or legally prohibited to name him explicitly” (Bohner 518). In these cases, “the 
verb form ‘raped’ was used more frequently in the passive (70%) than active (30%) voice” 
(518), while “the highest prevalence of the passive voice… was found for the verb 
‘murdered’ (76%)” (Bohner 518). What this study suggested, therefore, was that when these 
types of legal restrictions prohibit the reporting of an alleged rapist’s name, for instance, the 
resultant syntactical alteration from the active to the passive form – the switch from “man-X 
raped the woman,” for instance, to simply “the woman was raped” – often results in a series 
of subtle rhetorical effects that may easily go unnoticed at a conscious level by its readers, 
but have serious and lasting repercussions on the constitution of class, racial, and gender-
based power relations. In particular, the switch to the passive-voice ineradicably obscures 
readers’ perception of the perpetrator’s agency – that the perpetrator committed the crime 
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willfully and deliberately – altering readers’ interpretation of the events and the directing of 
blame. 
“In English, furthermore,” as Bohner points out, “the ‘get’-passive seems to be 
especially well suited to suggest direct responsibility of the victim. The sentence ‘the woman 
got raped’, for example, may invoke the completion ‘got herself raped’ and may thus indicate 
the woman’s active participation” (517). But while the “get passive” often reflects a spectator’s 
biases, such as a judge who implies a victim’s responsibility in her own assault, it is also often 
used by victims, themselves, when an instance of abuse is internalized as acknowledged 
grounds for punishment.  
 
Fig. 4.2 Sign from “Women’s March on Washington,” Toronto, Ontario. January 21, 2017. 
The dual meaning of this phrase illustrates the directionality of each respective verb-form and the ways in 
which the passive/active forms are directly associated with the assigning of blame and/or responsibility. 
 
 
In several gut-wrenching instances within the Final Report, survivor testimony is 
framed by the “get passive” when a discernable sense of self-reproach is implied – suggesting 
the internalization of disciplinary power relations. In these cases – such as when Emily 
Kematch recalls simply that as a young child, “If we cried, we got spanked” (The Survivor’s 
Speak 49), or Don Willie’s recollection that he “used to get strapped for being caught out of 
bed” (The Survivor’s Speak 72) – the “get” passive implies a self-reflective sense of the victim’s 
own responsibility through a direct correlation between the victim’s action and an unnamed 
perpetrator’s resultant disciplinary action. As a natural adjunct to the truncated passive form, 
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the “get passive” is often innately employed throughout the report when victims discuss their 
experiences of having to give up speaking their languages in favour of English. Richard 
Kaiyogan, for instance, candidly notes, “if you talk in your own language you get strapped,” 
which leads to the eventual capitulation: “Anyway… my language will be lost in the way. 
Okay, so why not think like a white man? Talk like a white man? Eat like a white man… so I 
don’t have to get strapped anymore. You know, I followed their own rules” (The Survivor’s 
Speak 51). 
In each of these instances, the subtle syntactical rearrangements of how a crime is 
articulated have a significant impact on how these events enter our cultural storytelling 
landscape. When legal restrictions continually regulate the ways in which, for instance, a man 
informs the public about the rape of a woman, it goes without saying that certain cultural 
attitudes within that community are accordingly influenced. If the active agent is 
continuously removed from the syntactical equation – that is, the crime is described in a way 
that avoids any mention of the perpetrator – then it is certainly plausible to assume that the 
cultural perception of the crime will be impacted accordingly. Sentences like “the woman 
was raped” would trigger certain readerly assumptions about the role of the victim, more so 
than a sentence like “the man raped the woman” would. 
It is in these instances, when language exerts its subtle powers over readers, that it 
becomes hegemonic. Slight alterations to subject-object relations, or the reversal of an active 
verb to its “truncated passive” form, can have radical effects on those understated linguistic 
indicators that allow the reader to identify blame or point to direct judgments of 
responsibility. Particularly, in violent physical abuse or sexual assault cases, the syntactical 
arrangement of witness’ testimony not only reveals much about their personal tendencies 
regarding the nature of the events, but it also has a subtle, yet critical, effect on readers’ or 
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listeners’ interpretation of them, as well. In fact, this contrivance is often so subtle that 
when, for instance, a former residential school student makes reference to “the use of 
shackles” (as opposed to, “Father Doe shackled me to my bed”), readers may very well pass 
over this sentence without noticing the full extent to which the phrasing modifies their 
interpretation of the testimony. 
In this way, the Final TRC Report makes a series of corresponding interventions into 
the collective perception of the residential schools victims’ relation to the endless surfeit of 
criminal behaviour that they endured. Severely undercut by the set of legal restrictions laid 
out in the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement, the Final Report was compelled 
into a narrative form that elevates the “passive” voice over the “active,” thereby implicitly 
emphasizing the victim’s roles in the crimes inflicted upon them while continually 
minimizing (or outright expunging) the role of the perpetrator. In these instances of 
linguistic avoidance, instances of abuse against Indigenous children are not only 
“normalized,” but the perceived responsibility of their assailants is also correspondingly 
reduced in the mind’s eye of the reader. 
Needless to say, however, the authors of the Canadian Final Report were certainly not 
motivated to play down the responsibility of the government and church officials, but rather 
the legal restrictions of the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate” both compelled the victims into 
structuring their own testimony according to an unfortunate “subject-less” syntactical 
paradigm and the editors of the report to extend and perpetuate this “truncated passive” 
form to the wider narrative structure. 
For instance, consider how the editorial injunctions protract and play up the passive 
verb form of various survivors’ testimony in this long excerpt from volume of the Final 
Report entitled, The Survivors Speak: 
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In many cases, a single student described many different types of 
abuse they experienced. Jean Pierre Bellemare, who attended the Amos, 
Québec, school, said he had been subjected to “physical violence, verbal 
violence, touchings, everything that comes with it.” …Some students were 
abused at more than one school. Students reported assaults from staff 
members of both the opposite sex and the same sex as themselves.
 
For many 
students, abuse, fear, and violence dominated their school experience. Sheila 
Gunderson recalled there being “a lot of physical abuse and sexual abuse” at 
Lapointe Hall, the Roman Catholic hostel in Fort Simpson, Northwest 
Territories, in the 1960s. …Many former students spoke of having been 
raped at school. Marie Tookate, who attended the Fort Albany, Ontario, 
school, said, “I didn’t enjoy myself when I was in school because I was too 
much abused. I didn’t learn anything; that’s what I was feeling.”18  
Her words echo the experiences of many former students […] One 
former student said he was sexually abused by a staff member of the Blue 
Quills school when he was five years old… Marie Therese Kistabish said she 
was sexually abused in the church confessional at the Amos school. 
(153-154) 
 
This excerpt – which is indicative of the syntactical tenor of the entirety of the 
report’s four-thousand-plus pages – illustrates the type of uniquely “subjectless” passive-
form narration of horrid sexual and physical abuse, reproducing the colonial relations 
between looking and power that have defined the deep-rooted relationship between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians. 
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The Residential School Photographic Archive and the Voyeuristic Gaze: 
 
And yet, if the passive narrative form produces an unreciprocated “settler gaze” by 
simultaneously concealing the perpetrators while bringing the victims into focus, then the 
relationship between power and looking is even further delineated by how the victims are 
made visible in the accompanying photographs within the Final Report. While the laconic 
pulse of the report’s passive syntax arouses the reader’s voyeuristic instincts in a way that 
both acknowledges and refuses the survivors (by letting them be seen, but only ever as 
victims), the photographs produce what I would call an equivalent “visual lexicon” that lays 
the foundations for a similar form of post-colonial power relations, while diminishing the 
devastating impact of the IRS system – albeit by different means. 
Although the inclusion of photographs in truth commission reports is quite 
common, the residential school photographs are, however, of a much different order than 
those typically found in reports such as Nunca Más, or of the extremely graphic images of the 
concentration camps alluded to in the Nuremberg report. Whereas the typical type of 
photographic images associated with human rights inquiries and transitional justice practices 
tend to depict shocking scenes of violence and cruelty – the aim being to expose the horrors 
of genocide, for instance – the photographic archive of residential schools is of a much 
different order. As Naomi Angel and Pauline Wakeham note, “Rather than being motivated 
by the goal of divulgence that has become the stock-in-trade of photojournalism and now 
social media in conflict zones, the image record of residential schools is composed largely of 
photographs taken by school and church staff as well as government officials seeking to 
produce propagandistic scenes of institutional order” (“Witnessing in Camera” 95). 
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Fig. 4.3 (Volume 1: History, Part Two, 297) 
Caption: “Staff and students at the Sturgeon Landing, Saskatchewan, school, 1946. Until the 1960s, members 
of religious orders made up a significant proportion of residential school staff membership.” 
St. Boniface Historical Society Archives, Oblates of Mary Immaculate of Manitoba fonds, N4096. 
Given that nearly all of the photographs included in the Final Report were obtained 
from the archives of the various church organizations that operated the schools, the 
catalogue of images used in the report depict a consistent visual-narrative of the exact type 
of conditions that the churches would have intended to put forward; images of girls happily 
sewing in unison or of students participating reverentially in Christian ceremonies (Fig. 4.3), 
for instance. There are, of course, no photographs depicting children being beaten by IRS 
staff, of young boys and girls (as young as six years of age) being molested by school 
officials, or of the frostbitten bodies of those children who froze to death while attempting 
to run away. There are, therefore, no photographs included in the sections of the Final Report 
titled: “Abuse,” “Discipline,” “Runaways and Truants,” or “Covering Up Sexual Abuse.” 
Instead, we only find the photographs displayed within the more generically-titled sections, 
such as: “The Canadian residential school system: 1867 to 1939,” “The 1970’s and Beyond,” 
and “Sports and the Arts.” Similarly to the “truncated passive” testimony of the written 
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section, the photographs therefore represent their own highly regulated story of the IRS that 
is constituted as much by what they do not reveal as by what they do. 
  
 Fig. 4.4 (What We Have Learned, 52) 
Caption: Inuit students at the Joseph Bernier School, Chesterfield Inlet, 1956.  
Source: Diocese of Churchill-Hudson Bay. 
In image after image, the reader is presented with a series of scenes that, at least on 
the surface, resemble the types of activities one might find at any other school across the 
country. Typically grouped into clusters of five to twenty at the end of various chapters and 
arranged thematically (as opposed to geographically), the photographs therefore present a 
seemingly homologous view of residential schools from across the country when taken 
together. The resultant effect of this arrangement suggests the existence of a false degree of 
uniformity and regulatory oversight throughout the schools, which did not exist. On the 
contrary, officials at each residential school were free to govern them according to whichever 
“pedagogical” and disciplinary methods they saw fit, leading to a complete lack of 
educational, nutritional, and disciplinary regulations. To this end, the pervasive scenes of 
educational “normalcy” depicted in the catalogue of photographs work in direct opposition 
to the survivor-testimonies that recall rampant and systematized abuse. Instead, the image-
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archive presents the reader with a contrary visual story of seemingly “ordinary” life within 
the schools, both subverting and challenging the written testimonies, and potentially sowing 
seeds of doubt that may embolden certain settler Canadians’ long-established cultural or 
racial biases. 
Indeed, several sceptics – including journalists Hymie Rubenstein and Rodney A. 
Clifton – have seized upon these counterfeit scenes of normalcy in an attempt to dismiss the 
legacy of the residential school system. In their recent incendiary editorial in the National 
Post, “Debunking the half-truths and exaggerations in the Truth and Reconciliation report,” 
Rubenstein and Clifton regurgitate the myth of “normalcy” that the IRS photographs 
erroneously portray, suggesting that “most aboriginal students attended day schools 
almost identical to the public schools that other Canadian children attended.”19 In extending 
the deception that the residential schools were “almost identical” to any other public school 
across settler-Canada, Clifton and Rubenstein minimize the abuse that thousands of 
Indigenous, Métis, and Inuit children suffered as part of a systematic program of forced 
assimilation and colonial discipline. However, for the two University of Manitoba professors, 
the perceived semblance of normalcy projected by the IRS administrators (and reinforced by 
the photographic archive) serves to devalue the trauma of survivors by equating it to the 
type of misdemeanour tribulations experienced by all schoolchildren. “Similar traumas, 
indignities, and deprivations faced by aboriginal students,” they erroneously suggest, “[such 
as] loneliness, sexual and physical exploitation, and harsh living conditions – have been 
reported by the children of wealthy parents forced to attend elite boarding schools 
throughout the former British Empire” (“Debunking the half-truths and exaggerations in the 
Truth and Reconciliation report,” National Post). By levelling the residential school 
experience with the relatively benign experience of “elite boarding schools,” Clifton and 
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Rubenstein go on to suggest that the legacy of the IRS is, therefore, entirely unexceptional 
and unworthy of the public’s moral solicitude. From here, it is a short rhetorical leap for the 
two National Post contributors to dismiss the entirety of the survivors’ TRC statements as, 
what they derisively call, the “unexamined testimonies of an unrepresentative sample of 
‘survivors’,” and suggesting that, by referring to “aboriginal children educated in residential 
schools [as] ‘survivors,’ this erroneously implies that they are equivalent to Holocaust 
survivors” (“Debunking the half-truths”). 
In addition to contriving a distorted sense of “educational normalcy” that subverts 
and undermines the survivors’ testimony, the age of the photo-images also present readers 
with a skewed perception of the historical duration of the residential schools. As Angel and 
Wakeham note, while many residential schools were fully functional up until the late 1990s, 
the vast majority of photographs that have proliferated in the mainstream media, and that 
are featured in the various volumes of the Final Report, are vintage-looking black-and-white 
images from the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. 
  
Fig. 4.5 (Volume 1: History, Part 1, p. 556) 
Caption: “The Anglican school on the Blackfoot Reserve, Alberta.”  
Source: Glenbow Museum, NC-5-1. 
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These images – with their uniform monochrome palettes and antique vignette fading 
– provide the reader with “a set of visual codes that cue the spectator to associate the IRS 
with a more distant temporal realm” (Angel and Wakeham, 98). This temporal distancing 
therefore works to not only disassociate the contemporary reader/viewer from the legacy of 
the residential schools – suggesting that this was something that happened “long ago” – but 
also to minimize the contemporary demand for justice and reconciliation for today’s younger 
generations of Indigenous youths. 
In a similar fashion to the Harper government’s re-framing of the IRS system as 
belonging to a bygone era, the temporal distancing of the black-and-white photographs 
reinforce the mandate of “Schedule ‘N’” by obscuring the perpetrators within the shadowy 
depths of history. Within the IRS photographic archive, church and government officials are 
almost exclusively depicted as glaringly anachronistic and antiquated “historical” characters – 
posing in old-fashioned dress, and in at least two cases, appearing quite literally, “horse-and-
buggy” (See Fig’s 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8). Such temporal-obfuscation implicitly encourages the 
reader to excuse the seemingly “historical” crimes as the product of shifting knowledge-
systems or the cultural and moral evolution of a nation between generations. By re-framing 
the IRS as belonging to an historical chapter that is now seemingly “closed,” the act of 
assigning responsibility and blame gets lost in the historical disjunction, thereby feeding the 
temptation to absolve historical injustices simply because they “belong to the past.” 
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Fig. 4.6 (Volume 1: History, Part 1, p. 558)      Fig. 4.7 (Volume 1: History, Part 1, p. 80) 
Caption: “Staff of the Crowstand School in       Caption: “Colonel Richard Henry Pratt, founder and 
Kamsack, Saskatchewan.”              superintendent of the Carlisle Indian Boarding School, 
Source: Saskatchewan Archives Board,       Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Pratt favoured a policy of  
R-B1457.      aggressive assimilation, saying “All the Indian there is in  
     the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save  
     the man.” 
     Source: Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-26798. 
 
Fig. 4.8 (Volume 1: History, Part 1, p. 292) 
Caption: “Anglican Church leader Samuel Hume  
Blake.”  
Source: Library and Archives Canada, c030420. 
 
 
 
As a string of newspaper editorials have recently 
demonstrated, such erroneous “historical distancing” has 
opened up space for a new and disturbing discursive trend 
calling for the exculpation of the founders of the IRS system for simply “not knowing any 
better.” On the contrary, as Angel and Wakeham note, there is more than “ample evidence 
demonstrating that the residential school system’s dangers were well documented for the 
federal government and in the popular press during the early twentieth century” (99), 
 294 
including Dr. Peter H. Bryce’s oft-cited exposé of the dangerous health conditions in 
residential schools which concluded that between 1883 and 1907, twenty-four percent of 
students died while in IRS custody (Bryce, 4). In spite of the prevalence and availability of 
reports such as these, several prominent journalists and media personalities continue to call 
for the moral exculpation of the IRS system on the basis that the past represents a time of 
callow naiveté. In a recent article in The Globe and Mail, titled “Good Intentions, Broken 
Lives” (2000), William Johnson suggests that the Church organizations were simply acting 
upon “good intentions” in establishing the residential schools, and should therefore be 
exempt from the moral umbrage of the general public. Apart from the imprudent appeal to a 
perverse form of deontological ethics20 – Johnson suggests that only the intended results of an 
action are of moral value, and that the actual historical consequences are of little importance 
– the Globe and Mail columnist’s case also centres on the mistaken belief that the churches 
were acting as “the agents of a misguided society” (“Good intentions,” The Globe and Mail), 
thereby absolving them of any blame by re-framing the past as a period of arrant unknowing. 
Given the extent to which this type of historically-distancing language has already 
circumscribed public discourse surrounding the residential school system, the Final Report’s 
use of such anachronistic photographs21 simply perpetuates the myth of historical-
detachment, enabling many readers to continue to dismiss the crimes of the IRS from a 
position of dispassionate indifference. By spuriously relegating IRS perpetrators to the 
seemingly naïve and unknowning depths of history, this type of historical distancing 
furthermore allows for the resurrection of the correspondingly archaic image of the so-called 
“Savage Indian.” When we excuse John A. MacDonald for his xenophobic and 
discriminatory beliefs, for instance, simply because “that was the opinion of the time,” we 
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are not simply invoking a sort of moral statute of limitations on these crimes, we are also 
implicitly reviving Macdonald’s own racist beliefs and resituating them in the present. 
Macdonald’s infamous 1883 speech to the House of Commons justifying the 
government’s residential school policy has been a particular focus of this recent trend 
towards “historical justification” in the post-TRC era. In his notorious speech – a segment 
of which opens the Official Summary of the Final TRC Report – Macdonald told the House: 
When the school is on the reserve the child lives with its parents, who are 
savages; he is surrounded by savages, and though he may learn to read and 
write, his habits, and training, and mode of thought are Indian. He is simply a 
savage who can read and write. It has been strongly pressed on myself, as the 
head of the Department, that Indian children should be withdrawn as much 
as possible from the parental influence, and the only way to do that would be 
to put them in central training industrial schools where they will acquire the 
habits and modes of thought of white men. (Debates of the House of 
Commons of Canada 1107–1108) 
 
Despite the incontrovertible malice behind Macdonald’s infamous speech, several 
recent attempts to excuse such vile, rancorous language as simply being “of the time” 
demonstrates the willingness of many settler Canadians to ignore the recentness of the IRS 
system, and the many ongoing and long-lasting consequences of such prejudice. 
In a recent article written for The Walrus, titled “Canada’s First Scapegoat,” author 
Richard Gwyn spuriously argues that “the general condemnation of Macdonald as a racist 
simply doesn’t fit the man’s character. The term brings to mind the image of a grumpy 
misanthrope. Macdonald couldn’t have been less like that. He was very, very funny. He was 
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well read – not just the political stuff, but also novels (Trollope was a favorite) – and he 
could rattle off fine poetry by heart.” Although it is tempting to dismiss Gwyn’s vacuous 
suggestion that Macdonald’s “sense of humour” and interest in “fine” poetry somehow 
constitute exonerating proof of his righteous benevolence, there is, of course, a deeper and 
more insidious ethic underlying such vapid attempts at moral exculpation. Gwyn’s desire to 
turn a blind eye to the wilful and calculated racism at the heart of the IRS system bespeaks 
an overarching moral-obscurantism that is echoed by many Anglo-European Canadians. 
And when Conrad Black argues for a similar vindication of Macdonald by suggesting (rather 
ironically, given his own condescending tone) that, “The native people were less fortunate 
…and there is no doubt that they were short-changed, condescended to, and in a 
heartbreaking number of individual instances, mistreated [while attending residential 
schools]… But none of it justifies the invocation of the word genocide, which is a 
contemptible device to tar esteemed people like John A. Macdonald with the brush of Hitler, 
Stalin, Pol Pot, and others” (Black, “Canada’s Treatment”), a similar latent echo of casteism 
underlies his argument. 
Belying both men’s attempted vindications of our first Prime Minister is an insidious 
minimization of Indigenous trauma and a subtle imitation of Macdonald’s own xenophobic 
beliefs. In attempting to exculpate the legacy of the residential school system as “belonging 
to a distant time,” Black not only justifies Macdonald’s malicious view of the so-called 
Savage Indian, but he also reintroduces it to the present moment. In his blustering and 
grandiloquent way, Black’s attempted historical-distancing of the residential school system 
aims toward a form of moral vindication by doubling-down on the racial Othering that gave 
rise to the residential schools, in the first place. In attempting to justify the supposedly 
virtuous “civilizing” intentions of Macdonald and other residential school architects of the 
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time, Black perpetuates the racist exoticization of the Savage Indian while spuriously 
ignoring the fact that the largest number of forced removals occurred relatively recently, 
during the years between the so called Sixties Scoop and the late 1980s. Nonetheless, Black 
harkens back to a malignant and exaggerated caricature of the supposedly uncivilized Indian 
in an attempt to minimalize and exculpate the egregious IRS crimes. “Apart from a few mid-
western farming tribes and Pacific and Great Lakes inhabitants of log dwellings,” Black 
writes, “the First Nations did not have permanent buildings or agriculture, metal tools, or 
knitted fabrics. They were nomads, clothed in hides and skins, living in tents, surviving on 
fish and game, and usually at war, which included the torture to gruesome death of prisoners 
from other tribes and nations, including women and children.” Therefore, Black argues, “It 
is not the case that the Europeans have no right to be here, …we have made vastly more of 
this continent than its original inhabitants could have done,” adding: 
Despite everything, even the First Nations should be grateful that the 
Europeans came here. There has been quite enough shameful conduct to go 
round, including by some of the natives. Let us all repent past wrongdoing 
without demeaning histrionics and hyperbole, and be proud of whatever we 
are ethnically: all cultures and nationalities have their distinctions. The whole 
country must do what it can to atone for the past, but a continuing orgy of 
recriminations will be unjust in itself, produce a nasty backlash, and will 
aggravate grievances. (“Canada’s Treatment of Aboriginals”) 
In attempting to vindicate Macdonald from the quite appropriate charges of racism 
and xenophobia following the publication of the Final TRC Report, Black’s equally salacious 
evocation of the “Savage Indian” archetype suggests what Thomas King has called, white 
 298 
North America’s obsession with “maintaining the cult and sanctity of the Dead Indian”; that 
is, white North Americans’ refusal to see Indigenous, Métis, or Inuit peoples as anything 
other than the “savage” caricatures of early Westerns and folk tales. By rendering young 
Indigenous children as “primitive savages,” it is easier for apologists and deniers like 
Johnson and Black to absolve IRS perpetrators for attempting (“with the best of intentions”) 
to “civilize” them into the Anglo-European traditions of settler Canada, regardless of the 
tragic historical and intergenerational consequences. And it is precisely this dangerous form 
of “historical distancing” that the IRS photographic archive keeps alive. 
 
Fig’s 4.9 and 4.10 
Captions: “Thomas Moore upon entering the Regina Indian Residential School, circa 1896”; and “Thomas 
Moore ‘after tuition’ at the Regina Indian Residential School.” 
Source: Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan. R-A8223(1) and R-A8223(2). 
 
“In reconstructing a photographic history of residential schools,” Angel and 
Wakeham note, “a ‘scant handful’ of archival images have repeatedly been chosen over and 
above others, acquiring ‘iconic’ status as the definitive representation of the residential 
school experience” (100). In particular, the notorious and now iconic “before and after” 
portraits that many residential schools recorded would often embellish the anachronistic 
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archetype of the “Savage Indian” as a means of justifying the so-called “civilizing” effects of 
the IRS system through an entirely contrived comparative visual-story. The most iconic of 
these photographic diptychs, of Thomas Moore, a Cree student at the Regina Industrial 
School, depicts Moore according to two contrasting colonial archetypes: the “savage Indian” 
and the “civilized modern man” (see Fig 4.9 and 4.10). In Moore’s “before” image, the 
young child is portrayed as a seemingly “primitive” arrival to the residential school, 
presented in long braids and wearing a “traditional” buckskin wamus, a breechcloth with a 
beaded floral design, several long beaded necklaces, and moccasins; in his right hand, Moore 
holds a toy gun – “a prop that is perhaps supposed to construct Indigeneity as a threat to 
settler security” (“Witnessing in Camera,” 100). “To emphasize his ‘primitive’ state,” Sherry 
Farrell Racette notes, “the furniture and floor are covered with fur pelts” (53), yet as Racette 
points out, a modest “checked shirt” can be seen poking out from under his tunic at his 
wrists and neck, suggesting deliberate costuming by the photographer (53). In the “after” 
photograph (likely taken on the same day as the “before” image), Moore is now depicted 
with a conservatively trimmed haircut, in a tidy school uniform, and posed in a less 
confrontational stance – casually leaning on a stone column, suggesting a sense of 
confidence in his new role as a “modern, civilized young man.” Representative of the type of 
“before and after” diptychs that many residential schools recorded of their young wards, the 
photographs are meant to provide the viewer with visual evidence of the assimilating effects 
of residential school system. Although based on the utter pretense and artifice of costuming 
and the assembly of fabricated scenes, the diptychs encourage the viewer to impose their 
own conditions of power and control onto the “uncivilized” Other in a way that mirrors the 
supposed “controlling and civilizing” regime of the residential schools. 
Placing us, visually, in the position of the church or government-hired photographer 
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– our gaze projecting outward toward the victims – these images summon the viewer to a 
relationship of visual complicity with the perpetrators.  
Although the “before and after” diptychs are, perhaps, more explicit in their manner 
of drawing upon the visual field to impose conditions of power and control, many of the 
other seemingly spontaneous (or “unposed”) IRS archival photographs do so as well, albeit 
perhaps in a more understated way. While the unmistakable artifice of the “before and after” 
photos inevitably arouse the reader’s voyeuristic gaze through the portrayal of the archaic 
“Savage Indian” archetype, many of the other black-and-white IRS images evoke a similar 
viewer-response through their portrayal of Indigeneity via the visual markers of poverty and 
illness. In countless IRS photographs, both male and female students appear in filthy, ragged 
outfits, portrayed in overcrowded and dilapidated quarters or sprawled out in tattered 
hospital beds. In image after image, the viewer is presented with images of crowded, dirty, 
dilapidated barracks and classrooms, filled with sorrowful, exhausted-looking children. With 
their filthy hands and faces directly facing the camera, and dressed in their ragged, ill-fitting 
outfits, the children come across as sympathetic, pitiable creatures. By visually emphasizing 
depravity, these images represent the poverty-stricken children as wholly other from the 
report’s mainly middle-class readers, potentially evoking fear or disgust in a similar way as 
the earlier “Savage Indian” archetype had. In a way, the visual representation of Indigeneity 
via the visual markers of poverty and illness represents a modern update on the “primitive” 
and  “uncivilized” trope. 
Echoing the type of voyeuristic class-consciousness made famous by early American 
documentary photographers, such as Margaret Bourke-White’s photographic study of 
Depression-era tenant farmers in the deep American South, You Have Now Seen Their Faces 
(1937), the IRS images produce a similar visual catalogue of Indigenous poverty within the 
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collective settler-Canadian Imaginary. Bourke-White, who Caleb Crain once described as 
“lay[ing] in wait for her subjects with a flash,” glibly boasted of her ability to “imprison” her 
impoverished subjects “on a sheet of film before they knew what had happened” (qtd. in 
Sontag, On Photography 192-93). In a way, the IRS images work to similarly “imprison” the 
residential school children in the mind’s eye of the report’s readers. 
  
Fig 4.11 (Volume 1: History, Part 1, p. 554) 
Caption: “During his 1925 inspection of the Round Lake, Saskatchewan, school, W. S. Murison commented 
that he had never seen ‘such patched and ragged looking clothing as worn by the boys’.”  
Source: United Church of Canada Archives, 93–049P1162. 
 
Situated within a visual spectrum of colonial hegemony, the viewer’s gaze pierces 
these images of abject, racialized poverty, giving the spectator an illusion of penetrating the 
private “exoticized” world of their subjects. Here, cultural curiosity and “the desire to look” 
mix with the sense of power derived from projecting one’s class-advantage over an other, 
giving rise to a crude set of power relations that organize vision and visual space according 
to the “spectacle” of surveillance within a settler-colonial context. Inculcating this optical 
power structure, the reader is free to enact his or her power over the residential school 
victims through observing, or surveilling them.  
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Fig 4.12 (Volume 1: History, Part 1, p. 554) 
Caption: “Boys at the Lac La Ronge, Saskatchewan, school.” 
Source: General Synod Archives, Anglican Church of Canada, P7538–229.  
(Volume 1: Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, Part 1: Origins to 1939) 
 
 
Emphasizing the inter-personal dynamics between the photographer (who shares a 
single visual perspective with the viewer) and their subjects, these images represent what 
Linda Nochlin calls, “the meeting of two subjectivities,” within the complex dynamics of 
racialized, gendered, and class-based power structures (29). Demonstrating that power is 
produced most acutely in the form of unreciprocated visual operations, Susan Sontag 
similarly suggests: “to take a photograph is to participate in another person’s [...] mortality, 
vulnerability, mutability” (On Photography 15). Given this unreciprocated visual power relation 
– the idea that to view someone, to penetrate them visually, is to exorcise power over them – 
the readers are therefore free to engage in a “fantasy of power” derived from penetrating the 
visual depths of these images. As Sieglinde Lemke suggests: 
Perhaps it goes without saying that in social documentary photography and 
particularly in portraits of poor people, the two subjectivities do not meet on 
equal terms. The impoverished subject is, obviously, more vulnerable than 
the artist. Controlling the camera and the production of the photograph 
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equals power... The poor person is relegated to the status of being looked at. 
This is of course inevitably the case in all of portrait photography… 
[however] in light of the class hierarchy, this power relation has larger 
repercussions. Being a passive object, the poor person is subjected to the 
professional gaze of the photographer and, once the portrait is exhibited, to 
the gaze of the spectator... All photography invites voyeurism, but, given the 
class divisions that are always already inscribed in poverty portraiture, the 
social divide and distance between the two subjectivities is even more 
pronounced. (100) 
Furthermore, the spurious visual representation of Indigeneity as being “historically 
marked by poverty and illness” obscures the reality that the trauma of the IRS system is one 
of the root causes of contemporary social and economic issues for today’s generations of 
Indigenous youths. Such class-based obfuscation works in concert with the “historical 
distancing” of the black-and-white photographs to imply that this is something that 
happened “long ago” and has no relevant cultural repercussions today. By erroneously 
framing poverty as being intrinsic to Indigeneity, and concurrently placing the residential 
school system “into the distant past,” these images block the reader from historically 
contextualizing the residential schools alongside the devastating intergenerational 
repercussions of the system. 
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Fig 4.13 (Volume 1: History, Part 2, p. 102) 
Caption: “Students from the Morley, Alberta, school. Throughout their history, the schools were not funded or 
staffed to function as child-welfare institutions in a manner that would allow them to provide the appropriate 
level of personal and emotional care children need.” 
Source: United Church of Canada Archives, 93-049P798. 
  
However, as Richard Wagamese poignantly illustrates, for many Indigenous, Métis, 
and Inuit youths, the IRS system is the very source of intergenerational poverty and illness, in 
the first place. In his recent collection of nonfiction essays, One Story, One Song (2011), 
Wagamese refers to the residential schools as “a spectre in our midst.” He writes: 
I AM A VICTIM of Canada’s residential school system. I never attended a 
residential school, so I cannot say that I survived one. However, my parents 
and my extended family members did. The pain they endured became my 
pain, too. Having attended residential school, the members of my family 
returned to the land bearing heavy psychological, emotional and spiritual 
burdens... Each of the adults had suffered in an institution that tried to 
scrape the Indian out of their insides, and they came back to the bush raw, 
sore and aching... And once they discovered that alcohol could numb their 
deep hurt and isolation, we ceased to be a family. From within their trauma, 
the adults around me struck out vengefully, like frightened children. When I 
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was a toddler, my left arm and shoulder were smashed... My siblings and I 
endured great tides of violence and abuse. We were beaten, nearly drowned 
and terrorized. (Wagamese 27-28) 
 After a vivid description of his experience being abandoned, along with his two 
brothers and sister, in a bush camp at age three, only to be found by a passing Ontario 
provincial policeman and taken to the Children’s Aid Society, the novelist describes his 
subsequent early life in foster homes until being adopted at age nine: “I would not see my 
mother or my extended family again for twenty-one years” (28). “For years after that,” 
Wagamese continues: 
I lived on the street or in prison. I became a drug user and an alcoholic. I was 
haunted for years by bad memories. Although I was too young to remember 
what had happened, I carried the residual trauma of my toddler years. I grew 
up ashamed and angry that there was no one to tell me where I had come 
from ...I ascribed all of my pain to the residential schools, and I hated those I 
held responsible. I blamed the churches that had run those schools for my 
alcoholism, my loneliness, my fears and my failures. In my mind, I envisaged 
a world where I could have grown up as a fully functioning Ojibway, and that 
glittered in comparison to the pain-wracked life I had lived. (28-29) 
  
 “As a writer and a journalist,” Wagamese adds, “I have spoken to hundreds of 
residential school survivors. Their stories have told me a great deal about how my own 
family had suffered” (29). Wagamese’s reflections on the intergenerational effects of the 
residential school experience echo the recorded statements of thousands of other survivors, 
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as well as those of their children. Elaine Durocher, for instance, recounts in the TRC report 
volume, The Survivors Speak, how she “learned the tools for a life on the fringes of society in 
the sex trade.” She reveals:  
They were there to discipline you, teach you, beat you, rape you, molest you, 
but I never got an education. I knew how to run. I knew how to manipulate. 
Once I knew that I could get money for touching, and this may sound bad, 
but once I knew that I could touch a man’s penis for candy, that set the pace 
for when I was a teenager, and I could pull tricks as a prostitute. That’s what 
the residential school taught me. It taught me how to lie, how to manipulate, 
how to exchange sexual favours for cash, meals, whatever, whatever the case 
may be. (The Survivors Speak 120) 
  
In light of Durocher’s testimony, and the thousands of survivors like her, Wagamese notes, 
“People who have been hurt often go on to hurt others, and our unhealed pain as Native 
people has deeply affected the lives of our children” (189). As reiterated in the final volume 
of the TRC report, The Legacy: 
 The research literature and Survivors’ statements to the Commission suggest 
that the legacy of residential schools is a significant factor in the over-
representation of Aboriginal children in the child welfare system. According 
to a Saskatchewan study, there is strong evidence that “the residential school 
period [was] the beginning of an intergenerational cycle of neglect and abuse. 
This cycle is seen as one very important contributor to the significant over-
representation of First Nations and Métis children and families in child 
welfare systems in the country today.” (31) 
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 In light of this current evidence, Wagamese concludes: “Truth and Reconciliation are 
not,” as he puts it, “‘all about the survivors.’ They are about the descendants of those 
survivors, too. The brunt of the residential school experience is being borne by the younger 
generation... For every dollar paid out to the original survivors, an equal dollar amount 
should go to initiatives geared towards empowering our kids: education, employment, 
healing. That’s how we’ll achieve real reconciliation” (188-189). 
 This vital link between the residential schools and “an intergenerational cycle of 
neglect and abuse,” which Wagamese’s testimony illustrates, is precisely what the erroneous 
“historical distancing” of the residential school photographs obscure from the reader. By 
concealing the realities of the IRS system, the photographic images portray a false sense of 
“educational normalcy” at the residential schools and erroneously constitute Indigeneity as 
commensurate with poverty and illness (as opposed to Canada’s long history of racist and 
colonial oppression, upon which the IRS system was founded, giving rise to systematic and 
intergenerational economic disadvantages for generations of Indigenous communities). At 
the same time, the photo-archive obscures the historical recentness of the residential school 
system, inaccurately implying that the traumas of the IRS occurred “long ago” in distant 
history. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the IRS photographs present a remarkably 
incomplete visual-story of the residential schools by failing to portray the most damaging 
scenes of oppression and abuse that occurred, particularly those scenes of: children being 
torn from their mother’s arms by Indian Agents and RCMP officers, the rampant physical 
and psychological abuse and widespread molestation of children as young as six years of age, 
the nonconsensual and unregulated medical and pharmaceutical experimentation on young 
Indigenous children, the unbridled malnutrition of victims as a means of disciplinary control, 
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and the many deep-seated and long-lasting intergenerational repercussions of the IRS on 
current and future generations of Indigenous men, women, and children. 
 In light of the “Schedule ‘N’” mandate to protect the identity of the perpetrators, it 
is no surprise that ther Final Report presents a “visual story” that both compliments and 
perpetuates the “truncated passive” voice of the written report. In both the visual and 
written narratives, the reader’s unreciprocated gaze is continually directed exclusively toward 
the victims and always away from the perpetrators. Refusing to “name names” or reveal the 
identities of the assailants, both image and text work with each other to re-frame the legacy 
of the residential schools as a “sad chapter in our history” that is now seemingly closed 
(Harper, Statement of Apology) and also seemingly ethically “distant.” Guided and organized 
entirely according to the authority of the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate,” the Final Report presents 
the nation with a radically skewed narrative of the residential school legacy that cleanses it of 
any allusion to criminality or the individual perpetration of human rights abuses, instead 
reframing the IRS system in general, ill-defined language of victimhood and survival. 
  
Fig 4.14 (Volume 1: History, Part 2, p. 102) 
Caption: “Girls at the Gordon’s, Saskatchewan, school. A 1967 study of nine residential schools in 
Saskatchewan concluded that 59.1% of the students enrolled were there for what were termed ‘welfare reasons’ 
and 40.9% for ‘education reasons’.” 
Source: General Synod Archives, Anglican Church of Canada, M2008-10-P14. 
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Resisting the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate”: 
 
 In light of this skewed dual-narrative, readers are left asking: “how, then, to challenge 
and refuse the authority of the Mandate?” One place we might start is Kent Monkman’s 
recent series of paintings featured in his 2017 exhibit, Shame and Prejudice: A Story of Resilience. 
Several of these works, depicting church and RCMP officials tearing Indigenous children 
from their mother’s arms, resituate the IRS crimes in their proper historical context – 
perhaps taking place during the “Sixties-Scoop” or later, with both the children and their 
mothers dressed in characteristic contemporary garb, as opposed to the anachronistic 
“costumes” depicted in the IRS photographs – and allow the viewer to visually contemplate 
some of the scenes that are “missing” from the residential school photographic archive. 
Moreover, the paintings also provide the viewer with the perpetrator’s “faces” (although 
fictional) of the Anglo-European RCMP officers, clergymen and women, and Indian Agents 
who terrorized Indigenous communities – but remain utterly obscured from the Final Report. 
 
 
Fig. 4.15  Kent Monkman. “The Scream.” 2017. Acrylic on Canvas. Shame and Prejudice: A Story of Resilience. Art 
Museum at the University of Toronto. 
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At the opening of Monkman’s exhibition at the Art Museum at the University of 
Toronto, which coincided with Canada’s sesquicentennial anniversary, the text from 
Macdonald’s 1883 speech to the House of Commons hung in large type across from his 
painting “The Scream” (Fig. 4.15), depicting a throng of RCMP officers, nuns, and priests 
wrestling children from their mothers’ arms. 
“One of the things that I wanted to achieve,” Monkman suggested in an interview 
with the Huffington Post, “was to make history paintings that are reflective of events that have 
never been authorized to art history” (Paling, “Kent Monkman Walks Canada Back Through 
Time”). In a way, Monkman’s IRS paintings demonstrate that these images have also never 
been authorized to Canada’s shared historical narrative of the residential school system. 
Opening up the conventional visual narrative, Monkman’s paintings radically intervene into 
the seemingly “perpetratorless” mandate of “Schedule ‘N’” in a way that upsets and reverses 
the conventional “unreciprocated” gaze of the settler-Canadian. In the IRS photo-archive, 
the viewer’s gaze is always directed solely on the victims in a visual relationship that 
simultaneously circumscribes a uniquely Canadian form of class-consciousness while also 
fetishizing the racialized bodies of Indigenous, Inuit, and Métis men, women, and children. 
By continually directing the reader’s gaze upon the Indigenous child’s racialized body – and 
presenting those bodies as the sole targets of the lust of the Anglo-European IRS 
perpetrators – both the text and the images of the Final Report codify Indigeneity according 
to the scopophilic desires of its white middle-class audience. 
In an earlier painting by Monkman, “History is Painted by the Victors” (2013) (Fig 
4.16), the artist’s muse and alter-ego – Miss Chief Eagle Testicle – appears standing at the 
foot of a sublime mountainous landscape, painting at an easel. Before her appear a group of 
young, naked white men, arranged in an extravagant sexualized display for her sole study. A 
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queer satirical reversal of the traditional Western fetishization of indigenous bodies, this 
piece stands as exemplary of Monkman’s overall approach to the visual-representation of 
Canadian history. By reversing the conventional settler-Indigenous roles, Monkman’s works 
redirect the Anglo-European viewer’s typical voyeuristic gaze back toward him or herself, 
foregrounding the implicit racialized and class-based fetishization that is inherent in this 
seemingly banal “visual” exchange of power relations. 
 
Fig 4.16 Kent Monkman. “History is Painted by the Victors” (2013). Acrylic on canvas. Shame and Prejudice: A 
Story of Resilience. Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
 
 In this way, Monkman’s works intrude upon the dominant historical narrative that 
typically presents the Indigenous body as an object of the settler-Canadian gaze. Challenging 
the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate,” these images call into question the visual “syntax” of the IRS 
photographic archive – demanding that the story of the residential school system be told in 
the “active” voice, as opposed to the “truncated passive.” Not beholden to the Indian 
Residential School Settlement Agreement, Monkman’s paintings are free to “name names” 
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(whether fictional or not) and to make direct reference to the “civil or criminal liability” of 
the church emissaries, RCMP officers, and agents of the Federal Government who willfully 
enacted these crimes upon thousands of young Indigenous children. In doing so, 
Monkman’s paintings reverse the viewer’s gaze, redirecting it toward the perpetrators and, as 
a result, reframing the IRS crimes from “something that happened to Indigenous children” to 
“something that an entire class of adult men and women deliberately carried out” – thereby, 
opening up a discursive space through which to address issues of historical accountability 
and providing an outlet toward which to direct our collective judgments of blame and 
responsibility. 
 
Fig. 4.17  Kent Monkman. “A Mother’s Grief” (2017). Acrylic on Canvas. Shame and Prejudice: A Story of 
Resilience. Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
 
 313 
 
Fig. 4.18  Kent Monkman. “Study for Mother and Child.” 2016. Acrylic on Panel. Shame and Prejudice: A Story of 
Resilience. Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
 
Fig. 4.19  Kent Monkman. “Study for the Removal of Children.” 2016. Acrylic on Panel. Shame and Prejudice: A 
Story of Resilience. Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
 
In a similar way, Jeff Barnaby’s 2013 film, Rhymes for Young Ghouls, likewise challenges 
the conventional narrative form that renders IRS victims as the exclusive object of settler-
Canadians’ unreciprocated gaze. In resituating the residential school consequences in their 
proper (contemporary) historical context, Rhymes – like Monkman’s paintings – re-aims the 
viewer’s gaze away from the victims and toward the perpetrators, while simultaneously 
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underscoring the deep-rooted and ongoing aftereffects of the IRS system on today’s 
generation of young Indigenous Canadians. 
Far from a cerebral study of the cultural vicissitudes of “reconciliation,” Rhymes for 
Young Ghouls instead works as a violent revenge-fantasy – telling the story of fifteen year-old 
Aila, a young Mi’kmaq girl on the fictional Red Crow reserve, who supports herself by selling 
drugs after the death of her mother and the subsequent imprisonment of her father. Using 
the proceeds from her illegal business, Aila is able to bribe the ruthless Indian Agent, Popper 
– referred to as paying a “truancy tax” – in order to avoid compulsory attendance at the 
fictional St. Dymphna’s residential school. When her drug-money is stolen one day, Aila and 
her friends plan a desperate scheme to break into “St. D’s” and steal the money required to 
keep her out of the residential school system. With her father returning home from jail and 
the discovery of her plan by Popper, Aila’s world is suddenly turned upside-down. Forced to 
assimilate into the residential school system by Popper and a group of equally vicious nuns, 
Rhymes for Young Ghouls plunges into a brutally candid depiction of the physical, sexual, and 
psychological violence at the heart of the IRS system. The series of haunting scenes that take 
place within St. Dymphna’s are unsettling in their brutal depiction of even the slightest 
interaction between child and perpetrator; every touch, every glance is rendered a blistering 
torment.  
In a searing, critically acclaimed sequence, Aila is savagely stripped of her clothing 
and shorn of her braids by two sinister nuns after being taken into custody at “St. D’s,” 
before being violently bathed and forced into a dark cell (see Fig. 4.20 and 4.21). Chided by a 
menacing priest-figure and the ever-brooding Popper – who howls, “From here on in, it’s 
the Queen’s fucking English. Relish it!” – Aila’s impending faceoff with the forbidding 
church figures and Indian Agent go on to constitute the main narrative arc of Rhymes. 
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Fig. 4.20 Barnaby, 2014. Rhymes For Young Ghouls [film still]. 
 
In Barnaby’s film, the perpetrators are always the central protagonists. The brutal, 
violent scenes that initially garnered the film much critical recognition is, at all times, enacted 
by an individual assailant. While the unstinting portrayals of physical and sexual abuse within 
the walls of the residential schools may provide the preliminary talking points regarding the 
film, it is the brooding and terrorizing Popper, along with the church officials, who are 
always the focal point. 
  
Fig. 4.21 and Fig. 4.22 Barnaby, 2014. Rhymes For Young Ghouls [film still]. 
  
Before escaping from St. Dymphna’s with the help of a young male friend, Aila 
manages to carry out her original plan to steal twenty thousand dollars from the residential 
school – a somewhat stale allegory for the monetary reparations obtained in the IRS 
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Settlement Agreement. Fleeing with her father, with the aim of starting a new life together, 
the two ultimately engage in a climactic discussion regarding the intergenerational trauma of 
the IRS system and the urgency of stopping the all-too-common cycle of post-IRS abuse. 
This critical and weighty conversation, however, is interrupted when Popper intervenes, 
brutally beating Joseph before turning on Aila. While Popper attempts to rape the young girl, 
Joseph regains just enough strength to intervene, setting up a final, nauseatingly graphic 
scene: a closed-shot frame of Popper’s face, as Joseph fires the Indian Agent’s own rifle into 
it. The film ends with Aila’s father falsely confessing to Popper’s murder in order to shield 
Aila and the boy from legal persecution, his sacrifice providing the younger generation of 
Indigenous youths with a desperately needed release from the intergenerational cycle of IRS 
trauma. 
 In its vivid portrayal of the deep-rooted aftereffects of the residential schools – 
namely alcoholism, suicide, poverty, and imprisonment – Rhymes For Young Ghouls bears 
witness to Wagamese’s claim regarding the “intergenerational cycle of neglect and abuse” set 
in motion by the IRS system. In directly resisting the implicit deference to the “Schedule ‘N’ 
Mandate” that guides the Final TRC Report, Barnaby’s film – like Monkman’s paintings – 
drags the settler-Canadian gaze away from the historically-instilled impulse to regulate the 
Indigenous body and, instead, toward an awareness of the perpetrators as willful-agents of 
systematized colonial persecution. At the same time, Rhymes For Young Ghouls provides the 
viewer with an alternative visual-narrative to the official IRS photo-archive, which 
emphasizes the historical recentness22 of the residential school system and demonstrates the 
degree to which the process of truth-telling extends far beyond the scope and form of the 
Final Report. As Chelsea Vowel argues: 
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The format, the beautiful cinematography, the amazing script, and a stellar 
cast makes [Rhymes For Young Ghouls] part of our collective history accessible 
in a way that no Royal Commission or official report can hope to match. 
More importantly, it utterly rips apart the notion that by beginning to gather 
an account of the residential school system we are in any way done the last 
bit of truth telling we need to undergo in this country. (Vowel, “Why Every 
Canadian Should Watch Rhymes for Young Ghouls”) 
 
 
Looking Forward: 
 
As Vowel suggests, it is precisely those cultural artifacts produced independently of 
the monophonic narrative framework of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that 
demonstrate just how far we still have to go in the “truth-telling” process. Those films, 
photographs, paintings, museums, novels, and personal histories that provoke and challenge 
the “Schedule ‘N’” mandate of the TRC contribute to a multi-media “truth-telling” tapestry, 
reminding us that all public acts of remembrance are part of a collaborative process of 
cultural “negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing.” To the extent that historical novels 
are informed by photographs, films by oral testimonies, monuments by written stories, and 
vice versa, in a reciprocal nexus of “cultural remembrance,” the most effective way to preserve 
and sustain the memories of IRS victims is to engage fully with the multi-media pastiche of 
memory products that work with, against, and alongside to one another. A polyphony of 
voices and perspectives – including those of the perpetrators – is urgently required in order 
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to contribute to a comprehensive and constructive historical account of the residential 
school legacy. 
Given that the Final Report has quickly become the leading document for the ways in 
which many Canadians have come to know (and will subsequently come to remember, 
across generations), the devastating consequences of Canada’s colonial history, it is 
important that we rethink the ethical and cultural consequences of delineating the 
reconciliatory process according to the exclusive mandates of “Schedule ‘N’.” More 
specifically, in enabling the IRS Settlement Agreement to determine the political, cultural, 
and ideological context(s) according to which the residential school legacy is entered into the 
fabric of our shared cultural storytelling process, both Indigenous and Non-Indigenous 
Canadians alike risk transmuting the reconciliatory process into a perverse “voyeuristic” 
reflection on a watered-down version of history. 
It will be especially important, in the ensuing years and decades, to keep a careful and 
vigilant eye on how the Final Report evolves, as these historical events are reconsidered and 
recontextualized in later editions and adaptations of the report. A rigorous mapping of these 
ever-changing revisions and reappraisals will be crucial for understanding how future 
generations will come to reckon with the legacy of the residential schools and for 
acknowledging how future acts of reconciliation will be performed by its readers. Given the 
solemn and far-reaching weight of the Final Report and its afterlife as a living historical and 
political artifact, it will be essential for us to continually monitor its socio-political evolution 
– especially considering how specific iterations of previous truth commission reports have 
often become hegemonic in public discourse as they were continually revised and 
reinterpreted. This was certainly the case during Nestor Kirchner’s 2003-06 Presidency in 
Argentina, in which his administration officially “re-wrote” the Nunca Más report in an 
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attempt to portray the Kirchner period (rather than the formal return to democracy in 1983) 
as the key tipping-point in which social demands for truth and justice finally found their true 
champion (Crenzel, The Memory 137). 
To this end, the cultural and political importance of the Canadian TRC Report cannot 
be overstated as the historical narrative that it sets forth continues to proliferate as both an 
educational tool and a vehicle for the implementation and achievement of reconciliation. As 
outlined in the “Schedule ‘N’ Mandate,” the primary purpose of creating the Final Report is 
the development of what the Commissioners call, “collective community narratives about 
the impact of the IRS system on former students, families and communities” (“Schedule ‘N’ 
Mandate”). And given that the initial Parliamentary report on the establishment of the TRC 
defines “reconciliation” as: “a new relationship between the parties concerned that emerges 
as a consequence of the commission and the truth it has reported on” (Schedule “N” of 
IRSSA), there exists a clear and unequivocal interconnection between the production of the 
Final Report, the “collective community narratives” that it proliferates and extends amongst 
the current and future generations of Canadians, and the performance and enactment of 
“acts of reconciliation.” Put simply, the Final Report on the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has been envisioned from the outset as the moral, political, and cultural blueprint 
for the national project of reconciliation – the bringing together of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians within a framework of forgiveness, mercy, and fellowship – yet it is 
implicitly guided by an underlying refusal by the perpetrators to allow themselves to be seen 
or heard. 
If, as Jacques Derrida suggests, forgiveness is a form of self-accusation – a turning of 
attention, a pointing one’s finger, toward themselves in order to declare, “I have done wrong!” – 
then the promise of Canadian reconciliation can not truly begin without a genuine and 
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sincere “turn toward the past” (Derrida 28). In the theatre of forgiveness, the audience must 
hear the repentant man speak, which, at least until now, the Canadian TRC has not allowed. 
It is in this context, as the nation looks ahead toward a renewed relationship, 
grounded in forgiveness and hope, that an acute and rigorous understanding of the complex 
ways in which this momentous socio-cultural document has extended the private patterns of 
memory and mourning into a comprehensive historical narrative is crucial for future 
generations of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, alike. Because the process of 
reconciliation will not stop when all of the personal, lived-memories of the residential school 
system will be lost, it is more urgent than ever that the voices of both sides coalesce into a 
single, comprehensive narrative. In the words that Richard Wagamese concludes his own 
personal meditation on the pain, hope, expectations of the reconciliatory process:  
  It’s a big word, reconciliation. It requires truth and true humility, on both 
sides. As Aboriginal people, we have an incredible capacity for survival and 
endurance, as well as for forgiveness. In reconciling with ourselves, we find 
the ability to create harmony with others. That is where it has to start - in the 
fertile soil of our own hearts, minds, and spirits. (Wagamese 45) 
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Sparks from a torch being used by maintenance staff during a repair job ignited a fire in the engine room of the 
Sturgeon Landing, Saskatchewan, school in 1952. The fire quickly spread and burned the school to the 
ground. St. Boniface Historical Society Archives, Fonds, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Keewatin – Le Pas, 
N3637.  
(Volume 1: Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, Part 2: 1939 to 2000. 
 
                                                
Chapter 3 Notes: 
 
1  In this sense, a “restorative” framework bespeaks of a traumatized yet unified 
cultural community, while “reconciliation” implies the restoring of relations between of two 
or more disengaged or isolated communities. 
2            In Chile, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that over four hundred 
alleged perpetrators were guilty of human rights violations and, based on the Commission’s 
recommendations, several hundred criminal cases were opened. In the case of South Africa, 
the Commission was set up to hear testimony from thousands of alleged perpetrators 
concerning their involvement in the Apartheid system, granting conditional amnesty or 
recommending criminal prosecution to domestic courts, when appropriate. In each case, the 
Commissions had powers to subpoena, search, and seize the assets of alleged perpetrators in 
order to compel them to answer questions in a court of law (even if such answers were self-
 322 
                                                                                                                                            
incriminating), while each Commission was also appointed the difficult task of providing 
rulings on both former and sitting government officials. 
3  In respect of The Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) and the Anishinabek of 
Ontario, I opt to use the term “Indigenous” in referring to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis 
peoples. Since the term “Indian” is a foreign word, and given that the root meaning of the 
word Aboriginal, “ab,” is a Latin prefix meaning “away from” or “not,” neither are adequate 
terms when referring to the earliest inhabitants of our land. When refencing the Indian 
Residential School System, I abide by the terminology of the report. Likewise, when 
referring to the “Indian Act” or “Indian Agents,” I do so in accordance with their (current 
or historical) legal designations, in spite of my own personal misgivings. 
44  The term “Sixties Scoop” refers to the Canadian government’s increased practice of 
taking, or “scooping up,” Indigenous children from their families and communities for 
placement in residential schools or in foster homes. Despite the reference to one decade, the 
Sixties Scoop actually began in the late 1950s and persisted into the 1980s. It is estimated 
that, during this time, a total of 20,000 aboriginal children were taken from their families and 
fostered or adopted out to primarily white middle-class families. For a detailed account of 
the “Sixties Scoop” see: Crey, Ernie, & Fournier, Suzanne. Stolen From Our Embrace. The 
Abduction of First Nations Children and the Restoration of Aboriginal Communities. Vancouver: D&M 
Publishers Inc, 1998. 
5  This was later increased to $475 million. 
6  This was later extended to six years. 
7  The mandate refers only to an interdiction against “domestic legal action,” meaning, 
putatively, the Government of Canada (as well as the various Church organizations, 
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members of the RCMP, and former “Indian agents”) could still be tried at a future date 
according to “universal jurisdiction” arbitrage. In other words, a criminal case could 
hypothetically be brought against perpetrators of the Indian Residential School system in Spain, 
for instance, where the Spanish High Court recognizes the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
8  Prime Minister Harper would also undercut this self-professed “historic” apology 
just over one year later, when he told a group of reporters at a press conference during the 
2009 G8 Summit that Canada has “no history of colonialism…. We are unique in that 
regard” (Ljunggren). 
9  In fact, a collection of excerpts from the survivor testimonies – co-edited by CBC 
journalist Shelagh Rogers – and published by the Aboriginal Healing Fund, was titled 
Speaking My Truth: Reflections on Reconciliation and Residential School (2012). 
10  For instance, alongside thousands of victim-statements collected at TRC hearings, 
the editors of the Final Report have expertly weaved together personal statements from 
church and government officials extracted from a host of academic studies and personal 
memoirs, such as:  Nicolas Coccola’s They Call Me Father: Memoirs of Father Nicolas Coccola 
(1988); H. W. Gibbon Stocken’s Among the Blackfoot and Sarcee (1976); The Letters of Margaret 
Butcher: Missionary-Imperialism on the North Pacific Coast [Edited by Mary-Ellen Kelm] (2006); 
Rosemary R. Gagan’s A Sensitive Independence: Canadian Methodist Women Missionaries in Canada 
and the Orient, 1881–1925 (1992); and Ruth Matheson Buck’s The Doctor Rode Side-Saddle 
(1974). 
11  The exception to this syntactical pattern is an equally unusual, and highly ambiguous, 
alternative that replaces the active-Subject with the indeterminate denomination “Canada.” 
In these instances, it is vaguely stated that: “Canada’s Aboriginal policy [was] to eliminate 
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Aboriginal governments” (Final Report: Volume 1, 3); “[Canada] disempowered Aboriginal 
women” (3); “Canada outlawed Aboriginal spiritual practices”; and “Canada separated 
children from their parents” (ibid., 4. Italics mine). Here the impersonal neutralization of the 
active-Subject again subverts the agency of those actual, historical perpetrators who willfully 
enacted these policies, and cunningly transfers responsibility onto an ahistorical and 
imaginary conception of the nation, “Canada.” 
12  Such as the testimony of a child who had escaped from the Kuper Island School, “he 
‘was afraid of Father [name redacted], as he had been trying unnatural acts with him, also 
other boys’” (Milloy 566). 
13  The effect would have and could have been lessened had the structure been, for 
instance, “Sam had been hurt.” 
14  I use the terms “voyeurism” and “scopophilia” here to describe a particular pleasure in 
looking that is derived from viewing a distant other and projecting one’s fantasies, usually 
sexual, onto that person, and a particular form of narcissism, a recognition of one’s self in 
the image of an other we are viewing. In my use of the term, I intend to describe the precise 
manner in which indigenous violence is presented to the white fetishized gaze at the nexus 
of power, politics, and pleasure. 
Both words’ associations lean toward perversion, which is not necessarily 
pathological, but can be. Arguably, in the context of reading torture recountings, Scopophilia 
arises in the context of – to put it colloquially – peeking, fulfilling the desire to see what has 
been hidden, rendered taboo or uncivilized, and perhaps the Sartrean desire to be discovered 
deriving pleasure from the scene.  While the Report’s purpose is to unhide the acts and the 
recipients’ experiences, there is still an inevitable “curtain” effect, because while the acts and 
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experiences may be in full narrative view, readers are allowed to stay behind a curtain as 
unidentified individually. The curtain is the term “Canada,” which hides not only the 
predominantly white perpetrators then, but also Canadian readers’ multi-racial and ethnic and 
religious make up now. However, in trying to operationalize that wish (true wish fulfillment), 
the writers of the Report put readers in this potentially perverse position of unintentionally 
and unconsciously desiring (by reading) to “peek” (and its an immersive peek) at torture. 
15  In light of various global shifts in terms of criminal and civil law (which have moved 
away from subject-focused justice to put more emphasis on proving crime and creating 
redress), we might be tempted to ask why the crimes, themselves, should not be considered 
more significant than the person(s) who committed them. For instance, those who advocate 
a Restorative judicial approach might suggest that an insistence on publicly “outing” criminal 
perpetrators implies that a particular model of justice (what we might call an active-subject 
focused judicial approach and thus a civilized evolution of justice-as-personal revenge 
model) is right and obvious. While I have no intention of engaging in a broad-ranging 
declamation on judicial ideology (nor am I qualified to do so), this point does warrant an 
explanation here. 
Indeed, throughout the course of this chapter, I am implying (perhaps even 
advocating) a very particular mode of justice, but it is not so much based on personal 
revenge. Rather, it is grounded in the idea and promise that the Final Report represents the 
foundation for national reconciliation. And, as previous Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions have established, reconcilation-as-justice necessitates the active participation of 
perpetrators and the very public outing of their crimes. I would argue that this is not 
necessarily a type of revenge or retribution per se, but there is surely an element of 
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punishment inherent in reconciliatory justice (at least until the Canadian case). The South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for instance, was very much predicated on its 
power to both subpoena perpetrators, compelling them to provide detailed testimony of 
their crimes, and to then either prosecute or amnesty those individuals based on this 
testimony. Likewise, the Chilean, Colombian, Peruvian, Congolese, Ghanan, Fijian, East 
Timorese, as well as the currently-unfolding Gambian and the uncompleted Yugoslav Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions were (and are) each similarly dependant on both the active 
participation of perpetrators (by way of subpoena) as well as the threat of criminal 
punishment.  
In this sense, reconcliation (as both a legal concept and a moral project) is grounded 
in the very idea that the victims and perpetrators openly acknowledge both the crimes that 
have been committed as well as the trauma that has resulted from them, and then agree to 
work toward redressing the harm caused by those actions. In other words, the victims 
cannot come together with the perpetrators and bystanders to enact the project of 
reconciliation if the perpetrators are never pressured into giving their testimony and 
acknowledging their roles in crimes. In fact, I would go so far as to suggest their non-
participation inhibits the healing of the victims and precludes the possibility of reconciliation. 
However, since “reconciliation” is the type of justice being marketed to Canadians 
here (as opposed to the outright punitive approach of the Nuremberg Trials or the 
restorative approach of the Argentine “Trial of the Juntas”), it is essential that the perpetrators 
be held accountable for their crimes (or at the very least are “outed” as perpetrators). 
Otherwise, this can only ever be a Truth Commission, with no potential for reconciliation.  
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16         According to legend, “Lady Godiva” – an English noblewoman and wife of Sir 
Leofric, Earl of Mercia – agreed to her husband’s proposition that he would reduce 
unpopular taxes only if she rode naked on horseback through Coventry’s marketplace. 
According to later versions of the story, nobody watched except “peeping Tom,” who was 
struck blind in punishment. Perhaps there is a metaphor, then, to be drawn between the 
lawmaking Earl and the government of Canada, who consented to the Settlement 
Agreement if the victims could be paraded throughout the nation at the various regional 
TRC events and, ultimately, within the pages of the Final Report. If we can be permitted to 
draw such a crude metaphor, it would be the settler Canadian readers who are then thrust 
into the position of “peeping Tom.” 
17  However, when presented in the “truncated passive” voice, the reader is 
unencumbered by the moral obligations associated with the typical “active” testimonial 
syntax. When we read or listen to a victim – such as Señor Urquiza – describe their abuse in 
a way that focuses our readerly attention on their abuser, our indignation is easily transferred 
to the assailant, rearranging the scene from a voyeuristic spectacle of “individual pain” into a 
demonstration of willful moral and legal transgression. 
18  In addition to the laconic rhythm of the repetitive and ill-defined accounts of abuse, 
the juxtaposition between the somewhat erudite prose-style of the overarching narrative and 
the uncouth (or perhaps, unrefined) vernacular of the victim-testimony produces what I 
might call a uniquely Canadian form of class-consciousness, which encourages the 
voyeuristic “gaze” of the settler-Canadian. 
19  This racist rhetoric was famously repeated by Conservative Senator Lynn Beyak, 
when she defended the residential school system in the Senate Chamber in March 2017, 
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lamenting that the “good deeds” accomplished by “well-intentioned” religious teachers have 
been overshadowed by negative reports documented by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. See: Tasker, John Paul. “Conservative senator defends ‘well-intentioned 
residential school system.” CBC News. 
20  Deontology refers to the moral philosophy that judges morality based on duty (deon) 
or obligation, and most commonly refers to the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that it is not the consequences of actions 
that make them “right” or “wrong,” but rather the motives of the person who carries them 
out. If someone inadvertantly causes harm to another person while intending to fulfill what 
they perceive as their moral duty, they are – according to the Kantian form of deontology – 
not morally accountable. For a detailed account of Kant’s notion of a “good will,” see: 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy, pp. 37-108. 
 
21  I use the term anachronistic here, in the sense that the photographs give the false 
impression that the Indian Residential School belongs to a distant historical period (many of 
them were taken between the turn of the 20th century and the 1930s). In fact, the largest 
number of forced removals occurred relatively recently, between the 1960s and 1980s, yet 
very few photographs from this period are featured in the Final Reports. 
22  That is, the film portrays the violence of the IRS system as occurring only decades 
ago in the 1970s, as opposed to the Final Report’s photographic imagery, which often 
depicts the schools as having operated in a much more distant historical period. 
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Conclusion: Will We Be “Haunted?” 
 
 
I began this study by questioning the “history-writing” promise of transitional justice 
in the wake of mass atrocities. What does it mean for a nation to come to terms with a legacy 
of large-scale past abuses? Does the collective “acknowledgment” of past crimes amount to 
justice? Does the phrase, “ensuring accountability,” demand an appeal to the psychology of 
inter-group or community emotions? And in turn, do the emotional climates of guilt or 
shame help foster reconciliatory efforts or hinder them? To what extent is the public airing 
of violent testimony bound up with its audience’s scopophilic impulses? What are the lasting 
political and moral implications of “narrating blame”? Or of not narrating blame? And lastly, 
what does it mean to “give a report of” extreme violence? To show or to tell someone else’s 
suffering? To put that pain into a story – a story that then participates in the construction of 
an entire community’s shared identity? 
In this conclusion, I would like to briefly extend these enquiries beyond recent 
history, and look forward. While Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has ended 
and its ten-volume report has been published, an impressive reconciliatory undertaking is 
now currently unfolding. What that reconciliation will look like – what that reconciliation 
will be – is entirely constituted by how Canadians understand what, how, and why the IRS 
system was what it was, because they – we – are the ones who will continue to tell its story. 
Reconciliation and justice are gestures; they are enacted, performed. And the ways that we, 
as a community, tell the story of the Residential School system, is part of that enactment. So, 
too, are the ways that we read that story, listen to that story, and teach that story. 
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Mariana Enríquez says that her generation is “haunted” by the two demons of 
Argentina’s past. The question, then, becomes: will the next generations of Canadians be 
similarly haunted by the legacy of the Residential School system? 
The issue, in short, is that, when faced with histories of injustice and atrocity, a 
nation’s desire to construct public visions of that history are almost always motivated by 
current political or economic objectives, and hardly ever by ethical ones. Addressing this 
challenge requires being continuously attentive to how stories transform the desires, 
imaginations, and identities of readers. 
It also requires acknowledging that these historical narratives are not objective, 
permanent, or fixed objects that take shape in-and-of themselves. They are crafted by and 
for people (both real and imagined). To put it simply, narrative is not a language talking to 
itself. Final Reports do not represent a State speaking to History. These stories imply someone 
telling another person or group about something that happened to real people in the past. 
There is an author, a reader, and a referent. And as a fundamentally interpersonal act – 
between, and of, persons – we ought to be continually attentive to what I might call, an 
ethics of narrative. 
 When negotiating these texts, we must continually question who is given the ability 
to speak for or as the State. We must permit those individuals or groups who, by virtue of 
history, are made persistently vulnerable to exclusion, to speak for themselves, in their own 
voices – in their own verb-tenses even. This challenge does not so much present a narrative 
or interpretive problem to be overcome as much as a perpetual mindfulness of the 
individuals within and on either end of the narration process. 
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 If we are to attend ourselves collectively to these problems, then the difficulties they 
present are also somewhat ameliorated by the fact that collective memories are never 
permanent. Memories are continually shifting and re-aligning, being re-shaped, re-
contextualized, and re-framed. Historical narratives can be set right. Consider President 
Kirchner’s new preface to the 2006 edition of Nunca Más and its momentous re-
contextualization of the “Two Demons” narrative. Collective memories can also be 
removed: statues can be taken down, histories can be rewritten, and performances changed – 
although often their remnants can serve as valuable reminders or deterrents. Decisions about 
what and how to remember are therefore not permanent, even though the construction of 
collective memory is essentially directed toward the future. The future may inherit our 
memories, but it does not have to accept them. There will always be space in the memorial 
landscapes we make and share with past and future persons for re-negotiation and change as 
we move together. 
As I write this, the Tunisian Truth and Dignity Commission (Instance Vérité et Dignité), 
established in 2013 following the Tunisian Revolution (as part of what is commonly referred 
to as the Arab Spring), is currently underway. Its purpose is to use both judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms to investigate flagrant human rights violations committed by the 
Tunisian government since 1955, and to provide compensation and rehabilitation to victims. 
It will, inevitably, tell a story. And that story will directly and incontrovertibly shape the ways 
in which Tunisia’s national trauma will be absorbed into the cultural storytelling process. It 
will lay a new moral groundwork for how that society will look back upon its past, 
reconstructing public consciousness according to carefully drawn moral, legal, and 
ideological lines. And that public consciousness will then disseminate, giving rise to stories, 
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textbooks, films, novels, poems, performances, and visual representations of the past. The 
question is: Will future generations be “haunted” by that past? 
  
 333 
Works Cited 
 
“A timeline of residential schools, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” CBC News, 16 
May 2008. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/a-timeline-of-residential-schools-the-
truth-and-reconciliation-commission-1.724434. Accessed 29 January 2017. 
Adams, Ian. “The Lonely Death of Chanie Wenjack.” Maclean’s Magazine. February 1, 1967. 
http://www.macleans.ca/society/the-lonely-death-of-chanie-wenjack/ Accessed 1 
February 2017. 
Adorno, Theodor. “What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” Translated by  
Timothy Bahti and Geoffrey Hartmann. Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, 
edited by Geoffrey Hartman, Indiana University Press, 1986. 
Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Translated by   
Daniel Heller-Roazen, Zone Books, 1999. 
Agee, James and Walker Evans. Let Us Now Praise Famous Men. Houghton  
Mifflin Company, 1941. 
Alfonsín, Raul. “Confronting the Past: ‘Never Again’ in Argentina.” Journal of Democracy  
Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, pp. 15-19. 
Angel, Naomi and Pauline Wakeham. “Witnessing In Camera: Photographic Reflections  
on Truth and Reconciliation.” Arts of Engagement: Taking Aesthetic Action In and Beyond 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, edited by Dylan Robinson and Keavy 
Martin, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2016, pp. 93-134. 
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin Classics, 2001. 
---------. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt Press, 1973. 
---------. “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility.” The Portable Hannah Arendt, edited 
by Peter Baehr, Penguin, 2003, pp. 146-156. 
 334 
---------.  “Reflections on Violence.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1, 1969, pp. 1– 
35. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24356590. Accessed 10 April 2017. 
Aristotle. The Art of Rhetoric. Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, Penguin, 1992. 
Arthur, Paige. “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of  
Transitional Justice.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2009, pp. 321-367. 
Assmann, Aleida and Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit. Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit 
deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999. 
“B.C. church goes bankrupt.” CBC News, 30 December, 2001. hwww.cbc.ca/archives/ 
entry/bc-church-goes-bankrupt. Accessed 29 January 2017. 
Bach, Caleb. “Ernesto Sábato: A Conscious Choice of Words.” Américas, vol. 43, no. 1, 1991, 
pp. 14-19. www.link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/H1100003723/LitRC?u= 
  Yorku_main&sid=LitRC&xid=20185584. Accessed 22 February 2018. 
Barry, John. “What’s New in the Novel: Sign and Convention in Latin American Narrative.” 
Hispanófila, no. 97, 1989, pp. 41–56. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43808239. 
Accessed 5 January 2018. 
Bass, Gary. “Victor’s Justice, Selfish Justice.” Social Research, vol. 69, no. 4, 2002, pp. 1035–
1044. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40971591. Accessed 26 November 2017. 
Benhabib, Seyla. “Identity, Perspective and Narrative in Hannah Arendt's ‘Eichmann in 
Jerusalem’.” History and Memory, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1996, pp. 35-59. 
Black, Conrad. “Canada’s treatment of aboriginals was shameful, but it was not genocide.” 
National Post, 6 June 2015. www.news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/conrad-
black-canadas-treatment-of-aboriginals-was-shameful-but-it-was-not-genocide. 
Accessed 10 February 2017. 
 335 
Bloxham, Donald. “Genocide on Trial: Law and Collective Memory.” Nuremberg Trials: 
International Criminal Law Since 1945, K G Saur Verlag, 2006. 
Böll, Heinrich. Group Portrait With Lady. Translated by Leila Vennewitz, McGraw-Hill, 1973. 
Bohner, Gerd. “Writing about Rape: Use of the Passive Voice and Other Distancing Text 
Features as an Expression of Perceived Responsibility of the Victim.” British Journal 
of Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 2001, pp. 515–529. 
Bourke-White, Margaret and Erskine Caldwell. You Have Now Seen Their Faces. Viking Press, 
1925. 
Bouvard, Marguerite Guzman. Revolutionizing Motherhood: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
Bowen, Kate. “Ernesto Sabato: Literature’s Conscience.” The Argentina Independent. 12 April 
2012. www.argentinaindependent.com/the-arts/literature-culture/ernesto-sabato-
literatures-conscience/. Accessed 3 February 2018. 
Boyer, Allen. “Review of Memory of Fire: Vol. 1, Genesis, by Eduardo Galeano.” Los Angeles 
Times, 29 December 1985. www.articles.latimes.com/1985-12-29/books/bk-
25855_1_eduardo-galeano. Accessed 11 March 2017. 
Brecht, Bertolt. “To Those Who Follow in Our Wake.” Translated by Scott Horton, Harper’s 
Magazine, January 15, 2008. www.harpers.org/blog/2008/01/brecht-to-those-who-
follow-in-our-wake/. Accessed 6 July 2017. 
---------. “The Trial of Lucullus.” Translated by Frank Jones. Brecht, Plays, Poetry, & Prose, Vol. 
5: Collected Plays, Life of Galileo, The Trial of Lucullus, Mother Courage and Her Children, 
edited by Ralph Manheim and John Willett, Bloomsbury, 1972. 
Brockman, Stephen. German Literary Culture at the Zero Hour. Camden House, 2010. 
Bryce, Peter Henderson. The Story of a National Crime. J. Hope, 1922. 
 336 
Brysk, Alison. “The Politics of Measurement: The Contested Count of the Disappeared in 
Argentina.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1994, pp. 676-692. 
Bulhof, I.N. Wilhelm Dilthey: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Study of History and Culture. Springer, 
2011. 
Burson, Harold. “American Forces Network Pre-Trial Broadcast Transcript: 19 November 
1945.” Property of Harold Burson, maintained by the American Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, Washington D.C. www.haroldburson.com/pdf/1945-11-
19,%20Pretrial%20Broadcast.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2017. 
Byron, Lord George Gordon. Don Juan. Translated by George Gordon, Houghton Mifflin, 
1958. 
Caistor, Nick. “Ernesto Sábato Obituary.” The Guardian, 1 May 2011. 
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/01/ernesto-sabato-obituary. Accessed 3 
January 2018. 
Camus, Albert. The Plague. Translated by Stuart Gilbert, Penguin Modern Classics, 1978. 
Canadien, Albert. From Lishamie. Theytus Books, 2010. 
Capote, Truman. In Cold Blood. Random House, 1966. 
Carpenter, Victoria. “Introduction.” (Re)Collecting the past: History and Collective Memory in Latin 
American Narrative, edited by Victoria Carpenter. Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 1-10. 
Carrasco, Germán. “Santiago Llach: Me quedo con la poesía de Facebook antes que con el 
hijo de puta de Juan Gelman,” The Clinic, 12 February 2011. 
www.theclinic.cl/2011/02/12/santiago-llach-“me-quedo-con-la-poesia-de-
facebook-antes-que-con-el-hijo-de-puta-de-juan-gelman. Accessed 16 January 2017. 
 337 
Carmody, Michelle Frances, “Post-Authoritarian State Formation in Argentina: Transitional 
Justice as the Accumulation of Symbolic Power.” Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol. 
30, No. 3, 2017, pp. 496-517. 
Caruth, Cathy. “Traumatic Awakenings.” Violence, Identity, and Self-Determination, edited by  
Hent de Vries and  Samuel Weber ,  Stanford University Press , 1997.  
Cecchini, Daniel and Alberto Elizalde Leal. “Presentaron una denuncia penal por la 
apropiación ilegal durante la dictadura del diario El Independiente de La Rioja.” 
Analisis, 22 September 2013. www.analisisdigital.com.ar/noticias.php?ed 
=1&di=0&no=191238. Accessed 3 January 2018. 
Christ, Ronald. “Dramas That Scorch.” The New York Times, 27 October 1985.  
www.nytimes.com/1985/10/27/books/dramas-that-scorch.html. Accessed 6 
February, 2017. 
Colás, Santiago. Postmodernity in Latin America: The Argentine Paradigm. Duke University Press, 
1994. 
CONADEP. Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine Commission on the Disappeared. Translated by 
Ronald Dworkin, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986. 
---------. Nunca Más: Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas. Eudeba, 2006. 
Conn, Stetson. Historical Work in the United States Army 1862-1954. U.S. Army Center of 
Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980. 
Cortázar, Julio. A Manual for Manuel. Translated by Gregory Rabassa, Random House, 1978. 
Cosgrove, Mary. “The Modern Language Review.” The Modern Language Review, vol. 112, no. 
2, 2017, pp. 541–543. 
Crawley, Eduardo. A House Divided: Argentina, 1880–1980, St. Martins Press, 1985. 
 338 
Crenzel, Emilio. “Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons: 
Contributions to Transitional Justice.” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 
2, 2008, pp. 173–19.  Oxford Academic. doiorg.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/ 
ijtj/ijn007. Accessed 9 October 2016. 
---------. “El Nunca Más en fascículos: el infierno resignificado,” Estudios Interdisciplinarios de 
América Latina y el Caribe, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2006, pp. 87-100. 
---------. “Genesis, Uses, and Significations of the Nunca Más Report,” in Latin American 
Perspectives, Vol. 42, Issue 3, 2015. pp 22-38. 
---------. The Memory of the Argentina Disappearances: The Political History of Nunca Más. Routledge, 
2011. 
Diaz, Alemparte and Luis Filipe. “Página A-8 – Los Estimación de la Inteligencia Militar 
sobre el Número de Desaparecidos en Argentina” (“Page A-8: Argentine Military 
Intelligence Estimate on the Number of Disappeared,” translation mine). 
Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 1978. 
www.nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/19780715%20%5bReport%20o
n%20Argentina’s%20dissappeared%5d%20A0000514c.pdf. Accessed September 
13, 2016. 
Demetz, Peter. Postwar German Literature: A Critical Introduction. Western Publishing, 1970. 
Derrida, Jacques. “On Forgiveness.” Translated by Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes. On 
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Routledge, 2001. 
Dorfman, Ariel. Widows. Translated by Stephen Kessler, Penguin Books, 1983. 
Englander, Nathan. The Ministry of Special Cases. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. 
Enríquez, Mariana. “In ‘Things We Lost,’ Argentina’s Haunted History Gets A Supernatural 
Twist.” Interview with Lulu Garcia-Navarro. NPR.org, 19 February 2017. 
 339 
www.npr.org/2017/02/19/515773022/in-things-we-lost-argentinas-haunted-
history-gets-a-supernatural-twist. Accessed 23 February 2017. 
---------. Things We Lost In the Fire: Stories. Translated by Megan McDowell, Hogarth, 2017. 
Environics Institute for Survey Research. Final Report on Canadian Public Opinions on Aboriginal 
Peoples. Published in Partnership with the National Centre for Truth and 
Reconciliation, 2016. www.environicsinstitute.org/institute-projects/completed-
projects/public-opinion-about-aboriginal-issues-in-canada. Accessed 3 November 
2017. 
Erll, Astrid and Ann Rigney. “Literature and the Production of Cultural Memory: 
Introduction.” European Journal Of English Studies Vol. 10 , Issue 2, 2006. pp. 111-
115. 
Etheridge, Brian C. Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory. University of 
Kentucky Press, 2016. 
Feierstein, Daniel, and Douglas Andrew Town. “Explaining Genocidal Social Practices 
inArgentina: The Problem of Causation.” Genocide as Social Practice: Reorganizing 
Society under the Nazis and Argentina’s Military Juntas. New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 2014. pp. 131–160. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wq9vn.13. Accessed 
14 April 2017. 
Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and 
History. Routledge, 1991. 
Felman, Shoshana. The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century. Harvard 
University Press, 2002. 
Ferrari, León. “Hitler Greets the Catholic Abbott Schachteitner and Muller, Reich Bishop + 
Jorge Videla Greets Cardinal Aramburu.” 1995, digital print on paper. Never Again. 
 340 
London, Tate Modern. www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/ferrari-hitler-greets-the-
catholic-abbot-schachteitner-and-muller-reich-bishop-jorge-p79545. Accessed 2 
January 2017. 
---------. “The Deluge by Doré, 1860 + Military Junta (Photo: Public Records Office).” 1995, 
digital print on paper. Never Again. London, Tate Modern. 
www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/ferrari-the-deluge-by-dore-1860-military-junta-
photo-public-records-office-p79517. Accessed 2 January 2017. 
---------. “Videla, Massera, Agosti and Cardinal Aramburu (Photo: Loicono) + Danté’s 
Inferno by Doré, 1860.” 1995, digital print on paper. Never Again. London, Tate 
Modern. www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/ferrari-never-again-96188/16. Accessed 2 
January 2017. 
---------. Six of the artist’s “Nunca Más” collages. Report of the CONADEP, edited by 
Página/12. 1995, digital print on paper. www.arte-online.net/Notas/ 
Escandaloso_Leon_1920-2013. Accessed 2 January 2017. 
Ferguson, Mark A. and Nyla R. Branscombe, “The Social Psychology of Collective Guilt.” 
Collective Emotions, edited by Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela. Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
Foster, David William. “Latin American Documentary Narrative.” PMLA, Vol. 99, No. 1, 
1984, pp. 41-55. 
Fuentes, Carlos. “A Despot, Now and Forever,” New York Times Review of Books, 6 April 
1986. www.archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/00/09/24/ 
nnp/supreme.html?_r=1. Accessed 4 April 2017. 
Galak, Oliver. “Controversia por el prólogo agregado al informe Nunca más: Rechaza la teoría de los dos  
 341 
  demonios.” La Nacion, 19 May 2006. www.lanacion.com.ar/807208-controversia-por-
el-prologo-agregado-al-informe-nunca-mas. Accessed 8 May 2018. 
Galeano, Eduardo. Memory of Fire: Vol. 1, Genesis. Translated by Cedric Belfrage, W.W. 
Norton, 1998. 
García Márquez, Gabriel. The Fragrance of Guava: Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza in Conversation with  
Gabriel García Márquez. Translated by Ann Wright, Verso, 1983. 
Garneau, David. “Imaginary Spaces of Conciliation and Reconciliation.” Arts of Engagement: 
Taking Aesthetic Action In and Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, edited by 
Dylan Robinson and Keavy Martin, Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2016. 
Gathering Strength – Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development/Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997. 
www.ahf.ca/downloads/gathering-strength.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2017. 
Genette, Gerard. Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation. Translated by Jane E. Lewin, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Gilbert, G.M. Nuremberg Diary. Da Capo Press, 1995. 
Ginsberg, Victor. “De los dos demonios al terrorismo de Estado.” Pagina/12, May 15, 2006.  
www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-66922-2006-05-15.html. Accessed 8 
May 2018. 
Gitlin, Daniella. Translator’s Note. Operation Massacre, by Rodolfo Walsh, Seven Stories 
Press, 2013, pp. xxiii-xxxiv. 
Giunta, Andrea and Liliana Piñeiro. “León Ferrari, Form Agitator.” León Ferrari: Works 
(1976-2008). Editorial RM, 2008. 
 342 
Grass, Günter. “The Art of Fiction, No. 124.” Interview with Elizabeth Gaffney. The Paris 
Review, No. 119, Summer 1991. www.theparisreview.org/interviews/2191/gunter-
grass-the-art-of-fiction-no-124-gunter-grass. Accessed 18 March, 2016. 
---------. Peeling the Onion. Translated by Michael Henry Heim, Harcourt, 2007. 
---------. The Tin Drum. Translated by Breon Mitchell, Mariner Books, 2010. 
---------. “What Shall We Tell Our Children?” On Writing and Politics: 1967-1983. Translated 
by Ralph Manheim, Mariner Books, 1986. 
Graziano, Frank. Divine Violence: Spectacle, Psychosexuality and Radical Christianity in the Argentine 
‘Dirty War.’  Westview Press, 1992. 
Greenberg, Michael. Introduction. Operation Massacre, by Rodolfo Walsh, Seven Stories Press, 
2013, pp. xiii – xxii. 
Grossmann, Atina. “The ‘Goldhagen Effect’: Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the 
New Germany.” The “Goldhagen Effect” History, Memory, Nazism: Facing the German 
Past, edited by Geoff Eley, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 
Guntsche, Marina. “Informe sobre peronistas en Sobre héroes y tumbas.” Cuadernos del CILHA, 2013, 
vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 10-31. www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid= 
S1852-9615201300010000 2&lng=es&nrm=iso. Accessed 13 March 2018. 
Gwyn, Richard. “Canada’s First Scapegoat.” The Walrus, 16 December 2014. 
www.thewalrus.ca/canadas-first-scapegoat/. Accessed 12 December 2017. 
Haberman, Clyde. “Children of Argentina’s ‘Disappeared’ Reclaim Past, With Help.” New 
York Times, 11 October 2015. www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/us/children-of-
argentinas-disappeared-reclaim-past-with-help.html. Accessed 7 March 2017. 
Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory. Translated by Lewis A. Coser, University of 
Chicago Press, 1992. 
 343 
Harper, Stephen. “Statement of Apology to Former Students of Indian Residential Schools.”  
The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. 
  www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1100100015649. Accessed 9 October 
2017. 
Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 
Routledge, 2010. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Translated by H.B. 
Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Henley, N. M., M Miller, and J.A. Beazley. “Syntax, Semantics, and Sexual Violence: Agency 
and the Passive Voice.” Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 14, 1995, pp. 60–84. 
Herf, Jeffrey. Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in Two Germanys. Harvard University Press, 1997. 
Hersey, John. “The Novel of Contemporary History,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1949, pp. 
80-84. 
Highway, Tomson. Kiss of the Fur Queen. Doubleday Canada, 1998.  
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Cosimo Publishing, 2009. 
House of Commons, Government of Canada. Official Reports of the Debates of the House of 
Commons of the Dominion of Canada: 1st Session, 5th Parliament: Vol. XIV. Maclean, 
Roger, & Co., 1883, pp. 1107–1108.  
Huckvale, David. Visconti and the German Dream: Romanticism, Wagner and the Nazi Catastrophe in 
Film. McFarland Publishing, 2012. 
Huyssen, Andreas. “Rewritings and New Beginnings: W. G. Sebald and the Literature on the 
Air War.” Present Pasts. Stanford University Press, 2003. 
Ingruber, Daniela and Ursula Prutsch. Filme in Argentinien/Argentine cinema. Lit Verlag, 2012. 
Jackson, Robert H. “Closing Arguments for Conviction of Nazi War Criminals by, U.S. 
 344 
Chief of Counsel, International Military Tribunal.” Robert H. Jackson Center, 
Jamestown, New York. www.roberthjackson.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/ 
  closingarguments-for-conviction-of-nazi-war-criminals.pdf. Accessed 5 May, 2016. 
---------. “Second Day, Wednesday, 11/21/1945, Part 04.” Trial of the Major War Criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal. Volume II. IMT, 1947. www.loc.gov/rr/ 
frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. Accessed 3 January 2016. 
Jameson, Fredric. “Foreword: A Monument to Radical Instants.” The Aesthetics of Resistance: 
Vol. 1, A Novel, by Peter Weiss. Translated by Joachim Neugroschel, Duke 
University Press, 2005. 
Jaspers, Karl. The Question of German Guilt. Translated by E.B. Ashton, Dial Press, 1947. 
Johnson, Eric A. and Karl-Heinz Reuband. What We Knew: Terror, Mass Murder, and Everyday 
Life in Nazi Germany. Basic Books, 2005. 
Johnson, Harvey L. “Book Review of ‘Ernesto Sábato: by Harley D. Oberhelman.” The South  
Central Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2, 1972, pp. 54–54. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/ 
3188935. Accessed 2 December 2017. 
Johnson, William. “Good intentions, broken lives.” The Globe and Mail, 5 July 2000. 
www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/good-intentions-broken-lives/article 
1340276/. Accessed 16 September, 2016. 
Jolly, Rosemary. “Spectral Presences: Narrating Women in the Context of South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue 
Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2004, pp. 622–637. 
Judgment at Nuremberg. Directed by Stanley Kramer, performances by Spencer Tracy, Burt 
Lancaster, Maximilian Schell, and Marlene Dietrich, United Artists, 1961. 
Kaufman, Zachary D. United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and  
 345 
Pragmatics. Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Kansteiner, Wulf. In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz. 
Ohio University Press, 2006. 
Kant, Immanuel. “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.” Practical Philosophy: the  
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Translated by Mary Gregor, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Kill, Timothy Lee. Ernesto Sábato’s Novels And Essays: Opposites In Conflict. The University of 
Wisconsin-Madison Press, 1980. 
Kritz, Neil J. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes: Laws, 
Rulings, and Reports. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. 
La Historia Official. Directed by Luis Penzo, performance by Héctor Alterio, Norma 
Aleandro, and Chunchuna Villafañe, Almi Pictures, 1985. 
Lalonde, Michelle. “Canadians ‘Comfortably Blind’ about Residential Schools’ Damage.” 
Montreal Gazette, 7 February 2013. www.montrealgazette.com/news/Canadians+ 
  comfortably+blind+about+residential+schools+damage/7934997/story.html. 
Accessed 2 February 2016. 
Landler, Mark. “Holocaust writer in storm over role of Catholic Church.” The New York 
Times, 14 November 2002. www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/world/holocaust-
writer-in-storm-over-role-of-catholic-church.html. Accessed 4 January 2016. 
La Noche de los Lápices (“The Night of the Long Pencils”). Directed by Héctor Olivera, 
performances by Alejo García Pintos, Vita Escardó, and José María Monje, Aries 
Cinematográfica, 1986. 
Laub, Dori. “Testimonies in the Treatment of Genocidal Trauma.” Journal of Applied 
Psychoanalytic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp. 63-87. 
 346 
Lemke, Sleglinde. “Facing Poverty: Towards a Theory of Articulation.” 
Amerikastudien/American Studies, vol. 55, no. 1, 2010, pp. 95–122. 
Lenz, Siegfried. The German Lesson. Translated by Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, Hill and 
Wang, 1972. 
Levine, Suzanne Jill. Manuel Puig and the Spider Woman: His Life and Fictions. Farrar, Straus, & 
Giroux, 2000. 
Lewald, H. Ernest. “Culture and Ideology in Recent Argentine Literature.” Latin American 
Research Review, vol. 14, no. 1, 1979, pp. 268–272. www.jstor.org/stable/2502844. 
Accessed 3 February 2018. 
 Ljunggren, David. “Every G20 Nation Wants to be Canada, Insists PM.” Reuters, 25 
September 2009. www.reuters.com/article/columns-us-g20-canada-advantages-
idUSTRE58P05Z20090926. Accessed 3 January 2017. 
Mack, Katherine. “Remembering Winnie: Public Memory and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa.” Global Memoryscapes: Contesting Remembrance in a 
Transnational Age, edited by Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes, University of 
Alabama Press, 2011, pp. 133-158. 
Maguire, Peter. Law and War: International Law and American History. Columbia University 
Press, 2002. 
Mailer, Norman. The Armies of the Night. New American Library, 1968. 
Maley, William. “The Atmospherics of the Nuremberg Trial.” The Legacy of Nuremberg: 
Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance?, edited by David Arnon Blumenthaland 
Timothy L H McCormack, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007.  
Martin, George S. “Letter to the Editor.” Die Zeit, 12 February 1948. German Historical 
Institute, Washington, D.C., translated by Thomas Dunlap. 
 347 
www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Denazification%205%20ENG.pdf 
Accessed 27 November 2016. 
Martínez, Tomás Eloy. Péron and the Nazi War Criminals. Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, no. 144, The Wilson Center, 1984. 
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wp144_peron_and_the_nazi_war_crimi
nals.pdf. Accessed 22 October 2016. 
Marrus, Michael R. “The Nuremberg Trial: Fifty Years After.” The American Scholar, Vol. 66, 
No. 4, 1997, pp. 563–570. 
McCaughan, Michael. True Crimes: Rodolfo Walsh, the Life and Times of a Radical Intellectual. Latin 
American Bureau, 2002. 
Meijide, Graciela Fernandez. “The Role of Historical Enquiry in Creating Accountability for 
Human Rights Abuses.” Third World Law Journal, Volume 12, 1992, p. 269. 
Merasty, Joseph Auguste and David Carpenter. The Education of Augie Merasty: A Residential 
School Memoir. University of Regina Press, 2015. 
Mihai, Mihaela. “Socializing Negative Emotions: Transitional Criminal Trials in the Service 
of Democracy.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, 2011, pp. 111–
131. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23014744. Accessed 3 July 2017. 
Milloy, John S.  A National Crime: The Canadian Government and the Residential School  System .  
University of Manitoba Press, 2011 . 
Misztal, Barbara A. “Legal Attempts to Construct Collective Memory: The Necessity and 
Difficulties of Aiming for Both Truth and Solidarity.” Polish Sociological Review, Vol. 
133, 2001, pp. 61–75. 
Moeller, Robert G. “How to Judge Stanley Kramer’s Judgment at Nuremberg.” German 
History, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2013, pp. 497–522. 
 348 
Monkman, Kent. “A Mother’s Grief.” 2017, acrylic on canvas. Shame and Prejudice: A Story of 
Resilience., Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
---------. “History is Painted by the Victors.” 2013, acrylic on canvas. Sovereign: Contemporary 
Voices Exhibit. Denver Art Museum. 
---------. “The Scream.” 2017, acrylic on canvas. Shame and Prejudice: A Story of Resilience. Art 
Museum at the University of Toronto. 
---------. “Study for Mother and Child.” 2016, acrylic on panel. Shame and Prejudice: A Story of 
Resilience. Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
---------. “Study for the Removal of Children.” 2016, acrylic on panel. Shame and Prejudice: A 
Story of Resilience. Art Museum at the University of Toronto. 
Moyano, María José. Argentina’s Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979. Yale University Press, 
2012. 
Mulroney, Brian. “Letters from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to Tony Penikett, 
Government Leader, Government of the Yukon Territory.” Honouring the Truth, 
Reconciling for the Future. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015. 
Neaman, Elliot. “Book Review of: Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in Two 
Germanys.” AJS Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1999, pp. 415–417. 
Neiburg, Federico. “Inflation: Economists and Economic Cultures in Brazil and Argentina.” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 48, no. 3, 2006, pp. 604–633. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/3879438. Accessed 4 April 2016. 
Nixon, Rob. “Turner Classic Movies Film Article: ‘Judgment At Nuremberg’.” Turner Classic 
Movies. www.tcm.com/tcmdb/title/22842/Judgment-at-Nuremberg/ 
  articles.html. Accessed 3 August 2016. 
“Nobel Prize in Literature 1972.” NobelPrize.org. www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1972 
 349 
/press-release/. Accessed 23 Aug 2018. 
Nochlin, Linda. “Some Women Realists: Painters of the Figure.” Arts Magazine, vol. 48, no.8,  
1974, pp. 29-33. 
Nolan, Mary. “The Elusive Pursuit of Truth and Justice.” Truth Commissions: State Terror, 
History, and Memory, edited by Greg Grandin and Thomas Miller Klubock, Duke 
University Press, 2006. 
Norrie, Alan. “Justice on the Slaughter-Bench: The Problem of War Guilt in Arendt and 
Jaspers.” New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, vol. 11, 
no. 2, 2008, pp. 187–231. 
Oberdorfer, Don and Martin Anderson. “Alfonsín Foresees Civil Trial of Argentine Ex-
Rulers.” The Washington Post, 27 September 1984. www.washingtonpost.com/ 
  archive/politics/1984/09/27/alfonsin-foresees-civil-trial-of-argentine-ex-
rulers/3c5b496b-0f22-4344-8760 -8e8a24514e49/?noredirect=on&utm_ 
  term=.a32a068b424a. Accessed 12 June 2017. 
Oberhelman, Harley Dean. Ernesto Sábato. Twayne Publishers, 1970. 
Obermayer, Hans Peter. “‘Yes, to Nothingness!’ ‘The Condemnation of Lucullus’: An Opera 
of Peace by Bertolt Brecht and Paul Dessau.” International Journal of the Classical 
Tradition, vol. 8, no. 2, 2001, pp. 217–233. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/30224190. 
Accessed 10 December 2017. 
Olsen, Sylvia. No Time to Say Goodbye: Children’s Stories of Kuper Island Residential School. Sono 
Nis Press, 2001. 
Osiel, Mark. Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law. Routledge, 2017. 
Paling, Emma. “Kent Monkman Walks Canada Back Through Time With ‘Shame and 
Prejudice: A Story of Resilience’.” Huffington Post, 1 February 2017. 
 350 
www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/02/01/kent-monkman_n_14557068.html. Accessed 
3 February 2017. 
Parkinson, Anna M. An Emotional State: The Politics of Emotion in Postwar West German Culture. 
University of Michigan Press, 2015. 
Paris, Erna. The Sun Climbs Slow: The International Criminal Court and the Struggle for Justice. 
Vintage Canada, 2008. 
Pauls, Alan. A History of Money. Translated by Ellie Robbins, Melville House, 2015. 
Perelli, Carina. “Settling Accounts with Blood Memory: The Case of Argentina.” Social 
Research, vol. 59, no. 2, 1992, pp. 415–451. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4097069. 
Accessed 13 December 2017. 
Phillips, Kendall R. and G. Mitchell Reyes. “Surveying Global Memoryscapes: The Shifting 
Terrain of Public Memory Studies.” Global Memoryscapes: Contesting Remembrance in a 
Transnational Age, edited by Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes, The University 
of Alabama Press, 2011, pp. 1-23. 
Piglia, Ricardo. Artificial Respiration. Translated by Daniel Balderston, Duke University Press, 
1994. 
---------. Afterward. Operation Massacre, by Rodolfo Walsh, Seven Stories Press, 2013, pp. 
221–230. 
Poniatowska, Elena, and Carlos Perez. “Memory and Identity: Some Historical-Cultural 
Notes.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 19, no. 3, 1992, pp. 67–78. 
Porterfield, Todd. “León Ferrari’s Hell.” Religion & the Arts, vol. 17, no. 1/2, 2013, pp. 98-
112. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1163/15685292-12341256. Accessed 5 May 2018. 
 351 
Posner, Richard. “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent.” The New York Times Review of Books, August 
29, 2004. www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/books/the-9-11-report-a-dissent.html. 
Accessed 18 November 2015. 
Priemel, Kim C. and Alexa Stiller. “Nuremberg’s Narratives: Revising the Legacy of the 
‘Subsequent Trials’.” Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals: Transitional Justice, 
Trial Narratives, and Historiography, edited by Kim C. Priemel and Alexa Stiller, 
Berghahn, 2012. 
Pron, Patricio. My Father’s Ghost Is Climbing in the Rain. Translated by Mara Faye Lethem, 
Vintage, 2013. 
Puig, Manuel. Kiss of the Spider Woman. Translated by Thomas Colchie, Alfred A. Knopf, 
1979. 
Racette, Sherry Farrell. “Haunted: First Nations Children in Residential School 
Photography.” Depicting Canada’s Children, edited by Loren Ruth Lerner, Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2009, pp. 49-84. 
“Residential school payout a ‘symbolic’ apology: Fontaine.” CBC News, 19 September 2007. 
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/residential-school-payout-a-symbolic-apology-fontaine-
1.660065. Accessed 23 January 2017. 
Rhymes For Young Ghouls. Directed by Jeff Barnaby, performance by Kawennahere Devery 
Jacobs, Mark Antony Krupa, and Glen Gould, Prospector Films, 2013. 
Richardson, Oliver H. “Lord Acton and His Obiter Dicta on History.” The Sewanee Review, 
vol. 13, no. 2, 1905, pp. 129–142. 
Richter, Simon J. The Literature of Weimar Classicism. Camden House, 2005. 
Riggan, William. “Ernesto Sábato: The 1984 Jurors and Their Candidates for the Neustadt 
International Prize for Literature.” World Literature Today, Vol. 58, No. , 1984, p. 54. 
 352 
Rita-Procter, Steven. “Interview with Mirta Baravalle, founding member of the Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo.” Personal interview. 23 May 2015. 
Roa Bastos, Augusto. I, the Supreme. Translated by Helen Lane, Dalkey Archive Press, 2000. 
Robben, Antonius C. G. M. Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina. University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 
Rock, David. Argentina: 1516–1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War. University 
of California Press, 1987. 
Rogers, Marc. “On This Day in 1955: The Bombardment of Plaza de Mayo.” The Argentina 
Independent, 16 June 2013. www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/analysis/ 
on-this-day-in-1955-the-bombardment-of-plaza-de-mayo/. Accessed 1 February 
2018. 
Roniger, Luis, and Mario Sznajder. “The Politics of Memory and Oblivion in 
Redemocratized Argentina and Uruguay.” History and Memory, vol. 10, no. 1, 1998, 
pp. 133–169. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25681022. Accessed 3 February 2018. 
Rothberg, Michael. Multidirectional Memory. Stanford University Press, 2009. 
Rubenstein, Hymie and Rodney A. Clifton. “Debunking the half-truths and exaggerations in 
the Truth and Reconciliation report.” National Post, 4 June 2015. 
www.news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/clifton-rubenstein-debunking-the-half-
truths-and-exaggerations-in-the-truth-and-reconciliation-report. Accessed 14 
January 2017. 
Russell, Nicolas. “Collective Memory Before and After Halbwachs.” The French Review, vol. 
79, No. 4, 2006, pp. 796-797. 
Sa’adah, Anne. Germany’s Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization. Harvard University 
Press, 1998. 
 353 
Sábato, Ernesto. “Ceremonia de entrega del premio Cervantes 1984: Discurso de Ernesto 
Sábato.” El Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Gobiernode de España, 1984.  
www.mecd.gob.es/premiado/downloadBlob.do?idDocumento=1704. Accessed 4 
May 2016. 
---------. Hombres y engranajes. Emecé Editores, 1951. 
---------. On Heroes and Tombs. Translated by Helen R. Lane, David R Godine Publishing, 
1981. 
---------. The Tunnel. Translated by Margaret Sayers Peden, Penguin Modern Classics, 2011. 
Saramago, José. The Notebook. Translated by Amanda Hopkinson and Daniel Hahn, Verso, 
2010. 
“Schedule ‘N’: Mandate for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, under the Indian 
Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.” www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/ 
settlement.html. Accessed 4 December 2017. 
Schlant, Ernestine. The Language of Silence. Routledge, 1997. 
Schumacher, Edward. “Argentina and Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, no. 5, 1984, pp. 
1070–1095.  JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20041999. Accessed 17 December 2017. 
Sebald, W.G. On the Natural History of Destruction. Translated by Anthea Bell, Random House, 
2003. 
Seghers, Anna. Transit. Translated by Margot Bettauer Dembo, New York Review of Books 
Classics, 2013. 
Sellars, Bev. They Called Me Number One: Secrets and Survival at an Indian Residential School. 
Talonbooks, 2013. 
Shandley, Robert R. Rubble Films: German Cinema in the Shadow of the Third Reich. Temple 
University Press, 2001. 
 354 
Shakespeare, William. Romeo and Juliet. Penguin Classics, 2015. 
Short, Robert S. “The Politics of Surrealism, 1920-36.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 1, 
no. 2, 1966, pp. 3–25. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/259920. Accessed 17 April 
2017. 
Sims, Calvin. “Argentine Tells of Dumping ‘Dirty War’ Captives Into Sea.” New York Times, 
13 March 1995. www.nytimes.com/1995/03/13/world/argentine-tells-of-
dumping-dirty-war-captives-into-sea.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed 3 December 
2017. 
Smith, Robert Metcalf. “Three Interpretations of ‘Romeo and Juliet.’” The Shakespeare 
Association Bulletin, vol. 23, no. 2, 1948, pp. 59–77. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/ 
23675399. Accessed 2 February 2018. 
Sontag, Susan. On Photography. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977. 
Soriano, Osvaldo. A Funny Little Dirty War. Translated by Nick Caistor, Readers 
International, 1986. 
---------. Winter Quarters. Translated by Nick Caistor, Readers International, 1989. 
Speck, Paula K. “The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities.” University 
of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1987, pp. 491-534. 
www.repository.law. miami.edu/umialr/vol18/iss3/3. Accessed 13 February 2018. 
Standish, Peter. Understanding Julio Cortázar. University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 
Starr, Jimmy. Barefoot on Barbed Wire: An Autobiography of a Forty-year Hollywood Balancing Act .  
Scarecrow Press, 2001 . 
Steinman, Ian. “When Ford Built a Torture Chamber,” Jacobin Magazine, 23 February 2018. 
www.jacobinmag.com/2018/02/ford-factory-argentina-videla-mauricio-macri. 
Accessed 1 March 2018. 
 355 
Stephenson, Roger H. Studies in Weimar Classicism: Writing as Symbolic Form. Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2010. 
Stites Mor, Jessica. Transition Cinema: Filmmaking and the Argentine Left Since 1968. University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2012. 
Storey, Mark. “Meister Böll.” Fortnight, no. 61, 1973, p. 16. 
Tasker, John Paul. “Conservative senator defends ‘well-intentioned residential school 
system.” CBC News, 9 March 2017. www.cbc.ca/news/politics/residential-school-
system-well-intentioned-conservative-senator-1.4015115. Accessed 14 April 2017. 
Taylor, Telford. The Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials 
Under Control Council Law No. 10. US Government Printing Office, 1949. 
Tedesco, Laura. “The Argentine Armed Forces under President Alfonsín.” European Review of 
Latin American and Caribbean Studies, No. 61, 1996, pp.21-37. 
Teitel, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford University Press, 2002. 
The Murderers Are Among Us (“Die Mörder sind unter uns”). Directed by Wolfgang Staudte, 
performances by Ernst Wilhelm Borchert, Hildegard Knef, and Arno Paulsen, 
Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft, 1946. 
Thorburn, Carolyn C. Myth And Symbol In The Novels Of Ernesto Sabato, Rutgers The State 
University of New Jersey-New Brunswick, 1972. ProQuest, 
www.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/30
2700893?accountid=15182. Accessed 3 January 2018. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. “The Morality of the Historian.” Translated by Lucy Golsan, South Central 
Review, vol. 15, no. 3/4, 1998, pp. 6–15. 
Tóibín, Colm. Introduction. The Tunnel, by Ernesto Sábato, translated by Margaret Sayers 
Peden, Penguin Modern Classics, 2011, pp. v-ix. 
 356 
Trevor-Roper, H.R. “Portrait of the Real Nazi Criminal: Albert Speer’s Philosophy, the 
Philosophy of So Many Germans, Made Nazism Possible.” New York Times, 29 
February 1948, p. SM7. 
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Proceedings, 14 November 
1945–1 October 1946, Vol. 2. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 
(Military Legal Resources), Nuremberg, 1947. 
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-II.pdf. Accessed 1 December 
2016. 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: 
Summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation of Canada, 2015. 
---------. What We Have Learned: Principles of Truth and Reconciliation, 2015. 
---------. The Survivors Speak: A Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015. 
---------. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action, 2015. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, Part 1 Origins to 1939: The Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Volume 1., 2015. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, Part 2: 1939 to 2000: The Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Volume 1., 2015. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: The Inuit and Northern Experience: The Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Volume 2, 2015. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: The Métis Experience: The Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada Volume 3, 2016. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: Missing Children and Unmarked Burials: The Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Volume 4, 2016. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: The Legacy: The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
 357 
Commission of Canada Volume 5, 2015. 
---------. Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation: The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada Volume 6, 2015. 
Tüngel, Richard. “Nuremberg Law.” Die Zeit, 22 January 1948. Translated by Thomas 
Dunlap, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. 
www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Denazification%205%20ENG.pdf. 
Accessed 27 November 2016. 
United Nations Security Council. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary General, 3 August 2004. www.un.org/ 
  ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-rule-of-law-and-transitional-justice-in-conflict-and-
post-conflict-societies-report-of-the-secretary-general/. Accessed 4 November 
2015. 
Updike, John. “The Great Paraguayan Novel and Other Hardships.” Odd Jobs: Essays and 
Criticism. Knopf, 1991. 
Urbina, Nicasio. “The Meaning of Genre: A Semiotic Study of Sábato’s Essays and Novels.” 
Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1987. UMI, 1988. 
Valenzuela, Luisa. The Lizard’s Tail: A Novel. Translated by Gregory Rabassa, Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 1983. 
---------. He Who Searches. Translated by Helen Lane, Dalkey Archive Press, 1988. 
Van Delden, Maarten “Ernesto Sabato, Author of ‘Death and the Compass’.” Short Story 
Criticism, edited by Lawrence J. Trudeau, vol. 187, 2014, pp. 44-50. 
Verbitsky, Horatio. Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior. New Press, 2005. 
Vernon, Kathleen M. “Cortázar's 3 R's: Reading, Rhetoric and Revolution in ‘Libro De 
Manuel’.” Modern Language Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1986, pp. 264-70. 
 358 
Von Tunselmann, Alex. “Judgment at Nuremberg – Poetic Justice for Holocaust 
Perpetrators.” The Guardian, 13 January 2001. www.theguardian.com/film/ 
  filmblog/2013/jan/30/judgment-at-nuremberg-reel-history. Accessed 26 
November 2016. 
Vowel, Chelsea. “Why Every Canadian Should Watch Rhymes for Young Ghouls.” CBC News, 
23 July 2014. www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/why-every-canadian-should-watch-
rhymes-for-young-ghouls-1.2687357. Accessed 2 January 2017. 
Wagamese, Richard. One Story, One Song. Douglas & Mcintyre, 2010. 
Walser, Martin. “Our Auschwitz.” The Burden of the Past: Martin Walser on Modern German 
Identity (Texts, Contexts, Commentary). Edited by Thomas A Kovach and Martin 
Walser. Camden House, 2008. 
Walsh, Rodolfo. Operation Massacre. Translated by Daniella Gitlin, Seven Stories Press, 2013. 
---------. “Open Letter From a Writer to the Military Junta.” Operation Massacre, by Rodolfo 
Walsh, Seven Stories Press, 2013, pp. 197–207. 
Webster, David. “History, Nation and Narrative in East Timor’s Truth Commission 
Report.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 4, 2007, pp. 581–591. 
Weiss, Peter. “The Investigation: Oratorio in 11 Cantos.” The German Library, Volume 92, 
edited by Robert Cohen, translated by Geoffrey Skelton and Daniel Thielson, 
Continuum Publishing, 1998. 
White, Hayden. The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987. 
Windham, Scott Allen. “The Trials of Representation: Critical and Aesthetic Reflections of 
Holocaust Perpetrator Trials, 1960-1965.” Dissertation, the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2002. 
 359 
Wolfgram, Mark A. Getting History Right: East and West German Collective Memories of the 
Holocaust and War. Bucknell University Press, 2013. 
Yar, Majid. The Cultural Imaginary of the Internet: Virtual Utopias and Dystopias. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014. 
Young, Sandra. “Narrative and Healing in the Hearings of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.” Biography, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2004, pp. 145–162. 
Zalaquett, José. “Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former 
Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints.” Transitional Justice, 
edited by Neil J. Kritz, the United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995, pp. 3-31. 
